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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the practices of knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
carried out in four foreign invested firms and their impacts on firms’ 
competitiveness in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry. The weakness in the literature on multinational corporations’ 
(MNCs) knowledge transfer, in particular to transitional markets, is analysed by 
examining: the categorisation of types of the transferred knowledge; the modes and 
routes of transferring knowledge within these MNCs, the process of utilising the 
transferred knowledge in the recipients based on organisational learning, and the key 
factors in affecting knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the Chinese 
market.
Based on our investigations in these firms, it reveals that the transferred knowledge 
includes not only technology and management skills as commonly known, but also 
social knowledge that helps to shape the vision and atmosphere of the affiliates 
established in the new market. Knowledge transfer and utilisation has been carried 
out based on a complicated process of organisation learning, which is essential to 
embedding the transferred knowledge and building up capabilities in the recipient 
firms in the Chinese market. Individual stages of the organisational learning process, 
and key factors associated with this process, are discussed, which leads to the 
understanding of the success of the capability development in these firms in the
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characteristic host market. As a further development, this thesis also examines the 
secondary knowledge transfers from the four firms to their own subsidiaries, also 
located in China, and the reverse learning by their parents, which follow as a result 
of successful knowledge utilisation and development in these four firms themselves.
The extension of MNCs’ firm specific advantages into China is based on a three-tier 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning process, where the tiers are (1) 
foreign parents; (2) the four foreign invested firms; (3) their own affiliates and 
component suppliers in the Chinese market. This represents a new contribution to 
understanding within the international business literature on generating 
competitiveness in the transitional markets. The implication is that knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning serves as the key to MNCs’ development in 
transitional markets, particularly in high-tech industries where the indigenous firms 
lag far behind in terms of technology and management.
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Complete Knock Down, means that all or most of the components of 
certain product, are transported from the supplier, usually the parent 
firm in the case of technology transfer within MNCs, to the recipient 
for reassembling. As these components are not even partly assembled, 
it is easy to transport them.
Semi-Knock Down, means that some of the components of certain 
products are partly assembled, and are transported to the recipient in 
bigger packages for further reassembling. As such, these partly 
assembled components are not so easy to transport.
Beijing Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd 
Acronym of Build-Operate-Transfer. It is a special form of export of 
both products (i.e., hardware, such as equipment, components, etc.) 
and services (i.e., software, such as know-how, training, etc.)
Code Division Multiple Access technology 
Customised Large Scale Integration 
Digital Signalling System Number 1 
Group Special Mobile or Global System Mobile.
Intelligent Network 
Intelligent Network Access Protocol 
Integrated Service Digital Network 
Kilo Lines
Material Management System 
North East Asia Telecom Co. Ltd 
Printed circuit Board Manufacturing 
Printed Circuit Board 
Piece Parts Manufacturing 
Pearl River Telecom Equipment Co. Ltd 
Shanghai Alcatel Kang Hua Cable 
Shanghai Bell Alcatel Mobile Co. Ltd 
Shanghai Bell Belgium 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy 
Surface Mounted Device 
Small Stand Alone (exchange)
Tianjin Economic and Technology Development Area 




After two decades of economic reform, China is now regarded as a lucrative target 
for international business enterprises and for international business researchers alike. 
Since the end of the 1970s, foreign direct investment (FDI)1 has been strategically 
utilised by the Chinese government as tool for spurring economic development, 
whilst China's debt-burdened state-owned enterprises are plunged into crisis. Second 
only to the USA in terms of FDI inflow since 1993, China is quickly emerging as 
one of the most important investment sites around the world. The accumulated 
actual utilised foreign capital in China, from 1979 to 1995, amounted to 250 billion 
US dollars, of which 115 billion US dollars accounted for foreign loans, and 135 
billion US dollars, foreign direct investment (Zhang, 1996). In the year of 1996, the 
amount approached 50 billion US dollars, of which more than 40 billion US dollars 
is FDI, enabling China to continuously occupy the first place among the developing 
countries. The years 1997 and 1998 have witnessed similar volumes of FDI entering 
the Chinese market, registering 48.3 billion and 45.6 billion US dollars respectively
1 Foreign direct investment is measured as the financial value of an investing firm's interest in a 
foreign affiliate. A foreign direct investment exists when at least ten per cent of an affiliate's voting 
stock is held by a foreign parent firm. Foreign direct investment is the hallmark of a multinational 
enterprise, and indicates the desire to exercise effective control in the management of a foreign 
affiliate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1977; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 1992)
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(FT, 1999). As a result of the tremendous FDI inflow, China’s foreign exchange 
reserves are among the highest in the world and have surpassed 150 billion US 
dollars at the end of August, 1999 (FT, 1999).
Along with the huge FDI inflow to China, hundreds of thousands of advanced 
technologies and patents have been transferred, managerial expertise offered, and 
international practices introduced. Knowledge transfer and utilisation has played an 
essential role in continuously promoting China's economic efficiency and, as a 
result, increasing its share in world markets, based on the strengthening of China's 
industry competitiveness. However, the practice of managing knowledge transfer 
through FDI into the Chinese market remains far from clear (Strange, Kamall and 
Tan, 1998). In particular, no research has been conducted to date on the process of 
carrying out knowledge transfer and organisational learning by affiliates of 
multinational companies (MNCs), to achieve competitiveness in this transitional 
market. In order to shed light on this subject, this research will investigate the 
knowledge transfer practices of multinational firms entering into the 
telecommunications and automotive markets in the People's Republic of China.
1.2 Rationale of the study
World markets are increasingly open to multinational corporations (MNCs). Foreign 
direct investment in a market is the most risky form of entry because it carries the 
highest capital risk (Buckley and Ghauri, 1993), especially in the very beginning. 
The ability to create, develop, protect and transfer knowledge within a worldwide
11
network will be the key basis for competitive strength as cheap labour loses its allure 
for investors (FT, 1998a). The literature on international business elaborates on the 
imperative of carrying out knowledge transfer within the process of 
internationalisation. This is in part a response to the cultural and economic barriers 
of new markets and intense external competition. Knowledge transfer by MNCs is 
the essence of developing firm specific advantages, and therefore is central to 
building up corporate competitiveness, protecting and further increasing MNCs' 
market share in host countries.
The global telecommunications industry and automotive industry are in the process 
of restructuring after decades of intense competition. A promising opportunity is 
now available to MNCs to compete worldwide in both mature and newly established 
markets. China is now the greatest potential telecommunications market in the 
world. It starts with a low telephone density per 100 persons in the population (a 
teledensity of 4 per cent in 1994) and has an ambitious development target. The 
Ministry of Post & Telecommunications of China plans to double the number of 
lines to 170 million during its 9th Five-Year plan (1996-2000). Based on exponential 
rate of growth (45% during 1991-1995. Engardio, et al, 1996), this will represent a 
total investment of 58 billion US dollars. FDI has been a major vehicle for searching 
market share in China since 1978. A Chinese official investigation (Wu, 1995: 11) 
shows that “more than 40 telecommunications equipment production enterprises 
funded jointly by enterprises attached to the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications and overseas businesses” have been established up to 1995. 
Most of world telecommunications producers, such as Northern Telecom Limited of
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Canada, Nokia of Finland, Alcatel Alsthom of France, Siemens of Germany, NEC 
and Fujitsu of Japan, Philips Communication Systems of Netherlands, Ericsson of 
Sweden, GPT of UK, Motorola of US, are involved in the Chinese market. A very 
similar picture can be found in China’s automobile industry, which also experienced 
rapid expansion in the past decade. Again major car producers of the world, e.g., 
Volkswagen (VW), General Motors (GM), Chrysler, Citron, and Honda, all have 
poured resources into the Chinese market. In exchange for market access, China 
expects companies to produce locally and transfer know-how in a full range of 
sectors (Engardio, et al, 1996: 21). In the last eighteen years, the Chinese 
government’s strategy for developing the telecommunications equipment industry 
and automotive industry has met with considerable success (Andersen Consulting, 
1997; Wu, 1995). This strategy has relied upon FDI from major international firms 
competing with each other as producers in the Chinese market. The overall 
competitiveness of China's telecommunications manufacturing industry, as well as 
its automotive industry, has improved tremendously. It is evident that knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning has been crucial, and FDI has been fundamental 
to what has been achieved.
1.3 Objective of the research
The overall objective of this research is to make an empirical and theoretical 
contribution to our understanding of the knowledge transfer practices within MNCs 
and their implications for the general competitiveness of affiliate firms in the 
transitional markets. This research intends, based on case study methodology, to
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provide a detailed analysis of the process of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning carried out by MNCs in the Chinese market. Based on existing theoretical 
frameworks (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Doz, 1980; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991; Hedlund and Riddertrale, 1994; Inkpen, 1995a and 1995b; 
Kogut and Zander, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Porter, 1990; Sohn, 1994), this research intends to analyse the process of MNCs’ 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning, by which foreign subsidiaries 
develop from “fresh” entrants to becoming competitive players in China’s 
telecommunications equipment market and automotive market. In doing so, the 
following questions will be addressed: What knowledge has been transferred by the 
MNCs into the Chinese market? How has the knowledge been transferred? How has 
the transferred knowledge been utilised? And, what is the impact of the Chinese 
business environment on MNCs’ knowledge transfer?
1.4 Significance of the research
The significance of the proposed research lies in the fact that:
(1) The subject of knowledge transfer has until recently received little attention in 
international business academic circles. Furthermore, the role of FDI in transferring 
knowledge to firms located in economies in transition has not been adequately 
addressed (though Clegg, Kamall and Tan (2000), have attempted this for Matav in 
Hungary). This topic is assuming greater importance as more countries embrace 
economic liberalisation and open their doors to foreign investment as a means to
14
upgrading their economies. The present study addresses the literature weaknesses on 
MNCs’ knowledge transfer by exploring the following issues: the categorisation of 
the transferred knowledge; the management of knowledge transfer and the utilisation 
of the transferred knowledge through a deliberate process of organisational learning 
in the recipient firm. Each of these topics is developed in the context of transition 
economies, in an attempt to take a step forward from the literature dominated by 
research on developed countries.
(2) MNCs have always been puzzled by the question of how to cope with the 
distinctive Chinese market (Child and Lu, 1996). There is no doubt that China has 
progressed significantly towards achieving a market economy (Chang and Nolan, 
1996). However, the Chinese market remains distinct from western markets 
politically, economically as well as culturally. FDI in China presents many 
challenges to western business practice as well as to our current modelling of FDI 
strategy and its implementation. First and foremost, key issues concern how to cope 
with the highly distinctive institutional and cultural characteristics of the host 
country. In essence, knowledge transfer concerns not simply the transfer of scientific 
technology, but also other types of knowledge that are essential for success in the 
Chinese market. This study concerns how firms have managed this process. In doing 
so, it draws on, and refers heavily to, the mainstream international business literature 
and that on the management of knowledge transfer and organisational learning. This 
research, therefore, presents an opportunity to test the validity of the existing 
literature on penetrating transitional markets by MNCs based on knowledge transfer.
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(3) The world telecommunications services market is in the process of liberalising. 
As one of the industries supplying established and new entrant operators, the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry is experiencing intense international 
competition. For its part, the world automotive industry is also undergoing 
restructuring. The emerging markets are becoming the final battlefield for the 
survival of MNCs in an over-supplied industry. MNCs in these two industries are 
experiencing conditions of change for both demand and supply-related reasons. As 
intermediate and final product markets become more globalised (less segmented into 
national or regional markets), knowledge transfer and organisational learning inside 
MNCs is seen as a crucial step to maintain and enhance their competitive advantages 
in newly opening markets.
In summary, this study intends to examine the process of managing knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning, within MNCs, in the context of coping with the 
distinctive Chinese market. It aims to extend our understanding of the management 
of knowledge transfer into a distinctive transitional economy within the general 
framework of international business.
1.5 The research process
In order to achieve the aim set out above, a multiple-case study design, based on 
cross comparative analysis, was chosen. This approach is used to carry out a 
detailed, but also relatively comprehensive, investigation of the knowledge transfer 
process of MNCs in both the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry
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and automotive industry. As described by Yin (1994: 44), multiple-case design 
contains more than one single case of analysis in the same investigation, and thereby 
permits a comparison across cases. The evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being 
more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983). Research findings resulting from such 
research are considered much solid in respect of validity, and much more reliable in 
the context of future applications.
This research relies on multiple sources of evidence gathered in several stages. The 
main sources of data include: (1) publicly available data, including company annual 
reports and press articles; (2) firms’ internal documents (when available), such as 
newsletters, strategic plan reports and evaluation report, many of which were 
confidential; (3) data collected from the nearly thirty face-to-face interviews 
conducted in three field trips (two to China and one to Belgium). These data 
complement each other and also permit verification of factual material, therefore 
increasing confidence in the data.
The whole research can be divided into three phases. In Phase One, great efforts 
were made to investigate the relevant literature up to date, to identify the research 
objectives of this study, and to assimilate the secondary data available on the chosen 
industries. Once we had developed an understanding of the milestones in the 
evolution of MNCs’ operations in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing 
and automotive industries, a list of 39 firms were selected and contacted to seek 
access in order to carry out case study research. In Phase Two, 9 firms deemed to be
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suitable for this research were visited and a mixture of open-ended and semi­
structured in-depth interviews were carried out to fill in the gaps found in the 
previous investigation. This deepened our understanding of MNCs’ knowledge 
transfer process in the two industries in China, and enabled comparison of the 
differences between the knowledge transfer practices among these firms. Based on 
the results of the first fieldwork, 4 firms (two in the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and two in the automotive industry; geographically, two 
from Europe and two from North America) were identified as the case subjects for 
further research. At this point, a second round of in-depth interviews was launched 
in these firms in China, based on the refined questionnaires developed through the 
previous fieldwork, to collect the data required for this project, including one 
research visit to Belgium. Finally, in Phase Three, all the data collected and reports 
drawn in the second phase were reassessed in line with the criteria and procedures 
set for qualitative research in general (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990), and case study methodology in particular (Yin, 1994), to identify factors 
contributing to the successful and unsuccessful execution of knowledge transfer. 
Then, cross-case conclusions were reached based on the analysis and research 
finding from Phase Two. This research procedure is designed to accord with the 
guidelines for qualitative research and good practice in case study methodology. The 
aim is to place the research on a solid base in terms of validity and reliability.
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1.6 The organisation of this thesis
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. After outlining the research objectives and 
rationale in this chapter, Chapter 2 overviews the relevant mainstream literature on 
the theory of international business, knowledge transfer and organisational learning. 
This chapter combines these literature to produce an analytical framework for our 
examination of the issues on the research subject in the context of MNCs’ 
investment in the Chinese market. Chapter 2 also presents the research questions 
intended to guide this study towards achieving the objectives set out at the 
beginning. Chapter 3 reviews the historical development of FDI in China with an 
emphasis on its policy aspects. This presents the general background of FDI in 
China, against which this research has been carried out. Chapter 3 also presents the 
two chosen industries of this investigation: China’s telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and the automotive industry. Chapter 4 follows on by 
narrowing the focus down to the particular level of the four firms included in this 
study. Chapter 5 explains the methodology chosen and the research process adopted, 
to achieve the goal of the soundness in the research, in line with the requirements for 
empirical studies in international business. The next two chapters present the 
findings of this research. Chapter 6 focuses on issues relating to the typology of the 
transferred knowledge and the approaches to transferring them; Chapter 7 analyses 
the process of organisational learning, revealing the key factors found in the above 
process, examining the impact of the Chinese business environment on the practices 
of knowledge transfer by MNCs, and the contribution of knowledge transfer and 
organisation learning on firms’ competitiveness in the Chinese market. Chapter 8
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then evaluates the entire research results against the objectives set out before, the 
managerial implications of these findings, and provides some recommendations for 
future research.
1.7 Summary
The overall objective of this research is to make an empirical and theoretical 
contribution to our understanding of the process of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning within MNCs with affiliates in China based on case research. 
Implications for competitiveness are also explored. This chapter has outlined the 
rationale of this research and the process by which the research objective has been 
achieved. It has also introduced the organisation of the whole thesis. This study can 
be seen as a test of the relevance of existing academic tools to examining the process 
of transferring MNC’s firm specific advantages to transitional markets. The study of 
globalisation in international business research, and the assimilation of transitional 
economies into the global economy, mean that this case research on the experiences 
of several MNCs in China is a timely enquiry. It represents a new effort of tackling 
the issues on establishing firm competitiveness in transitional economies that is at 
the core of international business study in the 1990s.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The topic of knowledge transfer arising from FDI has received little attention in the 
academic literature on international business. In the main, the literature has preferred 
to concentrate on the benefits of FDI that can be ascribed to formal resource 
transfers, especially those involving scientific technology. For many years this 
emphasis appeared to be justified when studying FDI into the less developed 
countries2 where the main issue was always seen to be an absence of national 
technological capacity in basic industries. The issue of the transfer of skills was a 
separate subject within the preserve of organisational studies and the human resource 
literature.
The majority of existing research is pitched at the level of broad macro policy, and is 
overwhelmingly economics or political science-based. However, in practice, the 
international private sector is already generating radical change in eastern and central 
European countries in the first half of the 1990s and, now, in China. Of all the 
private sector agents of change, it is foreign direct investors who exert, and who will 
exert, the most immediate and tangible impact on corporate performance in the
2 Such studies constitute the bulk of existing research on the transfer of technology.
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emerging markets and economic upgrading through the transfer of knowledge and 
organisational learning. However, too little is known about the process.
The intellectual challenge to this lacuna in the literature has come from the 
worldwide trend towards market liberalisation, and from the widespread ascendancy 
of economic policies based on market economics over that of state monopoly and 
central planning. The liberalising Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
and China have become test beds for the use of FDI to transfer skills to economies in 
transition. It can be argued that the rate of transfer of technological, managerial and 
organisational skills, is the binding constraint for the upgrading of economies. For 
these countries, their economic target is to attain comparable national outputs and 
economic structures to those in the developed market economies. Knowledge 
transfer and utilisation carried out by FDI is crucial to these ambitions.
There are two leading objectives in this chapter. The first is to reappraise knowledge 
transfer and to link it specifically to the act of foreign direct investment. The second 
is to derive an analytical framework on examining knowledge transfer by FDI to 
transition economies from this appraisal, which will be employed in the case studies 
of foreign invested firms in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry 
and automotive industry.
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2.2 Knowledge transfer and international business
2.21 A definition of knowledge, knowledge transfer and organisational learning
In the context of management research, the term knowledge is used with a different 
meaning from information. Information is organised data: data relating to the current 
or past state of some business activities that have been collected, filtered and 
organised according to some set of rules. Knowledge refers to the tacit or explicit 
understanding in a firm about the relationships between phenomena, structured in a 
more or less scientific manner (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993: 121). It is embodied in 
routines for the performance of business operations (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 99), 
in organisational structures and processes, and in embedded beliefs and behaviours. 
Knowledge implies an ability to relate inputs to outputs, to observe regularities in 
information, to codify, explain and, ultimately, to predict. As Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995: 8) assert, knowledge differs from information in being concerned with 
beliefs, commitment to a purpose, and with actions and meaning.
Knowledge transfer refers to knowledge communicated from one agent to another, 
such as from one individual to another, or from a group to an entire organisation 
(Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993: 123). It may happen within or between firms across 
national borders, but it could equally be between different institutions in the same 
country (Dunning, 1993: 289). In this study, we focus (but not exclusively) on 
knowledge transfer as intra-firm knowledge communication and exchange, i.e.,
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knowledge communicated from one part of a multinational corporation to the other 
part of the same firm.
The concept of organisational learning refers to the development of skills, 
knowledge, and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, 
and future actions (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). After the seminal work by Cyert and 
March (1963), organisational learning has been given lots of attention in the strategy 
literature (e.g., Ghoshal, 1987; Huber, 1991; Lall, 1980; Lyles, 1988). In fact 
organisation itself can be viewed as a learning system (Nevis, Di Bella, and Gould, 
1995). The development of firm skills through a learning process involves the 
interpretation of past experiences and strategy choices as a basis for present and 
future actions (Porter, 1991). The knowledge generated through learning supports a 
firm’s ability to understand the consequences of past actions and respond to 
environmental stimuli. Thus, effective learning results in an enhancement of an 
organisation’s skills and capabilities (Levinthal, 1991).
2.22 Knowledge transfer and international business
In the context of international business, knowledge is not a new concept . On the 
contrary, it has long been identified as a key part of the firm’s comparative 
advantages in doing business in foreign markets. Stephen Hymer made the founding 
contribution to what has become known as the Industrial Organisation Approach
3 The closest approximation to an intellectual link between the conventional economics-based 
literature on technology transfer and that on knowledge transfer is to be found in the writings of 
researchers on the economics of international transactions. For instance, Hennart (1988) proposed that 
the tacit component of technology is transferred more efficiently if the transferor and the recipient are 
under common ownership.
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(Dunning, 1993). His identification of the international firm as a firm that 
“internalises or supersedes the market” (Hymer, 1960; 1976: 48) provided a useful 
prologue to the theory of internalisation as a means for transferring knowledge, 
business techniques and skilled personnel (Hymer, 1960; 1976: 69). Hymer realised 
that firms must possess4 some kind of innovatory, cost, financial or marketing 
advantages that are sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages faced when competing 
with indigenous firms abroad via local production. The incoming MNC lacks local 
market knowledge, which puts it at a disadvantage compared with local firms. 
However, foreign direct investment involves the transfer of a package of resources5 
(technology, management skills, entrepreneurship, and so on), and not merely 
financial capital. It is the transfer of firms’ ownership advantages in these inputs that 
enables their subsidiaries to be competitive in foreign markets.
In effect this approach, initiated by Hymer (1960; 1976) and promoted by 
Kindleberger (1969), sees the foreign MNC compensating for local disadvantages 
through the transference of firm-specific advantages, that allowed it to cross- 
subsidise foreign production, and to be competitive in the first instance. Empirical 
research by Dunning (19586), which strongly influenced Hymer, had already 
identified the tendency of US multinationals to invest in the UK in technology and 
capital-intensive industries. Later, formal cross-sectional statistical research dating 
from the early 1970s (e.g., Caves, 1971) initiated a large body of empirical literature
4 With some degree of monopoly. Accordingly, these were referred to as ‘monopolistic advantages’.
5 An illustrative list would be: patents, technical know-how, financial resources, access to (and 
knowledge on how to build up) skilled professional and managerial personnel and teams, marketing 
and distribution systems.
6 The revised and updated edition of this classic research (Dunning, 1998) demonstrates that the basic 
thesis of the study remains valid forty years later.
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that reconfirmed Dunning’s observations and Hymer’s theory using different 
datasets, though still dominated by US data. Hymer’s original definition of the 
transferred resources within MNCs is much wider than that of scientific technology. 
However, until the 1980s, it was technology that became the undisputed focus of 
research.
In 1968 Harry Johnson (Johnson, 1968) noted that there were four means for the 
international transfer of production, each of which is based on the transfer of 
knowledge: (1) Imitation abroad; (2) The oligopolistic product life cycle, where 
direct investment prevents foreign competition (i.e., where FDI is employed to 
reduce oligopoly interaction) (Vernon, 1966; 1971); (3) The sale or lease of 
technology; (4) Where knowledge becomes a free good through embodiment in 
standard machinery. This early classification presages the different academic 
approaches to the transfer of knowledge, and stresses that the routes of knowledge 
transfer exert on firms.
In Vernon’s product cycle model (PCM), the transfer of knowledge within MNCs 
also played an important role. Vernon (1966) argued that, due to the structure and 
pattern of US factor endowments and markets, US firms accumulated a kind of 
competitive or ownership advantages, in particular their capacity to innovate new 
products and processes which were unmatched by firms of other countries. 
Gradually, as a given generation of the products of US firms become standardised or 
mature, the competitive advantages of producing firms change from those to do with 
the uniqueness of the product per se, to their ability to minimise the costs of value-
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adding activities and their marketing expertise. As demand becomes more price 
elastic at home, the need to cut costs to maintain price competitiveness increases. 
Rising real labour costs in the USA encourage US firms to relocate production 
abroad, both to mitigate production costs and to service expanding foreign markets. 
The marketing competence spawns the technology advantage of US firms in their 
home market, and the maintenance of international competitiveness relies on the 
effectiveness of transferring these resources across borders to engage in foreign 
production.
Hymer’s approach did not develop an explicit theory of how firm’s ownership 
advantages are generated (Clegg, 1987: 15), and Vernon’s theory is a very much 
descriptive account of US foreign direct investment and trade in the 1950s and 1960s 
(ibid., p. 24). However, internalisation theory has provided a powerful explanation 
of the generation of multinational enterprises based on the creation and utilisation of 
knowledge inside firms across borders (Buckley and Casson, 1976: 33). The 
internalisation theory approach is distinguished from the Industrial Organisation 
Approach partially by its emphasis on the creation of knowledge within firms 
through long-term research and development (Clegg, 1987: 20). Widespread 
imperfections in external markets (at the levels of the industry, country and firm) 
mean that there is no perfect external market available for realising the maximum 
benefits from privately created knowledge. Subject to the normal marginal 
conditions for choosing between the alternatives of external versus internal market, 
internalisation by the firm across national boundaries often materialises as the
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rational choice, thereby creating (or extending) a multinational enterprise (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; 1985).
Internalisation is usually, to some extent, a process of knowledge transfer and 
utilisation within firms across national boundaries . Internalised flows of knowledge 
within MNCs are clearly of great importance in accounting for overseas production, 
and for the fact that MNCs can usually outperform indigenous competitors. 
Multinationals’ superior performance rests on their capability to obtain inputs, which 
consist of proprietary knowledge (the output of past research and development), 
marketing know-how (arising from an international or world-wide intelligence 
system) and financial, management and production experience. These may simply 
not be available in external markets, or not be available on such favourable terms 
{ibid., p. 49). It is fair to say that internalisation theory is the underpinning of our 
following analysis on knowledge transfer and utilisation within MNCs, although the 
theory is not itself explicit on the process of internalising the market for knowledge 
itself. Equally, it is true that “The production of knowledge [through research and 
development] is a lengthy process which requires careful synchronisation with other 
activities within the firm” (Buckley and Casson, 1993: 48). However, it is not the 
aim of this research to look at the far wider issue of the production of new 
knowledge, even though this cannot be fully divorced from the transfer of 
knowledge.
7 While the transfer of a monopolistic advantage may not be necessary for an internalised market to be 
created, at the very least a flow of information will be involved.
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Some dynamic perspective on the process of the international internalisation of 
knowledge markets is afforded by the behavioural literature. This body of research,
o
exemplified by the Nordic School , argues that each initial expenditure in a new host 
has an element that can be re-used in other markets. The behavioural, or stages, 
approach suggests that internationalisation, and ultimately FDI, is the result of the 
accretion of firm-specific knowledge in the form of specialised experience. 
Accordingly, lessons from one market can be transferred to other markets. During 
internationalisation some portion of expenditures incurred in the internalisation of 
markets will represent investments. To this extent the knowledge created is an 
investment that can be re-applied. Davidson and McFetridge (1984; 1985) translate 
this into a dynamic transactional view of the firm finding that the propensity towards 
the internalisation of technology transfer abroad by US MNCs varies both with 
product and positively with previous experience of internal transfers. There is 
therefore an acceleration in the internationalisation of the firm, and in intra-firm 
transfers between affiliates. It is possible to conclude that the behaviour of the firm 
will change after initial internationalisation in step with the progressive significance 
of firm economies.
John Dunning has made a more explicit contribution to understanding the 
importance of knowledge in the context of firm’s advantages in international 
operations, especially in the context of FDI by MNCs. The eclectic theory or 
paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 1993) is built principally on the Industrial Organisation 
Approach, international economics, and the theory of the firm (internalisation
8 The behavioural approach to internationalisation is associated particularly with researchers at the 
University of Uppsala, and in the Nordic countries.
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theory)9. Within this framework, Dunning has emphasised that in order to explain 
FDI a number of necessary conditions must be satisfied, none of which on their own 
are sufficient. Firstly, the investing firm must have some ownership-specific 
advantages over foreign firms. Secondly, a foreign location must have some 
locational advantages over the home location. Thirdly, there must be advantages to 
the internalisation of the market or markets for these advantages, otherwise they, or 
the rights to use them, would be transferred through non-affiliate contracts, e.g., 
licensing and franchising. If all three conditions are satisfied, it follows that FDI 
represents the international transfer of a package of resources to a new location.
The elements of the FDI package normally consist of capital, technology and many 
different types of skills. These intangible assets are the key items in the transfer of 
knowledge within multinational enterprises. According to the eclectic paradigm 
(Dunning, 1993: 77-80), there are two types of ownership specific advantages10. The 
first, denoted as ‘Oa’ advantages, refer to the “assets” possessed by firms, including 
tangible assets, such as natural endowments, manpower and physical capital, and 
intangible assets, such as technology and information, managerial, marketing and 
entrepreneurial skills, organisational systems, financial capital and access to 
intermediate or final goods markets. The second type, denoted as ‘Ot’ advantages, is 
transaction cost minimising advantages. These arise from the ability of a firm to co­
9 The earliest drawing together of these strands occurs in Dunning’s 1973 review article, predating the 
first presentation of the eclectic theory in 1977.
10 The initial definition of ownership advantages is given by Dunning (1977) as capital assets in the 
Fisherian sense, explained by Johnson (1968) as "Anything capable of generating a flow of income" 
{ibid.: 17). In later work, Dunning (1993) distinguishes ownership asset (Oa) advantages and 
ownership transactional (Ot) advantages, with the former corresponding to the Fisherian concept, and 
the latter to the notion of economies of common governance within the firm. However, even Ot 
advantages will be manifest as a capital value, but indirectly in the valuation of the firm.
30
ordinate multiple and geographically dispersed value-adding activities, and to 
capture the gains of risk diversification as a result of the common governance of its 
core “assets”. They are understood to be economies of the firm over the market; 
however, the extent to which firms enjoy these will vary. Unlike Oa advantages, they 
cannot be separated from the firm, and the only way that they can be marketed is 
through the sale of the entire firm to another firm. Other writers similarly concluded 
that advantages are usually conferred on the firm that internalises the transfer of 
knowledge (Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982).
The eclectic theory places “non-codifiable knowledge” into the ‘Oa’ category of 
ownership advantages. This constitutes a ‘bank’ of human capital experience and 
know-how relating to the various functions of the firm (Dunning, 1993: 81). 
Therefore, it is clear the intangible part of ‘Oa’ is actually knowledge itself, while 
‘Ot’ is the gain from internalising and utilising ‘Oa’ internationally, via foreign 
production. Hence, the eclectic paradigm argues that it is not simply the possession 
of technology per se that gives an enterprise an edge over its competitors, but in 
addition the gains that follow from internalising the use of the technology (Dunning, 
1993: 85). It follows that the ability to successfully transfer knowledge and to utilise 
it within a multinational governance structure is at the centre of attaining Ot 
advantages internationally.
Kogut and Zander (1993) note that since Hymer’s (1960; 1976) thesis was 
received11, the central issue in the study of the MNC has been the notion of
11 Especially since it was widely disseminated by Kindleberger (1969).
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monopolistic advantages or, in modem parlance, ownership advantages. The generic 
O-specific advantage of MNCs is their ability to produce, acquire, master the 
understanding of and organise the use of technological assets across national 
boundaries (Dunning, 1993: 290). It is evident that in order to make progress in 
understanding the crucial role of knowledge in FDI, we have to do more than assign 
names for the purpose of theoretical classification, however effectively this is done. 
One way forward is to consider the strategy of the firm, and the role of knowledge in 
achieving this. Contributions such as the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
(Penrose, 1956, 1958; Wemerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992; Foss, 1997)12 suggest that focusing on the resources themselves 
might prove beneficial. The RBV links to transaction cost theory by redesignating 
the governance gains to the firm (the economies of the firm over the market) as 
motives for investing in, or acquiring, an asset. The contribution of the RBV to the 
theory of joint ventures is that it provides a workable model of quasi-integration. It 
shows how firms can increase the returns on their assets through co-operation with 
complementary assets owned by partner firms13.
According to a resource-based view of the MNC, the multinational firm could be 
characterised as a network of flows of three types of resources: capital; materials; 
and knowledge (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). FDI may thus be viewed as a 
process of transferring capital, materials and knowledge in order to realise the 
strategic objectives of the affiliate, and of the parent firm. Parent firms may also
12 The RBV can be dated back to Penrose (1956; 1958), whose contribution was recognised within the 
eclectic paradigm.
13 This point can be related to that on the economies of common governance (Ot) advantages 
identified by Dunning (1993). The RBV sees the firm as strategically acquiring Ot advantages.
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engage in FDI in order to acquire capital, materials, and knowledge from the 
affiliate, i.e., resources are transferred from the affiliate to the parent company14. In 
practice, even though the initial motive may be for a parent either to provide 
knowledge to or acquire knowledge from an affiliate, over time knowledge will flow 
in both directions (Cantwell, 1989; Pearce, 1989; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1994).
Research has shown that over time affiliates can develop their own local capabilities 
(Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995; Makino and Delios, 1996). In the context of China 
and the CEECs, it seems clear that the considerable knowledge gap that exists in 
every respect (e.g., technology, management skills, organisational capabilities) 
between the local affiliate and the parent firms in developed economies implies that 
the production of these local capabilities will be a lengthy process (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 1995).
How best to measure a firm’s competitiveness is controversial. Buckley, Pass and 
Prescott (1992), who are interested primarily in the international aspects of 
competitiveness, argue that ‘competitiveness’ can be measured by indicators in three 
groups (ibid., pp. 17-19): (1) competitive performance; (2) competitive potential; (3) 
management process. The performance of the firm can be assessed by objective 
indicators such as export market share, export dependency, export growth and 
profitability. Performance potential can be evaluated through cost competitiveness, 
productivity, price competitiveness and technology indicators. Performance in
14 These acquisitive motives for FDI are widespread, and are reviewed under the later section on the 
motives for FDI. The desire to acquire capital is rarely reported as an ex ante motive for FDI. 
However statistical work demonstrates that, at least between developed markets, the relative home to 
local cost of capital can influence FDI positions significantly. This occurs via the refinancing of 
affiliate debt to the parent using local funds (Clegg, 1995).
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management processes can be assessed by ownership advantages, commitment to 
international business, marketing aptitude, management relations, closeness to 
customer and economies of scale and scope. Each indicator suffers from at least one 
shortcoming, which is why Buckley, Pass and Prescott {ibid.) recommend using a 
composite approach. The latest research has demonstrated the importance of 
knowledge transfer in improving firm competitiveness in transition economies. For 
example, Hooley, Cox, Shipley and Fahy (1996) found evidence that the transfer and 
utilisation of western management skills accounted for a great improvement in the 
competitive advantages of foreign-invested local firms. This study demonstrates that 
FDI, as it does in the developed markets, also nurture the competence of the newly 
established affiliates in emerging markets.
2.23 The process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning
According to Inkpen (1995b: 55), knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
involves two stages in a JV context. The first stage begins with the formation of the 
JV and partner interactions. The interactions and the managers’ exposure to partner 
knowledge may lead to the recognition of partner skill differences embodied in the 
JV operation. Information acquired from outside the organisation can be used 
strategically only to the extent that it is distributed and interpreted within the 
organisation (Aguilar 1967; Jelinek 1979). Thus, the second learning stage involves 
the integration of information acquired by individual managers into the parent’s 
collective knowledge base. The input for this stage is the recognition and 
interpretation of information associated with skill differences between the partners.
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The two stages are analogous to the innovation diffusion process that also comprises 
the gathering and transmitting of information across organisational boundaries (e.g., 
Tushman 1977; Tushman and Scanlon 1981). Inkpen’s two-stage model generalises 
the complicated process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning in such a 
way that it can only serve as a launch pad for examining the further details of this 
process. More ‘connective tissues’ are needed to enable the detailed exploration of 
the process of organisational learning that is outlined in the second stage of Inkpen’s 
model. The other thing Inkpen failed to acknowledge is that the recognition of 
knowledge difference between the partners may take place prior to the setting up of a 
JV, and the JV is a vehicle to enable the transfer of knowledge from one party to the 
other(s), as the case of JV between GM and Toyota (Keller, 1989).
Hedlund and Nonaka (1993) also examined the process of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning. They proposed a much more detailed process which could 
be expressed as: gaining new knowledge (knowledge transfer) --articulation — 
application — dissemination {ibid., p. 126). This process can be illustrated as a 
sequence of steps as shown in Figure 2-1:
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Figure 2-1: The steps in the utilisation of knowledge
Dissemination
Inkpen’s two-stage model and Hedlund and Nonaka’s four-step model provide a 
foundation for this research to create a framework of examining the issues relating to 
the complicated process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning within, 
and between, firms. As very limited research has been done in respect of the 
knowledge transfer process, this research will integrate the above process models of 
Inkpen (1995b) and Hedlund and Nonaka (1993) into our analysis on the knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning process in the cases chosen in the Chinese 
market. Following the leads given by the two models above, the following literature 
review intends to address the following questions: What type of knowledge has been 
transferred from MNC’s parent to affiliate? How has knowledge been transferred? 
How has the transferred knowledge been assimilated based on a deliberate 
organisational learning process within the recipients?
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2.3 Knowledge transferred by FDI
The shift in the balance of research from the economics-based approach to the 
managerial approach, and from technology to knowledge, has taken place largely 
since the late 1970s. This has accompanied a methodological change, from focusing 
solely on the transfer of MNCs’ resources across national borders, to taking a 
holistic view of the impact on the firm’s competitive advantage, and of the firm’s 
strategy. The most recent studies show that multinationals entering new markets are 
seeking to exploit their competitive advantages by transferring knowledge to the 
subsidiary in order to build its capabilities (e.g., Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995:18; 
Kogut and Zander, 1993: 636).
2.31 The classic motives for FDI
John Dunning (1993:56) identifies four generic categories of motive for FDI: natural 
resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset or capability 
seeking. Different motives have different implications on knowledge transfer.
Natural resource seeking is strongly identified with backward international vertical 
integration in order to secure supplies of commodities. Vertical FDI and intra-firm 
trade are generated as opposed to non-affiliate trade in natural resource products. 
Typically the firms-involved will originate from developed countries, and will own 
or have interests in extensive downstream production or selling activities, or both, 
that invest in less developed countries (Buckley and Clegg, 1991). A broad view of
37
this motive allows it to encompass the securing of the services of “cheap and well 
motivated unskilled or semi-skilled labour” (Dunning, 1993: 57). Technically15, free 
labour cannot be internalised, however the location-specific nature of manpower 
prompts FDI to secure favourable access to labour services.
The implications of this motive for knowledge transfer are that mainly routine 
production technology would be transferred. While it might prove efficient to 
transfer some basic management skills, management and financial arrangements are 
more likely to be conducted by expatriates (who would return to the home country). 
Other things being equal, there would be little incentive to transfer neither 
marketing, nor purchasing and supply knowledge, as these functions will be 
centralised within the parent multinational.
Market seeking is the classic designation for most horizontally integrated 
manufacturing FDI by MNCs originating in developed countries that invest in other 
developed markets. It is encapsulated by the research of Dunning (1958) and Hymer 
(1960; 1976), which centred on US FDI in the UK and in Europe. Industry-specific 
barriers, again in the form of market imperfections, exist to the transfer of firm- 
specific assets. This results in MNCs engaging in a production process that is 
vertically integrated internationally, with the home country specialising in the 
creation of firm-specific assets (e.g., via research and development), which are then 
transferred to the foreign affiliate. This is typically described as horizontal FDI, as 
the affiliate is a replica of the production unit in the home country. The transfer of
15 That is to say legally. The internalisation of labour markets would amount to slavery.
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the firm-specific assets normally confers a degree of monopoly power of the foreign 
affiliate.
Efficiency seeking FDI emerges because of the existence of industry-specific barriers 
to the contractual co-ordination of production between countries. Casson (1991) has 
argued that these barriers are associated with asymmetric information over quality in 
intermediate product and services trade. This motive encompasses a family of 
categories of international vertical integration strategies, whereby FDI is generated 
as opposed to, for example, subcontracting or management contracts. These seek to 
attain optimal scale in vertically separable stages in the production process, exploit 
the mutual dependence of sales between different markets, minimise of transport and 
spatial information costs, and the benefits of economies of scope at the firm level. 
The outcome of these pressures has been the reorganisation and rationalisation of 
existing patterns of FDI based on a country-by-country basis, towards cross-border 
product or process specialisation, or both (Dunning, 1993:59). Information flows to 
co-ordinate production are clearly important between all stages. There are gains to 
the firm from the internal transfer of learning experiences that result from producing 
in different cultures with varying consumer tastes and cultural attributes. Knowledge 
about how to market and how to employ within different cultural groups can be 
crucial for the multinational firm, as the world is populated by various 
geographically dispersed, but to some extent similar, cultural groups.
Strategic asset or capability seeking motive helps to explain the often-perplexing 
cases in international business where a firm with an inferior ownership advantage in
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a key field acquires a firm with a superior advantage. This ‘reverse’ FDI can be 
explained by this motive, and is usually fuelled by the investing firm’s ownership of 
advantages in capital raising. Where a knowledge-based strategic asset is acquired, it 
should be expected that knowledge would flow from the location of the acquired 
asset. In this respect, the acquired knowledge asset would contribute to the MNC 
much in the same way as an absolute advantage under market seeking FDI.
The motives for FDI therefore do contribute fundamentally to the incentive for 
knowledge transfer to the affiliate. However, the position of any particular country 
depends on the balance of motives across the different sectors.
2.32 The characteristics of the transferred knowledge in the context of FDI
From the earlier review of the various knowledge items, it is evident that the 
resources transferred may typically include financial resources as well as knowledge- 
intensive resources, such as patents and formulas, proprietary processes or 
proprietary equipment, and managerial practices. Teece (1981) emphasises that 
knowledge transfer is typically a package, including the tangible embodiment of the 
technology and the associated tacit managerial know-how, which cannot be 
separated if the transfer is to be successful. Kogut and Zander (1993: 626) go further, 
to argue that the essence of FDI is the transfer of the organisational principles, or 
knowledge, of the firm from one country to another. There is therefore, especially in 
the more recent management writings, a consensus on the importance, indeed the
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pre-eminence, of soft technologies. This is in marked contrast with the emphasis in 
the economics-based development literature on hard technologies.
The business literature generally refers to at least three types of technology: product, 
process and management. Management technology is the knowledge used in 
operating a business — the managerial skills that enable a firm to compete by using 
its resources effectively (Groose, 1996: 782). It is true that most of the academic 
literature on the costs and benefits of technology transferred by MNCs to host 
countries has been concerned with the hard technologies of products and production 
processes. From this one might assume that hard technology was the most crucial 
type, certainly in the manufacturing industries. However, Behrman and Wallender 
(1976) and Robinson (1988) consider the full range of technologies that may be 
transferred within manufacturing industries, and found that ‘soft’ technology was the 
key transfer, and that it was highly firm specific in nature. This supports the view 
that the willingness and ability of firms to transfer and adapt soft technology and, in 
particular, organisational structures and work practices (UNCTC, 1990), is of 
leading importance in international business.
In the service sector, much of which employs relatively “soft” technologies 
intensively (Enderwick, 1989) compared with manufacturing, management-related 
and organisational technologies are, understandably, overwhelmingly important. 
According to Groose (1996: 782) the key technologies in the service sector include: 
knowledge of experience in the business; the methodology for producing the service; 
management skills; technical and specialised information; financial skills. This
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broader definition of “technology” is also supported by Lan and Young (1996: 58) 
who similarly list technical knowledge, but also organisational know-how in such 
fields as finance, marketing and management skills. Marton’s (1986) discussion of 
the transfer of industrial technology by transnational firms to less developed 
countries (LDCs) likewise emphasises the ‘soft’ nature of the technology, viz., 
knowledge, skills techniques, and experience.
The ability to transfer technology and management processes may depend on the 
existence of social knowledge. This type of knowledge is not itself directly 
productive and, unlike technology, does not flow only (or primarily) from the parent 
to the affiliate. This type of knowledge is critical for the parent company to 
understand, but not necessarily share, the value or behavioural systems of the 
affiliate in order to harness the affiliate’s non-bureaucratic and social control system.
In the theory of international business, social knowledge76 influences the ability to 
transfer technology, through reducing the transaction costs77, and, hence, direct 
investment flows (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Social knowledge is defined as one’s 
ability to understand and predict others’ general patterns of behaviour (Tolbert: 
1988). It follows that culture issues, as the core of social knowledge, also have a role 
in the transferral of other types of knowledge. According to Hofstede (1980), culture, 
in a broad sense, refers to the social context within which humans live. Culture may 
be regarded as the set of attitudes and values that are common to a group of people,
16 Going under the name ‘region-specific factors’ in Buckley and Casson (1976).
17 Buckley and Casson (1976) hypothesise that the higher is social knowledge between one country 
and another, then the lower will be international transaction costs. Therefore the volume o f FDI will 
be higher. They also argue that social knowledge will, ceteris paribus, favour external markets over 
internal.
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and that affects the ways that individuals perceive and respond to their environment. 
It is a kind of collective “programming of the mind that distinguishes the members 
of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980: 13).
Knowledge may be considered as a mixture of both articulated (or explicit) 
knowledge and unarticulated (or tacit) knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). 
Articulated knowledge is specified either verbally or in writing, e.g., verbal 
instructions, training manuals or computer programmes. It is therefore systematic 
and transferable from wherever it is located in such forms as databases, manuals or 
procedures (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993). In contrast, tacit knowledge is intrusive, 
non-verbalised and unarticulated (Polanyi, 1969; Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993; 
Howells, 1996). It is not formalised, since it depends on individual and collective 
experience, and is rooted in habits and value systems (Quelin, 1998). As a result, 
tacit knowledge is hard to communicate and share (Howells, 1996).
However, tacit and explicit knowledge is thought of as equally important (Polanyi, 
1966), and they both contribute to the development of MNCs. Tacit knowledge 
within organisations is commonly tied to the usage or activation of explicit, or 
codified, knowledge. Accordingly, Quelin (1998) argues that it is important to 
organise personal contact together with the exchanges of information and 
technology, e.g., through co-operative activities. With its reliance on personal 
contact, tacit knowledge will tend to raise the transfer cost of knowledge. However, 
it does offer the opportunity to mitigate the main drawback of articulated knowledge, 
that it is more vulnerable to imitation by competitors.
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It can be argued that all knowledge items are a compound of explicit and implicit 
knowledge, with the balance between implicit and explicit varying on a sliding scale 
for each item. It is evident that scientific technology is more explicit than social 
knowledge, which is the product of cultural, historical and psychological factors by 
their nature resistant to articulation verbally or in writing. However, much 
international management training, and many manuals and guidebooks, represent 
attempts to codify social knowledge in other countries for a business community 
forever more exposed to the need for this knowledge.
According to the extent of articulation, knowledge can be divided into two 
categories: explicit knowledge and implicit (tacit) knowledge, as represented in 
Table 2-1.










Foreign parents can be a vital source of both tacit and explicit knowledge for 
international joint ventures (IJVs) in host markets. The knowledge transferred from 
the foreign parent can be grafted into its affiliates via socialisation and training, in 
conjunction with the transfer of the different types of explicit knowledge to create
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new knowledge that is appropriate to the affiliate (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Lyles and Salk, 1996: 879). It was found that transfers of technical 
know-how occur relatively rapidly at the outset of the IJV, but it took longer for the 
Hungarian IJV managers and employees to absorb and adapt to the administrative 
and managerial skills of their Western parents (Lyles and Salk, 1996: 880). To fulfil 
the transfer of these managerial skills, local managers are required to actively 
participate in their exposure to ideas, concepts and processes over time (Nonaka, 
1994). This active participation is associated with firms that have parents with equal, 
or nearly equal, equity participation (Killing, 1983; Salk, 1992). It is worth noting 
that, in the longer term, the sharing of a common national culture may be less 
important than the tacit knowledge shared in a strong corporate culture. However, 
national differences may strengthen the variety of experience of markets and 
resource inputs that are necessary for knowledge creation.
From the above overview of the literature, it can be said that the transferred 
knowledge is a compound of explicit and implicit knowledge and the types of 
transferred knowledge are composed of technology, management skill and social 
knowledge.
2.33 The characteristics of knowledge transferred at different stages
There are three broad factors determining the nature and medium of knowledge 
transferred at each stage. First is the stock response effect to the existing knowledge 
gap. The skills currently available within the affiliate will determine what types of
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knowledge need to be transferred at different stages and the degree of exigency in 
making the transfers. The second concerns the motives for the acquisition of the
1 Q
affiliate , and the third relates to the predicted requirements of the affiliate as the 
host environment develops.
There will be an optimal rate of transfer, governed by the resources of the parent and 
the learning ability of the affiliate. For example, financial knowledge which would 
be immediately beneficial may be transferred via expatriate movements in order to 
speed up the transfer, while marketing knowledge not instantly required in an as yet 
unsophisticated host market, could be transferred via training over a longer period. It 
follows that the evolution of the affiliate should be considered in different stages 
(Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995). Different types of knowledge will be transferred 
during the various stages of an affiliate’s development, and the means employed will 
reflect the urgency of the transfer.
Initially, it is usual for key technologies and some management skills to be 
transferred from the parent to the affiliate. This is typically followed by the transfer 
of social knowledge which is critical in ensuring that the new affiliate achieves and 
maintains a competitive advantage by fully utilising the transferred knowledge as 
well as creating new knowledge incrementally.
In the case where the affiliate must compete internationally rather that just within its 
domestic market, the development of a global competitive capacity within a broader
18 The effects of the motives for FDI were reviewed earlier.
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perspective must replace narrow parochial attitudes (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986). 
Eventually, the formation of dynamic corporate culture based on trust and 
understanding should arise from social knowledge transfer. This equates with a 
reduction in socially generated transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976), and a 
consequent rise in the volume intermediate flows. General support for this “different 
stage-different transfer” model has emerged, e.g., the Sony Corporation’s 
development in the USA (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 14-15).
2.4 The way of transferring knowledge by FDI
As Contractor and Lorange (1988: 81) point out: despite the rich collection of 
studies on technology transfer, key issues remain unresolved regarding the nature of 
technology itself, on the one hand, and the transfer process, on the other. Since 
technology is usually regarded as the main constituent of knowledge, and there is 
already a pool of research on the process of technology transfer, we will examine the 
issues in relation to knowledge transfer in this chapter based on previous studies on 
both knowledge as well as technology transfer. In attempting to explain the way of 
knowledge transfer, three issues stand out as the basic elements: the choice of 
transfer mode; the execution of knowledge transfer; and the cost of knowledge 
transfer. There are other stumbling blocks to the way of knowledge transfer. First is 
conflict and disagreement over the objectives, for instance, in research and 
development. Secondly, working methods may differ because of organisational 
structure or because of cultural distance between the partners. There is the risk of a 
dilution of property rights and dissipation of the value of proprietary knowledge
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through imitation. Lastly, there is the problem of controlling the organisational 
processes for assimilating the knowledge developed during the co-operation 
utilisation (Quelin, 1998). These issues will not be discussed in detail, however. 
Instead, this section will focus on the three key issues mentioned above on the way 
of knowledge transfer.
2.41 The choice of transfer mode
There are three generic international transfer modes available for the international 
transfer of technology19: non-affiliate contract (e.g., licensing), equity joint venture20 
and whole ownership (Kogut and Zander, 1993: 632; Dunning, 1993: 311; Groose, 
1996: 782). The last two modes are equity-based modalities, and necessarily imply 
the existence of multinational operations. The theoretical determinants of this choice 
are the subject of a now vast literature, dating from Buckley and Casson (1976) and 
Dunning (1977). They can generally be described as contributing to the 
internalisation theory of the MNC or the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1993).
Theoretical contributions continue to be made, however, the centre of gravity of the 
literature has shifted now to empirical testing, of which studies by Davidson and 
McFetridge (1984; 1985) are early examples. This study of US firms finds that the
19 In the past, exports of technology-intensive products were sometimes regarded as a form of 
technology transfer. However, this has fallen out of usage, and is also of little relevance to this study.
20 As indicated earlier, joint ventures between a parent from a developed country and a parent from a 
host developing economy should be distinguished from joint ventures between two developed country 
parents in a host developing country (Beamish, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 1987). The evidence 
suggests that the first type of IJV is inherently less long-lived and stable. Evaluating the performance 
of the IJV is a separate, and highly controversial issue (Boersma and Ghauri, 1999). The precise 
composition of joint ventures by type may affect knowledge transfer. However, too little research is 
available on this to draw any firm conclusions.
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transaction costs of using external markets, together with the experience of firms, 
were the most powerful explanatory factors of the modality of international transfers. 
In particular, the age of the technology, the number of prior transfers of technology, 
and the transferor’s R&D intensity were all strongly and positively related to the 
propensity to internalise technology markets. No clear relationship was found 
between mode chosen and market size, the technological sophistication of the 
receiving country and the profitability of internal markets, while government policy 
appeared to play a modest role in influencing the form of technology transfer. Earlier 
theoretical work by Magee (1977) suggested that as firm-specific technology 
matured and lost some of its uniqueness, the profitability of internal over the 
external modes evaporated. Accordingly, firms would consider switching the 
modality of transfer from EDI to licensing. It is clear that in any empirical study, the 
age structure of firms, their experience, the products and the industry, can materially 
influence the findings.
One generally robust finding for MNCs in developing countries is exemplified by 
the early study of Contractor (1980). This research argued that the market for 
technology between developed and developing countries is likely to be more 
imperfect than that among developed countries. This can be attributed to inadequate 
technological supply capabilities, back-up services, or an inability to absorb new 
technologies. The larger the gap between transferor and transferee, the more likely 
foreign firms are to prefer to internalise technology transfers rather than engage in 
licensing. These are augmented by host country factors that affect the transfer mode,
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such as geography, language and religious proximity, and literacy, each of which are 
identified in the theoretical literature (e.g., Dunning, 1993).
Kogut and Zander (1993: 637) also found that knowledge that was more tacit, in 
terms of codifiability and teachability, was more likely to be transferred across 
national boundaries to a wholly-owned subsidiary than through either of the other 
two modes. In a later paper (Zander and Kogut, 1995), they showed that the time 
taken to transfer a technology was positively related to the tacitness of the 
technology. Other findings were that more rapid transfer is associated with parallel 
development by competitors. Also, the speed of imitation is enhanced by spillovers 
of enabling technology to others in the industry, and retarded by the innovating 
firm’s continuous improvement efforts. The implications of this are that the more 
competitive the environment, the more rapid will be transfer, and the greater the 
incentive to intensify the use of tacit knowledge, to improve the appropriability of 
firm-specific advantages. This very much agrees with our conclusions based on the 
effect of the degree of final market power of the firm, but with the additional 
conclusion that the intensity of tacit knowledge rises with competition.
Of the three modes of knowledge transfer, Kogut and Zander (1993: 639) argue that 
wholly-owned internal transfer is the most beneficial to a firm’s long-term 
development. Internal knowledge transfers preserve and strengthen the firm’s 
knowledge base, provide experience of environmental variety, and promote 
recombination of the elements of knowledge to meet new conditions. The firm’s 
penetration of foreign markets is a race to exploit its firm-specific knowledge before
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it is imitated by a competitor. Tacit knowledge is more difficult for competitors to 
observe and imitate and if a firm learns to transfer knowledge efficiently internally, 
it may be able to preserve more effectively an advantage. Bearing in mind Nonaka 
and Takeuchi’s (1995: 80) argument that knowledge creation is a spiral of 
interactions between tacit and explicit forms, the implication is that there is an 
optimal combination of tacit and explicit knowledge. The firm should ensure that its 
transferred knowledge is in the form of a lock and key. The explicit information (the 
lock) should be of limited intelligibility to competitors without the tacit knowledge 
(the key). Although some leakage of knowledge in explicit form to competitors is 
likely, the absence of essential tacit knowledge should curb its value to them.
The above discussion, with the support of research by Wathne, Roos and Krogh 
(1996), allows us to make the following conclusions. The factors associated with 
increased equity-based control include: the tacitness of the knowledge; the firm’s 
experience of prior transfers; the closeness of the knowledge to the transferor’s main 
business; the importance of a channel for interaction between transferor and 
transferee; the R&D intensity of the transferor, and the prior existence of an affiliate 
in the recipient country. Factors favouring decreased equity-based control include: 
the age of the knowledge; openness, and trust. Host country factors thought to be 
important for the choice of transfer mode, decreasing the incentive for equity-based 
control, were literacy, geographic, linguistic and religious proximity, and the 
certainty of protection of intellectual property.
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2.42 The execution of knowledge transfer
The literature suggests that the past strongly influences the way knowledge transfer 
is carried out. Knowledge transfer can arise from the direct experience of the 
organisation and of its members (Filo and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Lyles, 1988, 
1994). Thus, “history provides an important starting point for knowledge 
development” (von Krogh, Roos, and Slocum, 1994: 60), a view to which Lyles and 
Salk (1996: 879) also subscribe. Organisations and their members also acquire 
knowledge from elsewhere, through the “grafting” of individuals with special 
expertise. This applies to the use of expatriates in IJVs and of “vicarious learning” 
from other organisations (Huber, 1991; Westney, 1988).
Learning through the grafting of cognitive orientations into managerial and technical 
functions is closely allied to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) notions of knowledge 
transfer through socialisation and internalisation. Socialisation can involve 
conscious or unconscious acquisition of culturally embedded knowledge via 
exposure to reference individuals, groups and organisations. In the case of 
knowledge transfer to the affiliate, the referents would be from the foreign parent. 
Internalisation is achieved by the developing of experience over time in conjunction 
with explicit knowledge from the parent. Eventually the knowledge created becomes 
part of the orientation and routines of the affiliate itself.
The grafting of individuals is a more important method of knowledge transfer in the 
service sector compared with manufacturing. This is linked to a general difference
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between the sectors. The technology viewed as fundamental in services is almost 
always not protected by patents or copyrights, but rather by secrecy. This contrasts 
with the routine patenting of technology and products in manufacturing industries. 
The key technologies in services tend to be human capital skills that are not capable 
of being protected by legal means, at least at reasonable cost. Service firms therefore 
resort to protecting the appropriability of their intangible assets through finding ways 
of retaining employees longer within the firm (Groose, 1996: 782).
In manufacturing sector FDI, Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 132) see knowledge 
transfer as being executed in four ways: (1) selling products and services; (2) 
personal mobility; (3) licensing and gaining patents; (4) selling educational services 
(i.e., training). Groose (1996: 782) put forward a more specific itemised list of the 
means of knowledge transfer within the MNC: hardware (machinery); software; 
people transfer; people training; documentation; communication and legal 
agreements (permission).
When knowledge is explicit and codifiable, documents and manuals can effectively 
achieve transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1993: 631). However, when knowledge is 
complex and difficult to codify MNCs often send expatriates to perform key 
functions and to train local employees, or send local employees to the MNC parent 
for training (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 18). The effective transfer of resources 
may be impeded by the choice of inappropriate means, such as a reliance on 
documents and manuals when side-by-side training is required. Transfer may also
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fall short of objectives if the firm devotes insufficient resources, for example, in the 
form of expatriates (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 18).
The next question is over the volume of knowledge transfer. The volume of 
knowledge of each type that is transferred should logically depend on the knowledge 
gap between parents and affiliate. This proposition is to a large extent in line with 
the argument by Gupta and Govindarajan (1991:771). They found that it was 
generally true that the extent of knowledge flows was greater to subsidiaries located 
in less developed countries than to those in more developed markets.
The extent of knowledge transfer also depends on the competitive strategy of the 
parent firm in the host market. The knowledge transfer volume directly affects the 
quantity of time, financial resources and human resources that the participating firms 
will need to invest. Among the limited research on this subject, Groose (1996: 793) 
suggests that the amount of technology transferred is influenced by: ownership, 
experience, intemationality, joint and country. Lyles and Salk (1996: 881), on the 
other hand, argue that the factors thought to affect the level of knowledge acquisition 
by an IJV from its foreign parents include: the capacity to learn; articulated goals and 
strategies; and the degree of active involvement of the foreign parents in the IJV.
The literature provides little guidance on how to measure the volume of transferred 
knowledge. According to Groose (1996: 792), one method is to count the number of 
training days per year for officers and staff, the number of expatriates employed, and 
the number of visits by headquarters experts per year. Another approach would be to
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gauge the technological royalties and fees for technical services paid by the affiliate 
to the parent. This measure is meaningful in manufacturing industries, where 
technology often is embodied in machines or patented processes, and requires clearly 
identifiable specialist services to effect the transfer. Management and franchising 
fees would be a counterpart for many service industries. In the light of the discussion 
in this chapter, if there is an unavoidable need to quantify knowledge transfer, it is 
clear that a composite approach should be taken. However, it is clear from the theory 
of international business that the financial values assigned to knowledge transfers 
can be heavily distorted by the transfer-pricing regime of the multinational (Hill, 
1999). Physical values may be more objective, but introduce the problem of 
comparability across categories. The wisest course of action is almost certainly to 
encourage interviewees to qualitatively indicate the most important forms of 
transfer, and to compare the patterns of responses within, and between, firms.
2.43 The cost of knowledge transfer
The literature on the cost of knowledge transfer has come a long way since Hymer 
(1960; 1976) referred to the transference of the firm’s advantage abroad via FDI at 
“a marginal cost close to zero” (Hymer, ibid., p. 219). Contemporary writers refer to 
knowledge transfer as a costly and complicated transformation process (Hedlund and 
Nonaka, 1993: 126). There is evidence that tacitness increases the costs of transfer, 
while decreasing the speed with which knowledge is transferred within the firm and 
between partners (Kogut and Zander, 1993: 637). This is likely to be a result of tacit 
transfer being intensive in the movement of persons, which is a high-cost route, and
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one that must depend on the availability of key individuals. To a certain extent, firms 
are able to mitigate these costs (Contractor and Lorange, 1988: 92-93).
Each medium of transfer will have their own functional form, with both static and 
dynamic scale economies (Arrow, et al, 1961), and perhaps diseconomies . Lan and 
Young (1996: 60) suggest that costs include not only direct costs such as royalty 
payments, but also a range of indirect costs. Among the latter are communication 
and training costs, derived from resistance to foreign technology, lower levels of 
entrepreneurship, education or absorptive capacities. Many of these cost factors are 
clearly external to the firm. For example, those associated with host infrastructure, 
including scientific institutions and research and development facilities as well as 
vocational, technical and management training institutes and technology policy.
In addition to factors affecting communication and training cost, Teece (1977) found 
that the principal determinants of transfer costs are the degree of previous experience 
in transferring technology, the age of the relevant technology, and the number of 
firms using similar technologies. This demonstrates the importance of both internal 
and external effects on costs. The existence of other firms employing technology 
may provide both an indirect demonstration effect, and an effect through the 
availability of a pool of experienced professional and skilled manpower for the 
affiliates to recruit. This last point amounts to, in effect, a market for experience.
21 The popular conception of the learning curve is an example of dynamic scale economies. This can 
be equated with experience, and linked to our discussion of how the firm might develop, or acquire, 
the necessary experience.
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It is evident that the cost of transfer has multivariate causes, many with learning and 
external effects that are time-dependent. It follows that the successful execution of 
knowledge transfer depends both on a sound calculation of the costs as they stand, 
and on an understanding of how they are likely to change over the period of the 
transfer.
2.5 From knowledge transfer to organizational learning
In the case of the setting up of a new affiliate, knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning begin simultaneously. In young or new affiliates, or IJVs, knowledge 
structures are simple. From the outset the parent firm is responsible for transferring 
knowledge to develop the affiliate (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). In the case of an 
acquired affiliate the process is different. Here the parent seeks to exploit the 
advantages of the affiliate — such as its resources or local market knowledge — 
while at the same time transferring its own firm specific advantages to the affiliate. 
Therefore the knowledge transfer is not a one-way street, as characterised in the 
product life cycle model (Vernon, 1966) and the Industrial Organisation Approach 
(Caves, 1996), as well as the early incarnations of the Internationalisation Theory of 
the MNE (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). It can happen in both directions, i.e., from 
parent to affiliate and from affiliate to parent. Likewise, organisational learning takes 
place in both parent and affiliate following knowledge transfer. The effectiveness of 
organisational learning can make a huge difference in the competitiveness of the 
recipients (Inkpen, 1995b: 127).
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2.51 The utilisation of the transferred knowledge: An organisational learning 
perspective
If the knowledge transfer process can be viewed as the transfer of new resources to 
the affiliate, then the success of the firm’s strategy finally depends on the effective 
utilisation of these resources by the recipient. The conclusion of knowledge transfer 
by the process of utilisation pushes the analysis into the realm of organisational 
learning (Inkpen, 1995a and 1995b).
Many managers, management writers, and theorists maintain that organisational 
learning is the only sustainable source of global competitive advantage (Edmondson 
and Moingeon, 1998). For instance, where technical success (comprising product 
quality and excellence, productivity, and consistency) is the prime determinant of 
global market competitiveness, the capacity for organisational learning is an 
essential adjunct to maintaining competitive advantage. The literature on 
international strategic management and international joint ventures declares that 
organisational learning, embracing knowledge utilisation and adaptation, is an 
important rationale for the creation of IJVs that contributes significantly to IJV 
performance (Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Lyles and Baird, 1994; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). Learning is also held to 
contribute to organisational performance more generally (Filo and Lyles, 1985; 
Huber, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Lyles and Salk, 1996).
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The cultivation of firm skills through learning involves the interpretation of past 
experiences and strategic choices as a basis for present and future actions (Porter, 
1990). In the context of knowledge transfer, it is evident that these experiences and 
choices can be generated within the recipient firm, donated by the parent or secured 
through external recruitment. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) believe that 
organisational learning is most closely related to internalisation, which in the context 
of IJVs means taking explicit knowledge from the parent and converting it into tacit 
knowledge. It is closely related to “learning by doing”(/foV/., p.69). However, Lyles 
and Salk (1996: 879) subscribe to a broader view, that organisational learning 
connotes underlying organisational characteristics and structural mechanisms. These 
would be important for socialisation, i.e., converting tacit knowledge from the parent 
into tacit IJV knowledge, and for combination modes that combine tacit with explicit 
knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi clearly related these characteristics and 
mechanisms to training and educational programmes by firms. It would appear that 
the difference between the two views is over the degree to which organisational 
learning can be regarded as embedded in the firm. Either way, the knowledge 
generated through learning supports a firm’s ability to understand the consequences 
of past actions and to respond to environmental stimuli. Therefore, effective learning 
results in the enhancement of an organisation’s skills and capabilities (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).
A central concept in relation to organisational learning is that of absorptive capacity. 
This is defined as the firm’s ability to acquire, evaluate, assimilate, integrate, diffuse, 
deploy and exploit knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This definition
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emphasises the readiness of the recipient unit to recognise the value of a practice, to 
assimilate it, and to apply it to commercial ends. There is a consensus that the 
absence of an appropriate skills base and absorptive capacity in an affiliate 
represents a severe barrier to knowledge transfer (Li and Shenkar, 1996: 54; Quelin, 
1998). Therefore, transfer of a foreign firm’s technology, management and 
marketing skills will be less successful if the local firms do not have the necessary 
skills base or absorptive capability. As Dunning (1993: 289) appositely observes, 
there is often a lack of complementary assets, particularly in the administrative and 
organisational capabilities, in some countries. This impairs the ability of affiliates to 
assimilate foreign technology efficiently, and is often as important an obstacle to 
economic development as the failure of these countries to acquire or obtain the 
technology in the first place. As far as the individual firm is concerned, it is best 
advised by the injunction of Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 129). To make the most of 
the transferred knowledge, the affiliate will need to commit substantial financial and 
human resources, invest in absorptive capacity directly, and carry out organisational 
changes in order to build up a positive environment to facilitate the knowledge 
utilisation.
One essential way in which organisational learning can be embedded is through the 
creation of teams. This is often thought to be important in both the transfer of 
knowledge and knowledge utilisation. The performance of multicultural teams 
within a single MNC was studied by Hedlund and Riddersatrale (1994). The authors 
developed a framework for understanding international research and development 
project teams, and provide illuminating detail on communication modes, the tasks of
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team members, and the sources of difficulties. They find that individuals from the 
same culture are more likely to share tacit knowledge. This finding reinforces 
theoretical work on the importance of the social medium in learning and knowledge 
transfer. While the transfer of national culture would be problematic, the transfer of 
a strong corporate culture could in principle satisfy the need for a shared culture. 
Therefore, the transfer of social knowledge of the corporate variety is potentially 
invaluable. It might ensure the full utilisation of transferred knowledge and the 
incremental creation of new knowledge, enabling the affiliate to develop and 
maintain competitive advantage.
The furnishing of resources from the parent firm and resources secured locally 
enables the affiliate to begin operation. Once in operation, the subsidiary works with 
local suppliers, performs proprietary manufacturing processes, and markets its 
output to local customers. In short, it gains experience competing in the local 
market. The development of the affiliate’s capability has been described as an 
evolutionary process (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 4), based on the utilisation of 
the transferred knowledge and the development of new competencies in the local 
environment. Many factors are thought to affect the performance of the affiliate in 
the process of organisational learning. Among them, trust and relationship openness 
between the partners involved in the affiliate hold the key to the long-term success of 
the affiliate in the local environment (Inkpen, 1995b: 67). The result is an 
endogenous accumulation of capabilities, defined as skills, routines, and 
complementary assets, residing in the affiliate’s employees and in its relationships
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with external entities, specific to its line of business (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
1990; Kogut and Zander, 1993: 636).
The process of utilising the transferred knowledge by the affiliate is described as a 
knowledge transformation process. Knowledge transformation involves processes 
through which knowledge is added, restructured, recontextualised, reinterpreted, and 
through which new knowledge is generated (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993: 123). It is 
basically an adaptive process in response to the needs of host markets. In a classic 
and far ranging study by Grant Reuber and his colleagues (Reuber et al., 1973), the 
authors demonstrated that technology adaptation by affiliates in developing countries 
was more common in market-seeking than in resources-seeking or rationalised FDI. 
By far the most important stated reason for this high proclivity for adaptation was 
the idiosyncratic demands of the domestic market (Dunning, 1993: 294). It follows 
that the knowledge transfer, utilisation and transformation processes will tend to be 
more complete where the underlying motive for FDI is to service the domestic 
market. The more complete is this orientation towards the domestic market, the 
greater is the local responsiveness of the affiliate, and its current and future 
competitiveness.
2.52 The process of organisational learning
Learning is a dynamic process involving various organisational levels and actors 
(Inkpen and Corssan, 1995). Although much of the learning literature addresses the 
product or content of learning, of equal importance is the process of learning.
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According to Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 126), after receiving the transferred 
knowledge, organisational learning process is composed of three main stages: 
articulation, application and dissemination.
The first stage is articulation. The gaining of new knowledge represents the 
fulfilment of the transfer of knowledge resources. This is followed by articulation — 
the rendering of knowledge into explicit verbal or written form. For example, an 
organisation might make its corporate culture explicit by rules of conduct and ethical 
principles, thus transforming it from tacit knowledge to articulated knowledge. This 
is a crucial process, since it significantly increases the potential for critique, for 
testing, and most importantly, for sharing through the transfer of knowledge 
(Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993: 126). Articulation therefore lays a solid foundation for 
the utilisation of the transferred knowledge in the rest of the listed stages.
The next stage is application. Application refers to the process of making use of the 
articulated knowledge in the business operations of the recipient company. It is a 
process in which “knowledge at higher agency levels is accepted at lower ones” 
{ibid., p. 128). During this process, adaptation, customisation and modification are 
normal phenomena employed to make the articulated knowledge realise its most 
potential.
Dissemination is the third stage. It can be defined as “when knowledge reaches the 
wider environment from the organisation” (ibid., p. 131). The result is the output of 
the organisation, which can take the form of statements (such as patents), action
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(starting manufacturing) or tangible products. In a way, firms are main instruments 
for the exploitation of knowledge originating elsewhere, and dissemination is the 
route for the recipients to further exploit the utilised knowledge in a wider 
environment. Indeed, dissemination indicates the further transfer of knowledge (both 
utilised and newly developed) to more parties. It is legitimate to assume that at this 
stage the knowledge is further transferred from the recipient to its own affiliates or 
firms related through business process (suppliers or potential cooperative partners).
It can, however, be transferred from the recipient back to its parents which 
previously transferred knowledge out in the first place. This provides an opportunity 
for the parents to refresh their understanding of the practices of doing business in the 
environments where their affiliates are currently operating. Further discussion on 
knowledge transfer from an affiliate to its parent follows in the next section.
2.53 Knowledge transfer from the affiliate to the parent
It is a relatively short step from the discussion of learning in the affiliate to the topic 
of subsequent parental learning via feedback from the affiliate. This can be directly 
linked to the behavioural or stages approach to the internationalisation of the firm 
discussed earlier, and to the later management literature. The knowledge transfer 
literature preferentially takes the unit of analysis to be the headquarters and a single 
affiliate, whereas the international business literature takes the MNC group as the 
unit of analysis. Description and analysis of the process of learning accordingly 
becomes more complicated, and still more so the greater the complexity of the 
MNC.
64
Writers such as Chang and Rosenzweig (1995:23) foresee the affiliate’s eventual 
development to the point where it will have newly developed knowledge and 
capabilities to transfer to the parent. In the JV context, learning and internalisation of 
JV-derived knowledge by a JV parent can be viewed from three perspectives. First, 
JV knowledge might be used in the design and management of other JVs and 
alliances (see Lyles, 1988). Second, parent firms may seek access to other firms’ 
knowledge and skills but will not necessarily wish to internalise the knowledge in 
their own operations. As Hamel (1991) pointed out, knowledge that is embodied 
only in the specific outputs of the JV has no value outside the narrow terms of the 
collaborative agreement. Third, and the focus of this research, knowledge from a JV 
can be used by the parent company to enhance its own strategy and operations. The 
acquisition of this type of knowledge, called output knowledge by Westney (1988), 
has been suggested as one of GM’s objective in its JV with Toyota (Keller, 1989). 
GM hoped to learn about the efficient production of small cars and transfer its 
knowledge to GM plants. The focus on knowledge useful to the parent is consistent 
with the identification of learning as a possible motive for the formation of JVs.
These improved knowledge resources may be transferred to the parent in the first 
instance, but they constitute new capabilities to be transferred within the MNC on a 
worldwide basis. This reverse knowledge transfer represents a return on the parent’s 
initial knowledge transfer, but it also is the hallmark of the maturing of 
organisational learning. The structures and mechanisms that worked during the prior 
process of knowledge transfer and utilisation to the affiliate will generally be
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effective in the opposite direction. Social corporate knowledge, and the myriad 
factors that amount to a “common language” will have been established. As with a 
natural language, it may serve first as a medium for instruction, but it is equally good 
as a medium for dialogue. The parent’s absorption and application of knowledge 
from the affiliate via the reverse knowledge transfer can be carried out efficiently, in 
terms of less time, lower cost and higher utilisation, thanks to the prior experience of 
transfer. This argues for the existence of a characteristic sequence in the 
international organisational learning of the firm.
2.54 Extending the analysis
The purpose of this section is to elaborate in more detail the stylised facts of 
organisational learning in the specific context of an IJV. The earlier sections have 
provided an understanding of the knowledge transfer process between one parent 
and one affiliate. Here, the analysis is extended to consider knowledge transfer 
between two parents and one affiliate, and, as a result of this, knowledge transfer 
between two affiliates via the parent, i.e., in the specific case of international joint 
ventures.
The focus on knowledge useful to the parent is consistent with the identification of 
learning as a motive for the formation of IJVs (Inkpen, 1995a). Often, the parent 
firms bring complementary skills and knowledge to a joint venture, and this is an 
important consideration in selecting a joint venture partner (Glaister and Buckley,
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1997)22. The process of partners learning from each other via knowledge transferred 
to and from the affiliate is summarised in Figure 2-2:
Figure 2-2: Learning between parent firms in an international joint venture
Parent 2Parent 1
Affiliate
Parent 2 acquires knowledge from Parent 1 by gaining output knowledge from the joint venture
As the theoretical literature has demonstrated, output knowledge may also be a 
significant knowledge flow in the instance of one parent with two affiliates, shown 
in Figure 2-3. The parent company usually absorbs knowledge acquired from its first 
ventures abroad into its general internationalisation strategy, and is able to transfer 
relevant knowledge to newly acquired or established affiliates. This is compatible 
with the idea of organisational learning, and the transfer of learning across 
organisational subunits discussed by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995). It is also 
congruent with the Nordic School of research, and the empirical approach adopted 
by Davidson and McFetridge (1984; 1985).
22 The motives for the UV clearly impinge on the issue of knowledge transfer. Here these are 
addressed preferentially from the perspective of the international management literature.
Figure 2-3: Learning between affiliate firms via the parent
Parent
Affiliate 2Affiliate 1
Parent using output knowledge from one affiliate to improve competitiveness of another affiliate
The strategic decision by the partners to supply knowledge in a tacit form to the IJV 
may be intended to prevent dissipation through learning by the other partner, not 
simply to control dissipation by assimilation by firms unconnected with the IJV.
However, as discussed earlier, partners may specifically wish to prevent the 
“bleedthrough” of knowledge assets to each other (Harrigan, 1985). In this case the 
knowledge concerned should properly be termed the “input knowledge” of each 
partner, rather than the output knowledge of the JV. Therefore, we would expect the 
design of management control to reflect the strategic concerns of the partners, which 
should be observable in the division of tasks (supply of knowledge assets) and the 
composition of tacit and explicit knowledge. In particular, we might well expect to 
observe an otherwise inexplicable separation of corporate cultures between the 
partners in the JV, in order to limit strategically the “bleedthrough” of input 
knowledge. The intensity of tacit knowledge will depend both on the degree of 
codifiability of the knowledge resource to be transferred, and on the strategic 
concerns of the transferor.
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The literature on affiliates as generators of scientific knowledge (e.g., 
Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1997; 1998) is more applicable to affiliates in developed 
countries.
However, in the case of market entry via JV into the liberalising markets of the 
CEECs and China, it is quite possible for there to be elements of ‘reverse-learning’ 
by the parents (or at least one of the parents) from the affiliate. As we have argued, 
reverse learning is in fact implicit in the behavioural explanations of the 
internationalisation of the firm, and is best exemplified by the stages theory. This 
theory earlier emphasises the role of process and foreign market learning that can be 
re-used in other locations. The CEEC and Chinese markets lend themselves to this 
type of approach. They are all former centrally planned economies, but with 
liberalisation at different stages of advancement. This provides a clear incentive for 
the parent to gain knowledge from the affiliate on how to operate in such markets. 
This can be re-used in future market entry within the CEECs, China, or other 
liberalising markets.
The higher degrees of complexity in MNC organisational learning should be viewed 
as special cases of combinations of the ‘building blocks’ of analysis we present here. 
The simple one-parent one-affiliate (1:1) model, subsequent extension to two- 
parents one-affiliate (2:1) and one-parent two-affiliate (1:2) models can be viewed in 
terms of the building blocks of any MNC. In other words, knowledge transfer within 
a MNC may be understood more easily by considering the MNC as consisting of a 
number of 1:1, 2:1 and 1:2 relational subsets and considering knowledge transfer
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within and between these subsets. We must, however, note that the analysis of IJVs 
with multiple partners is inherently fraught with difficulties compared with joint 
ventures with two investing partners (Geringer, 1991). The evidence is that IJVs 
with more than two partners are not readily tractable within the simplifying 
framework used here.
2.6 Technology and knowledge transfer to transitional economies
There has been, of course, a distinct literature on technology transfer to less 
developed countries (LDCs), very much related to the economics of development23 
(Casson and Pearce, 1987). The early literature on this subject has often couched the 
issue of transfer in terms of the problems that exist in transferring production 
techniques between countries with different factor proportions, e.g., the pioneering 
work of Eckaus (1955). Further studies focused on the efficiency effects of capital- , 
labour substitutions in less developed countries (LDCs) in the context of an 
aggregate production function (Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow, 1961). All 
these studies focus on hard (scientific) technologies rather than the soft 
(organisational, managerial) know-how that underlies radical change through FDI. 
The later literature of the 1960s, through to the early 1980s, in the main, preferred to 
prescribe policies towards MNCs, technology transfer policy, and often gave 
sustenance to the infant industry argument as a useful tool of domestic and 
international trade industrial policy (Buckley and Clegg, 1991).
23 This topic is reviewed in Buckley and Clegg (1991).
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It became clear by the middle of the 1980s that increasing numbers of less developed 
countries were changing their attitudes towards foreign multinationals, from an 
essentially hostile (or at best cautious) stance, to one of encouragement towards FDI. 
This sea change was accompanied by a world shortage of loan capital and an 
accompanying shift in demand in favour of equity capital for development (Buckley 
and Clegg, 1991; Dunning, 1993). However, it remains the case that the majority of 
research on FDI and development has largely ignored the potential benefits of 
market liberalisation measures, which for many years were generally resisted by 
LDC governments. The largely economics-based literature is limited to the issue of 
scientific, especially production, technology. It generally fails to treat knowledge in 
the round, largely because the issue of knowledge transfer arises most forcefully 
when firms operate in competitive markets. It is under conditions of market 
liberalisation that far-reaching organisational change and knowledge transfusion is 
required.
Historically, there has been a tendency for economics-based academic research to 
work within the demands by less-developed countries for hard technology. Countries 
that have experienced excessive and prolonged government intervention, or state 
ownership and control whether under central planning or not, have imbibed a 
production orientation, philosophy, and human resource policies that emphasise 
production skills (Lan and Young, 1996: 80). This accounts for the customary 
preference for production technology at the expense of soft technologies. The most 
critical gap in skills therefore lies in the other corporate functions, such as sales, 
advertising and marketing, procurement, accounting and finance, and market-
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oriented research and development. Each of these is essential not only for domestic 
competition following market liberalisation, but to compete in the world economy 
— a respect in which these economies have fallen behind. It is not surprising 
therefore, that, in effect, when export-oriented production occurs in a less developed 
country, it is the marketing and distribution skills of the MNC that are most crucial 
in securing foreign market share.
The bulk of the literature on knowledge transfer is focused on developed countries 
because most of these have long enjoyed competitive markets at home. However, the 
research issues for knowledge transfer to competitive developing markets, and to 
liberalising transition economy markets are distinct. The comparable levels of 
economic development between developed countries mean that the research is 
largely based on case studies of knowledge transfer within organisations. In the 
transition economies, research must grapple with knowledge transfer within a setting 
where institutional and cultural factors play an important role in deciding corporate 
performance. The existing literature therefore does not relate well to knowledge 
transfers to transition economies that are at a lower stage of development.
It can be argued that the experience of liberalisation in the CEECs and China 
suggests, prima facie, that the value of market liberalisation for realising economic 
growth —  and the rapid transfer and deployment of technology and knowledge in 
general —  outstrips the impact of other policy measures. Historically, this has been a 
failure of conventional development economics. It is reflected in the past reluctance 
(conscious or otherwise), on the part of researchers to recommend liberalisation
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policies that were unacceptable to governments committed to central planning. The 
outcome is that the conventional literature is severely limited in relevance to 
knowledge transfer to the LDCs, and it is therefore not reviewed here in detail.
2.7 Summary
Apart from explaining the central role of knowledge within the paradigm of 
international business theory, this chapter has tried to examine the current literature 
on knowledge transfer and organisational learning by FDI, with an emphasis on its 
process dimension. In doing so, it intends to address three broad questions: What 
knowledge has been transferred from the parent to its affiliate within a MNC? How 
has the knowledge been transferred? How has the transferred knowledge been 
utilised based on an organisational learning process? The management literature on 
knowledge transfer and the international business literature have to some extent 
converged regarding the role of knowledge. Both literature has a majority of writers 
coming down in favour of the internalisation of knowledge, and of the importance of 
tacit (or non-codifiable) knowledge in protecting the firm’s competitive advantages. 
Combining the two allows us to extend the depth of analysis in the case studies of 
firms in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing and automotive industries.
It remains the case that while much is known about the factors influencing 
knowledge transfer between the developed economies, less is known about the 
factors directly applicable to emerging markets. We can surmise, however, that a 
crucial difference lies in the degree of stability and clarity of interpretation affixing 
to host government policies towards FDI and intellectual property in the CEECs and
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China. Higher equity knowledge transfer modes are accorded greater preference by 
firms as a way of protecting the knowledge transferred from exposure to 
uncertainties over the appropriability of firm-specific knowledge in these host 
markets.
It is evident that there is a need for research specifically on the issue of knowledge 
transfer to the emerging markets. This is important both for firms’ ability to manage 
the transfer, and to inform host policy. It is important not to overlook the fact that 
while high transaction costs imposed by the host environment increase the 
preference of firms for higher equity modes of transfer, there is also a negative 
volume effect. For firms engaged in knowledge transfer, the optimal level of 
knowledge transferred will be reduced on account of the high transaction costs and 
the risks associated with emerging markets. Moreover, there will be an unknown 
population of firms that, in view of the lower expected returns to their firm-specific 
assets in the host market, elect not to transfer at all, i.e., do not become foreign 
investors in that host. This is in addition to another equally unseen number of firms 
that will have been discouraged from transferring technology via non-affiliate 
contractual means. Had intellectual property protected been more robust and certain, 
the contractual method would be the natural choice for many smaller and medium­
sized firms that lack the capital and management to engage in FDI.
In conclusion, international business theorists have tended to concentrate on the 
technological and financial24 benefits of FDI, largely due to the predominance of
24 The financial benefits are conventionally portrayed as the transfer of financial capital, rather than as 
the skills with which to manage the financial operation of the affiliate.
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economists in this management area. There exists a large gap in the international 
business literature concerning the organisational benefits of FDI, such as the transfer 
of technology, management skills25 and cultural change. Undoubtedly, as the study 
of economic transition in eastern and central Europe and China matures, attention 
will eventually turn from an emphasis on broad policy issues and easily quantified 
economic aggregates towards matters concerning the dynamic and sustainable nature 
of improvements in corporate performance. In particular, it will have to encompass 
fully the issues of knowledge transfer and organisational learning, which is at the 
core of improving the corporate performance and lasting competitiveness of FDI in 
these emerging markets.
25These may be transferred via a formal management contract, but much of the organisational change 
via FDI is informal, and is the result of the exercise of effective control by the parent.
75
Chapter 3 The Business Environment in China
3.1 Introduction
In the western world, China has long been regarded as a different country politically, 
economically and culturally (Carver, 1996). After two decades of economic reform 
and opening to the international business, China is quickly emerging as one of the 
most important investment sites around the world. FDI has played an essential role 
in continuously promoting China's economic efficiency and, as a result, increasing 
its share in world markets based on the strengthening of China's industrial 
competitiveness. However, the features of the Chinese business environment, 
government policies towards FDI and the role of FDI in the Chinese economy 
remain far from clear. This chapter will shed light on these issues. It will first 
analyse the characteristics of the Chinese business environment, then introduce the 
policies of the Chinese government towards FDI in China, outline the important role 
played by FDI in the Chinese market. Lastly, some background information will be 
provided about the two chosen industries of this research: the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and automotive industry of China. Moreover, special 
government incentives and restrictions that apply to them will be explored.
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3.2 Features of the Chinese business environment
The 1990s have witnessed a mushrooming of business interest in investing in China, 
and, in its wake, academic interest (Beamish, 1993; Child, 1991; Daniels, Krug and 
Nigh, 1985; Davidson, 1987; Pearson, 1991; Pomfret, 1991). It is a widely 
recognised fact that foreign direct investment in China presents many challenges to 
western business practices (Child and Lu, 1996). First and foremost, key issues 
concern how to cope with the highly distinctive institutional and cultural 
characteristics of the host country (Selmer, 1999), because the Chinese market still 
remains different from those western markets politically, economically as well as 
culturally.
First, the uniqueness of Chinese socialist market economy. China has been in a 
process of building up “its socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” 
(Fang, 1999: 82). This can be translated as the present constitutional setting (one 
party dictatorship with mainly state ownership), and a public law regime (that is not 
transparent) which will not change even though China's market-orientated reform 
has deepened since 1992. Other features include central planning, government 
intervention, government monopoly over certain strategic sectors such as railway, 
post and telecommunications which will persist. It will be impossible to discern any 
quick disappearance of the usual features of the Chinese business environment, such 
as a changeable economic policy, the important role of internal documentation in 
economic governance (Carver, 1996), and market protection as a usual measure 
employed by local government to support the development of the local economy.
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These aforementioned peculiarities of the business environment of China have 
already created many obstacles to foreign investment. Yip (1995) argues that 
foreign retailers who want to enter the Chinese market have to pay particular 
attention to macro-environmental factors, as the market is in rapid transition and is 
regulated by constantly changing government policy. Seo (1993) reports that 
although the laws passed by Beijing often look good on paper, there is a wide gap 
between theory and practice in the application. China's relatively unfavourable 
investment climate stems from a number of factors, such as changeable political 
conditions, ambiguous rules and an inadequate legal framework, arbitrary charges in 
the interpretation of the law and bureaucratic red tape .
As a result of the deepening reform carried out more recently, some of the above 
reported problems have either been easing, or have been largely solved. Legislature 
readjustments in order to make the law more transparent to foreign investors (which 
is part of the efforts made by the Chinese government to meet the criteria of applying 
for the membership of World Trade Organisation) have been augmented by the 
break-through in the convertibility of the Chinese currency, the renminbi (translated 
as people’s money) yuan in current account transactions. This latter provision has 
enabled international business to exchange foreign currency freely for trade, 
dividend and interest payments, as well as profit remittances, and payments for
26 Foreign investors have been complaining about undesirable “fees”, such as “safety fees” and 
“public health fees”, applied to them without prior notice. These fees, collected by local governments, 
only serve to increase the burden on foreign investors. Wu Yi, the foreign trade minister, has 
announced that the government would rectify random charges imposed on foreign investors in the 
hope that this will attract more foreign investment. “We must bring things out in the open, and let 
foreigners know beforehand what to do and what not to do”, Wu said. (People’s Daily (Overseas 
Edition), 29th December 1997, page 1)
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services such as travel, freight and insurance, ensuring that the operation of the firm 
is unfettered by restrictions on international transactions. However, the fundamentals 
of this regime have not changed, which still creates uncertainties to FDI.
Second, the under development of social infrastructure. As the largest developing 
country in the world, with more than two thirds of its population still unurbanised, 
China can offer very little to meet the needs of foreign investors in terms of social 
infrastructure. Although many improvements have been made since 1978, the lack of 
western- standard business facilities is still the biggest handicap in the whole country 
in general, and in the middle and the western part of China in particular. Guo and 
Akroyd (1996: 33) identify several categories of barriers in the process of a 
technology transfer from a UK firm to its Chinese partner. Apart from management 
perception barriers, it is difficulties in information, communication and 
infrastructure that pose a great threat to the success of international business in 
China. One British managing director, who had personally been successful in doing 
business in China, commented “You can hardly find any yellow pages in China” 
{ibid., p. 34). In the case of infrastructure barriers, the difficulties in the sourcing of 
raw materials, personnel training, and the problems of operating and maintaining the 
transferred technology and so on, are among the list identified.
Third, the dominance of “guan xi” in business activities. Some researchers have seen 
culture as the centre ground in understanding the differences of operating in China. 
Child and Lu (1996: 4) identify five prominent elements of Chinese culture relating 
to individual behaviour and the most cited among them is close personal
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connections, or guan xi in Chinese pronunciation. While the guan xi phenomenon 
may be found to some degree in almost all parts of the world, commentators seem to 
be unanimous in the view that it is much more important in the context of Chinese 
business than else where. Davies (1995: 155) argues guan xi seems to be the 
lifeblood of the Chinese business community, extending into politics and society. 
Without guan xi one simply cannot get anything done. On the other hand, with guan 
xi anything seems possible. Bjorkman (1996: 70) also reports, based on his 
investigation, that companies that had good guan xi with the ‘right’ people were seen 
to have a big advantage. Therefore, competitors from different parts of the world had 
developed friendships with Chinese employees in the central ministries in Beijing, 
with government officials at the provincial and local levels, and with persons within 
the buying organisation itself.
However, guan xi is not everything. It would be naive to think that good guan xi 
alone would guarantee the success of business venture in China. Bjorkman (1996:
70) finds in his interviews that in spite of the perceived importance of guan xi, the 
respondents stressed that, with a few exceptions (usually concerning orders in South 
China), suppliers who were not able to compete in terms of technical quality and 
price had scant chances of winning business deals in China. McGuinness, Campbell 
and Lenotiades (1991: 205) argue that efforts to gain higher preferences through 
developing an extremely close rapport based on personal attractiveness may pay off, 
providing the company's services are also good. A better strategy for western firms is 
to concentrate on doing the basic marketing job well, and to let relationships take 
care of themselves.
80
3.3 FDI in China: Government policy and historic development
3.31 An overview of Chinese government policies towards FDI
FDI in China is divided into three categories: wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and cooperation projects . In a joint venture, the foreign partner is required 
to hold a minimum of 25 per cent of the shares in the enterprise; no such 
requirement is necessary for a cooperative project, which is set up and managed by 
an agreement signed by the foreign partner and the Chinese partner (Lan and Young, 
1996: 61). A wholly-owned subsidiary is entirely owned by a foreign company, 
including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
As early as the end of 1970s, the Chinese government began to introduce a wide 
range of preferential policies for foreign investors, providing a competitive 
investment climate internationally. First, the Chinese government has set a fairly 
comprehensive legal framework for FDI in general, including: The Law on Chinese-
27 Other forms of foreign involvement include foreign indirect investment in the Chinese stock 
market, foreign capital borrowing and licensing and franchising agreement. Foreign indirect 
investment has been allowed since the beginning of the 1990s. The Chinese government has strictly 
controlled foreign investment through this avenue by segregating the stock market into A market 
(exclusively for local investors) and B market (exclusively for foreign investors) for fear of 
surrendering local industries to foreign control and privatisation. The B market has poorly performed 
until now due to the heavy handed approach of the Chinese government. Foreign capital borrowing 
(public and private) may be loosely categorised as one form of foreign involvement. This was the 
main vehicle for China to seek foreign capital in the 1980s. Its importance dramatically declined in 
the 1990s as foreign direct investment took off. Similar to the above, the Chinese government kept a 
tight state control in foreign capital borrowing and earned a good reputation for returning foreign 
loans timely. Licensing and franchising agreement has been regarded as an important vehicle to tap 
the Chinese market by foreign investors. However, it practical application has met with serious 
difficulties arising from enactment and enforcement of intellectual property laws in China. (See 
Bosworth and Yang (2000) for details.)
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Foreign Joint Ventures (1979), Income Tax Law on Joint Ventures (1980), Law on 
Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises (1986), and Income Tax Law on Foreign-Funded 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (1991), among others. At the same time, China 
has also promulgated regulations on profit repatriation, foreign exchange, labour 
management, and lease, property right, etc. (Kening, 1997: 17).
Second, a series of tax concessions have been given to foreign investors, such as 
income tax reduction (only pay 15 per cent, while normal corporation tax rate is 33 
per cent for FlEs and 55 per cent for domestic enterprises, which was reduced to 33 
per cent as well in 1993), fixed-time tax exemption or reduction (usually tax 
exemption for three years and half rate reduction for another three years, and more 
preferential to high-technology or export oriented firms) and tax refunds for re­
investment of profits, and so on. These preferential treatments have undoubtedly 
played an essential role in attracting FDI in labour-intensive and technology­
intensive industries to China, especially before the 1990s.
Third, both regional policy and industrial policy have been developed to encourage 
the inflow of foreign direct investment. In terms of regional policy, FDI was first 
directed to the four special economic zones (SEZs) and fourteen coastal opening 
cities. Starting from 1992, the whole interior of China has been granted the same 
status as that of coastal areas, thus opening the vast inland area to foreign investors. 
At the same time, China has gradually withdrawn the restrictions set on foreign 
investors in most industries. Some previously prohibited sectors, such as highway 
construction, power generation, harbour and airport infrastructure, and even
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retailing, financial services and consulting, have all been partially or entirely opened 
to foreign investors. In particular, a comprehensive package of industrial policy on 
FDI developed by the Chinese government in 1995 provided the full list of industrial 
sectors that foreign investors are encouraged to enter. The combination of policies in 
these two respects has raised FDI in those areas that the Chinese government most 
wants.
These preferential policies were not produced in one step. Rather, they were put in 
place in the last two decades, reflecting the changing nature of the Chinese economy 
from a centrally planned one to the present socialist market economy. The 
development of China’s policies towards FDI since 1979 can be divided into three 
stages:
(1) 1979-85, the emerging stage. China was then still a central command economy, 
regarding FDI as a way of stimulating economic development and introducing 
foreign technologies in the four designated special economic zones (SEZS, 
comprising Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) in the southern coastal 
areas. Owing to inexperience, China only managed to deliver a legal framework 
suitable for the introduction of FDI under the mode of joint venture. The main 
laws promulgated during this time were The Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint 
Ventures (1979) and Income Tax Law on Joint Ventures (1980). Setting up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries by MNCs was restricted, indicating the strong 
suspicion on the part of the Chinese government on foreign ownership and its 
potential impact. Detailed national policies towards FDI were out of the question
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during this time, while local governments in the four SEZs were given the power 
to produce policies of their own to facilitate the development of FDI of various 
kinds, with an emphasis on joint ventures. The policies developed by these areas 
were introduced to other major cities on a select-and-trial basis.
(2) 1986-91, the developing stage. Having accumulated a great deal of experience in 
the previous stage, the Chinese government came to the realisation that FDI was 
conducive to the economic development of the whole nation, not only the four 
SEZs and some major cities. In addition, the wholly-owned subsidiary as an entry 
mode came to be regarded as central to the introduction of large scale FDI. As a 
result, quite a number of laws were promulgated, such as the Law on Foreign 
Wholly Owned Enterprises (1986), and Income Tax Law on Foreign-Funded 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (1991), among others. At the same time, 
more detailed policies were produced regarding issues such as profit repatriation, 
foreign exchange, labour management, leasing, and property rights (Kening,
1997: 17). The intention was to manage FDI properly under a socialist legal 
system. The Chinese government extended the favourable policies formerly 
restricted to SEZs to nearly the entire coastal areas and major cities across China, 
with the opening up of Hainan Province and Shanghai’s Pudong at the centre. FDI 
was welcome regardless of which entry mode was employed. Having recognised 
the essential role of technology in economic development and international 
competition, the Chinese government also set up a string of high-technology 
zones in cities with strong higher education establishments or research bases in 
order to attract MNCs with a substantial content of advanced technology.
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(3) 1992-present, the maturing stage. China for the first time claimed to be working 
towards the establishment of a socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics. This initiated a sea change in its attitude towards FDI. Foreign 
direct investment was not seen as something that threatened the national 
economy, as was feared during the days of the former command economy, but a 
vehicle to achieve economic efficiency and international competitiveness based 
on the introduction of technology, management skills and international practices. 
Accordingly, the initial favourable policies adopted by China were scrutinised in 
the light of international practices. Various restrictive policies were partly 
withdrawn. Foreign invested enterprises, including wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
MNCs, were gradually offered national treatment, guaranteeing their access to 
local markets, financial resources and human resources. A distinctive feature of 
this stage of policy reform, however, was the production of selective industrial 
policies towards FDI. This indicated a switch from pursuing volume to quality. 
Having seen an influx of FDI unmatched in the world except by the USA, the 
Chinese government believed it was time to attract knowledge-intensive and 
capital-intensive investments, rather than an indiscriminate approach, in order to 
accelerate economic development. In June 1995, the Chinese government 
produced its first “Industrial advisory list for FDI in China”, indicating clearly 
those industries in which entry was encouraged, allowed, as well as those to 
which restrictions and those to which prohibitions applied. The extension of 
favourable policies to the whole of China and the production of selective 
industrial policies signalled the determination of the Chinese government to
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upgrade Chinese strategic industries (such as agriculture, telecommunications, 
energy, transport, automobile, electronics, and pharmaceutical industry, etc.) to 
be internationally competitive through introducing a wide range of technological 
resources.
The other point worth elaborating is that China has been encouraging the 
introduction of technology-intensive investments, as well as labour intensive 
investments, from the very beginning of its opening policy. This has been more 
obvious in both the telecommunications manufacturing industry and automotive 
industry on which this research is based. According to the theory of international 
trade, China, as a less developed country, should introduce less advanced 
technologies to gain the benefits of international trade based on its cheap labour. 
Otherwise, being unable to absorb employment, China will pay a high price in 
creating a dual industrial structure, i.e., small, but advanced, high-technology 
industries in parallel with large, but traditional, industries of low technology 
intensity. However, it can be argued that China is so big that it can afford to have a 
dual industrial structure, where traditional industries, especially those located in 
small cities and countryside, are ushered in to take up the massive labour force, 
while government encourages the expansion of high-technology industries as a way 
of establishing China’s national strategic competitiveness. Absorbing employment 
via the utilising of foreign direct investment, has never been a priority.
Based on the preferential policies towards FDI, China has made great progresses in 
attracting inward foreign investment. From 1979 to 1995, the actual utilised foreign
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capital in China amounted to 250 billion US dollars, of which 115 billion US dollars 
accounted for foreign loans, and 135 billion US dollars for direct foreign investment 
(Zhang, 1996). The years from 1996 to 1998 continued to witness the strong inflow 
of FDI, each surpassing US$42 billion, indicating considerable success on the part of 
the Chinese government in attracting foreign capital from the world market.
Table 3-1: FDI in China, 1979-98 


















Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1997; Financial Times and China Daily, various 
issues.
From Table 3-1, we can see the inflow of foreign investment in China can be divided 
into three stages: the initial stage from 1980 to 1985, a continuously increasing stage 
from 1986 to 1991, and from 1992 to 1998, an accelerating stage.
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The sustained inflow of FDI has enabled China to occupy first place in the league of 
developing countries since 1993, being second only to the USA globally. This 
emergence of China as an inward investment site totally changed the structure of 
international capital movements. China’s share of inward FDI among both 
developing countries and the world as a whole, as showed in the table below, has 
been extremely high.
Table 3-2: Comparison of inward FDI in all countries, developing countries and 
China
(Unit: Billion of US dollars)
Recipient 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997
All countries 158 170 208 226 350 400
Developing Countries 41 55 73 84 129 149
China 4 11 28 34 42 44.5
China as % of all 3 6 13 15 12 11.1
China as % of_developing countries 10 20 38 40 32.6 30
Sources: UNCTAD: World Investment Report 1998.
China’s success in attracting FDI is evidenced in the steep increase in total volume, 
and partly derives from the fact that more and more large MNCs have invested in 
China’s coastal area, which is a sign of the upgrading of the quality of FDI. By 1994, 
52 of top 500 American companies by sales, 15 of top 20 Japanese companies, and 
10 of top 15 German companies have invested in China (Ji, 1995). Shanghai, as the 
largest city in China, has alone attracted 36 of the world’s 100 largest MNCs 
(People’s Daily-overseas edition, 9th October 1995). Investments made by large 
MNCs have enhanced the technological level of FDI by transferring into China 
advanced technologies tied to their capital (Kening, 1997: 9). As exemplified in the
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following table, the large MNCs having invested in China tend to concentrate on 
capital and technology intensive industries, such as automotive, telecommunications, 
and electronics.
Table 3-3: Leading MNCs in China, 1995-1996
(Unit: “Sales” and “Assets” in million Renminbi Yuan, “Export” in US$10,000)
Rank Firm Sales A ssets Export
1 Shanghai Volkswagen AG 18430.69 8035.01 461
2 Motorola (China) Electronics Co., Ltd 7364.44 4792.04 n/a
3 Beijing Jeep Co., Ltd 5745.93 2878.83 264
4 Guangdong Nuclear Power Co., Ltd 5480.16 34409.05 45880
5 Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd 4545.40 6215.23 3456
6 Southseas Oils & Industrial Co., Ltd 3774.97 3740.62 24525
7 Shenzhen Konka Electronic Co., Ltd 3610.21 2524.10 7112
8 Procter & Gamble (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd 3100.40 2109.57 267
9 Nanjing Jincheng Machinery Co., Ltd 2811.01 1593.06 981
10 Shanghai Mitsubishi Elevator Co., Ltd 2786.17 2846.81 665
• One pound was equivalent to 13.5 Renminbi yuan in 1996.
Sources: “China’s top 500 foreign-funded enterprises (in manufacturing) in 1995-6”, 
a report released by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) in 1996.
But, still, some problems in attracting FDI exist. The main problems are:
• the uneven industrial structure of foreign investment. Almost 50 per cent of 
foreign investments concentrate on the processing industry, 30 per cent on real 
estate and hotels. Only less than 10 per cent on infrastructure;
• the efficiency of foreign capital utilisation needs to be raised, and the 
management system improved. For instance, the quality of some projects tends to 
decline with the rapid increase of foreign investments. This suggests decreasing
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returns to the management functions, the likely solution for which is the 
remodelling of internal organisation.
• new sources of funds and new forms of utilisation should be explored. For 
example, 60 per cent of foreign investments are from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan, whilst those from the European countries account for less than 10 per 
cent (see Table 3-4 as below). New ways of introducing foreign funds such as 
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) project financing are in the experimental stage.
Table 3-4: Top 10 sources of the FDI stock in China by 1998 
(Unit: Billion of US dollars)
Source region Actual amount % of total
Total 267.3 100





South Korea 7.6 2.83




Sources: Beijing Review, 6th December 1999, page 22.
A more serious problem, it can be argued, is the lack of understanding on the 
importance of R&D by the Chinese government. This has been reflected in 
government policy and relates to the second point listed above regarding low 
efficiency of capital utilisation and poor performance of the management systems in 
some foreign invested firms. As in many developing countries, China offers a variety 
of incentives to inward investment, such as reductions in taxation, provision of land
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or facilities and access to local capital, which will be discussed below. These are 
balanced by various ownership restrictions, including a 25 per cent foreign 
investment shareholding to qualify for joint venture status, ceilings on the share of 
know-how and industrial property in total foreign investment, as well as some 
limitations on FDI in certain sectors or export requirements (Panagariya, 1995: 32- 
35). The two ceilings relating to industrial property and know-how are as follows: 
the proportion of industrial property of the foreign investor cannot be over 20 per 
cent of registered investment; and know-how’s share in foreign investment cannot 
exceed 10 per cent. Some problems of these policy packages are apparent: the policy 
package was more suitable for labour-intensive investment than for technology­
intensive investment; R&D capacities were not a concern of current policy; and, as a 
result of the implicit intention to neglect R&D, insufficient attention was paid to 
human capital development (Lan and Young, 1996: 75).
In the light of these problems, the Chinese government has come up with some new 
strategies for utilising foreign direct investment in the future. According to Zhang 
(1996), they can be generalised as follows:
• Making further improvements to the legal system relating to FDI in China. For 
instance, China is speeding up the process of reviewing and stipulating the 
managing decrees and acts about BOT and project financing;
• Raising the percentage of FDI in infrastructure, fundamental industries, and high 
value-added industries to 50 per cent of the total inward investment amount by 
the end of the year 2000. For this purpose, the Chinese government is to widen 
the fields open to FDI in a gradual and orderly procedure to increase value added,
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and to adopt a series of measures to introduce foreign capital to mid- and west- 
areas, much of which would be in infrastructure ;
• Widening the sources of foreign funds. Special attention is being paid to 
diversifying the channels of foreign capital, and raising the weight of the 
financing in European and American capital markets. The Chinese government is 
studying new forms for using foreign funds such as BOT, project financing, and 
enlarging the overseas share issues of Chinese companies.
Although the key problem discussed above has not been addressed, these strategies 
have produced fresh evidence to suggest that China is determined to attract much 
more FDI in the future based on an open market, competitive investment 
environment, and a complete legal system.
3.32 The impact of FDI on the Chinese economy
After nearly two decades of economic reform and opening to the outside world, the 
Chinese economy has been transformed from a closed economy to a relatively open 
one. FDI has played an important role in sustaining the upgrading of the Chinese 
economy, in terms of capital contribution and economic growth, foreign trade and 
the balance of payments, technology transfer, employment and human resources, 
regional development and income distribution and economic reform (Kening, 1997: 
27). By 1994, FDI had taken a significant share in China’s national economy: 10 per 
cent in industrial output and foreign debt, 18 per cent in fixed asset investment, 37 
per cent in foreign trade and 8 per cent in tax contribution (Guan, 1995).
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In the foreign trade sector, China ranked 10th in the world in terms of foreign trade 
volume in 1997, with its imports and exports totalling US$325 billion, leaping ahead 
from 32nd in 1978 with a trade volume of just over US$20.6 billion (China Daily,
9th February 1998). Foreign direct investment, as showed in the table below, has 
played a key role in expanding China’s foreign trade. Its share in the national total 
has increased substantially from a minimum 0.3 per cent in 1984 to 41 per cent in
1997.
Table 3-5: Export of foreign invested enterprises and its share in national total, 
1984-97
(Unit: 100 million of US dollars)















Source: Beijing Review, various issues.
Along with the huge inflow of FDI and fast expanding foreign trade, China has 
managed to maintain one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in the 
past two decades. The average annual growth rate has been 9.5 per cent during 1979
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to 1994, with double-digit growth between 1992 and 1996. It achieved an 8.8 per 
cent GDP increase in 1997, far higher than that of other Eastern Asian countries 
where the financial crisis had paralysed most economic growth. Especially due to the 
strong growth of the FDI inflow since 1993, as shown in Table 3-1, China has 
enjoyed a favourable international balance of payments and national foreign 
exchange reserves rose from US$19.4 billion to US$156.8 billion at the end of April, 
2000, second only to Japan in the world (Singtao Daily, 6th March 1998).
The reasons behind China’s success in attracting FDI in the past 18 years, in addition 
to the preferential policies discussed above, are as follows:
• Economic growth. Since the end of the 1970s, Chinese government has managed 
to maintain economic growth at a speed only experienced by few countries in 
world history. During 1979 and 1994, China’s GDP was more than quadrupled, 
and, as noted above growth rates have been among the highest in the region if not 
the world. According to a World Bank report (World Bank, 1994), the Chinese 
economy will continue to grow at a fast rate (above 7- 8 %) until 2020. This long 
term, high growth rate development, coupled with the prospect of liberalisation in 
key industries such as telecommunications, energy and communication, and 
extensive privatisation programmes carried out among state owned firms, will 
certainly create numerous business opportunities for foreign investors. Building 
up a stronghold in the fast- expanding Chinese market will provide foreign 
investors a long-term return in a more competitive globalised market.
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• Market potential. Based on its huge population (1.23 billion at the end of 1997 
according to China State Statistics Bureau, about 22 per cent of world as a 
whole), China has long been regarded as the largest potential market in the world. 
“The sheer size endows China with an unrivalled market potential in attracting 
foreign investment, and China’s fast economic growth is turning this huge 
potential into reality” (Kening, 1997: 22). The Chinese government has 
strategically used its internal market as a lever to attract FDI, especially 
investments with high technology, in order to upgrade its industrial 
competitiveness (Engardio, et al, 1996). Since 1992, more and more foreign 
invested enterprises have been allowed to sell their products internally. Lured by 
China’s expanding market, more and more foreign investors have been investing 
in China for the purpose of tapping into the Chinese internal market. According to 
certain surveys of FIEs in China, 87 per cent of Japanese firms and 92 per cent of 
American firms investing in China rate selling their products in China (i.e., as 
opposed to exporting from China) as the first aim of investing in this country 
(Qian and Gao, 1995). This present research on knowledge transfer in China’s 
telecommunications and automotive industries also indicates that the main 
incentive for the foreign firms interviewed to invest in China is market seeking, 
rather than that of being enticed by China’s cheap labour and other resources.
Kening (1997) argues that political stability has served as a key factor in inducing 
foreign investors to invest in China. However, on the contrary, it can be argued that, 
political uncertainty and a still incomplete and inconsistent legal system in relation 
to FDI have been the main concern of foreign investors up to now (Zhou, 1994: 58).
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This may partly explain why the sources of FDI into China have overwhelmingly 
been overseas Chinese while western investors only make up a small percentage (see 
Table 3-4). Had the Chinese government addressed this earlier and more 
comprehensively the FDI in China would have been much larger in volume and 
much higher in quality, as more western MNCs would have entered to service the 
huge Chinese market (Child and Lu, 1996).
3.4 The telecommunications manufacturing industry and automotive industry 
of China
Both the telecommunications equipment industry and automotive industry are key 
sectors for development in China’s economy. While telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing was identified as a bottleneck to economic development as early as 
the beginning of the 1980s, it was only partly liberalised in the middle of the 1980s. 
The automotive industry was granted the green light to take off in the early 1990s, 
but has experienced much more rapid development. This section introduces the 
background to these two industries and explains the government policies in spurring 
growth in these two “special” industries.
3.41 China’s telecommunications manufacturing industry
Telecommunications is an infrastructural backbone industry. It is fair to say that 
under conventional state socialism it is not a priority for development, although a 
satisfactory level of service is required (Clegg, Kamall and Leung, 1996). However,
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since the introduction of economic reform and the policy of opening at the end of 
1970s, the Chinese government finally came to the conclusion that without the 
proper development of telecommunications infrastructure, economic development 
would be bottlenecked forever. It has attached great importance to the development 
of the telecommunications sector, making it a focus of economic planning. 
Telecommunications, along with agriculture, energy and transport, became listed as 
a priority within national economic development. As a result of the preferential 
policies and huge investment in the past two decades, and especially in the 1990s, 
China’s telecommunications sector has expanded rapidly, and is playing an 
increasingly important role in the country’s economic progress.
By the end of 1994, China’s telecommunications industry had recorded an average 
annual growth rate of 31.6 per cent for the previous nine years, thereby bringing 
about an eight-fold increase over the base figure for 1980. China’s state monopoly 
provider, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT, which became part of 
the newly merged Ministry of Information Industry in 1998) had installed a long­
distance trunk line network comprising mainly optical fibre cable, digital microwave 
and satellite communications, as well as a nationwide programme-controlled local 
telephone network. The total length of long-distance fibre optical cable lines were 
820, 000 kilometres in 1995. China built 22 optical trunk lines from 1991 to 1995 
and expected to lay 23 more from 1996 to 2000 (.Beijing Review, 1995).
The country’s total telephone exchange capacity increased by 19.61 million lines in 
1997, to reach 111 million lines in total, ranking China second in the world behind
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the United States in terms of total lines. There are 8.11 telephones for every 100 
people (teledensity) in China, and that figure is expected to rise to 9.7 by the end of
1998. In the cities, there are expected to be 30 telephones for every 100 people by 
the end of 1998, compared with 26.1 by the end of 1997 (China Daily, 1998a).
Mobile telecommunications services and data telecommunications have also 
developed apace, with the number of subscribers increasing by about 170 per cent 
annually since 1990 (Financial Times, 1998b). China had 1 million mobile phone 
subscribers in 1993, 13.23 million at the end of 1997, 25 million in 1998, and 
expected to grow by a massive 77 per cent this year to 44 million (FT, 1999), the 
world’s second highest number after the United States. This has already dwarfed the 
bold forecast by specialists (The country was expected to have 35 million mobile 
phone subscribers by the end of this century, according to a Financial Times survey 
of 1998 (FT, 1998b).
Table 3-6: The development of China’s telephone system
ITEM 1978 1985 1990 1993 1994 1996 1997
Urban and rural 
telephone network 
(10, 000 lines)
n/a n/a 2045 4206 6162 9300 11100
Ownership of 
telephones (%)
0.38 0.6 1.1 2.2 3.2 7.4 8.11
Notes: “n/a” means not available.
Source: China Daily, Financial Times and Beijing Review, various issues.
China envisages the investment of RMB 500 billion (US$60.24 billion) during the 
Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) and have invested 124.5 billion yuan (US$15 
billion) in the sector’s fixed assets in 1997, which is 38.3 per cent more than the 90
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billion yuan (US$ 10.8 billion) invested in 1996 (China Daily, 1998a). The main 
reason for this high growth lies in the strategy of Chinese government of 
encouraging the introduction, absorption and assimilation of advanced foreign 
technology. This has been possible because the incumbent operator, MPT, has been, 
as its name indicates, responsible for the entire industry. Accordingly, China has 
been able to reach the level of more advanced countries by bypassing the traditional 
transition period required for the development of telecommunications. Various types 
of telecommunications technology and methods, representing the most advanced 
world levels, have been extensively introduced into the telecommunications network 
over the last decade. Technologies such as SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) 
and GSM (Global System Mobile or Global Synchronous Mode) have been 
integrated into the public telecommunications network. Urban telephone systems 
have been automated, with the rate of digital long-distance transmissions and 
programme-controlled exchanges in urban areas reaching 80 per cent and 97 per cent 
respectively. Ninety-eight per cent of inter provincial telephones are fully automated 
(Financial Time, 1998b).
Despite this rapid development over the last decade, China’s per capita 
telecommunications service level still lags far behind world average levels. In order 
to meet the soaring demand in the telecommunications sector, China strives to 
develop all types of telecommunications and information services, including 
information retrieval, data processing, electronic mail, voice mail, electronic data 
exchange and other value-added businesses. Overall plans through the year 2000 call 
for the initial completion of a nationwide public telecommunications network and
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raising the technological level of the nation’s telecommunications network in line 
with that of advanced countries. The total capacity of the nation’s telephone network 
is expected to reach 400 million lines by the year 2010, with the ownership of 
telephones reaching 25 per cent. A broadband integrated service digital 
telecommunications network, with the capacity to provide interactive-mode multi- 
media services, is planned to be initially established by then. In addition, all families 
in provincial capitals and developed coastal areas are planned to have access to 
optical fibre telecommunications services.
In order to fulfil these ambitious goals, the country has solicited foreign capital to 
improve its telecommunications facilities and upgrade its technological capacity in 
the telecommunications sector, with US$6 billion in foreign capital having already 
been put into use. The Chinese government has developed policies with regard to the 
introduction of foreign equipment and technology:
First, allowing foreign producers to set up subsidiaries in China (first only joint 
ventures, then since the end of the 1980s, wholly-owned subsidiary). Priority is 
given to establishing Sino- foreign joint ventures to transfer advanced equipment, 
transfer technology and set up local production lines. Foreign businesses are now 
allowed to participate in telecommunications construction projects, engage in joint 
ventures to produce equipment, and gain due returns in accordance with equity 
shares as well as under contractual agreements. Restrictions have been removed on 
setting up wholly-owned subsidiary of MNCs. Currently there are more than 40 
telecommunications equipment production enterprises in China. Overseas businesses
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include Northern Telecom Limited of Canada, Nokia of Finland, Alcatel Alsthom of 
France, Siemens of Germany, NEC and Fujitsu of Japan, Philips Communication 
Systems of Netherlands, Ericsson of Sweden, GPT of UK, Motorola of US. 
Underpinned by such participation, China now has the capacity to develop and mass- 
produce program-controlled digital telephone exchanges for domestic 
telecommunications networks.
Second, allowing local operators to purchase advanced technology and equipment 
from abroad and foreign providers with a local presence in order to quickly ease the 
strain on telecommunications facilities in major cities and coastal developed areas. 
China opened its telecommunications equipment manufacturing market fairly early 
(Clegg, Kamall and Leung, 1996), and has since become one of the world’s leading 
countries in terms of the level of market openness and the volume of equipment 
purchasing. MPT of China introduced a network access licensing system for 
telecommunications terminal equipment that allows users to freely purchase this 
equipment through public bidding in both domestic and international markets in 
accordance with technical standards set by the state. As a result, foreign 
telecommunications manufacturers, especially those with a local presence, have 
gained a substantial share of this rapidly expanding market. Now, China has become 
Ericsson’s largest market, having overtaken the USA in 1997. Motorola is now 
building its third production base in Sichuan province after the first two in Tianjin 
and Suzhou. Its aim is to invest at least US$2.5 billion by the end of this century 
(China Daily, 1998b). Nokia, the world’s second largest mobile phone group, has 
stepped up its presence in the fast-growing Chinese telecommunications market. A
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single contract announced in September 1997, worth US$300m, allowed Nokia to 
expand its network in Fujian province, leading to a fourfold increase in the region’s 
capacity from 600, 000 to 2.4m subscribers by the end of 1998 (Financial Times, 
1997).
Third, encouraging the expansion of indigenous scientific research and development 
in order to gradually release China from totally relying on foreign technologies. The 
Chinese government has allowed local governments to produce favourable policies, 
such as preferential access to financial resources, tax exemption and government 
subsidies, etc. to nurture the local producers in pursuit of independent R&D 
capability. All these policies seem to have met with some success. For instance, after 
more than ten years’ development, there have been a group of Chinese indigenous 
firms emerging as independent producers with strong R&D capability, such as Da 
Tang Telecom, Ju Long (Great Dragon) Group, Shenzhen Huawei Group,
Zhongxing Xin Telecom, Jin Peng Electronics, and Southern Telecom Industry 
(China Science Report, 1997).
In the telecommunications service sector, however, it is a different story. China 
appeared determined to achieve its development goal without yielding on a central 
prohibition against foreign equity participation in actual network operation (Clegg, 
Kamall and Leung, 1996). All the ventures between foreign firms and indigenous 
players are carried out on the condition that the foreign partner neither holds shares, 
nor gets involved directly in telecommunications business operations. However, the 
latest development indicates that China will allow foreign equity participation up to
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50 per cent as part of its package to secure World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
membership (FT, 1999). Whether this will be realised depends on the economic 
calculation, the state of China’s indigenous operators (MPT and Unicom - the 
second entrant) and the ascendancy of those interested in reform in the government.
The competition in telecommunications equipment sector is increasingly intense. 
China’s capacity in manufacturing of exchanges reached 15 million lines in 1997, 
accounting for 90 per cent of the total installed in the same year. It is predicted that 
in the next two years, manufacturing capacity is to grow to 20 million lines — far 
beyond demand. “Equipment vendors have even been willing to sell a line for $8, 
while it was $150 three years ago” (FT, 1999:7). In the mobile equipment market, 
the prices of handsets supplied by mainly Motorola, Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel and 
Nortel have dropped significantly over the past two years, due to an abundance of 
choice (FT, 1998b).
It seems clear from the above description, that the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry is a special industry of China, which is highlighted by the 
key role it plays in the development of national economy, the strategic priority in the 
policy agenda of the Chinese government accompanied by huge investment on a 
sustainable level, the extraordinary government support given to technology transfer 
and the nurturing of local R&D capability, and the tight control enforced by MPT. 
All these created opportunities, but spurred unusual competition as well. Although 
great progress has been made, domestically produced telecommunications 
equipment in general still fails to meet the country’s needs for the construction of
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modem telecommunications networks. China will have to continue importing 
modem technology and equipment that is badly needed for the construction and 
upgrading of telecommunications networks, while striving to enhance internal 
development and production capacity.
3.42 China’s automotive industry
The Chinese automotive industry was established in 1953 when the First Auto 
Works (FAW) was put into operation in that year. The main purpose was to provide 
trucks for industrial and military use. Since the 1980s, it has developed more rapidly, 
both in quantitative and qualitative terms, particularly through joint ventures with 
Western manufacturers. The industry’s history can be divided into two stages:
First stage, 1953- 1978. Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, Chinese government carried out extensive Soviet-style industrial policies. 
Central planning and administrative guidelines directed decisions as to what and 
how much should be produced. During this period, two assemblers, FAW and 
Second Auto Works (SAW, now called Dongfeng Group) were established and a 
complete range of parts suppliers were set up, which constituted the foundation for 
China auto industry. By 1978, the annual production of Chinese-made auto vehicles 
was 150,000 units. The passenger car industry was not developed as in the western 
economies. Cars were the prerogative of a relatively small number of high-ranking 
officials. Only a couple of thousand units were produced each year; most vehicle 
production comprised trucks.
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Second stage, 1979 - present. With the implementation of open-policy and economic 
reform since the end of the 1970s, the Soviet style planning economy has been 
gradually transformed into the “socialist” market economy. Partly as a consequence 
of this reform, China has begun to realise its economic potential and has exhibited 
one of the highest growth rates in the world over the last 20 years (EIU, 1997). 
However, unlike the telecommunications industry, the automotive industry was 
ignored by the Chinese government in the 1980s due to the conservative central 
planning mindset which regards car as luxury for a few. China paid a heavy price for 
this: it had to import 1.02 million units of cars during 1980-1995 (Yu, 1997: 184), 
spending tens of billions of US dollar worth precious foreign hard currency when the 
national economic development was restricted by the availability of it. In addition, 
having seen the pivotal role played by the automotive industry (essentially car 
production) in the economy of advanced countries, the Chinese policy makers finally 
designated the automotive industry as one of its pillar industries at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Production of all vehicles has risen considerably in recent years, 
especially cars and motorcycles. The output of all vehicles rose from 180,000 units 
at the beginning of the 1980s to 1.46 million in 1995, with annual increases of 
around 13 per cent. Motorcycles' production has grown from a negligible number to 
7.83 million; and cars, from 5418 units in 1980 to 400,000 in 1996 (Automotive 
Industry of China, 1997: 11; EIU, 1997).
Current production volumes in China are modest by the standards of advanced 
industrialised nations. However, the Chinese government has set ambitious targets
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for the development of the automotive industry. In 1994 the government was 
predicting demand to be 2.5 million vehicles of all types by the year 2000 (up from 
sales of 1.4 million in 1993). More recent estimates are for sales in the year 2000 to 
be 1.96 million, of which approximately 0.5 million will be passenger cars (EIU, 
1997).
Although the automotive industry in China has grown rapidly, it faces a number of 
problems. First, the industry is relatively scattered and fragmented, with 122 
assemblers, more than 150 bus producers, 450 vehicle-refitting factories and 119 
motorcycle makers in 1995 (Automotive Industry of China, 1997: 7). One of the 
reasons for this is competition between the various provinces and local governments, 
many of whom have sought to develop their own automotive operations. Secondly, 
the industry suffers from a lack of R&D capability. The main technologies used in 
the beginning of the 1980s were still based on those transferred from the former 
Soviet Union in the 1950s, about three to four decades behind the those of the USA, 
Japan and Western Europe. It also copes with weak base of component 
manufacturers. Most of the assemblers have to rely on their internal supplies, or 
import from international markets. Thirdly, from the latter part of 1993 the central 
government began to apply a tight monetary policy, which has led to a weakening of 
the automotive market. In addition, legislative measures to control traffic congestion 
since the beginning of the 1990s have further dampened demand. Finally, lack of 
independent R&D capabilities has hindered the development of the indigenous 
Chinese industry.
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In order to address these questions, the Chinese government issued the Industrial 
Policy for the Automotive Industry in 1994. This policy has four key objectives: to 
establish large-scale groups of saloon and light truck producers (to replace the small- 
scale, scattered manufacturers); to improve the components industry; to create 
automotive product development capabilities; to encourage individual car 
ownership.
In order to promote the competitiveness of Chinese automotive manufacturers 
through utilising foreign capital and technologies, the Chinese government has 
created an explicit policy link between joint ventures and the issue of knowledge 
transfer. It decreed that all the car assembly operations must be joint ventures with 
Chinese enterprises, and foreign partner cannot hold more than 50 per cent share in 
any circumstances. Furthermore, the Chinese government produced three lists of 
components according to China’s indigenous production capability, allowing joint 
venture as the only form of foreign entry on producing those most demanding ones 
and local partners must hold no less than 50 per cent of the equity. At the same time, 
the Chinese government extends preferential treatment to those following its 
policies, such as access to cheap loans, foreign currency allocation, less restrictions 
to the Chinese market, favourable tax and tax exemption on reinvestment, etc. This 
represents a huge effort by the Chinese government to encourage the transfer of 
advanced technologies from foreign producers.
Attracted by the huge potential of the Chinese market, there is no shortage of foreign 
candidates willing to establish joint ventures with local producers based on
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technology transfer. It is generally accepted that there are eight significant car 
assemblers in China, all of which are in partnership with foreign producers: the ‘big 
three’ (Shanghai Volkswagen, FAW Volkswagen and Dongfeng-Citron), the ‘small 
three’ (Guangzhou-Peugeot28, Beijing Jeep/Chrysler and Tianjin/Daihatsu) and the 
two mini projects (Suzuki and Fuji Heavy Industries). The characteristics of these 
producers are shown in Table 3-7. The top six of these enterprises accounted for 
90% of car sales in 1996 (EIU, 1996).



















































































1983 Suzuki Alto 6,859 350,000
Source: EIU, 1996.
Indeed, the Chinese government strategy has met with increasing enthusiasm. A 
policy of freezing new joint venture applications in the automotive industry was
28Peugeot’s interests in Guangzhou-Peugeot was sold to Honda in November, 1997.
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loosened from 1997. This resulted in the signing of several new joint venture deals. 
Apart from Honda’s take over of Peugeot’s share in the joint venture with 
Guangzhou Junda Group, General Motors was granted a license to set up a 50-50 
joint venture with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp (SAIC) and the total 
investment in the project was US$1.52 billion. The joint venture is designed to 
eventually produce 100,000 Buick sedans every year from 1999 (China Daily,
1998c). In comparison with previous deals, the technologies involved in these recent 
joint ventures are much more advanced, underlying success of the Chinese 
government strategy in strengthening its automotive industry competitiveness 
through technology transfer. The same picture can be see in component sector. For 
example, Mitsubishi, one of Japan’s leading vehicle makers, won approval from the 
Chinese government to set up a joint venture engine manufacturing plant in 
Shenyang, with initial investment of RMB 730 million Yuan (US$88 million). The 
company expects to produce 150, 000 units a year of both engines and transmissions 
(FT, 1997). Other big car producers, such as Ford, Toyota, Nissan and Fiat, in 1998, 
were all said to be in discussion with the Chinese government on establishing their 
own joint ventures in near future.
In retrospect of the development of China’s automotive industry, one can easily 
conclude that it is not a conventional industry. Rather, it is a special one in that, apart 
from great market potential and huge government investment, strict government 
control applies, which hindered the development of this industry before the 1990s, 
but also facilitated its take off in the 1990s. If compared with telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and other typical industries, government control in this case
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does not only mean restrictions on market access, equity requirement, sophistication 
of technologies transferred, and so on. It also extends to some specific aspects. One 
example is the central government stipulates the prices at which vehicles must be 
sold (+/-10 per cent), while in telecommunications manufacturing industry the 
government takes a hands off approach in this respect. In addition, some local 
governments place restrictions on the use of certain vehicles within their area of 
jurisdiction, based on intense regional rivalry. Shanghai, for example, refused to 
license the Tianjin-produced Charade for use as a taxi (taxis represent a major 
proportion of car sales in China). The identification of extensive government control 
as the specialness of China’s automotive industry is helpful, because this will send a 
message to foreign automobile makers, that although there is clearly considerable 
potential in the Chinese market, but many challenges lie ahead in realising this 
potential. The withdrawal of Peugeot from its venture with the Guangzhou Group in 
November 1997, and their replacement by Honda, demonstrates that it may be those 
with a long-term perspective, extensive financial reserves and skills to cope with 
government control who can ultimately remain in the Chinese market.
3.5 Summary
Since the end of the 1970s, China has quickly emerged as one of the most important 
investment sites around the world. FDI has been strategically utilised by the Chinese 
government as an effective tool of spurring economic development and 
strengthening industrial competitiveness. However, the Chinese business 
environment remains distinctly different from western counterparts politically,
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economically and culturally. Issues relating to the features of the business 
environment in China, government policies towards FDI, and the profiles and 
specialities of the two industries in this research were discussed. Extensive evidence 
from the research reviewed in this chapter indicates that the Chinese government has 
been intimately involved in the ventures. It is also evident that the policy of utilising 
FDI has largely speaking an efficient way of transforming its state owned firms (in 
the case of the automotive industry) and of upgrading its backbone industries (i.e., 
telecommunications equipment industry and automotive industry). More research, 
however, is needed to resolve the uncertainties facing foreign investors in respect of 
how to operate successfully in such an environment.
I l l
Chapter 4 Company Profiles
4.1 Introduction
This chapter intends to present some factual information on the four firms used in 
this research: Shanghai Bell and Motorola in the telecommunications, and Shanghai 
Volkswagen and Beijing Jeep in the automotive industry. These four firms are 
among the largest foreign invested enterprises in the Chinese market (see Table 3-3 
for details). Apart from the natural aspects of the firms, such as when these Chinese 
affiliates were established, the partners involved, and their products and employees, 
the key purpose of this chapter is to outline what technologies were transferred from 
the western parents to these affiliates, and how the technological assimilation has 
been carried out within them up to now. This is to lay a foundation for our analysis 
in Chapter 6 and 7.
4.2 Profile of Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd
Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd, a Sino-Belgian joint 
venture, was established on 30th July 1983. The original contract was for 15 years 
with a 5 years’ extension option. It was replaced in 1992 by an expansion contract 
until 2013. Its registered capital is US$80 million (in 1983). The partners involved in
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this joint venture include: Postal & Telecommunications Industry Corporation of 
China (60 per cent), Alcatel Bell (32 per cent) and Belgian Government (8 per cent).
After fourteen years of establishment, Shanghai Bell has become one of the pillar 
enterprises (a leading manufacturer of digital switching systems) in the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, based on knowledge transfer from 
Alcatel Bell. All the technologies involved, including product technology, 
production technology and test and quality control technology, were all transferred 
from the Belgian side. The number of staff of Shanghai Bell is around 1500, among 
which more than 50 per cent are university-educated professionals. System 1204 
(SI2) digital switching system, the main product of the company, covers all over the 
country in more than 2000 exchanges with a total capacity of 16 million lines. It 
manufactured programme-controlled digital exchanges with a combined capacity of 
6 million lines per year, and increased its product localisation rate to over 80 per cent 
in 1996. The sales revenue in 1995 was US$535 million.
While S12 public digital switching exchanges (i.e., remote, local, tandem, toll, 
international, intelligent net work) as the main products, Shanghai Bell’s products 
category also includes:
• Rural system exchanges and business system exchanges
• SS A® for hotels, schools, factories and hospitals, and transmission equipment
• Access network system
• Custom CLSI® chips
• Standard rack of GSM
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• Series products for wide band information highway
• Software products
(D SSA: Small Stand Alone (exchange)
® CLSI: Customised Large Scale Integration
Table 4-1: The key entries in Shanghai Bell’s chronology since its establishment
30/07/1983 Contract signing
01/10/1985 First manufacturing output
15/12/1986 First of its switching products was put into use
01/01/1987 Building 2 inauguration
1987 Introduction SSU-12 Production
06/09/1988 Belling Joint Venture contract signing
1988 First year of profit
1988 First year of “royalty”
1990 Capacity increase from 300 to 600 KL* /year
1990 First export contract
1992 Capacity increase from 700 to 1700 KL/year
25/09/1992 Contract extension till 2013
1992 PRTEC® Joint Venture Foundation
1992 SBB® Foundation
1993 Capacity increase from 1700 to 2800 KL/year
1993 Beijing BOT Investment & Development Co. Ltd
05/1994 NEATC® Joint Venture Foundation
09/1994 SAKHC® Joint Venture Foundation
10/1994 SB ABC® Joint Venture Foundation
12/1994 SB AMC®Joint Venture Foundation
12/1994 TEMIC® Joint Venture Foundation
1995 Capacity increase from 2800 to 4500 KL/year
1995 BBTEMC® Joint Venture Foundation
1996 Urumqi Bell; Sino-Russia Telephone Co. Ltd
* KL: Kilo Lines
(D Pearl River Telecom Equipment Co. Ltd
(D Shanghai Bell Belgium
(D North East Asia Telecom Co. Ltd
® Shanghai Alcatel Kang Hua Cable Co. Ltd
(D Shanghai Bell Alcatel Belling Co. Ltd
© Shanghai Bell Alcatel Mobile Co. Ltd
® Shanghai TEMIC Microsystems Co. Ltd
® Beijing Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd
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In order to consolidate its leading position in China, Shanghai Bell, with a total 
investment of US$172 million, built its Pudong Plant, which was completely 
finished and put into operation in 1995. This large plant includes components 
manufacturing and assembly and test workshops.
The components manufacturing department has a total space of 20256 square 
meters, comprising two main production lines: piece parts manufacturing (PPM) and 
printed circuit board manufacturing (PBM). They mainly provide the metal & 
plastic piece parts and printed circuit board (PCB) needed for system 12 assembly.
The PPM production line is equipped with the state-of-the-art production facilities, 
including computer-controlled laser cutting machinery, computer-controlled 
punching machinery, computer-controlled hydraulic bending machinery, auto spot 
welding machinery, robot welding machinery, automatic plastic injection machinery 
and an auto power coating line.
The PBM line is equipped with the most advanced computer-controlled drilling and 
milling machine, panel and pattern lines, laminator, exposer, develop etch line, 
multilayer press, X-ray drilling machine, solder mask coating line and computer 
aided manufacturing (CAM) system, with a projected production capacity of 500 
square meters. The PBM line is equipped to produce high- quality products with 
smaller holes, higher density and more multilayers to meet the requirements of J 
generation of S12 system.
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The assembly and test workshop were put into operation in July 1995, mainly 
manufacturing the hardware of S12 switching system. The workshop, characterised 
by large space and brand new layout, is equipped with the state-of-the-art facilities 
such as SMD (Surface Mounted Device) production lines and wave soldering 
machine. The production capability is among the highest in the world. Currently still 
producing E family of S I2, the company is upgrading that to J family. In order to 
ensure the quality of the product, the workshop started the application of MRPII 
(material management system) in early 1996.
Since its establishment, Shanghai Bell has dedicated its efforts to extensive 
assimilation through the introduction, design, absorption and innovation of both old 
and new products and relevant technologies from Alcatel Bell. First, in the course of 
assimilating the transferred technologies and developing its localisation capability, 
Shanghai Bell adheres to the strict procedures for quality and the principle of quality 
first. Since 1987 more than 1,000 items of different specifications in 15 categories 
have been provided covering CLSI, sophisticated high-current and high frequency 
filters, signalling cables of various types, multi-layer PCBs and raw materials, metal 
and chemical materials, etc. A large-scale coordinative production network of 85 
accessory factories with more than twenty- thousand employees for S I2, has been 
formed, which eventually promoted the technical programme and business 
development of the domestic component industries. By the end of 1995, the 
localisation rate of Shanghai Bell products reached near to 70 per cent and the total 
annual output of these supporting factories exceeded to 1 billion RMB yuan. 
Shanghai Bell has wholly assimilated the S12 hardware and software technologies
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and has effected some upgrading in some fields. At the same time, an independent 
technical and management team has been established.
Furthermore, some adaptations and developments have been made to enable S12 and 
other transferred products meeting the Chinese market better. In recent years the 
Technical Development Department of Shanghai Bell developed new products based 
on S12 in line with the specifications defined by the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications (MPT) of China. It was not only the very first one in the 
country to win the “China No.7 Signalling System Validation Acceptance 
Qualification Certificate” but also the provider of corresponding signalling systems 
for telecommunications networks in North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Russia. This 
enabled the products of Shanghai Bell to enter the world telecommunications 
market.
Second, training is the other area to which Shanghai Bell has paid attention in its 
process of assimilating the transferred technologies. The Training Centre of 
Shanghai Bell has become well qualified in the last seven years to provide training 
for ordinary maintenance staff up to high-level engineers, to meet the requirements 
of the customers. By the end of 1995 the accumulated number of the trainees reached 
14300. Moreover, to cope with the needs of the customers, eight branch- training 
centres were successively established in Beijing, Nanjing, Changchun, Changsha, 
Wuhan, Nanning, Jinan and Suzhou. Two contracted training bases are consigned to 
Zhujiang Telecom and Northeast Asia Telecom. At present a training network 
covering whole China is in the preliminary stages of formation.
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Shanghai Bell was awarded, in six consecutive years, from 1989 to 1994 the honour 
as one of the "Top Ten Best Joint Ventures". In 1995-1996 Shanghai Bell ranked 76 
among 500 large-scale industrial enterprises in China, and took first place with the 
best economic results of the electronics and telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing enterprises, and the fifth place in terms of total sales among China’s 
top 500 foreign-funded enterprises.
4.3 Profile of Motorola (China) Electronics Co., Ltd
Motorola is one of the world’s leading providers of wireless communications 
devices, semiconductors and advanced electronic systems and services. The 
company’s major product groups include cellular communications equipment, 
electronic automotive components, defence and space electronics and computers. 
Motorola is a leader in cellular phones, pagers, two-way radio and commercial code 
division multiple access (CDMA) technology.
Motorola’s first investment in China took place in 1987 with the set-up of a sales 
and marketing office. Since then, the company has enjoyed rapid growth. On 25th 
March 1992, Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd (MCEL), a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
was officially established in Tianjin’s Economic and Technology Development Area 
(TEDA). In June of that year, Motorola broke ground on its first major 
manufacturing facility in TED A. The facility became operational in March 1993, and 
manufactures pagers, cellular phones, communications components and
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semiconductors, largely for sale in China and other markets in Asia. In November 
1995, Motorola began construction of a large integrated circuit wafer fabrication 
plant, also in the Tianjin Area. The semiconductors manufactured at the plant supply 
makers of automotive communications, personal computers, peripherals and digital 
products. By the end of 1997, total investment reached US$1.2 billion, which was 
the original goal for the end of the century, making Motorola one of the foremost 
foreign investors in the electronics industry in China.
Motorola is the largest American investor in China, and has a holding company 
registered in Beijing, a wholly-owned venture in Tianjin and is involved in six equity 
joint ventures, five co-operative projects and dozens of other significant investments. 
It has made stunning progresses in the Chinese market shortly after its establishment. 
For example, it produced half a million unit of mobile phones, and more than one 
million unit of pagers in 1995 alone, about 50 per cent and 70 per cent of China’s 
output that year respectively (Yu, 1997: 119). Motorola’s 1996 exports to China 
(including Hong Kong) totaled US$3.1 billion, approximately 11 per cent of the 
company’s total worldwide revenues. Motorola exports to China from the United 
States totaled nearly US$1 billion (by 1996), supporting jobs in many states, 
including Arizona, Florida, Illinios and Texas.
Motorola’s milestones in China are indicated in Table 4-2 on next page.
Motorola declares that it follows a four-point business strategy that guides its 
investment in China (Bowers, 1997), which is the cornerstone for Motorola’s
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participation in China’s electronics industry. The first point of it is continuous 
investment and technology transfer. Attention has been placed on the establishment 
of world- class manufacturing in this host country. To date, Motorola’s Tianjin 
facility has a semiconductor plant, a pager plant, a cellular phone plant, a component 
plant, and a power source parts plant. In order to improve the level of technology in 
domestic semiconductor production, a further investment of 720 million US dollars 
was used in 1995 in building a semiconductor wafer fabrication factory with state- 
of-the-art technology transferred from the headquarters of Motorola.
Table 4-2: The key entries in Motorola (China)’s chronology in China
1971 First Motorola 2-Way radio system was installed in Shanghai Customs.
11/1986 Bob Galvin, Chris Galvin and Carl Lindholm, three executive directors, 
visited China.
06/1987 Opened first representative office in Beijing, China.
03/1992 Wholly-owned Motorola (China) Electronics, Ltd. was established.
03/1993 Began production in TEDA (Tianjin Economic-Technological 
Development Area).
05/1993 Opened Motorola University in Beijing.
02/1995 Established the first joint venture in China in Leshan, Sichuan Province.
09/1995 2nd increase to Motorola’s China investment.
11/1995 Began construction of large-capacity integrated- circuit wafer fabrication 
plant in Xiqing, Tianjin.
1996 Achieved $3.1 billion in exports to China & Hong Kong, and over 9,000 
Chinese employees.
With the construction of each facility, a steady flow of advanced production skills, 
technology, and equipment has come to China. For example, at the current 
semiconductor plant using the latest technology generated in the USA, the assembly 
and testing of linear integrated circuits (IC) and microprocessors have passed the 
relevant international standards. The plant’s automatic assembly production area
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provides a dust-free work environment and complements the most advanced saw- 
machines and wire bounders.
Motorola (China) attached great importance in assimilating the cutting-edge 
technologies transferred into its Tianjin site. First, it puts intensive training at the 
centre of its business strategy in China, as it does in all of its affiliates around the 
world. The company requires that every single employee attends at least five days 
training each year. In fact, Motorola exceeded this goal in 1996 and provided an 
average of seventy class hours of training per employee in China. A total of 19,000 
student-days of classes were taught in 1996, spread among 130 different courses.
The figure for 1997 was 27,000 student-days of training.
Motorola (China) not only requires each employee, regardless of position or 
function, to undergo a minimum of one week's training each year, but also provides 
training courses for distributors, suppliers and business partners. In addition, 
Motorola offers management education courses for Chinese government officials, 
including exchanges with Motorola operations overseas.
Second, Motorola (China) invested heavily in R&D facilities and partnerships, to not 
only facilitate its technology assimilation and adaptation, but also explore some 
latest development in the lines of business concerned, based on the competitive, but 
cheap, technological capability available locally. It has established a software centre, 
a mobile telecommunications products development centre, a manufacturing 
technology research centre, and a paging research and development centre in
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addition to other scientific research and development services. All these are to 
provide research and development services for all divisions of Motorola. Motorola 
has entered into five joint development projects to conduct research and to develop 
its communications and computer technology. It has undertaken these projects 
together with leading research institutions in China such as Tsinghua University and 
the National Research Centre for Intelligent Computing Systems, as well as 
enterprises like Legend and the Xi’an Datang Telephone Corporation.
Table 4-3: Motorola’s cooperative projects in China
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The latest cooperative project is Beida-Motorola Semiconductor Development 
Centre, established on 7th April 1998. The Chinese partner is Beijing University, one 
of the elite universities in China. Motorola will invest US$1 million in this project 
(People’s Daily, 1998).
Third, enabling technology transfer through local sourcing. Motorola has been trying 
to identify local suppliers for the key components of all equipment manufactured by 
the company’s ventures in China. In 1996, Motorola spent a total of US$473 million 
on locally-sourced components, materials and services, double the amount from 
1995, and a figure that represents 42 per cent of total expenditures. The company 
expects to spend US$1 billion annually on locally sourced products from direct and 
indirect materials suppliers in China by the end of the century. It intends to 
accomplish this by forming partnerships with Chinese suppliers, helping them in the 
process to improve management efficiency and quality control systems. In addition, 
Motorola provides suppliers with designs and new technology, and it helps them 
secure credit for necessary capital improvements, and facilitates joint ventures with 
appropriate foreign suppliers. In 1996, Motorola’s suppliers received 150 student 
days of training in nine specially-designed courses.
This approach has enabled Motorola (China) to develop a pool of local suppliers that 
has already grown to 700 across China. With Motorola’s help, these suppliers were 
able to export US$80 million worth of products in 1996, a figure that doubled in 
1997. Motorola has also helped local companies grow and improve their technology,
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an initiative that dovetails with the Chinese government’s strategy for upgrading 
state-owned enterprises.
Fourth, facilitating technology transfer and utilisation by developing joint ventures 
with local manufacturers. Since March 1995, Motorola has formed six joint ventures 
with local partners in China to manufacture a range of high-technology products, 
from pagers and multi-media computers to CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) 
infrastructure and semiconductor products. These joint ventures were claimed to 
offer opportunities for Motorola to bring cutting edge technology and management 
skills to its partners, in order to manufacture the highest quality products for the 
Chinese and export markets.
Motorola has always placed great importance on its product quality. To improve 
both products and services for the customer, in addition to utilising high technology, 
employees are expected to actively participate in quality control. “TCS” (Total 
Customer Satisfaction) teams provide opportunities for employees to participate in 
and oversee technological and process innovations. Each team is composed of 
workers from one or more work areas using their spare time to analyse and find 
solutions for workplace problems. As a result of its quest for quality excellence, the 
Semiconductor Plant and the Pager Plant both received the ISO 9002 international 
quality certification on 18th May and 15th December 1994 respectively, which allows 
the products of these two plants to be shipped anywhere in the world without import 
quality inspections.
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Table 4-4: Motorola’s joint ventures in China








































































Source: Motorola in China, 1997, page 3.
Due to the nature of its investments, its transfer of high technology and its good 
corporate citizenship, Motorola has enjoyed solid support from the Chinese 
government at all levels. In 1995, the company was presented with two certificates 
by the Chinese government: the Advanced Technology Enterprise Status Certificate 
and the High-Tech Enterprise Status Certificate. In 1996, Motorola was second 
among the Top 500 Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China in terms of total sales. 
These awards are tangible evidence of the government’s recognition of Motorola’s
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on-going commitment to transfer advanced technology to its operations in China, 
and its achievements in research, development, production, sales and after-sales 
service in the Chinese market.
4.4 Profile of Shanghai Volkswagen
The Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd (SVW) is a Sino-German joint 
venture established in 1984. The shareholders of SVW are: Volkswagen AG of 
Germany (with an interest of 50 per cent), Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (25 per cent), Bank of China Shanghai Trust and Consultancy Company 
(15 per cent) and China National Automotive Industry Corporation (10 per cent). Up 
to now the registered capital of the company has increased to RMB 2.3 billion in 
1995 from RMB 160 million when the joint venture contract was first signed in
1984.
Located in Anting Industrial Zone on the west outskirts of Shanghai, SVW is made 
up of three plant areas, i.e. Luopu Road Area (Car Plant I), Miquan Road Area (Car 
Plant II) and Changji Road Area (Engine Plant), covering 650,000 square meters of 
land in total with a floor space of 416,000 square meters.
From 1985-1995, SVW made a total investment of RMB 3.5 billion in its Phase I 
and Phase II constructions. With the completion of Phase II construction, in which 
an investment of RMB 2.5 billion was made, SVW has an annual production
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capacity of 300, 000 cars and corresponding number of engines. At present the 
company has about 7,000 employees, of whom 23 are expatriates.
Table 4-5: The key entries of Shanghai VW’s chronology
10/10/1984 Signing of the joint venture contract.
01/09/1985 Shanghai VW started operation.
07/1986 Started the manufacture of Audi 100.
01/08/1986 Started the manufacture of Santana Variant.
29/09/1986 The 10,000th Shanghai Santana rolled off the production line.
27/03/1987 SVW decided to increase its capacity to 60,000 units per year.
23/10/1987 The assembly line of the engine plant went into operation.
01/07/1988 Santana Localisation Community was inaugurated.
24/08/1988 SWV Training Centre was completed.
21/10/1989 The paint shop was completed.
15/05/1991 SVW reached the volume target of 100 cars per shift.
20/10/1991 Began Phase II construction and developing new Santana with 
VW.
28/01/1992 The total turnout of Shanghai Santana reached 100,000 units.
30/04/1994 Santana 2000 passed the national technical appraisal.
29/09/1994 SVW decided to increase its capacity to 300,000 units per year.
26/10/1994 SVW R&D centre was completed.
27/12/1994 Phase II construction was finished.
What was transferred from VW to Shanghai VW is the entire technology of 
producing Santana car, which had been developed by VW for its European and 
South American markets. Each Santana car consists of more than three thousands of 
parts. To produce these parts and assembly them at the stringent German quality 
standard was a huge challenge to this Chinese affiliate. The main ways of 
assimilating the technologies of producing Santana are as follows:
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Improving employee competencies
No firm can expect to achieve fully assimilating the transferred technologies without 
a highly qualified work force. Shanghai VW has more than 10,000 employees with 
an average age of 33, of whom a quarter has received education at or above the level 
of secondary technical school. Ever since its establishment, the SVW has always 
attached importance to personnel training. It offers secondary school graduates 
vocational courses, in which the German mode of “Dual Track Training” is adopted. 
To date Shanghai VW has produced up more than 400 skilled young employees. In 
addition to this, the firm has opened up a variety of channels for personnel training, 
such as pre-post training, manager training, overseas training, spare time courses and 
full time training in universities. According to approximate statistics, from 1985 till 
1994 a total of 19,840 person-times (or equivalent) training of different kinds were 
carried out, of which 380 person-times were trained overseas.
Shanghai VW also employs many German experts to facilitate the assimilation of the 
transferred technologies on site. Since its establishment, Shanghai VW has 
employed 107 long-term (about 3- year stay) German specialists in all, and on 
average about 200 short-term foreign specialists every year.
As a result of these measures, Shanghai VW now boasts a team of specially-trained 
people who are competent to handle matters of organisation, production and 




An important step in ensuring a high level of parts localisation is the availability of 
qualified suppliers. By adhering to the technical standards of VW, it is possible to 
establish a parts supply industry at world technical standards. In the past years SVW 
has made considerable efforts to select qualified suppliers and to assist them to 
introduce and apply advanced technology from abroad, to organise their production 
processes, set up strict quality assurance systems, and to train their personnel. 
Moreover, in order that there should be no quality failure in the production of local 
parts, SVW subjects each and every local part to a set of strict tests and adopts on 
the cars only those that have successfully passed all the highly demanding processes. 
At present SVW has about 200 local suppliers that are able to provide it with parts in 
quantities. While making parts and components not only for Santana cars, but for 
cars of other automakers in China as well, these suppliers are playing an important 
role in China’s effort to upgrade its car-making industry.
In the past 13 years, Shanghai VW, in collaboration with all the parts suppliers, has 
carried out extensive parts localisation programmes, and the local content rate has 
kept rising. In 1991, of all the carmakers in China, Shanghai VW was the first to 
achieve the local content rate of 60 per cent and successfully localise the five major 
assemblies, and therefore the first to get the customs duties on its CKD (Complete 
Knock Down) import parts reduced. In 1993 the local content further rose beyond 80 
per cent and exceeded 85 per cent in 1994 from only 2.7 per cent at the initial step in
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1985. This remarkable achievement has not only laid down a solid foundation for it 
to further increase its output and cut down the cost, but also has pushed a great 
number of parts suppliers to higher technical level and further development. It 
indicates that, by way of introducing, absorbing and assimilating advanced 
technology, China’s automobile supply industry has taken shape, and become 
capable of making car parts in conformity with international standards.
Strengthening R&D capability to carry out adaptations
Specialist engineers at Shanghai VW have made quite a number of adaptive 
improvements to the main product “Santana” based on the advanced technology 
transferred to China from overseas. This has ensured that the models are better 
suited to the road conditions in China and meet local customer requirements. In 
addition, adapting to the changing market situations, Shanghai VW has developed a 
new model of Santana jointly with VW and Autolatina, the VW’s affiliate in Brazil. 
SVW continued to make further improvements on the new model according to VW 
standards. A much-enhanced product of this model, Santana 2000 GTI, was put into 
market in 1998. The successful joint development of Santana 2000 helped to build 
up and temper a team of Chinese research and development specialists. This 
exemplifies that China’s automobile industry is advancing in terms of its technical 
ability.
Now Shanghai VW has started to work out a ten-year programme for specialist 
development as well as product development. It has also introduced from abroad a
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complete CAD system for styling, data, designing, simulation and prototype 
building. Additionally it has acquired instruments, facilities and equipment for 
analyses, tests and experiments of parts and components, so as to build up the 
resources for future research and development.










1985 62.3 1.73 1.69 1752
1986 422.5 8.90 8.37 1915
1987 714.3 11.00 10.54 2082
1988 1142.4 15.55 15.54 2352
1989 1222.3 15.68 15.58 2684
1990 1822.9 18.54 18.52 3047
1991 3575.5 35.00 33.86 4368
1992 7108 65.00 65.94 5907
1993 10528.9 100.00 100.02 6410
1994 12710 115.33 115.30 7142
1995 18430 160.07 159.75 9318
1996 24306 200.22 200.03 10333
1997 26316 230.44 230.19 10009
Source: Shanghai VW Annual Report, 1997, page 40.
In the Joint Venture Contract, the annual capacity of Shanghai VW at the initial 
stage was set at 30, 000 cars only. After thirteen years’ continuous investment on the 
one hand and renovation on the other, SVW’s products are well received by the 
users for their style, quality, price and after sales service and have become the 
models with the greatest population in China. Shanghai VW has climbed to current 
annual capacity of 300, 000 cars and 350, 000 engines. It turned out 230,443 unit of 
cars in 1997, holding more than 50 per cent of the total car market in China.
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4.5 Profile of Beijing Jeep
thBeijing Jeep Corporation Limited (BJC) was established on 5 May 1983. It is a 
joint venture between Beijing Automotive Works (B AW), part of Beijing 
Automotive Industrial Corporation, and American Motor Corporation (AMC), 
formerly controlled by the French Renault Group (which was acquired later by the 
Chrysler Motor Corporation (CMC) in August 1987). The registered capital was 
US$51.03 million, with the Chinese partner investing US$6.6 million in cash, the 
rest in workshop and equipment, holding 68.85% of the total equity; the American 
side invested US$16 million, of which US$8 million was in cash, the rest in 
technology, management skills and other intellectual property rights, holding 
31.15%. Total investment amounts to US$152.33 million. The duration of this joint 
venture was set as 20 years, i.e., until 2004.
Table 4-7: The key entries in Beijing Jeep’s chronology
1984 Beijing Jeep began operations on 15th January in Beijing, and was the 
first joint venture in China’s automotive industry.
1985 The new production line of Cherokee XJ was introduced.
1985 The first Cherokee Jeep was assembled on 26th September in Beijing 
Jeep.
1986 “Beijing Jeep Incident”.
1989 Equity percentage adjustment: Chinese partner decreased its share from 
68.85 per cent to 61.5 per cent; the American partner increased its share 
from 31.15 per cent to 38.5 per cent.
1994 Equity percentage readjustment: Chinese partner decreased its share from 
61.5 per cent to 57.6 per cent; the American partner increased its share 
from 38.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent.
1994 the localisation rate reached 80.4 per cent, and the firm began enjoying 
tariff exemption on its components import from overseas.
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Since its establishment, a significant flow of technologies took place from the 
American side to Beijing Jeep. The transferred technologies mainly include:
• The XJ series of American Motor Corporation (AMC) based on dynamic 
(continuous) transfer until 2008 (i.e., AMC will transfer any new development of 
the same line of products to BJC), including the technologies of product design, 
testing, manufacturing and quality control. This is the only one of the joint 
ventures in China’s automotive industry in which the foreign partner agreed to 
contribute its current and future technology (insofar as it relates to the same line 
of products) as its main contribution to the total investment (The American 
partner also contributed US$ 8 million cash to the new joint venture).
• Production processes: 105 sets of production equipment (covering 
assembling, welding, painting and testing) were introduced from various 
countries (engine production equipment from the UK, Italy and Germany, 
moulding equipment from Japan, painting equipment from the UK, others from 
the USA), which were supported by more than 3000 sets of equipment made 
locally.
• Computer-based project management techniques, yearly product innovation 
management processes, manufacturing engineering designing.
• Technical information management based on microfilm and use of 
computers.
So, the technologies transferred from American Motor Corporation (AMC), and then 
Chrysler Motor Corporation (CMC), to Beijing Jeep, includes those relating to the 
product, production processes, R&D techniques, and information management based
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on computers. It is worth noting here that many technologies in relation to 
production processes were obtained not only from the American side, but also from 
the UK, Italy, Germany and Japan, to help ensure technical advancement in the 
production line of this joint venture.
In order to fully assimilate these technologies, Beijing Jeep has taken effective 
measures such as intensive training, team-building (including technical teams and 
management teams, where local employees can learn from foreign expatriates 
directly), vigorous recruiting practices and increasing investment in R&D facilities. 
Indeed, the assimilation of the transferred technologies in Beijing Jeep has been 
integrated into the following processes:
1. Raising localisation rate. Every American general manager of Beijing Jeep 
averred that the success of localisation wholly depended on the technological 
capacity of local suppliers. So, the success of Beijing Jeep has been largely linked to 
the capability of local suppliers. The total components of the XJ series are 2364 
(Zhang, 1995: 33), of which 1479 need to be supplied by local component producers. 
In order to raise the localisation rate of the Cherokee XJ series, Beijing Jeep has 
taken the following measures:
• Setting up the Beijing Jeep Localisation Community, including 136 components 
suppliers, which is supervised by the Beijing Jeep Localisation Committee joined 
by managers for the two sides of the firm;
• A clear strategy of localisation with a clear implementation plan of localising 
most of the 2364 components of Cherokee XJ series;
134
• The Division of Localisation and Coordination was set up in 1986, charged with 
the responsibility of implementing the localisation strategy step by step;
• Setting up a new management system in the process of localisation, based on 
project management and contract system with clear reward or fine provisions.
2. Vigorous quality control. The quality control system in Beijing Jeep includes: 
quality control in the production process (including quality control of the 
components supplied by local manufacturers), quality testing of the product, quality 
reporting and the information dissemination system. Once Beijing Jeep was 
established, the quality policy and quality management system was taken (or copied) 
wholly and directly from AMC (later on CMC) and applied in the operations of 
Beijing Jeep. Extensive training programmes have been arranged to ensure that each 
of the employees of this firm has been equipped with the sense and skills of quality 
control. The management team claims that quality control is not only the business of 
the Department of Quality Control, but also the responsibility of everyone of this 
firm. The Department of Quality Control only works as a coordinator in 
implementing the quality strategy of the firm, carrying out the quality education and 
training, making detailed quality policy, e.g., “Quality Policy of Locally Produced 
Components”, and so on.
A fundamental philosophy behind the quality control system in Beijing Jeep is that 
high quality can only be achieved through quality assurance in each step of 
production, not a result of testing the final product. Therefore, a comprehensive 
quality system was established in Beijing Jeep after its birth consisting of: (1)
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commitment of the management team, e.g., setting up a quality control committee; 
(2) setting up quality control teams in every section of the firm; (3) extensive 
training programmes on quality control; (4) the dissemination of information on 
quality control; (5) cooperation on quality control; (6) cross-examination of quality. 
Regarding the quality control of components, apart from the specific policy towards 
local suppliers, Beijing Jeep has applied the “Quality Handbook” developed by 
CMC in its entirety.
3. The upgrading of old product. Beijing Jeep not only produces the Cherokee XJ 
series, but also produces the BJ212, the old product of the Beijing Automotive 
Works. The upgrading of BJ212 naturally becomes part of the task of the newly 
established joint venture, which is the best way of demonstrating the successfulness 
of Beijing Jeep’s assimilation of the transferred technology. BJ212L was the first 
product based on the further transfer and utilisation of technology and management 
skills initially transferred from AMC (and then CMC). This marked the ending of an 
era of no serious innovations in the BJ212 series for twenty years. This comprised 26 
innovations and the upgrading of 385 components concerning areas of braking 
system, noise reduction, and emission reduction. BJ212N was marketed in China in 
1989, and embodied 28 innovations compared with the BJ212L.
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Table 4-8: The production volume of the main products of Beijing Jeep, 1984-1997
Total production volume (unit) Total sales (unit)
Year Total BJ2020® BJ2021® Total BJ2020 BJ2021
1984 16418 16418 0 16384 16384 0
1985 21262 21000 262 20909 20685 224
1986 24087 22555 1532 24384 22826 1558
1987 26705 23703 3002 26688 23704 2984
1988 31002 26502 4500 31076 26551 4525
1989 39130 32500 6630 39153 32528 6625
1990 41832 34332 7500 41840 34330 7510
1991 48230 35530 12700 48209 35523 12686
1992 56245 36244 20001 55683 36248 19435
1993 47130 33321 13809 46604 33297 13307
1994 60907 46204 14703 60219 46233 13986
1995 80151 55024 25127 80457 54536 25921
1996 71333 45282 26051 70851 45122 25729
1997 50191 30814 19377 50103 30713 19390
© BJ2020: the original product of Beijing Automotive Works, BJ212. This has 
become part of Beijing Jeep’s business from the date of its establishment its 
establishment.
© BJ2021: i.e., Cherokee XJ series.
Source: Beijing Jeep internal statistics, 1998.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has provided a picture for each of the four firms used in this research, 
i.e., Shanghai Bell and Motorola in China’s telecommunications manufacturing 
industry, and Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep in China’s automotive industry. Issues 
such as when these firms were established, what technologies were transferred, and
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how the technologies were assimilated, were analysed in the context of their 
development within the Chinese business environment. It is evidenced that 
progresses have been made in terms of transferring technologies from western 
parents to these Chinese affiliates, enabling them becoming competitive players in 
the two industries concerned. However, huge gap still remains between them and 
their foreign parents in terms of technical and managerial capability, which indicates 




In order to achieve the objectives set out in Chapter 1, a sound and coherent research 
methodology must be identified. This chapter explained the reason for choosing a 
multiple-case study methodology, based on cross comparative analysis, and the 
process of implementing it in this exploratory research, notably during data 
collection and data analysis. It showed that this research was conducted based on the 
prior development of a questionnaire (used for examining the four research questions 
set out in Chapter 1) to guide data collection and analysis, and relied on different 
sources of evidence from multiple stages of research, with data collected and 
processed in a triangulating fashion. Thereby, the finding of this research was placed 
on a solid basis in terms of validity and reliability.
5.2 Research methodology and the research process
A multiple-case study design, based on cross comparative analysis, was chosen in 
order to carry out a detailed, but also relatively comprehensive, investigation of the 
processes of knowledge transfer and organisational learning of several MNCs 
operating in multiple sites in both the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing 
industry and automotive industry. It is argued that the objective of the research could 
not be achieved by employing a different methodology, such as the survey method.
139
As explained by Yin (1994: 1), “Case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ 
or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigation has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context”. The purpose of this research is to explore the process of knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning through FDI in the Chinese market, with the 
research questions being centred on the “what”, “how” and “why” of knowledge 
transfer in this transitional market. In particular, what knowledge has been 
transferred by the MNCs into the Chinese market? how has the knowledge been 
transferred? how has the transferred knowledge been utilised? And, what are the 
impacts of the Chinese business environment on MNCs’ knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning? Owning to the lack of research in this subject area, and the 
fact that researcher has no power to manipulate the behaviour of the subjects 
(employees of both the parents and affiliates) within the on-going event (i.e., 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning), the case study approach was 
selected as the best. This approach allows the in-depth analysis of the complicated 
issues involved in the research topic. In short, the case study methodology enabled 
this research to tackle the “meat” (details) of the process of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning carried out by FDI in the Chinese market. Given that this 
research is not a study that tests or repeats earlier work, and, as noted earlier, there is 
little existing research, the case study method is the logical choice to explore the 
chosen topic.
This research has chosen a multiple-case design. As described by Yin (1994: 44), 
multiple-case design contains more than one single case of analysis in the same
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investigation, and thereby permits a comparison across cases. The reason for 
choosing a multiple-case design instead of a single case design is because the former 
has distinct advantages in comparison with single-case designs. The evidence from 
multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust (Heiriott & Firestone, 1983). In the course 
of carrying out multiple-case research, each case must be carefully selected so that it 
either (a) predicts similar results or (b) produces contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons (Yin, 1994: 46). This suggests that cases should be selected for 
aspects in common or in contrast, for which we are able to predict the outcomes.
In this research, two cases have been chosen from each of two industries, China’s 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and its automotive industry, making the 
total number of cases up to four. The reason why these four firms were selected from 
the nine firms in the first round of investigations, is that: (1) Being final assemblers, 
they have engaged in more extensive knowledge transfer than component suppliers; 
(2) Being at the top of the FDI league table (see “Table 3-3: Leading MNCs in 
China, 1995-1996” in Chapter 3 for details), they were considered to be of large size 
and therefore more suitable for comparative analysis than others; (3) Choosing equal 
number of firms from the USA (Motorola and Beijing Jeep) and Europe (Shanghai 
VW and Shanghai Bell) will better enable comparison of the business practices on 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning between firms of different national 
origin. Therefore, the research covers the western countries from which most FDI in 
China has been drawn. Hence, these four firms are deemed to be the most suitable 
for this research.
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Multiple-case research is, in essence, also a process of cross-comparative analysis. 
According to Warwick and Osherson (1973: 8), comparative method refers to social 
scientific analyses involving observations in more than one social system, or in the 
same social system at more than one point in time. Comparative analysis performs at 
least one of four functions: replicating earlier evidence to check out whether it was 
correct; to establish the generality of a fact; verifying existing theory and generating 
new theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 23). Moreover, a synthetic comparative 
research must be both holistic -  so that the cases themselves are not lost in the 
research -  and analytic -  so that more than a few cases can be comprehended and 
modest generalisation is possible (Ragin, 1989: xiv).
In this research, both China’s telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry are chosen as the final sectors for our case study. There are 
many similarities between these two industries, but there are also crucial differences 
rendering them excellent case study materials for scientific enquiry. In terms of 
similarities, both are large-scale foreign direct invested industries in which extensive 
knowledge transfers have been reported. In respect of their differences, these largely 
arise in the technology intensity of production and their human capital intensity. The 
telecommunications manufacturing industry is at the forefront of advanced 
technology29, and the cutting edge technologies are the basis for creating firm
29 Advanced' or 'high1 technology normally refers to that which is relatively new and represents the 
application of recent research and development. 'Low technology', by contrast, refers to older, more 
mature technologies, arising from research and development carried out some time ago. There is often 
(but not always) an association between the level of technology and its factor-intensity. Advanced 
technology, arising from recent research and development in high wage economies, is often associated 
with relatively capital-intensive manufacturing process, while older technology is often relatively 
more labour-intensive (Child and Lu, 1996).
142
competitiveness. The automotive industry, on the other hand, is less technologically 
intensive, relying on modest technologies and large-scale production to reduce 
average cost and maintain competitive edge over rivals.
In the process of this research, paired comparisons were made to explore the 
commonalties and differences in knowledge transfer practices between not only the 
telecommunications and the automotive industry, but also the joint ventures and the 
wholly-owned subsidiary, and American investments and European investments. A 
replication logic has been applied throughout the process of data collection and data 
analysis (as described in the Section “5.31 Selection of the research site”, in the 
paragraph starting with “This research has carefully selected ...”) to establish the 
validness of the new findings. In conducting the comparative analysis, special 
attention was paid to both conceptual equivalence and linguistic equivalence, 
referred to by Glaser and Strauss (1967: 11), to achieve relatively valid result. It has 
been proved that choosing such a multiple-case design based on comparative 
analysis has proved to be the cornerstone of the soundness of the quality of this 
research.
The research went through several phases of data collection. Phase 1 might be 
termed the “defining and designing” phase. Some grasp was gained on the progress 
of research in relevant subjects and we identified which was salient. Then the data 
collection protocols were designed. Phase 2 can be termed the phase of “collecting 
and comparing”. We conducted several field investigations (two in China and one in 
Belgium) and worked on the research problems extensively. Phase 3 may be termed
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the “analysing and concluding” phase. We analysed the data collected and checked 
the findings in accordance with the procedures of judging the research quality given 
by Yin (1994: 33). After further theoretical refining, the whole research became the 
basis of this thesis. The research methodology employed in this study can be shown 
as below:
Figure 5-1: Research methodology: Multiple-case design
Research Methodology: Multiple-Case Design
define & design collect & compare analyse & conclude
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5.31 Selection of the research site
As most of the world major telecommunications equipment manufacturers and 
automotive producers have become involved in the Chinese market (Wu, 1995: 11; 
Anderson Consulting, 1997), the availability of research cases is not in question. In 
identifying potential research candidates, the following criteria were developed. 
Apart from the entry mode chosen (either joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiary) 
and industry engaged (either automotive or telecommunications manufacturing 
sector), MNCs had to have been operating in China for a period of at least five years. 
The five-year criterion was deemed necessary in that the selected firms would have 
at least one key technology transferred and utilised, and the overall performance 
results of the transfer(s) could be scientifically assessed then without the 
contaminating impact due to start-up, enabling analysis of the complex adjustment 
process in transferring knowledge and its impact across the organisation. This also 
provided a basis for comparison analysis among multiple cases. The five-year 
criterion is a little longer than that established in previous research on knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning, e.g., Inkpen (1995b: 129) and Lyles and Salk 
(1996: 887). The aim is to exclude any period of time that was not used in 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the firms concerned, for example, 
business license application, which took about 3-6 months in Beijing Jeep and 
Shanghai Bell (according to the respective annual reports of these two firms).
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Thirty-nine companies meeting the above criteria, roughly half to half in the two 
industries targeted in this research, were contacted in order to seek permission for an 
in-depth cases study of their experiences of handling knowledge transfer in the 
Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry or automotive industry. Upon 
receiving the positive responses from twelve firms, nine of them were selected for 
fieldwork after a thorough review of the newly received company-related documents 
(The other three were eliminated because they were either too small or only able to 
provide us access far different from the date of our scheduled field work. Please see 
Appendix I for a profile of the interviews conducted). Based on the results of the 
first fieldwork, four firms, which equally represented the industries 
(telecommunications and automotive) and the FDI source regions (EU and US), as 
shown below, were identified as the cases for further research (the reason why these 
four firms were chosen has been explained in the paragraph starting with “In this 
research, two firms ...” in Section “5.2 Research methodology and the research 
process” and also in the footnote on page 148).
Table 5-1: The origin and industry representation of the researched firms
Telecom Automotive
EU Shanghai Bell Shanghai VW
US Motorola Beijing Jeep
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Given the restrictions faced by the researcher, such as time, and especially financial 
resources, this is the maximum number of cases which can be handled using the 
chosen means of exploration (Ragin, 1989: xiii). The question here is: Can findings 
based on only four cases be generalisable in a wider context? This is an issue of 
considerable pertinence to this thesis and we believe it appropriate to address it 
directly.
Findings from multiple-case research can be generalisable to a wider context. 
However, the logic behind the generalisation of the findings from multiple-case 
research is different from quantitative research. Yin (1994: 31) points out that “A 
fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalisation as the 
method of generalising the results of the case”. The case study approach does not 
aim to ‘represent’ a ‘sample’ (ibid., p. 10), hence the rules for examining case study 
should be different from those of sampling-based survey research. The relevant 
method of generalising the findings is called “analytical generalisation”. Yin (ibid., 
10) argues that “Cases are not ‘sampling units’ and should not be chosen for this 
reason. Rather, individual case studies are to be selected as a laboratory investigator 
selects the topic of a new experiment. Under these circumstances, the method of 
generalisation is ‘analytic generalisation’, in which a previously developed theory is 
used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If 
two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be 
claimed” (ibid., 31). “Once such replication has been made, the results might be 
accepted for a much larger number of [cases]” (ibid., 35). The above discussion
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clearly indicates that findings based on multiple-case research, if underpinned by 
replication, can be generalisable.
This research has carefully selected the four firms30 and put replication at the centre 
of the process of data collection and data analysis. Based on the questionnaire 
developed from the present theoretical framework (which was tested and refined in 
the preliminary field investigations, as described in the paragraph starting with 
“Thirty-nine companies meeting ...” of this section), a detailed investigation was 
first launched in Shanghai Bell, then a replication approach was employed to test the 
validity of the findings in Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and Motorola (China). Any 
differences emerging between two cases were then examined in the other two. It was 
also possible to examine Alcatel Bell, the foreign parent of Shanghai Bell. Research 
findings as a result of such a deliberate process are solid in their validity, and are 
thought to be much more reliable in future applications (Yin, 1994).
30 The correct procedure in case study research is that “Each case must be carefully selected so that it 
either (a) predicts similar results or (b) produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons” (Yin, 
ibid., 46). As discussed on page 141, in this research we have selected four cases (being the 
financially manageable number) for similarity in terms of two from each industry, and two from the 
USA and two from Europe. In addition to the reasoning given on page 141 (in the paragraph starting 
with “In this research, two cases have been chosen from each ...”), we are able to justify in theoretical 
terms the selection of the four firms from the perspective of international business. In respect of 
industry, relatively speaking, both the telecommunications manufacturing industry and the automotive 
industry are knowledge intensive (even though there are obvious differences between them). 
According to the theory of international business, research and knowledge-intensive firms are likely to 
wish to maintain appropriability over their intellectual assets, either through ownership strategy or 
through effective internal organisation to reduce dissipation (Harrigan, 1985). Our four cases can 
therefore be seen to seek similarities in respects where these are expected, on the basis o f received 
theory. In respect of the size of the chosen cases, at present there is no relevant theoretical body of 
work to assist in predicting the outcome of joint venture partner-size effects in a developing country. 
Consequently, choosing firms of significantly different scale in the list o f inward investors in China 
would mean introducing a possible source of contrast for which we had no theoretical prediction, and 
it is likely that the confidence in some aspects of our existing findings would have been sacrificed. 
Therefore, the four foreign invested firms (all in large size) were selected for their similarity in this 
respect.
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Even so, we acknowledge that it is still a weakness of this research that it comprises 
only four cases examined in detail. The limited resources for this research has meant 
that some aspects of generalisability would inevitably be lost, whatever combination 
of four firms was chosen. In our research the reliance on very large affiliates in the 
Chinese market clearly suggests that generalisability may well be limited to other 
very large foreign invested firms. The findings of this research would have been 
more solid and more ready for future application in other industries in the Chinese 
market and in other transitional markets had more cases of different sizes been 
included.
5.32 Data collection process
This research included two phases of data collection. The objective of this first phase 
was to obtain sufficient information on what is important enough to follow up in 
detail, and prepare for the field investigation. Initially, a good deal of knowledge 
about MNCs’ knowledge transfer in general, and their practices in the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and automotive industry in particular, 
was gleaned through a review of the relevant literature available and the study of 
archival documents, such as annual reports, newsletters, strategic plan reports and 
press articles. The firms that qualified for fieldwork were then identified and 
contacted. Several data collection protocols to be used in future fieldwork were 
designed according to the theoretical framework derived from the relevant literature 
survey, with some contingent plan prepared.
149
In Phase 2, two rounds of in-depth interviews were carried out. Sufficient time was 
allowed between Phase 1 and 2 for Phase 1 data to be thoroughly analysed and for 
more structured protocols (for interview) to be built accordingly. Then, during Phase 
2, these protocols were used in obtaining information in depth about those elements 
determined to be salient.
After further study of the chosen firms, a first round investigation was carried out in 
nine firms of both the telecommunications manufacturing industry (four firms) and 
the automotive industry (five firms) in China (a full name list of the firms and 
interviewees has been attached in the form of Appendix I). This round investigation 
was intended, via a mixture of open-ended interviews and semi-structured interviews 
(most of them were in-depth ones), to thoroughly examine the key issues identified 
in the previous study and gain a deep understanding of the inter-relationship among 
them. It also sought to establish a complete list of factors which would be essential 
in handling the MNCs’ knowledge transfer in the Chinese market. During the first 
round investigation (20th May to 31st July 1997), a mixture of both open-ended and 
semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted. For example, the interviewees 
were asked several grand tour questions first, following which their answers on some 
pre-determined questions were sought based on the understanding of the researcher 
himself. Each part lasted around half an hour, making every interview at least one 
hour in total (There were several occasions when the interviews were less than one 
hour due to various reasons, such as the inability of the interviewees to explain their 
points deeply, time restrictions when the interviewees were on duty, unexpected 
interruptions and so on). There were at most two interviews a day and three
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interview days a week. One-day breaks (sometimes longer depending on 
interviewee’s availability) were arranged between interview days, allowing enough 
time for data categorisation and recording.
Between August 1997 and February 1998, We had been immersing ourselves in 
transcribing the data collected from the 24 interviews conducted in China and 
analysing other relevant information in relation to the knowledge transfer activities 
of those firms concerned. Mail communications with the interview participants were 
maintained to help the researcher further understand those points that had not been 
enough pursued, and suggestions were sought from both academics and practitioners 
on the next stage research. Preliminary findings were developed and, at the same 
time, certain gaps were also identified for further investigation. These formed the 
basis of designing the amended research questions for the second fieldwork.
Before the second field visit to China, on 18th-21st February 1998,1 travelled to 
Antwerp, Belgium, interviewing managers at the headquarters of Alcatel Bell, 
which is Shanghai Bell’s foreign parent (a profile of the interviewees is attached in 
Appendix II). This trip was to gather the European perspective, and to improve the 
scientific validity of our findings from China. This field visit31 provided a good 
chance for me to review the knowledge transfer process between Alcatel Bell and 
Shanghai Bell, and developed a more comprehensive and correct understanding of 
knowledge transfer within MNC. This served as a benchmark to examine the 
practices of knowledge transfer in the other three firms chosen for the second stage
31 I was accompanied by my supervisor Dr Clegg in this field visit.
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investigation, and to compare the commonalties and differences in knowledge 
management in the two industries concerned, and to explore the internal and 
environmental reasons for those different practices which were identified.
Based on the research carried out in the first two and half years of this Ph.D research 
and a refined questionnaire, the second field trip was much more focused. Four of 
the nine firms previously visited were chosen for the final investigation. Again, a 
mixture of open-ended and semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out to 
fill in the gaps found in the previous investigation, deepen our understanding on 
MNCs’ knowledge transfer process in the two industries concerned in China, and 
compare the differences in knowledge transfer practices among these firms (i.e., the 
triangulation of the findings). In doing so, a benchmarking technique was employed 
to ensure the cross comparative analysis, validate and polish the findings of the first 
round, and build up a more solid interpretation on the research topic. The findings 
were taken back to the site and subjected to the scrutiny of the people who had 
provided information. The task was to obtain confirmation that the report had 
captured the data as constructed by the informants, or to correct, amend, or extend it, 
that is, to establish the credibility of the case.
In total thirteen interviews were conducted, i.e., Motorola, 2; Shanghai Volkswagen, 
7; Beijing Jeep, 4 (Please see Appendix III for a profile of the interviews conducted). 
Each interview session lasted one to two hours.
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The participants in the field investigations, as shown in the appendixes at the end of 
this thesis, were employees of the selected firms located in various bases in China, 
but predominantly concentrated in Shanghai and Beijing. They included: president, 
vice-president for R&D, executives of various functional divisions, such as business 
planning, marketing, finance, production and human resources. Other members of 
the knowledge transfer team, such as the training manager, operational manager, 
project engineer and other technical professionals, were also interviewed when 
possible. Participation in the interviews was totally voluntary. The anonymity of 
respondents and the confidentiality of their responses, when requested, were assured.
When possible, interviews were conducted by two interviewers, recorded and 
content-analysed, i.e., interviews in Alcatel Bell’s headquarters in Antwerp,
Belgium. However, the interviews conducted in China were carried out by myself 
with the help of a mini-recorder. The benefit of two interviewers proved to be 
important for thorough note taking, for asking the best follow-up questions, and for 
subsequent synthesis and analysis. If the interviews were not allowed to be recorded, 
as with some of the cases in China, note-taking was carried out and the interview 
would last intentionally longer in order to make more time available for closing the 
gaps found in the interview process. Attention was paid to avoiding interview bias. It 
is well known that data collected by a single interviewer can be very imprecise if 
interview bias is not properly identified (Huber and Power, 1985: 172). In order to 
address this I attended research seminars on methodology training, and conducted 
detailed preparation before each interview. The avoidance of bias was effected 
through the careful handling of probing in the process of interviewing, treating
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respondents equally and objectively regardless of their positions as managers or 
engineers, Chinese or foreign expatriates, and through triangulating the data 
retrospectively by seeking to interview more than one person in each unit of analysis. 
These measures, proposed by Jackson (1995), Easterby-Smith (1991) and Hyman 
(1954), were proved to be worthwhile in guarding against interview bias emerging in 
the various interview situations of this investigation.
Before the actual interview took place, special efforts had been made to ensure the 
questionnaire used was accurate and clear. This was mainly to do with avoiding 
questionnaire-wording problems. I carefully selected the questions to be asked, 
drafting them in very clear language, which was then re-examined by my 
supervisors. When interviews took place, the main questionnaire was refined after 
each interview session, prohibiting repetition of any possible errors. As my 
interviewees were composed of both Chinese and foreign expatriates, the English 
version of the questionnaire was carefully translated into Chinese, and back 
translation suggested by Brislin (1970) was carried out to seek the content 
consistency between them.
The working language of interviewing, understandably, was both English and 
Mandarin Chinese. The Chinese version of the transcripts were also translated into 
English using the back-translation method to ensure conceptual equivalence.
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5.33 Data recording and transcribing
Interview data and field notes were recorded by using the 'critical incident' approach 
suggested by Erlandson et al (1993: 103). This first involved recording significant 
and meaningful data in descriptive terms that was as specific as possible. It also 
involved structuring the data collected to address the research questions identified 
and to focus efforts on emerging themes. The documentation of the data in this way 
did facilitate the data, analysis. Moreover, suggestions on data recording discussed 
below were also consulted to ensure the quality of the recorded data.
How many interviews need to be transcribed? It seems that it would be always better 
to transcribe every interview conducted in the whole research process. However, 
according to Strauss and Corbin (1990: 30-31), the actual transcription should be 
selective. The general rule of the thumb here is to transcribe only as much as is 
needed. The very first interviews or field notes should be entirely transcribed and 
analysed before going on to the next interviews or field observations. This early 
coding gives guidance to the next field observations or interviews, or both. Later, as 
the research questions develop, one may wish to listen to the tapes and transcribe 
only those sentences, passages, or paragraphs that relate to one’s evolving 
propositions or theoretical predictions. They emphasise that, especially near the end 
of your study when your analysis tells you there is a hole in your theoretical 
formulations that needs closing and that further data collection is needed to close it, 
then, you may want to transcribe only those portions of the interviews or field notes 
that pertain to the theoretical gap that sent you back into the field.
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Therefore, given the fact that a detailed framework on the process of transferring 
knowledge within nine MNCs was developed as a result of twenty-seven interviews 
(twenty-three of them are in-depth ones) in China, and a big interview participated 
by five managers in Alcatel Bell, there is no need to fully transcribe all the 
interviews conducted in the second field trip to China. Only those substantially 
contributing to our understanding on issues of this research should be mostly 
transcribed. The rest could be selectively transcribed according to their importance 
to the research questions. Based on the above understanding, the taped interviews of 
the first round investigation were mostly transcribed verbatim, but then notes were 
taken or only important parts were transcribed later on those of second round 
interviews. These transcriptions were then being analysed according to the themes 
identified in the aforementioned stages of investigation and answers to specific 
questions were tabulated. This has been further explained in the next section.
5.4 Data analysis
The data analysis in this research has closely followed the procedures set for 
interpreting qualitative data (Easterby-Smith, et al, 1991; Marshall, 1996; Strauss, 
1987; Creswell, 1994) in general, and case study methodology (Yin, 1994) in 
particular, to pursue a high-quality result. Moreover, data analysis was not conducted 
only following data collection and preceding report writing. Data analysis began 
with the very first data collection, in order to facilitate the emergent design, 
grounding of theory, and emergent structure of later data collection phases (Lincoln
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and Guba, 1986: 241). We considered data analysis as an ongoing activity 
throughout all phases, as increased awareness and understanding of the knowledge 
transfer issues would facilitate the development of a conceptual framework.
The interviews were analysed individually, across teams of different sites within the 
companies, to identify factors contributing to successful and unsuccessful 
performance of knowledge transfer and organisational learning. Subsequent data 
analysis focused around the managerial dimensions in the process of executing the 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning, and involved an emergent process in 
constructing grounded interpretations. Case writing-ups were available for 
circulation among leading participants to verify overall accuracy, a step 
recommended by Yin (1994). It was hoped that by this way would we be provided 
with additional information to help fill in potential missing areas.
Moreover, in order to gain genuine, holistic results from the investigation, some 
significant overlaps were placed among the investigation phases. First of all, as soon 
as even one interview was obtained in Phase 2, or some other informational sources 
were drawn on, data analysis began and some initial very provisional insights were 
formed. These were continuously pursued to ensure that subsequent informants or 
sources were also provided the opportunity to provide “stream of consciousness” 
inputs. The development of a report following the first round in-depth interviews 
uncovered certain information gaps that could be filled during the second round 
investigation of Phase 2. The member checks process between Phase 2 and Phase 3
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was also carried out during the other phases, for example, by checking information 
from one respondent with another (i.e., cross referencing and cross checking).
By the end of this process, we finally had a comprehensive account on the selected 
firms in its approach to promote the firm competitiveness by transferring knowledge 
to their affiliates in China's telecommunications and automotive manufacturing 
industries.
5.5 Justification of the research finding
It remains controversial on how to judge the validity and reliability of the qualitative 
type research findings. Strauss and Gorbin (1990: 249) argue that a qualitative study 
can be evaluated accurately only if its procedures are sufficiently explicit so that 
readers of the resulting publication can assess their appropriateness. Also, the 
scientific canons (research standards) that the researcher has assumed should be 
appropriate to the study. Yin (1994: 330) further supposes that any qualitative 
research based on case study designs should be judged from research design stage to 
the very end of data analysis, i.e., the whole research process rather than some parts 
of it must be examined to establish the quality of any empirical research finding. In 
this research, every effort has been made to ensure the soundness of research finding 
in terms of validity and reliability required by case study methodology (Yin, 1994: 
33) and qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1986: 43; Strauss and Gorbin, 1990: 
249), respectively.
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First, construct validity was addressed by way of prolonged engagement, 
triangulation and member checks. By ‘prolonged engagement’, we mean that when 
the research design was finished, sufficient time was invested to learn the history and 
culture of the chosen firms in order to clearly know “them”. At the same time, many 
efforts were made to get rid of the misinformation introduced by respondents and 
build up trust with respondents in the firms chosen (in this case, affiliates of the nine 
MNCs in the first round investigation, from which the four selected MNCs were 
further researched in the second round investigation), and those in the parent MNC 
(i.e., Alcatel Bell). By ‘triangulation’, we mean the use of different methods to 
validate the gained data. It has been pursued throughout this research. Firstly, 
triangulation was conducted when all the data collected from the secondary sources 
prior to the first fieldwork were checked using whatever the first hand information 
from the companies visited was available. Indeed, the typical questions asked at the 
beginning of each interview (after explaining the background of the research and the 
purpose of the interviews) were to seek confirmation from the interviewees that the 
data we held were still valid. If not, what were the changes and why did they happen. 
Secondly, triangulation also took place between: (1) the first round of interviews 
(May to July 1997) and the second round of interviews (June to July 1998); (2) 
interviewees of the same company, for example, asking Mr Zheng, the production 
manager of Shanghai Bell, to comment on the description of the knowledge transfer 
route and the knowledge transfer process contained in the interview with Ms Yin, 
Director of the office of Board of Directors in this firm; (3) and interviewees of 
different companies within the same industry, for example, some of the insights 
about Shanghai VW’s approach of selecting local suppliers were obtained first from
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an interviewee in First Auto Works, one of the nine firms visited in the first 
fieldwork, and then checked upon when an interview was later conducted with Mr 
Wolfgang Rohroff, senior adviser and director of supply department in Shanghai 
VW. Thirdly, triangulation was also carried out by collecting the most recent 
publicly available data, e.g., latest statistics, newspaper articles, news release and 
annul report, etc., to update and validate the existing ones. And finally, by ‘member 
checks’, we mean all kinds of data, such as analytic categories, interpretations and 
conclusions, were tested “with members of those stake holding groups from whom 
the data were originally collected” (Lincoln and Guba, 1986: 314). In this respect, 
after the data were collected and subjected to preliminary analysis, they were sent to 
the following people to check the accuracy of the data: Ms Yin Linggu and Mr 
Zheng Yulu of Shanghai Bell, Mr Cheng Gang and Mr Sun Changsheng of Shanghai 
VW, Mr Liu Hui (Lee Liu) and Mr Boris Wang of Motorola (China), Ms Sun Ying 
and Mr Tong Zhiyuan of Beijing Jeep. The data were also sent to the following 
interviewees of Alcatel Bell for comments and validation: Mr Jos Caerts, Mr ir.
Marc De Koker, Mr Hubert Van Potelberghe, and Mr Jef Jacobs (please see 
Appendix I and El for the individual profile of these people). Moreover, as the 
analysis proceeded, further contacts were made with relevant interviewees to seek 
information or clarifications on issues which had been ignored in the fieldwork, or 
validate new data which were found to be different from what we had.
Second, internal validity was addressed by pattern matching, recommended by Yin 
(1994: 33). Pattern matching indicates the logic of comparing an empirically based 
finding with a relevant one developed in the research proposal. If they coincide, the
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results can help a case study strengthen its internal validity. This technique was used 
as the backbone for developing theoretical issues and validating findings within this 
research: a research proposal, with concrete research questions derived from the 
literature review and extensive discussions, was designed in the first year of this 
Ph.D research, and assessed by the formal Ph.D upgrade panel in February 1997.
This formed the basis for the two-stage fieldwork. Each of the research questions 
was explored in the investigation of those firms one by one, and an evolving process 
of developing those solidly established into points of the theoretical building up of 
this research was pursued in each of the research phases. The application of 
benchmarking in the second fieldwork based on a comparative analysis, and the 
exploration of the commonalties and differences of knowledge transfer practices 
among the chosen firms during that process, further strengthened the internal validity 
of this research.
Third, external validity was addressed by way of using replication logic in this 
multiple case study. Replication was not only carried out in the second round 
investigation where four firms were further examined based on the findings gained 
from previous investigation, but also applied from the very beginning when every 
element of the findings was established (The process of conducting replication in 
this research has been described in Section “5.31 Selection of the research site”, in 
the paragraph starting with “This research has carefully selected the four firms and 
put replication ...”). This spiral replication approach ensured that findings from one 
comer of the investigation was repeatedly examined in the rest of the research, 
therefore, allowing any false findings to be removed before the final version.
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Fourth, reliability was addressed by using a series of evolving case study protocols 
and developing a database for this multiple case study in the data collection process. 
The case study protocols were first developed during February and March 1997, 
after the research design was approved by the Ph.D upgrade panel. They included 
questionnaires (open-ended and semi-structured), standard letters to companies, 
interview strategies, etc. Based on the continuous refinement of the research 
protocols in accordance with the changes indicated from the consultations with the 
chosen firms in the data collection process (pilot study and first field work in 1997, 
and second field work in 1998), mistakes in the course of the data collection and 
analysis were thus minimised. The data base developed for this research included 
raw data collected, such as interview transcripts, company annual reports, relevant 
books and newspaper articles, company statistics and technical materials, etc.; data 
analysis materials, such as inquiry proposals, personal research notes, write-ups of 
field notes, summaries and important references; methodological notes, such as 
procedures, designs, strategies, rationale; findings, conclusions and stage reports. 
This created a chain of evidence and thinking driving the whole research, which can 
serve as a launch pad for the research findings to be applied elsewhere.
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Chapter 6 Knowledge transfer by FDI in China’s 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and automotive 
industry
6.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to address the first two research questions set out for 
this research, i.e., what knowledge has been transferred through FDI from MNCs’ 
headquarters to their affiliates in China’s telecommunications manufacturing 
industry and automotive industry, and how has the knowledge been transferred? 
Before examining them we first shed some light on the situation in these affiliates 
prior to knowledge transfer, which will affect the knowledge transfer practices 
employed by the firms concerned. Then we explore the typology of the transferred 
knowledge, the stage characteristics of the transferred knowledge and the way of 
managing knowledge transfer. This chapter also sets the stage for analysing the 
process of utilising the transferred knowledge in the recipient firms, that is, inherent 
in the organisational learning process. Knowledge utilisation has been regarded as 
part of the whole knowledge transfer process and, represents a continuation of the 
issues addressed in this chapter.
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6.2 The context prior to knowledge transfer
6.21 The strategic motives of MNCs in entering the Chinese market
In the introduction to Chapter 3, we have seen that since the end of the 1970s FDI 
has continuously increased in the Chinese economy. Early investments made by 
Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese into China’s coastal areas, notably those in 
Canton Province, where processing industries are the mainstay of inward investment, 
were established mainly with the intention of utilising cheap labour. Later 
investments made by firms of the Triad (US, EU and Japan) have been much wider 
in terms of motives, following the changes in Chinese government policies on FDI 
in the middle of the 1980s.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four main motives of FDI by MNCs in overseas 
markets, i.e., resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic 
asset or capability seeking (Dunning, 1993: 56). Unlike the early investments whose 
motives were mostly resource seeking, the later investments in the Chinese market 
are much more diverse in motivation. But, a key characteristic is the emerging 
dominance of the market-seeking motive. The opening of China’s internal market 
has been the main incentive for MNCs’ direct investment in the Chinese economy, 
especially so in the 1990s. The interview data from the four firms investigated 
appear to fully support the above expectation.
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According to the interviewees, the primary motive for the foreign partners to engage 
in these four firms is to service the Chinese market. In the case of Shanghai Bell, as 
explained by the senior managers of the Belgian parent Alcatel Bell during the 
interview, the motive of the parent to be involved in the Chinese market was market 
seeking. They explained that, they never thought about turning the joint venture into 
a base for servicing East Asia and Pacific markets, by using the cheap Chinese 
labour. These markets were in fact already serviced by either Alcatel Bell itself or its 
other joint ventures in this area (Alcatel Bell has joint ventures in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Australia). Labour cost is only a fraction of the whole cost of switching 
systems, besides, labour cost in China’s coastal area is not dirt-cheap any more. It 
therefore does not make sense to base export on low labour cost, as it makes an 
insignificant contribution to competitive needs.
You mentioned the factor of cheap labour. I tell you cheap labour now really 
has not much attraction to foreign investors, especially in industries like 
telecommunications. This industry is not labour intensive, but high technology 
intensive and capital intensive. How much is the percentage of labour cost in 
the final product? 10 per cent or 15 per cent? Not much! What matters is 
whether you can recruit and retain the skilled employees, especially engineers 
who can carry out R&D and application, and reward them with a dear income. 
Moreover, labour cost in the coastal areas of China is not that cheap any more. 
In places like Shanghai labour cost has been soaring in recent years. Without a 
start salary of RMB2000-3000 yuan (US$240-360) per month, plus other 
numerous benefits, no one will come to work for you. The average salary in 
Shanghai Bell is something between RMB40,000 to 50,000 yuan per year. In 
Shenzhen the salary level is even higher.
(Mr Zheng Yulu, Shanghai Bell)
The motivation of market seeking can be further discerned in the parent’s success in 
supplying intermediate products to its joint venture affiliates in China. In the case of 
Shanghai Bell alone, as shown in the following table, more than US$ 500 million of
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intermediate products were imported from Alcatel Bell during 1988-1997. These 
successfully supported the employment and production in Alcatel Bell in Belgium.
Table 6-1: Alcatel Bell’s intermediate products export to Shanghai Bell, 1988-1997 
(Unit: Million of US dollars)
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Import from 
Alcatel
21.6 27.7 27.2 43.5 46.2 69.5 42.3 64.8 103.0 62.9
Shanghai 
Bell’s sales
41.6 66.6 81.9 126.4 229 488.5 610.3 546 551 540
Import/Sales
(%)
51.9 41.5 33.2 34.4 20.1 14.2 6.9 11.8 18.7 11.6
Source: Alcatel Bell’s internal document (1998), P.III/12, and interview data.
It is evident that Alcatel Bell has used Shanghai Bell as an “aircraft carrier” to help 
secure the Chinese telecommunications equipment market. Considering seven joint 
ventures have been set up by this firm in the Chinese market alone, there is no doubt 
that Alcatel Bell’s strategy of servicing the Chinese market is two fold: the first is to 
invest capital and knowledge assets in establishing equity-based joint ventures; the 
second is to directly export to these firms.
Motorola, a dominant player in the world electronics industry, also entered China for 
its huge market. As commented in the interviews by Mr Bill Bowers, the executive 
vice president of Motorola (China):
It is the business opportunities that attracted Motorola to take concrete steps in 
penetrating the Chinese market. Being one of the biggest firms in electronics, 
we want to go with China.
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This has been fulfilled by a huge investment programme (US$2.5 billion by the end 
of 2000). It also carries with it extensive technology transfer and R&D cooperation, 
intensive in-house training and localisation activities, and endeavours to promote 
good corporate citizenship, as explained in the relevant company profile in Chapter 
4. Motorola (China) has been successful in establishing itself as one of the market 
leaders in China’s telecommunications manufacturing industry (for example, 
according to Yu (1997: 119), Motorola occupied 50 per cent of China’s mobile 
phone market and 70 per cent of pager market in 1996). Furthermore, Motorola’s 
benefits in engaging in the Chinese market can also be found in its export of 
intermediate goods to its Chinese subsidiaries. During 1993-1996, Motorola’s plants 
in America exported “nearly US$ 1 billion of intermediate products to its Chinese 
subsidiaries, supporting jobs in many states, including Arizona, Florida, Illinois and 
Texas” (Motorola in China, 1997: 4). Benefits of this nature are clear evidence of 
Motorola’s market seeking motivation in the Chinese market: not only local market 
servicing via its subsidiaries, but also direct export to these subsidiaries.
The automotive industry is no exception to this pattern. Both Volkswagen (VW) and 
American Motor Corporation (AMC, later Chrysler Motor Corporation -  CMC) all 
wanted to serve the Chinese market. They have been in China first and foremost to 
service customers of this highly regulated, but little developed, market. As explained 
by one senior manager of Shanghai VW, Mr Cheng Gang:
The aim of VW’s investment in China is to be dominant in this huge Chinese 
market, and then enter South East Asian market. Without a stronghold in Asia, 
it is very difficult for VW to service this transitional market. Based on the 
ideal combination of VW’s advanced technology and the cheap labour 
available in China, VW has been very successful in the East Asian market. 
That is VW’s initial strategy.
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Mr Zhao Nailin, a vice president of Beijing Jeep in the 1980s, also confirmed the 
strategic motive of AMC (and later CMC) in entering the Chinese market:
Their motive is first Chinese market; then (use the Chinese) production base of 
Chrysler for competing in the Far East. This is the motive of the American 
side.
Like that in the telecommunications industry, an additional incentive for these two 
firms to engage in China is the direct export of intermediate goods. Beijing Jeep is 
another classic example. As Beijing Jeep and its suppliers were unable to achieve a 
high localisation rate in a short time, a large amount of foreign exchange was needed 
to import the components from AMC and CMC for the assembly of the Cherokee XJ 
series (CKD mode). This is shown in the following table.













CKD per unit 
(US$)
1985 262 1615.4 499.5 19064.89
1986 1532 3102.1 1260.1 8255.20
1987 3002 4659.8 3266.4 10880.75 78
1988 4500 7763 4258.7 9463.
1989 6630 11046.3 6533.1 9853.85
1990 7500 10372.1 6772.2 9029.60
1991 12700 17216.1 11503.8 9058.11
1992 20001 24372.3 17333.6 8666.37
1993 13809 14469.7 10818.6 7834.46
Source: “Beijing Jeep Statistics, 1984-1994”, BJC, 1994.
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The above table actually indicates the volume of internal trade flows from AMC 
(and then CMC) to BJC. The contents of these trade flows were components 
supplied by the American side to BJC. Driven by the increase in the production 
volume, the foreign exchange expenditure on importing components rose 
dramatically. Beijing Jeep was unable to export its products in the start-up period to 
generate enough foreign exchange with which to meet the cost of importing 
components, as indicated in the export earnings and foreign exchange net spending 
in the following table. This forced the Chinese government exceptionally to allow 
Beijing Jeep to sell its products by invoicing Chinese customers in foreign exchange, 
as a means of easing the situation.










1985 24 7.2 1615.4 1608.2
1986 494 308.8 3102.1 2793.3
1987 174 131.7 4659.8 4528.1
1988 603 673.51 7763 7089.49
1989 559 545.94 11046.3 10500.36
1990 513 484.57 10372.1 9887.53
1991 241 380.42 17216.1 16835.62
1992 597 820.85 24372.3 23551.45
1993 891 1456.8 14469.7 13012.9
Source: “Beijing Jeep Statistics, 1984-1994”, BJC, 1994.
According to one study (Zhang, 1995), the American parent can earn a net profit of 
at least US$2500 per car from exporting intermediate goods to Beijing Jeep. In view 
of such premium margins, foreign car producers had already enjoyed some rewards 
in entering the Chinese market before their affiliates were established in full
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capacity. However, as supernormal returns are theoretically a compensation for risk, 
it is possible that these margins are required to enter a risky market such as China. 
Some degree of market power also helps in this respect, and it is noteworthy that Mr 
Cheng referred to the aim of VW to be “dominant” in China.
Benefits arising from exporting intermediate goods to overseas affiliates is part of 
the rents accrued through FDI, which usually also include royalties, profit sharing 
and other income. To achieve high rents in this way is part of the incentive that 
drives FDI to enter the Chinese market, which was confirmed in the interviews. For 
example, Mr Zhao of Beijing Jeep said that “Even if Beijing Jeep did not make any 
money at all, the profits from exporting parts to this firm alone would have been 
enough to justify AMC and CMC’s investment in China”. The famous “Beijing Jeep 
Incident” that occurred in 1986 was a result of shortage of foreign exchange by 
Beijing Jeep to buy components from AMC, which threatened to derail the whole 
joint venture programme. Ms Yin Linggu, director of the office of Board of 
Directors, Shanghai Bell, and the managers of Alcatel Bell, agreed that intermediate 
goods’ trade between parent and affiliate “is very big business”. Shanghai VW and 
Motorola (China) have also relied on the component supply from the foreign parents 
to keep production in China running. It appears that it is hardly possible for FDI to 
be committed so heavily in a risky environment like China’s without the parent 
calculating the immediate return from intermediate goods export. All four firms’ 
experience seems to indicate this.
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We can now conclude that the leading motive for these four MNCs in the Chinese 
market is primarily local market servicing and the rents that accrue from the transfer 
of knowledge and the sale of intermediate goods to affiliates in this market. But, a 
cautious note should be struck here. We do not claim this as general motives for all 
firms entering the Chinese market. For instance, investments made by Hong Kong 
manufacturers in labour-intensive industries in the 1980s, which were entirely 
resources oriented, are not implicated in this conclusion. Therefore, this finding is 
more appropriate to industries with a certain technological sophistication.
The motives of these foreign investing firms cannot be easily realised unless they 
can meet the aspirations of the Chinese government (upgrading their industrial 
competency by way of attracting FDI), and, in the case of joint ventures, the 
objectives of the Chinese partners. It is no surprise to find out that the motives of the 
Chinese side are common and clear. They are in effect to “Get hold of the latest 
technology and management skills, export for hard currency, and thus revitalise the 
old state-owned firms by setting up joint ventures with an established foreign firm” 
(Mr Zhao, Beijing Jeep). The Chinese partners usually requested their foreign 
counterparts to bring in the most recently developed product as the starting point for 
the joint ventures. Mr Zhao Nailin, the vice-chairman of Beijing Jeep, commented:
A good product can ensure at least 50 per cent of the success of the foreign
invested firms.
According to him, “good product” here means the kind of product based on the latest 
technology, and also presenting strong marketing prospects in the Chinese market, 
and ultimately the international market. It was decided to transfer the Cherokee XJ
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series to Beijing Jeep in 1983, when it won the best award for off-road cars in the 
same year, and was regarded as the jewel of the American Motor Corporation. The 
S1204 was chosen to be the main product of Shanghai Bell, even when it had only 
just been developed by the then Belgian Bell (it became part of Alcatel Bell later 
on). The case of Shanghai VW differs, as Santana was not VW’s core product. But, 
it was considered to be an advanced product when compared with those produced in 
China. VW made great efforts to transfer the relevant technology to the joint 
venture. The reason behind VW’s offer was that transferring a product (the Santana) 
whose market was in decline (then in Germany and other European markets), to 
China, promised to substantially extend the life cycle of this product, ensured the 
advantageous position gained by VW in the Chinese market. This is a classic case 
for Vernon’s product life cycle theory, which relates emergence of overseas 
investment to the maturing process of a new product (Fai, 1998). The success of 
VW shows that it is not necessary to transfer unstandardised technology for the latest 
products to ensure commercial success in China.
Foreign partners have been expected to bring not only the advanced technologies and 
management skills, but also distribution and market channels to international market. 
The Chinese government also grants some incentives, such as tax exemption, to 
enable the smooth implementation of the business strategies of these joint ventures.
One significant difference has been found between these two industries with regard 
to the effect of low labour costs (cheap labour), and China can provide a locational 
attraction especially in this respect (Andersen Consulting, 1997). Labour cost played
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an important role in attracting FDI in the automotive industry, as exemplified in the 
case of Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, but was viewed as less important in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry (As indicated in the comments by Mr 
Zheng above, labour cost is only about ten to fifteen per cent of the total cost of 
Shanghai Bell’s product). This is mainly due to the differences between the 
technologies employed in the two industries concerned: the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry can be characterised as using cutting-edge technologies with 
a relatively low proportion of labour cost in total cost, while labour cost shares have 
been much higher in the automotive industry which is predominantly based on 
moderately new technologies in its production line. Moreover, it is the more labour- 
intensive stages that are located in China, although this changes over time.
Denoting automotive production as moderate in terms of the novelty of its 
technology does not contradict to the fact that huge investments are needed in the 
R&D stage of each new model. This is still wholly carried out in the R&D centres, 
usually located close to the headquarters of MNCs, in North America, Europe and 
Japan. Although some types of R&D have been conducted in the developing 
countries, as we will see in the case of Shanghai VW, they are mostly adaptations 
and upgradings of the current models, and therefore strictly not comparable to 
developing an entire new model, in terms of capital and technological input. It 
remains clear from the cases discussed that market seeking has been the dominant 
motive in the entry into the Chinese market, although, resource seeking is also a 
minor motive in facilitating FDI in the automotive industry as cheap labour can 
make a more significant difference to lowering the cost of production of the final
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product of this industry than that of the telecommunications manufacturing industry. 
This suggests that the sophistication of the technologies employed in the production 
line may influence the choice of the firm’s entry strategies in their operation in 
transitional markets.
Another difference in respect of entry motivation among these four firms, but not 
between the two industries, is that only Shanghai Bell was expected to service the 
Chinese market alone, while the other three were projected to be a production base 
for both the Chinese market and other East Asian markets in the long term, although 
the Chinese market formed the chief target in the near term. As a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Motorola group, Motorola (China) is assigned not only to serve the 
Chinese market, but also to serve the world market at the same time. It is designated 
to export its core products to other markets under the co-ordination of its 
headquarters, which is the typical arrangement of a global strategy referred to by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). This, however, does not contradict the fact that the aim 
of Motorola (China) is predominantly to serve the Chinese market. VW and AMC 
(later CMC) also intended to target the Far East and Southeast Asia market at a later 
stage. China was from the outset perceived as a potential production base for the 
emerging East Asia market in the long-term strategy of these two automotive firms. 
This difference can only be related to firms’ business strategies, rather than bearing 
any theoretical implications. It is a fact that Alcatel Bell has already established 
several individual subsidiaries in South Korea, Taiwan and Australia to serve these 
markets, therefore eliminating incentive to develop Shanghai Bell into a regional 
exporter. Shanghai Bell did manage to export some of its products to China’s
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neighbouring countries, i.e., Vietnam, Laos, Russia, and North Korea. However, this 
can be attributed to meeting the Chinese government’s export campaign and to 
seeking foreign exchange from international markets in order to ease payment for the 
intermediate goods imported from Alcatel Bell. Exporting does not feature in the 
long-term strategy set by Alcatel Bell. Hence, the strategy towards servicing (or not 
servicing) the Chinese market is a difference between these firms. It is a difference 
generated by firm-specific factors, in this case the pre-existing portfolio of regional 
investments by Alcatel Bell. It is not a difference between the two industries.
Equally it has nothing to do with either wholly-owned subsidiary or joint venture. 
The main factor responsible for the decision to serve the Chinese market alone or not 
is the business strategy of the firms concerned.
6.22 Entry mode
The success of FDI in China largely depends on the right choice of entry mode. But, 
as explained in Chapter 3, there are not many options available for multinational 
firms investing in China’s telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry. Before 1990, it was a legal requirement to be in partnership 
with the Chinese manufacturers for foreign firms wanting to set up local 
manufacturing affiliates in the strategic industries, including telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing and the automotive industry. This is evidenced in all the 
three firms, Shanghai Bell, Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, established during that 
period through joint venture partnership. This policy regarding investment in the 
telecommunications equipment sector was changed at the end of the 1980s.
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Motorola set up its own wholly-owned subsidiary in 1992 following the changes in 
the above policy. No changes have been made regarding FDI in final assembly in the 
automotive industry. The Chinese governmental policy encourages the establishment 
of wholly-owned subsidiaries of MNCs in automotive components production, but 
requires that joint venture is the only mode of FDI to be allowed in the business of 
assembling cars. Foreign partners cannot hold more than 50 per cent of equity in this 
kind of activity at the time of writing.
Though different in terms of technological sophistication, a common theme for the 
four firms in this research in respect of market entry is that each must find the best 
entry strategy that can enable them to secure a big market share based on their 
existing technologies. Given the official restrictions applying to FDI in these two 
strategic industries, these firms had no choice but to accept what was offered by the 
Chinese government in the 1980s. This explained the reasons behind the chosen 
entry mode - equity joint venture - made by Shanghai Bell, Shanghai VW and 
Beijing Jeep. Motorola, however, opted for operations in the form of wholly-owned 
subsidiary, after the changes of host government policy. This decision is in line with 
the argument made by Afriyie (1988: 83) that firms with a leading edge in 
technology tend to avoid joint ownership participation in host markets. The impact 
of Chinese government policy on FDI in strategic industries can therefore be clearly 
inferred from the behaviour of these firms: liberalisation allows firms to choose their 
preferred mode of participation. But liberalisation, as it comes later, naturally 
favours firms entering later. The question also arises of whether later entrants are
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advantaged relative to earlier entrants unable to extricate themselves from existing 
joint ventures.
However, in a business environment like China’s, it is sometimes necessary to have 
a Chinese partner to shelter the affiliates concerned from exposure to local 
disadvantages, which include political risks (Contractor, 1980). The interview data 
indicate that the success of Shanghai Bell has been largely based on the support 
given by the Chinese government, which is indirectly the main shareholder of this 
firm. Ms Yin Linggu of Shanghai Bell, commented as follows:
I think the Chinese government has given lots of preferential policies to joint 
ventures since the opening to the outside world. Compared with state-owned 
firms, joint ventures do enjoy unbeatable preferential policies, such as lower 
taxation, flexible employment policy, and so on. Shanghai Bell has been a 
direct recipient of government support in its development course, but not only 
in the sense of preferential policy. In the first three years Shanghai Bell was in 
a truly difficult situation, facing the prospect of being shut down due to low 
market demand. The Ministry of Post & Telecommunications first helped us 
obtain about 100, 000 lines of orders, enabling us to start low level production 
and the training of our workers, engineers, and also installing equipment 
bought from overseas. It then decided to provide subsidies to those purchasing 
our products. The volume of the subsidies was the difference between our 
price and that of our competitors. Say, our competitor’s price is $500/line, and 
our price is $650/line, then those firms that purchased the products of 
Shanghai Bell would be given $ 150/line subsidy by the Ministry in order to 
make the prices equal. The subsidy would only last for a two-year period. After 
the two-year period, Shanghai Bell had to depend on itself. This measure was 
taken in the second half of 1987. Based on this support, we obtained lots of 
contracts in the next two years and our production volume began to increase 
dramatically.
From the above description, we can see that government support has been a very 
' critical element in nurturing success of FDI in operating in China. It includes not 
only information, consulting, preferential tax, as it is commonly referred to, but also 
direct subsidy to a joint venture.
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The critical role played by the Chinese government in effecting the operation of 
foreign direct investment has also been found in the cases of Shanghai VW. For 
example, Shanghai VW was consistently listed as the No. 1 project by Shanghai 
Municipal Government in the beginning of the 1990s. This meant that the local 
government would do everything it could to support Shanghai VW in achieving its 
goals, which usually centred on production expansion. In the case of Beijing Jeep, 
this assistance resulted in the allocation of foreign exchange directly from the central 
government to help purchase foreign components, which is a very rare occurrence 
(For a more focused discussion on government support please see Section “7.3 The 
key factors in the knowledge transfer and organisational learning process”).
It therefore appears that it has not been unwise to choose joint venture as the rational 
entry mode in China’s strategic industries, provided foreign parents can maintain 
control over their intellectual property rights. Cooperation and support, if obtainable 
from the Chinese side as a result of choosing joint venture mode, will certainly assist 
in mitigating or overcoming the L-specific disadvantages and risks (Dunning, 1993: 
81), or in reducing the information cost (Casson, 1991: 83). In the case of Motorola 
(China), it is a wholly-owned subsidiary in its own right. It follows that it has to do 
everything it can to be a good corporate citizen, which is one of the four key 
strategies followed in its business operations in China, illustrated in its company 
profile in Chapter 4. This is also an effective way of overcoming the local 
disadvantages that is especially attractive to a wholly-owned foreign firm. Moreover, 
Motorola (China) has also developed quite a number of joint venture affiliates with
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Chinese firms in various localities across this country. This is for the purpose of 
strengthening its competitiveness by partnering with the dominant players of local 
markets. It also enables Motorola to indigenise itself, but in a flexible manner. This 
is another one of the four key strategies directing Motorola’s business operation in 
China. It further supports our suggestion that the joint venture is a rational choice of 
entry mode when investing in China’s strategic industries. As explained by Mr Boris 
Wang of Motorola (China) on its strategy to set up joint venture affiliates later on:
This is the strategy of this firm, which has been decided by our bosses in 
Beijing (headquarters). My understanding is that Motorola wants to develop in 
a way of better utilising the opportunities and resources available in this 
market. Joint venture exactly meets our needs. Secondly, I think Motorola 
wants to be a good corporate citizen in China (or in anywhere it operates). 
That’s our cultural promise. Based on a wholly-owned subsidiary, Motorola 
wants to bring more benefits to Chinese partners including knowledge transfer, 
and joint ventures are the way of meeting this goal. They will be good for all 
the partners as well as ourselves.
Therefore, we can see that the underlying common theme for the foreign invested 
firms is how to secure a more favourable environment from the host market by 
making a strategic decision on entry mode, irrespective of which industry they are in 
or which country they came from. In China this “more favourable environment” can 
even includes discretionary direct support from the host government. However, the 
fact that these four firms, which are from two industries of different sophistication 
and of different countries of origin, all chose equity agreement (joint ventures and 
wholly-owned subsidiary) instead of contractual agreement, highlighted the 
difference between the Chinese market and those in developed countries where, 
according to Hagedoom and Narula (1996), the higher the technological intensity of 
industries, the more likely a contractual agreement will be chosen. The explanation
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for this difference is two-fold. First, the Chinese market is still a risky one, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, and the adoption of an equity agreement can minimise the 
possibility of leaking foreign proprietary assets (Harrigan, 1985). Second, due to a 
large technological gap, foreign investors would be extremely lucky if they can find 
capable local partners in the telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry in the Chinese market to form contractual agreement-based 
alliance.
In the joint ventures foreign partners, however, are expected to bring in nearly all the 
important resources, in terms of technology, management skills and capital, to 
ensure the prospect of success. The availability of these resources, or, the capability 
to generate them, is the crucial criterion for the Chinese side to select their foreign 
partners. This is a more specific manifestation of a similar, but more general, 
tendency in selecting partners noticed by Glaister and Buckley (1997) in their study 
of IJVs. According to managers in Alcatel Bell, the Belgian partner in Shanghai 
Bell provided nearly all the resources needed for the joint venture, such as 
technology, management skills, capital, marketing expertise and so on. The Chinese 
partner is only responsible for local approval, apart from providing labour (which is 
anyway remunerated via the operation of the joint venture) and the production site. 
The technological superiority of the Belgian partner and its willingness to furnish the 
essential resources via joint venture was sufficient to convince the Chinese 
government that Alcatel Bell (then Belgian Bell) was the optimal partner. This has 
been confirmed in the following comments of Ms Yin Linggu of Shanghai Bell, on 
the decision to select Alcatel Bell from a group of foreign contenders:
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But the most crucial reason for us to choose Belgian Bell was that, supported 
by the Belgian government and ITT, it was willing to carry out technology 
transfer at that difficult time and was capable of persuading the US 
government to issue a license for this technology transfer project. So, there are 
two fundamental criteria for selecting the foreign partner of this joint venture. 
One is the comparatively advanced technology, the other is the potential 
foreign partner was capable of transferring the relevant technology to us. Only 
Belgium Bell met the two conditions then. We were especially impressed by 
the Belgian side’s efforts in lobbying and applying for certain licenses for the 
technology transfer.
In the case of Beijing Jeep, according to Mr Zhao Nailin, vice chairman of Beijing 
Jeep, the contributions made by the two partners were: On the American side are 
foreign capital, the latest technologies and management expertise, enhanced 
decision-making ability, various training programmes, technical support to suppliers, 
and channels to world markets. On the Chinese side are experienced employees, 
some production equipment and workshops, certain technology and R&D capability 
(though at a low level comparatively), long term relationship with suppliers, 
complete local marketing channels, and contacts with government bodies, banks and 
other agencies in this market.
It clearly transpires that it is only when foreign partners are capable of bringing in 
scarce resources which are badly needed by the Chinese firms, i.e., advanced 
technologies, management expertise, capital and international market channels, is 
the Chinese government then ready to allow the entry of foreign producers. 
Subsequently, the government provides joint ventures with various support, such as 
tax exemption, various preferential treatment in land use, employee recruitment, 
bank loans, and most important of all, access to China’s internal market. This is 
found to be exactly the case for Shanghai VW, where the Chinese partner provides
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experienced labour, workshop, land and a potentially big market. The German 
partner is responsible for technology, capital, and management expertise. In general, 
the data collected from this investigation show that the Chinese government has 
been largely successful in selecting firms with competitive capabilities. The foreign 
partners in these two strategic industries have both found that the domestic market 
has been used as a leverage to expedite the transfer of resources by the MNCs to 
China, such as advanced technology, management skills and so on.
This preference for choosing capable foreign partners to participate in the Chinese 
market is also evidenced in the Hungarian market (Hooley, et al, 1996). In Hungary, 
only firms with resources that could be used by the local partners to create their own 
competitive advantages were encouraged to move into strategic industries through 
the joint venture mode. Being transitional countries, China and Hungary have been 
desperate to close the gap with Western countries by attracting firms with knowledge 
assets. This demonstrates the pivotal role played by knowledge resources conveyed 
by FDI in transitional economies. This transfer of intangible assets is in the broad 
sense very much in line with the arguments put forward by Hymer (1960,1976), 
Vernon (1966), Dunning (1977,1993) and so on, as reviewed in Chapter 2. A 
programme of transfer of knowledge resources conducted by MNCs can be used to 
mitigate their local disadvantages. In the words of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995: 10) 
knowledge resources are employed by the MNCs, “to overcome the liability of its 
foreignness”, when carrying out FDI in overseas markets.
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6.23 Corporate governance
Chapter 2 has suggested that the design and division of management control in an 
IJV in transitional markets is a way for foreign partners to limit the “bleedthrough” 
of their input knowledge and proprietary assets. With no exceptions, the three joint 
ventures all have introduced western style management systems, with the board of 
directors as the locus of strategic decision making. This has been enabled through 
China’s economic reform, which has changed the people’s mindset towards 
accepting international practice as a way of enhancing the efficiency of business 
administration in China. The board of directors is composed of representatives 
chosen from the partners involved, based on the shares held by them. For example, 
in Beijing Jeep, there are 11 directors, 7 from the Chinese side and 4 from the 
American side. Usually, a set of rules or procedures are agreed to define the function 
and operating process of the board of directors, e.g., “The policy and procedure of 
the Board of the Directors” in Beijing Jeep. Motorola (China), the only wholly- 
owned subsidiary among these four firms, on the other hand, is under the direct 
control of Motorola’s headquarters from the US, which is also in line with 
international practice.
The management team in these joint ventures is headed by a general manager and 
vice general manger, appointed by the board of directors. These two positions are 
always held by both foreign partner and the Chinese partner, but in different ways. 
For example, in Beijing Jeep, the first three general managers were Americans, 
supported by their Chinese associates. From the fourth one, Chinese have held the
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position of general manager and assisted by an American associate. In Shanghai 
Bell, the general managership is always held by the Belgians according to the joint 
venture contract, even though the Chinese partner holds the majority of the shares. In 
contrast, in Shanghai VW, the Chinese have always been appointed as general 
manager, assisted by German executive vice general manager, although the two 
partners hold equal shares in the company.
In order to strengthen the implementation of the decisions made by the Board, an 
Administrative Committee usually is set up in joint ventures, comprising major 
managers from the different sides. In Beijing Jeep, it is composed of two vice 
chairmen (one American and one Chinese) of the board of the directors, the deputy 
general manager and one manager (American) at the department level, and is headed 
by the general manager(when an American fills this post, his deputy general manager 
is a Chinese, and vice versa). In Shanghai VW, it is called the Executive 
Management Committee and is composed of two Chinese (one is the Managing 
Director, and the other Personnel and Administrative Executive Director) and two 
Germans (one is the Deputy Managing Director and Commercial Executive Director, 
the other is Technical Executive Director). Usually each member of the committee 
has equal voting power and can veto an important proposal if needed. This is 
designed to safeguard the interests of the foreign investor.
At the middle management level, it is common in the three joint ventures that 
foreign expatriates are always placed in charge of finance, R&D, quality control, and 
sometimes production, purchasing and local sourcing. In Beijing Jeep, for example,
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the American partner still holds the following departments after 15 years’, out of the 
agreed 20 years’ duration of this joint venture, operation: finance, product design, 
production, purchasing and supply, production engineering, according to Mr Sun 
Jiashan (chief of the localisation office of Beijing Jeep) and Mr Jiang Kuiduo (chief 
of division II of production engineering of Beijing Jeep). In Shanghai VW, the 
German expatriates are the direct managers of finance, R&D, quality control, 
purchasing and supply departments, while supervising production, localisation and 
marketing aspects via the executive deputy managing director’s post (which was 
designed to be permanently filled by the German partner). The picture in Shanghai 
Bell is largely the same. The Belgian partner holds finance, quality control and 
purchasing and supply directly, while the whole company is under the direction of 
the Belgian general manager during the lifetime of the joint venture. The division of 
management roles in this way is the result of the relentless negotiation prior to the 
signing of the joint venture contracts in the firms concerned. While no direct 
answers were provided, as in the case of the setting up of administrative committee, 
the intention behind this type of management governance design is clear -  to ensure 
that the foreign side could control the financial and technological aspects of the joint 
ventures where they have brought essential resources in. The human capital 
(professional skills) needed to administrate these resources can only be gained by 
extensive training and experience. Therefore, these roles are not transferable to the 
Chinese within a reasonable period. However, there are also appropriability issues at 
stake, as well as issues of the performance of the JV itself. Being accustomed to 
endless stories of foreign investors’ failures in transitional market, due to their 
knowledge assets being leaked, their capital diluted, and expatriates sidelined,
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foreign partners of these three joint ventures have sought to avoid any loss of this 
kind by negotiating a secure design of management control with the Chinese partner 
and integrating it into the joint venture contracts. This transpires that the design and 
division of management control in an IJV in transitional markets is to limit the 
bleedthrough of the foreign partners’ asset to the local partner.
A vivid example supporting this judgement is the management design in Shanghai 
VW. At the highest level, in the Board of Directors, five Chinese and five Germans 
are present, in line with the capital contribution of the two sides, with one Chinese 
holding the chairmanship and one German holding the vice chairmanship. With the 
responsibility for deciding major and strategic issues for Shanghai VW, the board of 
directors oversees the operation of this firm and constitutes the first ‘firewall’ for the 
German side to keep control of its technological and financial assets. The second 
‘firewall’ is at the executive level. There is an executive committee of management 
comprising two Germans (one is the deputy managing director and commercial 
executive director, the other is technical executive director) and two Chinese (one is 
the managing director, and the other personnel and administrative executive 
director). It operates under the principle of unanimous consent, i.e., each of the four 
members of this committee carries equal voting power, and issues for the 
consideration of this committee must obtain the support of all of the members. In 
addition, the two German directors actually control all the essential departments of 
this firm, both technology related and finance related, leaving only non-essential 
departments at risk of leaking low-level technology and of diluting assets that the 
foreign side is cautious about, such as human resources and public relationship, into
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the Chinese control. This, plus the guarantee that key departments will be headed by 
German managers, is believed to have totally eradicated any possibility of “wrong 
doing” by the Chinese partner, and constitute the third ‘firewall’. This precautionary 
mechanism does work effectively. The German side has supplied a large amount of 
financial and technological resources, and the rewards for these extensive 
investments have been considerable , and, above all, no case of knowledge leaking 
nor finance irregularities has been found. At the same time, the Chinese partner has 
achieved its aspiration to transfer advanced technology and management skills from 
the MNC, which we discuss later in detail, and in reforming run-down former state- 
owned firms. Therefore, this case demonstrates that the design and division of 
management control in an IJV in transitional markets is a way for foreign partners to 
limit the “bleedthrough” of their input knowledge and proprietary assets. The clear 
delineation of responsibilities in the JV means that bleedthrough is minimised while 
cooperation is maximised, and so, it follows, will be the performance of the firm.
A striking feature of the corporate governance of the three joint ventures is the 
disappearance of the Communist Party cadres, such as party secretaries, from the 
surface. This is in stark contrast with that in state-owned firms where party 
secretaries directly carry out primary managerial duties (Child, 1994: 73). However, 
this does not mean that the Communist Party system does not exist in these firms. 
Legally, there is no clear reference regarding the activities of the Communist Party
32 VW holds 50 per cent of the equity share of SVW. It transferred the whole range of technologies of 
its Santana to this joint venture and, from 1985-1997, contributed proportionately towards the total 
investment of RMB 6.66 billion in its Phase I and Phase II constructions. With the completion of 
Phase II construction, SVW now has an annual production capacity o f 300,000 cars and 350, 000 
engines. It turned out 230,443 unit of cars in 1997, holding more than 50 per cent of the total car 
market in China.
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and its subordinated groups (the China Youth League, the Women’s Association and 
other “democratic parties”) in the Chinese law in relation to FDI. Only trade unions 
are explicitly recognised. Nevertheless, these political groups have been operating in 
these joint ventures since their establishment, either publicly in the case of Shanghai 
Bell and Beijing Jeep, or silently in the case of Shanghai VW. Usually, the Chinese 
executive managers are key members of the local Communist Party in their 
respective firms. The proposals presented by the Chinese partner, especially in 
respect of the promotion of managerial staff, can always be translated as the results 
of decisions or consultations with the Chinese Communist Party branches in the 
respective firms. In a word, the Chinese Communist Party branches do exist in the 
joint ventures. They may vary in the working manner, but they are the same in 
effecting their influence on corporate governance and business decisions by the 
Chinese senior managers. The Belgian parent managers of Alcatel Bell commented 
on this:
The Chinese Communist Party’s involvement in business operation is 
unbelievably extensive, especially in respect of management localisation.
Some of the very promising local staff cannot be promoted to the right 
positions due to the fact that they are not Communist Party members. Belgian 
managers don’t have a say in selecting Chinese managers. Even when they 
made suggestions, the Chinese partner did not listen to their advice.
But foreign investors do not need to worry too much about this, as the central goal of 
these branches is to facilitate the smooth operating of joint ventures instead of 
organising “class struggle”. So industrial relations problems in the west are not 
experienced in these firms because there are no independent labour unions.
However, the price that is paid for the security of the proprietary knowledge of the 
firm can be compromised. For example, although no public case has been registered
188
with respect to the leaking of the transferred technologies in Shanghai Bell, it seems 
to those who have been the expatriates of Alcatel Bell, that most of the key 
technologies of S12 have been systematically disseminated to other state-owned 
telecommunications firms in China without the knowledge of the Belgian partner. 
One piece of evidence is the melting technology in S12 production, an element of 
the whole technology transferred from Alcatel Bell to Shanghai Bell, which was later 
found to have been available in most local telecommunications manufacturers. This 
has been suspected to be a strategy of the Chinese government to use joint ventures 
as a vehicle of seeking western advanced technologies, which has been orchestrated 
and carried out by local communist party branches. In contrast, western labour 
unions are almost completely disinterested in appropriating the technology of the 
inward investor. Plenty of evidences from the investigation of these firms indicate 
that these political organisations are generally very supportive towards the decisions 
of the Director of the Boards and company executive management teams.
No differences have been found between the automotive industry and the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, or between the American firm (Beijing 
Jeep) and the European firms, in respect of corporate governance. A clear 
consistency, instead, has been evident across the three firms under joint venture 
ownership in negotiating and designing the corporate governance based on the 
international practices, which can safeguard the interests of the foreign investors. A 
clear ownership difference does exist between Motorola (China) and the other three 
firms, as the former has been managed without any host equity involvement, which 
is also in line with the international practice. It is clear that all these firms have been
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operating largely based on the international rules, which indicates how far the 
Chinese government has gone to nurture an environment favourable to MNCs. 
However, because the Chinese Communist Party only operate its command structure 
in joint ventures, not in wholly-owned subsidiaries, the role played by the 
Communist Party branches in the decision making processes of the three joint 
ventures, as described in the above paragraph, signifies the difference between joint 
ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries regarding corporate governance in the 
Chinese market. Foreign investors need to learn to live with this political machine in 
their pursuit of the Chinese market under joint venture ownership.
6.3 The knowledge that has been transferred by FDI 
6.31 The typology of the transferred knowledge
After establishing an affiliate in a new market, MNCs typically seek to exploit their 
competitive advantages by transferring knowledge to the affiliate in order to develop 
its capabilities (Chang and Rosenzwig, 1995). This is the case for Shanghai Bell 
where, as a new establishment, no knowledge has been accumulated locally 
beforehand. The technologies transferred from Alcatel Bell in every respect of 
producing System 1204 formed the comer stone of Shanghai Bell’s abilities to 
compete with its rivals in this niche market. The transfers include technical 
documents and protocols covering more than 1,000 items of different specifications 
of 15 categories, such as CLSI, sophisticated high-current and high-frequency filters, 
signalling cables of various types, multi-layer PCBs and raw materials, metal and
190
chemical materials, etc. Much related computer software and state-of-the-art 
equipment were also imported to enable the production line to meet the high 
requirements of System 1204.
The first research question set out for this study is what knowledge has been 
transferred from foreign parents to their Chinese affiliates. In Chapter 2 it is 
predicted that the transferred knowledge is a compound of explicit and tacit 
knowledge, and is composed of technology, management skills and social 
knowledge. Teece (1981) also argues that knowledge transfer is often a package that 
includes both the tangible embodiment of the technology and the associated tacit 
managerial know-how; the two often cannot be successfully separated (Teece, 1981). 
Alcatel Bell’s expertise in operation and management was transferred together with 
the transfer of technology. One way of transferring managerial expertise is through 
the hands-on apprenticeship-style management team. As described earlier, the joint 
venture contract of Shanghai Bell requires that the expatriates of Belgian Bell will 
always hold the general managership, supported by two Chinese deputy general 
managers. This model extends to middle management with a group of Belgian staff 
working in key positions, usually heads of key departments, to ensure that the 
organisation of production and the quality of products are at the same level to that in 
Belgian Bell. However, the tenure of these positions is restricted. Chinese associates 
were expected to leam the management skills from their Belgian counterparts 
through this hand-on-hand approach. This is augmented by the extensive training 
programmes in both Belgium and China. It is then expected that the Chinese 
nationals would take over those positions not designated to be held permanently by
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the Belgians. Another aspect of the transfer of management skills is that Shanghai 
Bell sent some selected people to attend MBA courses overseas. “Upon finishing 
their courses they stayed in [the parent firm] Alcatel Bell for several weeks or 
months observing and learning the very practical side of management functions.” 
(Mr Jef Jacobs, programme manager China, Switching Systems Division, Alcatel 
Bell). As a result of these efforts, Chinese have now replaced most of the Belgian 
expatriates except in very sensitive positions, such as that of the manager of the 
finance department.
Both the Belgian partner and the Chinese partner were clearly aware of the 
importance of social knowledge. The managers of Alcatel Bell regarded social 
knowledge as the “secret weapon” of their business operation:
We regard tacit knowledge (including culture) as our secret weapon in 
business operation. It’s important, very important, but difficult to say 
[articulate] it.
(Mr Jos Caerts, Alcatel Bell)
Moreover, culture was singled out by Belgian managers as an indication that social 
knowledge had been transferred to Shanghai Bell:
Certainly the cultural stuff and tacit knowledge in general have been 
transferred to Shanghai Bell by ways of personal contact, as we are all human 
beings. But the culture (and tacit knowledge) there in Shanghai Bell is not only 
from Alcatel Bell, but is a mixture of Chinese culture [“in their country”] and 
the culture of the west. To be more specific, apart from Chinese culture, there 
are the cultures and tacit knowledge of Belgium, of Alcatel Bell, of Alcatel 
Bell’s switching systems division, of the engineering department of Alcatel 
Bell, and of the technology transfer department itself, and so on.
(Mr Jef Jacobs, Alcatel Bell)
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Ms Yin Linggu of Shanghai Bell also acknowledged the need to absorb western 
social knowledge in this new joint venture:
In respect of management and corporate culture, we must absorb the essence of 
western culture from their work practices, then make ours more suitable to
meet the challenges in front of u s  Most of our managers came from the
state sector. Their thinking has been changing continuously since coming here 
but they still need to leam more (from their Belgian colleagues) to understand 
all the new issues in running a joint venture.
Because of the importance of tacit knowledge, the Belgian partner still keeps about 
15 expatriates in Shanghai Bell to date (mainly technical assistants) for the sake of 
effectively communicating between the two firms.
However, there are no specific programmes intended to transfer social knowledge 
from Belgian Bell (later Alcatel Bell). This was confirmed by the staff of Shanghai 
Bell during the interviews.
Yes, social knowledge was transferred, but not formally. The way of 
transferring tacit knowledge is by co-operating, through training programmes, 
meetings, technical assistance and other ways of communications. No formal 
things were written down in relation to the transfer of tacit knowledge, as tacit 
knowledge itself is hard to be expressed. In general tacit knowledge has been 
transferred automatically.
(Ms Yin Linggu. Shanghai Bell)
All interviewees acknowledged the difference of Shanghai Bell from Chinese firms 
in respect of managing processes, communication style and corporate culture. Issues 
in this regard have been heavily influenced by Alcatel Bell — through Belgian 
expatriates, training programmes in Belgium and China taught by Belgian experts. 
Most of Shanghai Bell’s staff have been immersed in extensive daily communication 
between the two firms in the course of technology transfer and business co-operation
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— as well as in the Chinese cultural tradition and social environment since the birth 
of the Chinese firm. Therefore the transfer of social knowledge has been achieved, 
though without a specific plan, through exposure to national and company cultures 
as a by-product of the intended transfer of technology and management skills.
The same can apply to Motorola (China)’s Tianjin factories. A greenfield 
investment, Motorola’s factories in Tianjin all had to start from scratch, including 
the Semiconductor Plant, the Back End Plant, the Pager Plant, the Cellular Phone 
Plant, the Component and Power Source Parts Plant, and the Semiconductor Wafer 
Fab Plant. Everything they have in this site, from production equipment to 
organisational structure, from architectural design to corporate culture, was brought 
in from Motorola. As a senior Chinese manager (Mr Boris Wang) commented:
I can only say ‘many’ or ‘everything’. Don’t forget this is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Motorola. So everything has been done at the highest level of 
Motorola. The technologies here are the most advanced in terms of 
international standards. All the management systems are the same to that in 
other parts of the Motorola family. And more importantly, Motorola’s 
corporate culture is the core of our operation. Every employee has been trained 
to follow our culture doctrine. And we provide all we can to accommodate the 
needs of every employee.
We can note that even when the Chinese partner has substantial knowledge about the 
main line of business concerned in the joint ventures, the transfer of various know­
how from the foreign partner is still extensive, and vital for the building up of the 
competitiveness of the newly formed firm. As explained in the respective company 
profiles, the Chinese partners had been producing their main products (passenger car 
in Shanghai Auto Works, and off road jeep in Beijing Auto Works) for around thirty 
years before they both engaged in joint ventures. The reason for them to engage in
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joint venture partnerships with foreign enterprises was based on the consensus that, 
both financially and technically, they were unable to develop and produce 
competitive products on their own, especially when foreign products have been 
pouring into the Chinese market. At the inception of the joint venture the primary 
purpose of these two Chinese enterprises were to seek the capital input of foreign 
partner to develop new competitive products based on the original series of products 
of the Chinese partner.
However, after realising the great technical gap that existed between their foreign 
counterparts and themselves, the Chinese partner had to abandon their initial mindset 
of learning by jointly designing new product, then pursued the large scale transfer of 
knowledge in relation to one current product from the foreign partner: first in aspects 
closely related to the products themselves, such as technologies, production 
equipment, production engineering, and then in product renovation, management 
skills (finance, human resources management, strategic planning, quality control, 
supply chain management, leadership skills) and so on. We want to analyse the 
transferred knowledge in the case of Beijing Jeep in detail to see what has been 
transferred from the foreign parent to the joint venture in the past fourteen years.
Since its establishment, Beijing Jeep has been a recipient of the kind of knowledge 
discussed above. In the context of technology, the following has been transferred:
• The XJ series of American Motor Corporation (AMC) based on dynamic
(continuous) transfer until 2008 (i.e., AMC will transfer any new development of
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the same series products to BJC), including the technologies of product design, 
testing, manufacturing and quality control. This is the only one of the joint 
ventures in China’s automotive industry in which the foreign partner agreed to 
contribute its current and future technology (insofar as it relates to the same series 
of products) as its main contribution to the total investment (The American 
partner also contributed US$ 8 million cash to the new joint venture).
• Production processes: 105 sets of production equipment (covering assembling, 
welding, painting and testing) were introduced from various countries (engine 
production equipment from the UK, Italy and Germany, moulding equipment 
from Japan, painting equipment from the UK, others from the USA), which were 
supported by more than 3000 sets of equipment made locally. This indicates that 
the Chinese partner only introduced essential parts, but strove to achieve self- 
reliance, where possible, owning to the difficulties of acquiring foreign exchange 
to import equipment from abroad.
• Computer-based project management techniques, yearly product innovation 
management processes, manufacturing engineering designing.
• Technical information management based on microfilm and use of computers.
So, the technologies transferred from American Motor Corporation (AMC), and then 
Chrysler Motor Corporation (CMC), to Beijing Jeep, includes those relating to the 
product, production processes, R&D techniques, and information management based 
on computers. It is worth noting here that the transfer is not a totally closed one-way 
process, but very open. Many technologies in relation to production processes were 
obtained from the UK, Italy, Germany and Japan, to help ensure technical 
advancement in the production line of this joint venture.
196
In respect of management skills, the transfer from the American partner to the joint 
venture was also comprehensive. Since 1984, the following items have been 
transferred:
• The corporate governance and organisational model: Beijing Jeep applied the 
AMC model of corporate governance in its entirety, with the firm being managed 
by the general manager under the control of the board of directors. It applied the 
organisational model of AMC, setting up different departments according to lines 
of business. In order to transfer management skills (including leadership skills) to 
the Chinese counterpart, American expatriates filled the positions of general 
manager and of some of the heads of departments during the first four years. 
Subsequently, they were held by Chinese associates. Later, owning to the poor 
performance judged by the Board of Directors, Americans were appointed to 
some of the positions again.
• Human resources management: Some of the human resources management 
practices of AMC were applied in this joint venture to promote the efficiency of 
the firm, such as the whole scale labour contract system, breaking the “iron rice- 
bowl”33 inherited from China’s central planning system. From 1983 to 1988, 
Beijing Jeep recruited 120 employees through open competition, and fired 30 as 
unqualified. At the same time, a new remuneration system was set up to make 
way for promotion based on efficiency.
33 This means the central and local governments provide every employee in state-owned firms job 
security and cradle-to-grave welfare coverage. See Warner (1996) for detail.
197
• Production management systems: such as standard production planning, just-in- 
time management, and so on.
• Financial practices: such as budgeting, cost management, capital management, 
management of goods in stock, and computerisation in financial management.
• Marketing expertise: such as after sale service, promotion strategy and 
implementation of marketing strategy, and so on.
• Quality control system: with its core aim of being “Be the best”, based on the 
concept of “quality control starts from every employee” (see the following page 
for details of the quality control system introduced)
In relation to the transfer of management skills, there have been various barriers to 
the process of learning new management expertise, due to the so-called “reality of 
China”. This “reality” has largely become an excuse for not applying the latest 
management practices in Beijing Jeep. The interview data reveal that western 
management practices can be applied successfully in Beijing Jeep and other joint 
ventures. It is the old mindset (the “traditional mindset” in people’s minds) that 
blocks the application of western management ideas in Chinese firms. This shows 
the importance of renewing people’s mental approach to applying management ideas 
in every aspect of operating a joint venture. This corresponds to the need for the 
transfer of social knowledge, especially the transfer of corporate culture, from the 
parent firm -  in the case of Beijing Jeep, specifically from AMC and CMC rather 
than from the Chinese parent.
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An example of this is the transfer and application of CMC’s quality control system 
in Beijing Jeep. CMC’s quality control management system includes: quality control 
in the production process (including the quality control of components supplied by 
local suppliers), quality testing of the product, quality reporting and the information 
dissemination system.
To some extent, the quality control system is part of technology (quality testing, 
reviewing and adjusting in the process of product design and production) and 
management expertise (quality management). However, it is primarily the attitude in 
every employee’s mind that counts, as the quality of the product depends on the 
contribution of every section of the firm in part and in whole. After its 
establishment, Beijing Jeep took the quality policy and quality management system 
wholly and directly from AMC (and later on from CMC), and applied them to its 
own operations. The quality control system includes: (1) commitment of the 
management team, setting up the quality control committee; (2) setting up quality 
control teams in every section of the firm; (3) extensive training programmes on 
quality control; (4) the dissemination of information on quality control; (5) co­
operation on quality control; (6) inter-examination of quality. For example, the 
components quality control section of Beijing Jeep has wholly applied the “Quality 
Handbook” developed by CMC, in addition to the specific policy towards local 
suppliers.
So, the fundamental philosophy behind the quality control system in Beijing Jeep is 
that high quality can only be achieved through each step of production, and not a
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result of testing of final products after errors may have already been made. Extensive 
training programmes (more than 400 occasions during 1984-1989) were arranged to 
ensure that each employee of the firm was equipped with the awareness and skills of 
quality control. As Mr Tong Zhiyuan commented:
Quality control is not only the business of the Department of Quality Control,
but also the responsibility of everyone of this firm.
Following the model of its American partner, “quality first” has been extended to 
“every comer” of Beijing Jeep. The Department of Quality Control only works as a 
co-ordinator in implementing the quality strategy of the firm, carrying out quality 
education and training, making detailed quality policy, e.g., “Quality Policy of 
Locally Produced Components”, and so on.
We conclude that the transfer of modem management ideas may be the most 
important part in the transfer package. In Beijing Jeep, this has been achieved by the 
transfer and dissemination of the social knowledge of AMC and CMC, including 
corporate culture. Without the proper transfer and embedding of these ideas, the 
transfer and utilisation of both technologies and management skills would not be 
carried out successfully. People would otherwise have divergent ideas on the 
technologies concerned, such as its suitability in China, or insist on developing old 
products or lines of business, in this case BJ212 series, before wholly accepting the 
more advanced products from AMC or CMC. Hence, the case of Beijing Jeep 
vividly illustrates the importance of the integrity of knowledge transfer that 
comprises technology, management skills and social knowledge.
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Very similar results have been found in the case of. Shanghai VW in relation to the 
types of knowledge transferred from Volkswagen of Germany. The only difference is 
that, in this 50:50 joint venture, the influence of the German partner is stronger than 
that of Beijing Jeep. In the latter, the American partner has to utilise many other 
channels to influence the behaviour of the whole joint venture which otherwise 
would be impossible based on the American partner’s minority equity-holding. After 
the establishment of Shanghai VW, a “Germanisation” process has been pursued 
from top management down to workshop practices, and comprehending production, 
R&D, quality control, logistics, marketing and corporate citizenship. This has been 
supported by extensive training programmes throughout the year. It is obvious that 
the above transfer of knowledge covers not only technology and management skills, 
but also social knowledge, most of which is in tacit form. An interviewee (Mr Cheng 
Gang) commented on this:
Certainly there are technology and management know-how transferred. 
Regarding social knowledge, there is not a single project specifically targeting 
this end. But social knowledge, such as corporate culture, work practices, and 
even the way of behaving in this company, has been transferred quietly. We 
can clearly notice that there are some cultural factors that are actually 
originating from our German partner. For example, quality consciousness, 
efficiency consciousness, time consciousness, environment protection 
awareness and so on. This has been the common sense of the employees of this 
firm now. In general our corporate culture is a new hybrid culture of the 
German partner and our Chinese culture.
Based on the above account, we can say with some confidence that the transferred 
knowledge from MNCs to their affiliates investigated in this research does include 
technology, management skills and social knowledge, which confirms our argument 
in Section “2.32 The characteristics of the transferred knowledge in the context of 
FDI” of Chapter 2. Each of the components of the transferred knowledge has
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contributed to the successes as well as the failures of these joint ventures in the past
years.
Our research supports the findings of Hymer (1960), who asserted that FDI involved 
the transfer of a package of resources (technology, management skills, 
entrepreneurship, etc.), Dunning (1993: 77 and 298) and other researchers (e.g., 
Howells, 1996). As discussed in the literature review section, MNC is one of the key 
channels for the cross-border transfer of culture and business customs. Furthermore, 
social knowledge, which incorporates corporate culture, business custom and 
entrepreneurship, is an important part of the transferred knowledge, and each type of 
the transferred knowledge contributes to the building up of the firm’s 
competitiveness in the Chinese market.
It is clear that the three joint ventures have managed to transfer more types of 
knowledge than they originally wanted. The reason why this happened is worth 
exploring. During the joint venture negotiation stage, only those “hard” items, such 
as capital contribution, technologies to be transferred, production equipment to be 
purchased, the division of management responsibilities and control, and so on, were 
clearly identified. However, the transfer of management skills were largely absent in 
the contracts, let alone social knowledge. A manager of the parent Alcatel Bell 
commented on this:
Technical training and assistance are part of the contract. But the exact 
contents and length of training courses were a bit flexible according to the 
requirements of the Chinese partner. Management skill transfer is not officially 
part of the contract.
(Mr Jos Caerts, Alcatel Bell)
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But, according to these Belgian managers,
A complete set of management skills (every aspect of business operation) have 
been transferred to Shanghai Bell, but they are not required by the contracts. 
They have been presented to the Chinese side as goodwill.
(Mr Jef Jacobs, Alcatel Bell)
The aim of such a “goodwill” is to equip Chinese managers with the latest 
management knowledge for the purpose of being competitive in a fast growing 
market. In fact, this has been carried out as a “must do” policy, because “you have to 
guard your position in this huge market, as there are many others over there willing 
to transfer” (as commented by one Alcatel Bell manager).
It is evident that the size of the Chinese market, both current and potential, and the 
competitors from various countries, have been key drivers pushing the wide range of 
knowledge transfer beyond that originally intended. This strategy of comprehensive 
knowledge transfer in terms of scope is coherent with the motivation of FDI in 
entering the Chinese market, with the market-seeking motive being at the core 
behind the investments of these four firms. The situation of Beijing Jeep and 
Shanghai VW is very similar to that of Shanghai Bell: management training was 
later on singled out as a key area for upgrading, for the sake of improving efficiency 
and of assuring product quality. While little cost has been charged to the affiliate, the 
foreign investors have portrayed formal and informal management training at 
different levels as an essential dimension to enable them to compete in the Chinese 
market.
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An important issue relating to the types of the knowledge transferred by MNCs to 
China, is the level of technology (and other knowledge assets) in the affiliates in 
relation to the parent firm and affiliates in other countries. This can be distinguished 
as a difference between the telecommunications manufacturing industry and the 
automotive industry. Our investigation reveals that in the telecommunications 
industry, where technological development is continuous, the technology transferred 
can be characterised as advanced (Shanghai Bell) or even as the most advanced 
(Motorola). Motorola claims that it “manufactures only world-class equipment in 
China with the highest technology available” (Motorola in China, 1997, page 2).
But, in the automotive industry, only modest (very mature) technologies have been 
transferred to China by VW, which demonstrates that modest technology can also 
enable a firm to be successful, and that product selection alone is not responsible for 
the success of doing business in China. In the case of Beijing Jeep, the technology 
was the latest then when the transfer took place in the middle of the 1980s, but due 
to the lengthy process of localisation, it is nearly obsolete now. Although the joint 
venture contract allows Beijing Jeep to transfer any new development of Cherokee 
series made by the American parent, an inability of assimilating the transferred 
knowledge fairly quickly has in practice prohibited this joint venture from taking full 
advantage of the technological advancement of the American parent. There are no 
big differences in terms of management skills or corporate culture, as the parents 
always want to promote the integrity and efficiency by “colonising” its joint venture 
affiliates in these respects, i.e., bringing the latest, or exactly the same ideas from 
headquarters. The question is how much can be applied in these affiliates due to the 
host market situations, host government policies, and resistance from local culture
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(national culture of the host country as well as corporate culture of the Chinese 
partners).
There is one difference in terms of the transferred knowledge between China and 
other transitional economies, which has its origins in the different technological 
capabilities between China and these countries. If compared with China’s, the 
economies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe boast far more advanced 
technologies and production skills within their respective manufacturing industries 
(Radosevic, 1998). This means that the gap between them and the western countries 
in terms of technological advancement is considerably smaller than that between 
China and the West. On account of the scale of the technology gap, Chinese firms 
have always sought to prioritise the transfer of the hard elements of knowledge in 
scientific technology. In contrast, firms in the transitional economies of Europe have 
tended to seek the transfer of the soft elements of knowledge. The experience of 
Boras Wafveri’s (a Swedish textile firm) involvement in Estonia’s biggest industrial 
firm clearly indicates that management skills -  especially marketing and leadership 
skills -  are badly needed in the first instance of transfer to transitional economies 
(Financial Times, 1996b). Radosevic (1998: 25) also points out that enterprises in 
Central and Eastern European Countries have to transfer knowledge in those 
formerly neglected business functions (marketing, finance, and operation 
management) first, through technological alliances with western firms, before they 
can become quality and cost competitive partners. Based on our research and others, 
e.g., Lyles and Salk (1996), Hooley, et al, (1996), it is clear that both China and 
other countries in transition have come to the conclusion that only the transfer of all
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types of knowledge can be of use to their economies. This will be further 
demonstrated in the following section.
6.32 The stages characteristic of transferred knowledge
An important argument generated by this research in the literature review chapter on 
knowledge transfer is that there is a stages characteristic of the transferred 
knowledge. Although this “different stage-different transferred knowledge” model 
has been proved to be true in many earlier studies of cases of FDI (e.g., Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 1995), some variations have been found in this present investigation 
between Motorola (China), the only wholly-owned subsidiary and the other three 
joint ventures.
The interview data show that in the case of Motorola (China), all types of knowledge 
have been transferred at the same time. There has been a clear development strategy 
for this wholly-owned subsidiary. Social knowledge was considered as the key to 
implement the development strategy, and was emphasised in the transfer package 
from the outset. A senior manager (Mr Liu Hui) commented about this:
I don’t think there is a stage model in our case, as everything -  but everything 
— has been transferred at the same time. All the things done here are 
following Motorola’s way. Technology, management skills and corporate 
culture and other things are transferred and utilised at the same time.
The situations in the joint ventures are quite different. Although, according to the 
interviewees, the close relationship between technology and management skills 
makes it impossible to deal with them separately, different types of knowledge have
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been transferred in different stages in joint ventures, a stage approach has been 
evident.
In practice, a lack of emphasis on the soft management skills caused these joint 
ventures dearly in the early stage of their operations. Social knowledge has not been 
transferred in the way seen in Motorola (China), but was transferred along with the 
other two types of knowledge silently and simultaneously through training, 
communication, leading and various other activities. The Belgian parent managers 
commented on the question whether there is a stages model of transferring 
technology, management skills and social knowledge as follows:
Seems to us ‘no’ is the answer to the stages model proposition. Due to the 
great difference [between parent and affiliate] in business management and 
technology, knowledge should be transferred at the same time.
Social knowledge has long been identified as things that cannot fit into the needs of 
a “socialist enterprise”. This is due to the “production first” mindset inherited from 
the central planning era, which still dominates most of those state-owned firms 
today. Therefore, the Chinese partners of these joint ventures were much more 
interested in factors that can increase the production volume directly, i.e., advanced 
technologies (design, production engineering and equipment) and gradually, 
management skills, than those soft elements that were entirely new to them. Mr 
Cheng Gang also aired a similar view:
Generally speaking, technology is the easiest item to be transferred, the second 
is management skills, while social knowledge is far more difficult, and far 
more time-consuming. They may begin at the same time (!), but cultural 
factors will be the last to work.
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The impression gained from the above comments indicates that the parties within the 
joint ventures took the same view on the importance of transferring different types of 
knowledge at the same time. However, differences can be found in both the 
perceptions towards the sequence of knowledge transfer and the implementation of 
knowledge transfer strategy. First, the three joint ventures had different perceptions 
regarding the sequence of knowledge transfer. Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell 
were aware of the importance of transferring different types of knowledge at the 
same time, and managed to emphasise this by setting up various training 
programmes from the beginning. The two sides within Shanghai Bell even signed 
the contract for technical and management training programmes when the joint 
venture was not yet set up. Though not written in the joint venture contracts, some 
social knowledge related material was transferred to employees from the very 
beginning in Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell as an important part of training 
programmes. Beijing Jeep, however, was slow in realising the importance in 
transferring management skills and social knowledge. Only after several years when 
the management team in this firm realised how important it was to equip their 
employees with new concepts and management ideas, did they pay much more 
attention than the other two firms did on the transfer of knowledge in this aspect in 
order to promote competitiveness, as the formation of dynamic corporate culture 
based on trust and understanding could reduce the socially generated transaction 
costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976), to increase efficiency and productivity, and to 
promote integration across the different affiliates of the whole company.
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Second, the effective implementation of knowledge transfer in the three joint 
ventures occurred in a sequential way. In the case of Beijing Jeep, as discussed 
above, the transfer of technology (product technology, manufacturing process 
technology and quality control technology) stood out in the first stage of its 
knowledge transfer. In Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW, having realised the 
importance of carrying out the transference of both hard and soft knowledge at the 
same time, they found it arduous to achieve a smooth transfer of social knowledge. 
This is evidenced in the above-mentioned comments made by the senior manager of 
Shanghai VW. What usually happened in these two firms was the smooth 
introduction of scientific technologies, while the training programmes for passing 
over management skills and social knowledge were in an ad hoc status (the progress 
of these was not as easily measurable as those of technologies). The effective 
transfer of social knowledge was achieved only after several years’ conflicts and 
compromises between the foreign partners and their local counterparts (Ruan, 1988), 
which was itself a demonstration of the effort and time required to integrate the 
Chinese employees into modem business operation systems on the one hand, and to 
educate the foreign partners in the different practices involved in doing business in 
China on the other.
Table 6-4: The relationship between foreign equity holding and the stages model of 
knowledge transfer
Firm Name Foreign Equity 
Shareholding(%)
Stages Approach Social Knowledge 
Transfer
Motorola 100 No Strongly emphasised
Shanghai VW 50 Yes Emphasised
Shanghai Bell 40 Yes Engaged
Beijing Jeep 31.35 Yes Emphasised later
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To conclude on the stages characterising the knowledge transferred, based on the 
data from this research, it seems that the stages approach is evident in all the joint 
ventures but not the wholly-owned subsidiary. As showed in the above discussion, 
all types of knowledge, including social knowledge (especially corporate culture), 
have been transferred intentionally at the same time, and right from the very 
beginning, in Motorola (China). In the joint ventures, the transfer of technology, 
management skills and social knowledge appear to be effectively carried out 
sequentially, even though some of them (Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW) were 
quick to realise the importance of transfer them at the same time. This has confirmed 
that our argument holds in the three joint ventures in this research. Our argument 
that usually key technologies and some management skills were transferred first 
from the parent to the affiliate, only then to be followed by the transfer of social 
knowledge, is consistent with the practice within the three joint ventures. The delay 
in passing over social knowledge from parent to Chinese affiliate is due to the 
differences over understanding its importance for the establishment of the firm’s 
competitive advantages (Ruan, 1988).
Among the three joint ventures, there is no evidence to suggest that any difference 
exists between the telecommunications manufacturing industry and the automotive 
industry. However, if viewed from the perspective of country of origin, the 
information collected (as discussed in the above paragraph starting with “The 
impression gained from the above ...”) seems to suggest that the American parent, 
AMC, was comparatively more interested in transferring hard elements of
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knowledge to Beijing Jeep, while showing less enthusiasm towards the transfer of 
social knowledge than the Europeans did. This might be attributed to the differences 
in terms of international business experience of these three firms (i.e., firm-specific), 
rather than the difference between American firms and their European counterparts 
as a whole (i.e., country-specific). It is reasonable to suppose that the fact that both 
Alcatel Bell and VW had been involved in many joint ventures around world helped 
them appreciate the importance of the simultaneous transfer of all types of 
knowledge (notwithstanding their success in doing so). However, a lack of 
experience in international joint ventures by CMC contributed to its ignorance of the 
crucial role of the transfer of social knowledge from the start of Beijing Jeep.
6.4 The way of handling knowledge transfer
6.41 The choice of knowledge transfer mode
The current literature suggests that there are three generic international transfer 
modes available for the international transfer of technology: affiliate licensing, 
equity joint venture and whole ownership (Kogut and Zander, 1993: 632; Dunning, 
1993: 311; Groose, 1996: 782). Among them, it has been found that knowledge that 
is more tacit, is more likely to be transferred across national boundaries to a wholly- 
owned subsidiary than through either of the other two modes (Kogut and Zander, 
1993: 637). It is revealing that each of the three transfer modes has been used in the 
firms investigated in this research. This is shown in the following table:
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Table 6-5: The relationship of foreign equity holding and knowledge transfer mode
Company name Foreign equity {%) Knowledge transfer mode
Motorola 100 Internal transfer
Shanghai VW 50 Joint venture
Shanghai Bell 40 Affiliate licensing
Beijing Jeep 31.15 (1983) 
42.40 (1994)
Joint venture
The interview data from Motorola (China) confirm the argument made by Kogut and 
Zander (1993: 639) that internal transfer is of great importance to the strengthening 
of the firm’s long-term competitiveness. The technologies transferred from 
Motorola’s headquarters to its Tianjin site were at the forefront of the semiconductor 
industry at that time (as shown in Motorola’s Profile in Chapter 4), enabling it not 
only to serve the Chinese internal market, but also to supply the world market. These 
advanced technologies, along with management skills and corporate culture, formed 
the core of Motorola’s firm-specific advantage in the Chinese market. Only when 
these technologies became standardised in the world market, though still competitive 
if compared with those available in the Chinese local producers, would Motorola 
(China) make further transfers of these relatively obsolete (within Motorola) 
technologies to its Chinese joint venture affiliates by way of affiliate licensing. This 
knowledge transfer strategy enabled the Motorola group to extend the life cycle of its 
technologies, maximise its gross benefit from the Chinese market without 
weakening its own technological superiority. The result is Motorola (China)’s 
competitiveness in the Chinese market has been greatly improved. This case once 
again demonstrates that transferring knowledge from parent to subsidiary has been 
vital in creating comparative advantages for firms engaging in international market.
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Alcatel Bell chose affiliate licensing as its way of knowledge transfer. However, the 
license agreement only covered the technological aspect. It is one of the three 
contractual agreements signed by the two partners regarding the establishment of this 
equity-based joint venture, which include: (1) the joint venture contract (signed in 
July 1983); (2) the technology transfer contract and (3) the direct supply contract.
The latter two were signed in April 1984, although all the contracts were discussed 
at the same time. Technical training and assistance were also part of the contract. But 
the precise content and length of training courses were somewhat flexible, to accord 
with the requirements of the Chinese partner. The transfer of management skills was 
not officially part of the contract, as the partners involved, especially the Chinese 
partner, did not realise the imperative of addressing issues related to this aspect until 
later on. Hence various programmes facilitating the transfer in management skills 
were provided as a supplement to the technology transfer package.
The rewards to an investment made by a multinational firm may include: (1) a share 
of the profit according to its share of equity, i.e., dividends ; (2) a royalty; (3) 
revenue from goods and services supplied; (4) revenues according to the price 
received for technological materials. According to Mr Zheng Yulu of Shanghai Bell, 
Alcatel Bell has not only got dividends from Shanghai Bell in line with its equity 
holding, it also profited from selling components to Shanghai Bell. The parent also 
picked up a sliding scale (2-4 per cent) of total revenue of Shanghai Bell for 10-15 
years as royalties, and was also paid for the technological materials at a rate of 
US$0.8/page. It is worth pointing out here that roughly the same prices were set with 
which to charge Shanghai Bell as with other joint ventures of Alcatel Bell in other
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countries for transferred technologies. Management training, however, has been free 
for Shanghai Bell. The method through which Alcatel Bell derived its earnings (local 
sales and tied component sales) has further demonstrated that Alcatel Bell’s 
motivation for entering into the Chinese market was market-seeking, rather than 
resources-seeking or efficiency-seeking.
The two joint ventures in China’s automotive industry, Shanghai VW and Beijing 
Jeep, have both employed the joint venture mode for knowledge transfer, i.e., 
knowledge transfer and technical assistance becoming part of the investment of the 
foreign partner in the joint venture concerned. However, there are differences 
between them. The most obvious one is that, in the case of Shanghai VW, German 
VW provided a complete range of technologies on one mature product: the Santana, 
and promised to engage in joint development in the future refining of this product 
along with the Chinese partner. In the case of Beijing Jeep, AMC (and later on 
CMC) promised to transfer both the technology and any new development on its XJ 
series during the twenty-year life of this joint venture. It seemed that the Beijing Jeep 
deal was much more favourable to the Chinese investors, but the result of this 
research showed that Shanghai VW has been more successful in terms of knowledge 
transfer and utilisation, as indicated in Chapter 4.
Due to the limited number of firms investigated, we cannot give a sound 
generalisation on the employment of knowledge transfer modes among foreign direct 
investors in the Chinese market. Our data only indicate that both affiliate licensing 
and internal transfer are used in the telecommunications equipment industry, while
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joint venture is the main way of knowledge transfer in the automotive industry. The 
technical capacity of the recipient firms could be seen as an important factor 
affecting the choice of transfer mode in the automotive equipment industry, but the 
more important determinant is the host government policy on foreign direct 
investment in this industry, which allows the establishment of joint venture (at most 
50:50) as the only legal form of foreign involvement in the car assembly industry. 
Reluctant to invest massively in an uncertain market, these two car manufacturers 
were wise to commit their technological resources into the joint ventures in 
exchange for equity share, and more importantly, a physical presence in a rigidly 
regulated, but highly expected transitional market (as discussed in Chapter 3). In the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, it appears that the factors listed in 
previous studies (e.g., Davidson and McFetridtge, 1985; Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Zander and Kogut, 1995), such as the tacitness of the knowledge, the age of the 
knowledge, the firm’s experience of prior transfers, the R&D intensity of the 
transferor and the prior existence of an affiliate in the recipient country, and so on, 
were found to be relevant. The case of Motorola (China) also supports the argument 
of Dunning (1993: 311), who suggests that newer technologies -  those which 
represent a radical change in the state of the art, those which require the presence of 
related industries and sophisticated supply capabilities if they are to be used 
properly, and those where the perceived risk of loss of proprietary rights is the 
highest -  are most likely to be internalised. Motorola’s firm-specific advantages 
include not only its advanced technology, but also its effective management 
expertise and unique corporate culture, of which quite a large share is tacit in nature. 
Internal transfer was chosen by Motorola to prevent the dissipation of its whole-
215
range competitiveness in the process of knowledge transfer under either joint venture 
or licensing. Relatively speaking, the two automotive producers’ practice 
emphasised technology more than tacit knowledge transfer. It is, of course, difficult 
to isolate cause and effect, as host government policy required the joint venture 
mode. However, the impression is gained that the existence of a local partner 
complicates the transfer of tacit skills and soft technology. These joint ventures only 
actively involved the transfer of tacit knowledge after encountering huge challenges 
in assimilating and utilising the transferred technology. This confirms the argument 
of Kogut and Zander (1993: 637) that the more tacit the knowledge is, the more 
strong the incentive to transfer to a wholly-owned subsidiary. Shanghai Bell chose 
licensing as the way of transferring its technology to protect its interests in a highly 
regulated industry when the host investment environment was still far from stable. 
This behaviour is consistent with Dunning (1993) that the host market situation, 
such as the openness of the market, government intervention, and so on, can 
influence the choice of transfer mode.
6.42 The execution of knowledge transfer
In this part, two issues will be dealt with: one is knowledge transfer route, the other 
is the volume of knowledge transfer.
216
Knowledge transfer route
Knowledge transfer route is the way of delivering the knowledge to be transferred. 
Chapter 2 discusses various transfer routes and suggests that sending expatriates to 
overseas affiliates is very important to facilitate knowledge transfer, as expatriates 
can perform key functions, enable communications and provide training to local staff 
(Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 18).
It is revealed by our investigation that there is not much difference between these 
four firms in terms of transfer route used. When asked which knowledge transfer 
route was employed, such as staff exchange, management training, books, computer 
software, etc., the answers from interviewees of respective firms were as follows:
Motorola
We have employed all of them. Because we are a subsidiary of Motorola, and 
every means has to be used to make sure that this firm will be at the forefront 
of similar industries in the world, so every possible transfer route has been 
utilised to make the knowledge available here at the fastest speed.
Shanghai Bell
The routes are mainly composed of: (1) Documentation. A list of 
documentation is available, under which a complete set of documentation will 
be sent to the joint ventures automatically, and the Belgian side keeps all the 
receiving parties updated. Through this the joint ventures can keep in pace 
with Alcatel Bell in terms of technology and engineering development; (2) 
Training (a detailed training schedule is available); (3) Technical assistance, 
including sending expatriates to Shanghai Bell (about 40 in Shanghai Bell at 
one time, about 10-15 today) and daily follow-ups carried out by special teams. 
All these will in future be achieved by digital routes, such as email.
Shanghai VW
In many ways, including sending managers and engineers to Germany, inviting 
German experts to Shanghai VW to give training programmes, exchanging of 
information, co-ordination and training programmes. Specifically, we require
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that unless they have attended extensive training programmes, workers will not 
be allowed to work on production line. Some of them were trained in Germany 
and spent some time in working on the production line there. We also sent 
some of our engineers to VW’s subsidiary in Brazil for training, because 
Santana was originally developed and produced for that market as well as for 
the European market.
Initially, the exchange of information was achieved by post or by person, now 
it is mainly by email or other online protocol transfer. There are also a number 
of experts sent by the German partner to Shanghai VW. This is part of the 
Technical Assistance Agreement, which is based on our requirement now and 
then.
Beijing Jeep
Training in both the USA (during 1984-9, more than 300 engineers were sent 
to AMC and then Chrysler for training) and BJC, technical documents (more 
than 50000 pages, including technical materials and whole blueprints of the XJ 
series), ad hoc seminars (more than 400, in total having trained the equivalent 
of 2400 man during that period), constant co-ordination, technical assistance 
on site and on line.
Based on these statements, we can therefore say that the transfer routes employed in 
these four firms includes: (1) technical documentation; (2) training programmes both 
in-house and in the parent firm, or sometimes in other subsidiaries of the same 
group; (3) technical assistance, including sending expatriates to the affiliate (“on­
site assistance”) and continuous co-ordination between headquarters and the affiliate 
(“on- line assistance”). This is represented in the following table:
























It is worth noting that social knowledge was not intentionally transferred through any 
formal routes as described in this table, rather, its transfer was achieved as a by­
product of the above transfer programmes.
Sending expatriates to the affiliate, referred to as “on- site assistance”, was cited as 
essential among the routes mentioned above by the four firms. It may be necessary to 
clarify at this stage that, although all the expatriates are expected to facilitate 
knowledge transfer through their respective duties, most managers with long-term 
assignments (according to the division of management control between partners in 
the joint venture contract) are also charged with protecting the interests of the 
foreign partner(s) within their capacity, working like guard dogs. Only those 
technical assistants, advisers and some short-term managers of the foreign partner 
are solely servicing knowledge transfer.
All four firms in this study have used expatriates to enable knowledge transfer. In 
Shanghai Bell, hundreds of short-term technical assistants were sent by Alcatel Bell 
to help set up the production line and streamline the management systems. Due to 
the contribution made by those expatriates in terms of passing on tacit knowledge 
and bridging technical gaps, the Chinese partner still keeps about 15 expatriates in 
Shanghai Bell (mainly for technical assistance) up to date for the sake of effectively 
communicating between these two firms. In Motorola, sending expatriates was 
regarded as the main way of enabling the delivery of high quality products and the
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transference of integrated corporate culture right from the beginning. The situation in 
Shanghai VW is similar. According to Mr Cheng Gang:
[Every year] dozens of German expatriates come here to do their jobs in 
production and management related areas. This is part of the Technical 
Assistance Agreement signed by the two sides at the beginning. The exact 
number of expatriates usually depends on our requirement in the process of 
production upgrading.
Mr Sun Jiashan and Mr Jiang Kuiduo of Beijing Jeep reported that “On average nine 
expatriates have been working in Beijing Jeep annually. There were thirty at one 
time and now only six are staying in this firm now.” While the production is already 
stabilised and that no new project is yet coming out, these six expatriates are actually 
intended to fulfil two duties: (1) continuing knowledge transfer and refining 
production and management, (2) acting as “guard dogs” of CMC, filling those 
positions designed to be held by American.
In general, although the cost of keeping expatriates is extremely high, it is clear from 
the practices of these firms as discussed above that expatriates have been welcomed 
by all the four firms as a bridge with which to close the knowledge gap and to 
overcome communication barriers. This confirms our argument in Section “2. 42 
The execution of knowledge transfer” of Chapter 2 that sending expatriates to 
MNCs’ affiliates to emerging markets is essential to enable the recipient company to 
acquire and utilise the transferred knowledge much more effectively. This finding 
provides additional evidence in support of the argument made by Groose (1996) and 
Chang and Rosenzweig (1995) on the importance of the “grafting” of individuals in 
the process of knowledge transfer. The expatriates appeared to be a key channel in
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facilitating headquarters-affiliate communication, which is a function also 
emphasised by Marschan (1996) in her study of Kone Elevators. This is also 
evidence of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) notion of knowledge transfer through 
socialisation and internationalisation, which are based on the exchange of personnel 
and extensive communications among employees of different units within the same 
company.
As the cases on which this research is based are all large-scale FDI in China, where 
very sophisticated knowledge has been transferred in great volume in the past decade 
or so, this research can only conclude that the relationship between the knowledge 
transferred and the transfer routes chosen in these two industries appears to be that, 
when the transferred knowledge is complex, more routes are chosen. In these cases, 
each route of those generalised above has played its own role in the whole 
knowledge transfer process. All of them are required to ensure the effective delivery 
of knowledge needed by the affiliates concerned. However, sending expatriates to 
affiliates is the most important one, as it facilitated knowledge transfer in the firms 
concerned through expertise available on site.
No obvious differences appear between the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry and the automotive industry, nor between American firms and European 
firms. There are, however, some differences between the wholly-owned subsidiary 
and joint ventures. In this research, it is evident that the emphasis in sending 
expatriates to Motorola is overwhelmingly predicated upon facilitating knowledge 
transfer, and the headquarters had full discretion over deciding the most effective
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transfer route with absolute authority and maximum flexibility. The joint ventures, 
on the other hand, had to go through a negotiation process between the partners on a 
case-by-case basis when any plan was initiated. Expatriates sent to the Chinese 
affiliates were also expected to guard against any possibility of leaking the 
intellectual property owned by the parents, as discussed in Section “6.23 Corporate 
governance” of this Chapter.
The volume o f knowledge transfer
Before discussing the issue of knowledge transfer volume, we have to establish how 
to measure it in practice. The direct answer from the interviewees is that the volume 
of the transferred knowledge cannot be accurately measured. As has been discussed 
before, knowledge consists of technology, management skills and social knowledge, 
and each of them includes both explicit and tacit contents. Tacit knowledge is in its 
nature not quantifiable. This was clearly addressed by one interviewee of Motorola, 
Mr Boris Wang, who queried how people could count the volume in things such as 
management and cultural issues. Due to this very nature of tacit knowledge, the 
entire knowledge transferred from parents to these affiliates in this research, or those 
transferred between any firms, is not measurable in whole. This is in stark contrast 
with the arguments made by Groose (1996), as discussed in Chapter 2, who said that 
the volume of transferred knowledge could be measured by the number of training 
days per year for staff, the number of expatriates employed, and the number of visits 
by headquarters experts per year, or through the technological royalties and fees for 
technical services paid by the affiliate to the parent. The problem with Groose’s
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approach is that it ignores the difference between explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge, therefore failing to point out the nature of tacit knowledge being 
unmeasurable. His suggested ways of measurement are largely indicative, addressing 
only a small part of the entire body of the transferred knowledge.
Although it is hard to measure the volume of the total knowledge transferred, 
interviewees of both Shanghai Bell and Beijing Jeep all indicated that the explicit 
knowledge could be counted by pages or by value based on pages. This indicates to 
us that, when obliged to do so, this is how they conceptualise and operationalise the 
issue. For example, Alcatel Bell charged Shanghai Bell on those transferred 
technical materials at US$0.80/page. Beijing Jeep, on the other hand, reported that 
more than 12000 pages of technical materials and the whole set of blueprints were 
transferred from the American parent to this joint venture during 1984-1997. The 
initial technological input from the AMC, according to the joint venture contract, 
was the right by Beijing Jeep to access the whole range of information about AMC’s 
XJ series, including any new development within twenty years. But, no means has 
been mentioned regarding how to measure the volume of tacit knowledge due to its 
nature as discussed above. These means of measuring the transferred knowledge in 
the firms visited are clear and comparable only for those embedded in documents 
that cover mostly technology and management skills, and to a lesser extent, social 
knowledge, which can be articulated and put on paper, such as rules, the official 
version of corporate culture, and so on. Quite a large proportion of tacit knowledge, 
irrespective of technology, management knowledge and social knowledge, is
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excluded. It seems that a perfect way of measuring the volume of the transferred 
knowledge is not available due to the very nature of tacit knowledge.
However, there is still a need to compare the transfer volume between firms in order 
to examine the critical factors affecting the delivery of knowledge from parents to 
affiliates. Although we agree that the volume of knowledge transfer between two 
small or less sophisticated firms in terms of industrial complexity is usually less than 
that between two large, or more sophisticated firms, we cannot compare directly the 
volume of knowledge transfer between firms of similar size and in similarly 
sophisticated industries. As both the telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry are sophisticated industries (though the technologies employed 
in the former are in general more advanced than those in the latter), and the four 
firms of this research are among the top tier FIEs in China in terms of their size, we 
assume the knowledge transferred from their foreign parents to these firms are 
“commensurately” huge. This will enable us to examine the important factors 
influencing the volume of the transferred knowledge in the firms concerned under 
comparable conditions.
We suggested in Section “2.42 The execution of knowledge transfer” of Chapter 2 
that the knowledge gap between the foreign parents and their affiliates, and 
competitive condition in the host market, would directly affect the knowledge 
transfer volume, i.e., when the gap is bigger or the competition is more intense, the 
knowledge transfer volume will be larger than otherwise. Regarding the first factor, 
the knowledge gap, the data collected indicate that it does not hold strongly in the
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firms visited. The knowledge gap does not play a role in either the newly established 
firms, such as Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell, or those in which the Chinese 
partners already have accumulated some expertise and experience in the main line of 
business concerned, such as Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep. The knowledge transfer 
volume, in these cases, is a result of the contract signed by the two sides, which has 
clear clauses on the contents of the knowledge to be transferred in order to fulfil the 
objective of the firms concerned. One senior manager of Shanghai VW, Mr Cheng 
Gang, commented on this as saying:
In fact, the technologies related to this specific product have all been 
transferred regardless the production volume— one or one million.
The difference between wholly-owned subsidiary and joint ventures might be that 
knowledge in more than one line of business is transferred in WOS while in the case 
of joint ventures usually knowledge of only one line of business is transferred. The 
former has been supported by the following comments stated by Mr Wang, a senior 
manager in Motorola (China)’s Tianjin site:
There is no relationship, in our case, between knowledge transfer volume and 
knowledge gap. Why? This is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Motorola, and 
Motorola wants to build this firm not only for the Chinese market, but also for 
the whole world market. Most [types] of our products are exported to 
Motorola’s market in the world [though by value most are still sold in China]. 
The only consideration, I understand, is how to make this firm the best in the 
world. We in Motorola are the best in terms of semiconductor, pagers and 
mobile phone production. Our headquarters in the USA send the most 
advanced technologies and production equipment to this firm.
In the case of Shanghai Bell, just as that explained by one senior manager of Alcatel 
Bell, the “Knowledge transfer has always been carried out as soon as possible 
according to the relevant contract, and no constraints were imposed” (Mr Jos Caerts,
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head know-how and technology transfer, Bell Telephonelaan 3, Switching Systems 
Division, Alcatel Bell). Unlike Motorola (China), each of the three joint ventures in 
this research involved only one product, i.e., S1204 in Shanghai Bell, Santana in 
Shanghai VW, and Cherokee in Beijing Jeep. That means the transferred technology 
in these three firms seems generally no more than that projected in the joint venture 
contracts establishing these firms.
However, having defined knowledge is composed of technology, management skills 
and social knowledge, we do find that there is a relationship between knowledge 
transfer volume and knowledge gap, if not for technology alone (as far as we can 
discern of the present evidence). The interview data strongly indicate that the 
volume of the management skills and social knowledge transferred in the joint 
ventures have been much greater than that predicted at the very beginning in the 
contracts, thus making the total knowledge transferred in each of them greater as a 
result. It has been revealed that in the joint venture contracts signed only very few 
words appeared in relation to the provision of management training by the foreign 
parents. But, in practice, extensive training programmes have been arranged to 
transfer management skills to the three joint ventures concerned. In addition to that, 
foreign expatriates have been appointed to be managers of key departments, and lots 
of short-term technical and management experts have been invited to deliver the 
expertise needed on a case-by-case basis. Social knowledge has been transferred, as 
a by-product, to these firms through these extensive exchanges, and all the 
interviewees acknowledged the differences of their management style and corporate 
culture from that of the Chinese state-owned firms.
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Therefore, it transpires that the increase in knowledge transfer in respect of 
management skills and social knowledge was not a result of the contracts signed.
The increase has resulted partly because of the knowledge gap in respect of 
management capability and corporate culture, the lack of which often contributed to 
the failures and low efficiency of knowledge utilisation in these firms; and partly 
because of the competitive strategies of these firms in this transitional market, as 
these firms gradually realised the importance of learning management skills and 
transferring social knowledge for strengthening the firm’s competitiveness in this 
transitional market. We can conclude that knowledge gap in terms of management 
skills and social knowledge is a key factor in affecting the knowledge transfer 
volume in joint ventures -  the bigger the knowledge gap is the greater the transferred 
knowledge (relating to management skills and social knowledge) will be. But this 
conclusion does not hold in the wholly-owned subsidiary, as showed in the case of 
Motorola in this research.
Competition is another factor worth exploring. On the face of it, none of the four 
firms (except the Chinese partner in Shanghai Bell) openly support that the more 
intense the competition is, the greater the volume of the transferred knowledge will 
be. For example, from the interviews with managers of Beijing Jeep, e.g.. Mr Zhao 
Nailin, Tong Zhivuan and Mr Chen Xulin (general manager, 1988-93), it is clear that 
the American partner consistently supported the fast transfer of technology and 
management skills according to the contract, whatever the market competitive 
situation was. The knowledge transfer in Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW has been
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carried out strictly according to the joint venture contracts, as described above, 
irrespective of the specific market competition situation. When we examine the 
business strategies with respect to knowledge transfer in these firms, however, it is 
clear that market competition has been a crucial factor in pushing up the knowledge 
transfer volume. In line with the argument made above on the role of knowledge gap 
in spurring knowledge transfer, market competition has been another factor of 
importance in affecting the knowledge transfer volume. We now examine this factor 
below.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, both the telecommunications and automotive 
industries have been selected as pillar industries, among others, by the Chinese 
government, and various preferential policies have been granted to attract FDI in 
these industries as well as encouraging the upgrading of indigenous firms. As a 
result, most of the world famous producers, i.e., Siemens, GPT, Lucent, NEC, 
NOTEL, Alcatel Bell, AT&T, Ericsson, Nokia in the telecommunications industry, 
and GM, Ford, Chrysler, Volvo, Daimler-Benz, VW, Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi, 
Citroen, Peugeot, Daihatsu and Fiat in the automotive industry, have been pouring 
their resources into these sectors in order to position themselves to exploit the 
potential of the Chinese market. Remarkably, the two sectors have turned into 
buyer’s markets in the 1990s based on the substantial efforts made by these MNCs 
and indigenous firms. Market competition, as a result, has been increasingly intense 
in these two industries.
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As a reaction to the heated competition, the firms selected in this research have 
sought to strengthen their competitive advantage by transferring more knowledge 
from their parent firms. In the case of Motorola, more lines of businesses have been 
introduced to improve the existing product offerings and to build up a greater 
competitive edge over its rivals. These products include: semiconductor, pagers and 
mobile phone production. A new wafer plant has just been finished to provide 
components for Motorola’s main line of business worldwide. Another result of the 
fierce competition for Motorola is the change in its business strategy. Unlike earlier 
when it overwhelmingly relied on the knowledge transfer from its own headquarters, 
Motorola (China) has been very active in establishing joint R&D centres with 
prominent Chinese research institutions and universities, and has worked very hard 
to be in partnership with major local producers in setting up joint ventures based on 
the technology and management skills of Motorola itself. This change of strategy has 
given Motorola a much stronger base in meeting competition in the Chinese 
telecommunications equipment market.
In the case of the three joint ventures, in order to strengthen their competitiveness, 
they have: (1) realised the importance of the contribution of management skills and 
social knowledge to the whole performance of firms, and actively involved the 
transfer of knowledge in these two aspects. For example, Beijing Jeep emphasised 
the learning of managerial expertise from foreign expatriates and invested heavily in 
arranging relevant training programmes. It was then obliged to reverse the trend of 
management localisation by re-appointing foreign expatriates as managers of key 
departments, such as production, product R&D, quality control, finance, purchasing
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and supply; (2) tried to transfer more upgraded technologies from their foreign 
partners to strengthen their competitive position in the Chinese market, e.g., from E 
family to J family of S1204 system in the case of Shanghai Bell, the continuous 
annual upgrading of the Cherokee series in the case of Beijing Jeep (though it had 
problems in meeting all the requirements on components), and the integration of 
environmental technologies from VW into its new product, the Santana 2000, in the 
case of Shanghai VW; (3) sought to develop stronger R&D capabilities based on the 
co-operation with their parent firms, e.g., Shanghai VW’s Santana 2000 and the 
latest mode Santana 2000 GTI. Also the transference of new knowledge by way of 
setting up new joint ventures with their parent firms, e.g., Belling, a new joint 
venture between Alcatel Bell and Shanghai Bell. However, the proposal to transfer a 
new line of product -  passenger car production line -  in Beijing Jeep was never 
achieved due to the opposition from the Chinese central government.
From the above accounts of the four firms, we can discern the influence of market 
competition in the transfer of knowledge from MNCs to their affiliates in the 
Chinese market, which is in line with our theoretical proposition contained in 
Section “2.42 The execution of knowledge transfer”. Some interviewees explicitly 
support this argument, for example, Ms Yin Linggu of Shanghai Bell presented the 
following analysis as follows:
From the perspective of the foreign partners, it is right to say that when the 
competition is fiercer then the volume of technology transfer will be bigger. 
Only in this way could the foreign partners get a fair share of this market, as 
their target is market share. If the competition is not so intense, then they will 
naturally hold back some of their technologies in order to make more profits 
later. They do have a strategy on how fast to transfer, how much to transfer. 
But, from the perspective of the Chinese side, we do not want to connect the 
competition situation here in the Chinese market to the volume and speed of
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technology transfer. We prefer a clear timetable on transfer process whatever 
the market situation is, because what we want is the technology. Of course, we 
like it faster and for there to be more in the technology transfer, if the market 
competition is very intent.
A simple fact from the above description is that Motorola has transferred more lines 
of business to its Chinese subsidiary, setting up several new production bases in both 
Tianjin and other provinces, while the three joint ventures have tried to consolidate 
their positions in the Chinese market by transferring upgraded technologies within 
the same line of business (even the same product). This difference in terms of the 
volume of the transferred knowledge arises from the different levels of equity 
ownership of foreign parents in these firms: Motorola treats Motorola (China) 
entirely as its own child, offering everything necessary to nurture the development of 
its wholly-owned subsidiary; VW, Alcatel Bell and Chrysler, on the other hand, have 
been reserved to put in technological resources in a jointly owned affiliate, with the 
majority (in the case of Shanghai Bell and Beijing Jeep), or at least half (Shanghai 
VW), of equity controlled by their Chinese partners. This fully supports the 
argument that the volume of the transferred knowledge is affected by the degree of 
active involvement of the foreign parents (Lyles and Salk, 1996) or ownership 
(Groose, 1996).
The other comparison that can be made is the volume of the transferred knowledge 
between Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell of the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry, and Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep of the automotive 
industry. The telecommunications manufacturing industry, along with the computer 
industry, has been at the forefront in technological advancement in the past two
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decades, and the liberalisation taking place as a result of opening up national 
markets has in fact transformed the competition in the telecommunications industry 
into a global one. As indicated above, China has been regarded as potentially the 
largest market in the world by MNCs, and competition has been intensifying. Hence, 
both Motorola and Alcatel Bell have transferred the most advanced technologies to 
their affiliates in the Chinese market, followed by substantial efforts in making 
corresponding management skills available to their Chinese employees. The volume 
and novelty of the transferred knowledge is much greater than first planned.
The automotive industry, on the other hand, is primarily based on modest 
technologies, and the speed of technological advancement is not as quick as that of 
the telecommunications manufacturing industry. Technologies transferred to 
Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep from their respective parents have been very mature, 
representing a significant time lag from their use in western Europe and North 
America. The impression gained from the above analysis is that the volume and 
novelty of the transferred knowledge in the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry have been much greater than in the automotive industry. This is in line with 
our argument that labour cost has been much less significant in the former than in 
the latter.
One of the most striking findings from this investigation is the significance of 
market size in affecting the speed and volume of knowledge transfer. To a large 
extent, it is the size and growth of the Chinese telecommunications equipment and 
automotive markets that pushes multinationals to be involved. The Chinese
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government is aware of this and has been looking for great rewards from foreign 
investors in exchange for market access. Knowledge transfer is the most important 
target on the reward list. “China expects companies to produce locally and transfer 
know-how in a full range of sectors” (Engardio, et al, 1996: 21). In the case of 
Shanghai Bell, it is the future market size that attracted Belgian Bell to be in 
partnership with the Chinese firm. This encourages the parent to transfer a whole 
package of technology to the joint venture, accompanied by extensive training 
programmes, and to keep transferring new technologies even though Shanghai Bell 
failed to occupy even an acceptable market share in its first three years. Long-term 
vision has been referred to as one of the key factors enabling Shanghai Bell’s 
success. But the true picture of “long-term vision” is the accelerating demand for 
high-technology telecommunications equipment in China. Mr Zheng Yulu of 
Shanghai Bell commented:
Yes, foreign partners do relate the volume and speed of technology transfer to 
the size of the market. They are very clear on this: the bigger your market is, 
the more and faster the technology transfer will be. On the contrary, the 
smaller your market is, the less and slower the technology transfer will be. In 
fact, what we (Chinese) are really in control of is our huge market. We have 
traded our market for the technology we wanted.
In the case of Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, the “Chinese market” was cited as the 
primary incentive to push the foreign parents to take concrete action in setting up 
joint ventures and carrying out extensive knowledge transfer, although the Far East 
market was also mentioned as a future target of expansion. The signing of the joint 
venture contracts, which indicates the commitment of the foreign investors to the 
Chinese market, has proven the attraction of the Chinese market — in particular its 
future size.
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We conclude that the size of the Chinese market has in the first instance played a 
very important role in pushing Alcatel Bell, VW and CMC — and so many other 
MNCs — to agree on transferring their key technologies in exchange of the access to 
this market. Market size continues to be a dominant factor in the process of 
knowledge transfer. Indeed, the fact that the potential size of the Chinese market 
became a reality in the past decade, has prompted fierce competition and created a 
greater need to transfer latest knowledge. In the case of the only wholly-owned 
subsidiary, the establishing of Motorola (China) was mainly to address the needs of 
the Chinese market, as well as turning China into a production platform for the 
international market, which therefore forms part of the internationalisation strategy 
of Motorola. The continuous increase in the wake of the investment package in 
China by Motorola, from US$1.2 billion to US$2.5 billion by the end of 2000, as 
shown in “Motorola Profile” of Chapter 4, is an indication of the importance of the 
Chinese market within Motorola’s global strategy and its success in implementing 
this. To a certain extent, market size has become the only meaningful leverage to 
influence the volume and speed of knowledge transfer carried out by multinational 
corporations in the Chinese market. This has not only confirmed the findings of 
Grosse (1996), but also has indicated the importance of market size in affecting the 
MNCs’ competitive strategy in transitional markets. Clearly, few countries can come 
cross to China’s market potential (the notable exception being India).
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6.43 K now ledge transfer cost
Many factors affect the cost of knowledge transfer. Among them, the relating 
literature has identified that tacitness of the transferred knowledge (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993), previous experience in transferring technology (Teece, 1977) and 
absorptive capacities (Lan and Young, 1996) are said to be more significant. This 
section intends to examine the impact of these factors on the cost of knowledge 
transfer.
Ideally, transfer cost should be measured in simple value terms. Unfortunately, due 
to the fact that knowledge transfer is a process that concerns nearly every department 
of a firm, it is not possible for firms to come up with a clear number on the amount 
of money spent on this process. We can only roughly estimate the scale of the cost 
involved from the following indicators:
(1) the length of localisation programmes in these firms;
(2) the training programmes involved (in both headquarters and affiliate and those 
for suppliers);
(3) the expatriates sent to the affiliates;
(4) the specific teams set up co-ordinating knowledge transfer in both parent and 
affiliate.
A table indicating the cost elements incurred in these respects by the four firms in 
the knowledge transfer process was compiled, as below:
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Length (years to reach 
80% localisation rate)
n/a not yet 9 11
Training Programmes
—headquarters V S
—affiliate ✓ V S
—suppliers S V V
Expatriates Sent S V ✓
Transfer Team S S
From this table, it is clear that very little difference has been found among these four 
firms in terms of the scale concerning the knowledge transfer cost. Indeed, not a 
single interviewee of the four firms could come up with a clear idea of how much 
has been spent on any one item of the list in the above table [although the direct cost 
of sending expatriates to subsidiaries, including salary, international travel cost, local 
accommodation and transport, allowance and so on, could be measured if access was 
given to the financial details of the foreign parents]. Instead, they used words like 
“very expensive”, “substantial”, “a large sum”, “huge amount of resources” and so 
on, to describe their financial input in the knowledge transfer process. This is an 
indication of the complexity and volume of the knowledge involved.
Financial resources invested are not the only factors that decide transfer cost. The 
tacitness of the transferred knowledge also matters. Unlocking (decoding) the 
tacitness of the knowledge transferred (a process of articulation) takes time, 
requiring experts to deliver. Various training programmes run by each of these firms 
have been part of the efforts to make tacit knowledge accessible to employees in the 
affiliates in the Chinese market. These have increased the cost of both the foreign
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parent and the Chinese affiliate. This supports the argument made by Kogut and 
Zander (1993) that tacitness increases the costs of transfer, and renders obsolete 
Hymer’s (1960, 1976) view that the transference of the firm’s advantage abroad via 
FDI is at “a marginal cost close to zero” (ibid.: 219), as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
marginal cost of knowledge transfer in the four firms is significantly different from 
zero in all cases, and the average cost is perceived to be large. It is quite probable 
that marginal cost declines with increasing output (of the affiliate). However, even in 
the case of upgrades, marginal cost is reported to be decidedly non-zero.
Moreover, the absorptive capacity of the recipient affects the total cost in carrying 
out knowledge transfer as well. Among the factors that relate to absorptive capacity, 
previous experience of knowledge transfer is very important (Teece, 1977). All the 
four firms in this research have engaged in the transfer of some substantially 
complex knowledge. However, none of them, except Beijing Jeep (where the initial 
technology and management systems were entirely brought in to China from then 
Soviet Union in 1950s), have had any previous experience on knowledge transfer34. 
While the transfer cost in each of them has been very high, we cannot find adequate 
evidence to support that the previous experience about knowledge transfer can 
decrease the total transfer cost. The reason may lie in the fact that the product ranges 
involved are so diverse that prior knowledge transfer experience just does not help to 
close the knowledge gap in new knowledge transfers. Whatever the role of prior 
knowledge transfer experience in affecting knowledge transfer cost is, it needs to be 
further studied at in future research in this area.
34 Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell were newly established firms, and Shanghai VW was set up 
with an existing firm which had been entirely dependent on its own R&D.
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Absorptive capability as a whole does have some influence on the transfer cost. The 
two firms with established Chinese partners, Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, did not 
spend much less in terms of the scale of the transfer cost, than the two telecom firms 
(which were set up through green field investment), as might be expected, based on 
their prior absorptive capability. However, absorptive capability has been identified 
as a key factor in affecting knowledge transfer costs, and has been cultivated by all 
the firms concerned in various ways. We will deal with absorptive capability in more 
details in later sections on knowledge utilisation and organisational learning.
The transfer of management skills and social knowledge, which can enable the 
recipient to decode the tacitness and complexity of the knowledge transferred, does 
help to facilitate the transfer and utilisation of new technology, therefore decreasing 
the transfer cost. This has been very palpable in the case of Motorola, where one 
corporate culture and similar social knowledge has made the transfer process less 
problematic. The other point worth mentioning in relation to knowledge transfer cost 
is that, in dynamic terms, transfer cost could be decreasing when the production 
volume of the firm concerned is increasing. This has been indicated by the 
interviewees in the parent firm Alcatel Bell:
The size of production does matter in terms of decreasing transfer cost. If the 
production volume were huge, then the transfer cost would be (comparatively) 
low.
This does make sense if one interprets transfer cost as “average transfer cost”. The 
cost of knowledge transfer becomes an outstanding issue, especially in the initial
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stage of technology-orientated joint ventures. Large volume of affiliate production 
can provide the financial resources needed to implement the knowledge transfer 
strategy, thus alleviating the cost of the process.
Our investigation reveals that the other way of reducing some of the knowledge 
transfer costs is to gain access, through venture partners, to skilled labour and 
software institutions, such as quasi-government at R&D organisations and 
autonomous state-funded multidisciplinary research institutes (Afriyie, 1988). As 
discussed in the next chapter on overcoming language problems (which are only part 
of the costs incurred in the knowledge transfer process) all the four firms have been 
very active in recruiting new graduates from key universities and, at the same time, 
attracting experienced engineers and managers from other, usually state-owned, 
firms. This is a common way of nurturing absorptive capacity at the recipient site. In 
the extreme case, in order to recruit some of the most wanted engineers in 
telecommunications equipment design and production from other state-owned firms, 
Shanghai Bell secured a preferential policy from the central and Shanghai local 
governments, which ensured that all the new recruits would be allowed to register as 
a full resident of Shanghai under the rigid Chinese household registration system. 
This provided a great incentive to those seeking to move into the business centre of 
China. It clearly demonstrates the importance of government intervention in creating 
the right environment for FDI in a socialist market economy, as discussed in Section 
“3.2 Features of the Chinese business environment” in Chapter 3. The above case 
also confirms the argument by Roehrig (1994) that establishing a good relationship
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with government is one of the most important strategies for Sino-foreign joint 
ventures.
Partnering with various R&D organisations in China further reduced the knowledge 
transfer costs of these firms. Shanghai Bell set up a strong link with R&D 
institutions of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), and with key 
universities with substantial engineering capability. Beijing Jeep established a 
localisation community that includes government R&D institutions as well as 
university laboratories. In the case of Motorola, partnering with various R&D 
institutions has become a basic business strategy in its China operations. Up to now, 
it has opened six joint R&D centres with several elite universities in Beijing and 
Tianjin. Its cooperation with local producers has also concentrated on the sharing of 
information and knowledge developed from joint research projects. These have 
certainly minimised the knowledge transfer costs of these incoming firms and 
strengthened their R&D capability in the challenging Chinese market.
6.5 Summary
This chapter has dealt with the first two research questions set out in this research, 
i.e., what knowledge has been transferred into the Chinese market through FDI and 
how has the knowledge been transferred? It has done this by examining the practices 
of knowledge transfer carried out by four multinational firms in the Chinese 
telecommunications equipment industry and the automotive industry. This has been
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conducted by closely following the relating discussions in Chapter 2, as 
demonstrated in the following table:
Table 6-8: Correspondence of Literature Review and Analytical Chapters.
Analytical Chapter
Section 2.1-2.4 Chapter 6 First two research 
questions
2.1 Introduction
TTTirm™ 1 ................. . 1 r' ri vrr
6.1 Introduction
2.2 Knowledge transfer and 
international business
2.3 Knowledge transferred by FDI 6.2 The context prior to knowledge 
transfer
2. 31 The classic motives for FDI 6.21 The strategic motives of MNCs 
in entering the Chinese market
6.22 Entry mode
6.23 Corporate governance
2.32 The characteristics of the 
transferred knowledge in the context of 
FDI
6.3 The knowledge that has been
transferred by FDI
6.31 The typology of the transferred
knowledge
Question No. 1: 
what knowledge has 
been transferred
2.33 The characteristics of knowledge 
transferred at different stages
6.32 The stages characteristic of 
transferred knowledge
2.4 The way of transferring knowledge 
by FDI
6.4 The way of handling knowledge 
transfer
Question No. 2: 
how has knowledge 
been transferred
2.41 The choice of transfer mode 6.41 The choice of knowledge 
transfer mode
2.42 The execution of knowledge 
transfer
6.42 The execution of knowledge 
transfer
2.43 The cost of knowledge transfer 6.43 Knowledge transfer cost
6.5 Summary
Before tackling these two questions themselves, some relevant issues in relation to 
FDI carried out by these four firms were examined. Based on extensive
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investigations, it reveals that the strategic motives for FDI within these two 
industries in entering the Chinese market is primarily local market servicing and the 
rents that accrue from the transfer of knowledge to the dominant suppliers of this 
market (i.e., the foreign investors’ affiliates). The point here for the foreign invested 
firms is how to secure a favourable environment from the host market by making an 
optimal strategic decision on entry mode, irrespective of which industry they are in 
or which country they come from. Three out of the four firms chose joint venture as 
their entry mode, reflecting the restrictions imposed by the Chinese government in 
the 1980s on the one hand, on the other hand, the nature of risk in the Chinese 
market and the need for a Chinese partner to negotiate the local environment. A clear 
indication of the purpose of Chinese firms in engaging in joint ventures can be found 
in the product selection stage, where only the most advanced products are expected 
to be introduced. The leading criteria in selecting foreign partners by local Chinese 
firms are the strategic assets held by the foreign firm, such as technological 
advantages, financial resources, and management skills (although the importance of 
the last is often only fully realised later). Foreign partners, on the other hand, seek to 
limit the “bleedthrough” of their input knowledge by way of designing the structure 
of corporate governance to achieve a division of management control within the 
firms concerned that preserves the value of their ownership advantages.
In respect of the characteristics of the transferred knowledge, it has been confirmed 
that the transferred knowledge includes not only the commonly recognised 
technology and management skills, but also social knowledge which helps to shape 
the vision and atmosphere of the affiliate. Motivated by the prospect of expanded
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market size and enhanced market growth, some (offensive) foreign direct 
investments are more likely to transfer knowledge appropriate to a broader range of 
functions than just production related technologies. The knowledge transferred to the 
three joint venture affiliates in the Chinese market has been found to have stages 
characteristics. Our investigation shows that the firms actually transferred the 
different types of knowledge at different stages, even though some of them intended 
to carry out the transfer of different knowledge simultaneously.
There have been some illuminating findings regarding the way of transferring the 
knowledge within MNCs into the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing sector 
and its automotive industry. It is evident that the more tacit the knowledge concerned 
is, in terms of codifiability and teachability, the more likely it is to be transferred 
across national boundaries to a wholly-owned subsidiary (where permissible) than 
through a joint venture. Foreign parents usually send expatriates to their affiliates in 
the Chinese market to ensure that the recipient company can acquire and utilise the 
transferred knowledge much more effectively due to the availability of foreign 
expertise on site. A key finding is that the volume of knowledge transfer (i.e., 
including management skills and social knowledge) is dependent on both the 
knowledge gap between foreign parents and their joint venture affiliates, and the 
competitive strategy of the parent firms in the host market. Knowledge flows from 
the parent to the affiliate might be increased to include the latest technological and 
managerial expertise if the affiliate faces declining market power (i.e., increasing 
market competition). The cost of knowledge transfer in the Chinese market is 
influenced by the complexity and tacitness of the transferred knowledge, the
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financial and human resources committed by the parents, and the absorptive capacity 
of affiliates in the host market. This is a confirmation of the relevant studies 
conducted in developed economies, but with emphasis on the complementarity of 
management skills and social knowledge in order to better effect the required radical 
change compared with the Chinese norms.
Though different in terms of technological sophistication, we can conclude that the 
common themes for the four firms in this research with respect to knowledge 
transfer are: how to secure the most favourable environment in the host market by 
making a well-judged strategic decision on entry mode, irrespective of industry or 
country of origin, that can enable them to secure the desired market share based on 
their existing technologies; and how to carry out the transfer of the chosen 
technologies, managerial skills and social knowledge to their affiliates in the most 
efficient mode, to establish the competitiveness of these affiliates in the Chinese 
market without surrendering too much of their proprietary assets or incurring higher 
cost.
There are some significant differences between the affiliates as well: apart from 
“choosing” different entry modes (joint venture vs wholly-owned subsidiary), they 
selected products of different levels; the Chinese Communist Party operates its 
command structure in the joint ventures influencing decision making processes, but 
not in the wholly-owned subsidiaries; knowledge in more than one line of business 
was transferred to the wholly-owned subsidiary while, in the case of joint ventures, 
usually knowledge of only one line of business was transferred; there are a stages
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characteristics found for the transferred knowledge among the three joint ventures, 
but not the wholly-owned subsidiary; and these three joint ventures all subsequently 
transferred more types of knowledge than were originally negotiated. In addition, 
regarding the way the knowledge transfer was handled, different knowledge transfer 
modes were employed by the four firms. The firms all deployed expatriates to 
facilitate knowledge transfer, however, those expatriates in the joint ventures were 
also expected to guard against any possibility of the leaking of intellectual property 
owned by the parents.
There are also some differences between the two industries. The most important one 
is that the latest technologies have been brought in by the foreign investors in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry where the fast pace of technological 
advancement has characterised the industry. However, in the automotive industry, 
only modest (very mature) technologies have been transferred to China. The volume 
of the transferred knowledge between the two industries appears different too: the 
volume transferred in the telecommunications manufacturing industry has been 
much greater than in the automotive industry. The other difference found between 
them is that labour cost does have some significance in the investment decision of 
the automotive industry, and China can provide a locational attraction especially in 
this respect on account of its internationally low real wage costs. However, in the 
case of the telecommunications manufacturing industry, the proportion of labour 
costs in total cost is too low for this to materially affect the investment decision.
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Is China different from other transitional economies? Based on the limited research 
conducted on Central and Eastern Europe in respect of FDI and knowledge transfer, 
there is one difference emerging in respect of the different technological capability 
between China and these countries. When compared with China, the transitional 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe boast more advanced technologies and 
production skills within their respective manufacturing industries. As a result, while 
Chinese partners have always sought to start by transferring the hard elements of 
technology, firms in the transitional economies of Europe have more often 
prioritised the soft elements of knowledge on their transfer lists. However, this does 
not contradict the commonality between China and these countries that foreign firms 
with resources that can be used by the local partners to create their own competitive 
advantages were encouraged to move into strategic industries through joint venture 
mode (Hooley, et al, 1996).
These findings have some theoretical implications. Firstly, knowledge should be 
viewed as a complete set rather than the substitution of technology alone, or 
technology with some management skills. The contents of knowledge are much 
wider than technology as traditionally envisaged, and each of the three types of 
knowledge, i.e., technology, management skills and social culture, should be neither 
overestimated nor ignored. In fact, each contributes to the successful production and 
delivery of the transferred product and the competitiveness of the firm in general in 
the transitional markets. The customary technology-centred view should be 
rebalanced to reflect the unique value and inseparable contribution by management
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skills and, in particular, social knowledge in enabling the business operation of the 
newly established affiliate.
Secondly, we find that the volume of knowledge transfer is strongly influenced by 
both the knowledge gap between foreign parents and their joint venture affiliates, 
and the competitive strategy of the parent firms in the host market. In fact, 
knowledge transfer is an on-going process of great complexity rather than a static, 
pre-set, carefully-planned, journey. MNCs adapted to the changing market situation 
by committing more of their resources than planned. The key to success in a 
potentially huge market such as China’s is in strategic judgement instead of 
accounting judgement, i.e., seeking long-term strategic presence and the overall 
financial return from it instead of short-term net gain.
Thirdly, considerations of the host business environment were highly placed and 
incorporated into the process of choosing a market entry strategy by MNCs. While it 
was likely to be preferred to adopt the wholly-owned subsidiary mode in order to 
enter foreign markets in knowledge-intensive industries (such as the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and the automotive industry), the joint 
venture was used as leverage to seek substantial government support. This is due to 
the host governments’ preference for facilitating knowledge transfer to and the 
nurturing of indigenous industries. Therefore, whether to choose a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or joint venture is not a simple comparison of their own merits but a cost- 
benefit analysis of MNCs’ negotiation with the host government. When the joint 
venture route has been chosen as the entry mode, MNCs must deliberate on how to
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safeguard their proprietary assets from ‘leaking’ or dissipation. Because, in most 
cases, especially when the foreign side holds a minority equity in the joint venture, it 
can gain greater influence over the business operations of the joint venture by 
controlling the knowledge transfer -  in the form of the knowledge transfer mode, 
knowledge transfer volume and knowledge transfer rate. While aspects of 
knowledge transfer are agreed in advance, the controlling ability to accelerate the 
transfer rests entirely with the foreign partner, thus improving its bargaining power.
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Chapter 7 From knowledge transfer to organisational learning: 
Knowledge utilisation by FDI in China’s telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and automotive industry
7.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to address the remaining two research questions set 
out for this research, i.e., How has the transferred knowledge been utilised? And, 
what’s the impact of the Chinese business environment on MNCs’ knowledge 
transfer? Knowledge utilisation is the main part of the knowledge transfer process 
addressed in this study. This chapter is intended to examine the process of 
knowledge utilisation in the recipient firms from an organisational learning 
perspective. The common themes among the four firms of this investigation are: (1) 
how to carry out organisational learning effectively to achieve an improved and 
sustainable firm performances in the Chinese market; (2) how to deal with the 
environmental uncertainties presented by the host market in the organisational 
learning process; and (3) how to adapt appropriately to the local culture. To address 
these, this chapter first examines the different stages of the organisational learning 
process (including the secondary knowledge transfer carried out in the four firms in 
the Chinese market), followed by an analysis of the key factors in this organisational 
learning process and a discussion of the impact of the Chinese business environment 
on knowledge transfer and organisational learning. Finally, this chapter compares the
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results of knowledge transfer in the four firms chosen, i.e., the impact of knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning on the competitiveness of these firms.
7.2 The process of organisational learning
7.21 The process of organisational learning: An overview
The current literature suggests that organisational learning is essential to maintain 
firm competitiveness. It is composed of three main stages: articulation, application 
and dissemination (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993, which is discussed in Section “2.52 
The process of organisational learning”). This section will look at these issues in the 
Chinese context.
The interview data of these four firms confirm that knowledge transfer and 
utilisation is in essence a learning process carried out in the recipient firm.
Knowledge transfer is actually a process of active learning and hard working. 
That’s the secret of our success in transferring knowledge from VW and as a 
result of that learning process, now we are the No. 1 in car production in 
China.
(Mr Cheng Gang, Shanghai VW)
We learnt a lot in the process of making this joint venture work. Don’t forget 
that we had had no idea at all about joint venture before entering into this firm. 
To maintain this firm in a proper working order, numerous things needed to be 
grasped, from technology, manufacturing, quality control, to marketing, human 
resources management, and so on. They [western firms] have extensive 
knowledge on how to run a firm competitively, especially in a time when the 
economy has been increasingly internationalised, we must learn (otherwise we 
have no chance of survival). Each employee of this firm learned continuously 
and so we are successful today. I hope our state-owned firms can learn [from 
western firms] as well, and try to learn fast.
(Mr Zheng Yulu, Shanghai Bell)
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It seems clear that these two firms have realised that learning is the key to their 
current success. Without extensive learning firms cannot generate and maintain 
competitiveness even in the Chinese market. Motorola (China) and Beijing Jeep are 
no exception. The fact of Motorola University’s active role in facilitating learning 
within Motorola (China), and the establishment of “Beijing Jeep’s Localisation 
Community” - in addition to various training programmes in Beijing Jeep - signifies 
that organisational learning has been considered an inseparable part of their business 
operations. This is in line with the argument made by Edmondson and Moingeon 
(1998) that organisational learning is an essential adjunct to maintaining competitive 
advantage. It also supports the view that organisational learning contributes 
significantly to IJV performance (Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Lyles and Baird, 1994; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992).
Generally, this research confirms the organisational learning process proposed by 
Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 126), which includes: gaining new knowledge -  
articulation -  application -  dissemination and expansion, is applicable to China’s 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and automobile industry. For example, 
in the case of Beijing Jeep, the process of organisational learning was described as:
First, translating all the documents, digesting and assimilating the technical 
documents, choosing and training qualified workers, equipment installation 
and adjusting; second, beginning production, direct application of the technical 
directory, technical criteria, technical upgrading information, and some 
changes need to be made at this stage, such as the transformation from the 
USA weights and measures system to the metric system, the reorganisation of 
manufacturing engineering due to the differences of production equipment in 
the two firms concerned, and the reproduction of the blueprints (with some 
mistakes or unclear numbering of the pages and so on); third, utilisation with 
certain refining and renovation. This has been carried out especially in the area
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of adjusting the product concerned to the environmental and traffic conditions 
of China.
(Mr Tong Zhiyuan, Beijing Jeep)
We can see that the process in Beijing Jeep exactly matches that envisaged by 
Hedlund and Nonaka {ibid.). In the telecommunications manufacturing industry, few 
differences have been found from this model. For example, the general knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning process in Shanghai Bell, according to Mr Zheng 
Yulu, its production manager, is: gaining knowledge, digesting, localisation, joint 
development and self-development.
When compared with Shanghai Bell’s model, we can see that the process of 
organisational learning in Beijing Jeep does not emphasise the R&D aspect, which is 
an essential part of strengthening firm’s competitiveness, as will be discussed in the 
later section. This reflects the strategic weakness of Beijing Jeep in handling 
knowledge transfer, which partly contributed to the lower efficiency in its operation 
and fewer successes in market competition. In contrast, Shanghai VW has always 
been conscious of the imperative of R&D capability development in the process of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning. This was clearly stated by an 
interviewee, Mr Cheng Gang, on Shanghai VW’s stages of knowledge utilisation:
Our main weakness is R&D capability. That’s why we had to transfer in 
foreign knowledge. When the technology is transferred, assimilation 
(digesting) and production localisation is the first stage. The second stage is 
joint R&D on the new products. In this case, we also contributed to the new 
products. We are now in the later part of this stage. In the third stage, we will 
be able to contribute more than half of the new products developed. That 
means we will be dominant or in a leading position in the R&D development. 
The last stage is independent R&D. In that case we will be able to develop new 
products on our own.
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In the first stage, we can have sub-stages. First, copying everything from our 
partner, even mistakes. Then, when we have accumulated certain knowledge 
about the transferred products, we solved the problems occurred in the 
localisation process (one way of doing this is perfecting, i.e., making the 
products flawless, the other way is modification, i.e., making them meeting the 
circumstances of China). That indicates that we have a bigger say in the 
transfer process.
The Shanghai VW case indicates that firms in China can still build into the agenda 
the improvement of their own R&D capabilities in the process of utilising the 
transferred knowledge and organisational learning. An emphasis on this will make a 
big difference in terms of competitiveness over several years. The following sections 
will look into the organisational learning processes of these four firms in more 
detail, employing the stages model proposed by Hedlund and Nonaka (ibid.).
7.22 Articulation
Articulation is the crucial stage in the whole organisational learning process for 
understanding, testing and sharing the knowledge transferred (Hedlund and Nonaka, 
1993:126), as illustrated in Section “2.52 The process of organisational learning”. 
This aspect has received extensive attention in the four firms investigated. This 
results partly from the fact that the difference of languages has been the primary 
barrier in the assimilation of the transferred knowledge, although generally the 
Chinese management team and engineers have a good command of the foreign 
language the foreign partner uses35. German is used in the case of Shanghai VW
35 Generally managers and engineers need to demonstrate their language capability in the recruitment 
process, e.g. pass certain examinations in reading, speaking and writing of the designated foreign 
language in the joint venture,, unless they are graduates in the foreign language. In-house training 
continues after they have taken up their posts. Language capability is taken into consideration in terms 
of promotion or opportunities of assignments in overseas countries, such as conducting joint research 
or receiving training in the headquarters of the foreign partner.
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(English is also used at work place, but not so predominant as German), and English 
in the remaining three. The level of understanding and command of the foreign 
language among workshop workers is never higher than the basic level. This strictly 
requires the provision of technical and management materials, based on the 
transferred knowledge, in a Chinese version so that the people on production line 
can grasp the advanced knowledge from the foreign parent to the degree expected. 
For this purpose, translation centres and document centres were set up in the three 
joint ventures. For example, there is a translation group in Shanghai Bell, which, 
after screening and selecting all the transferred document, translates those materials 
required or needed into Chinese and sends them to the relevant departments. This 
has ensured that the transferred knowledge from Alcatel Bell was correctly 
categorised, analysed and distributed.
Being aware of the impact of the language problem on the organisational learning 
process, all the firms in this research have been tackling it from early in the 
recruitment stage. University graduates with a good command of foreign language, 
usually English, which is the most popular one among foreign languages, have been 
attracted to these firms by better pay and fashionable social facilities. In the case of 
Shanghai VW, because German is the main working language in the firm, but very 
few institutions provide it as an option for non-language students, Shanghai VW has 
to recruit: (1) students from Tongji University of Shanghai, which is an engineering 
institution that also specialises in German training; (2) some students of foreign 
language disciplines; and (3) students with fluent English. Based on the fact that 
most German mangers can speak good English, English has become a second
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working language between German expatriates and Chinese employees, though most 
of the documents are in German with the exception of some publicity materials. The 
other way of tackling the language problem is by providing workers with some 
language training as part of the general training programme.
All the staff sent to Germany for training programmes have all been examined 
in their German proficiency. Only once having passed language examinations 
can people be sent away. So, we set up a German training centre in SVW to 
deal with this issue. Secondly, we employed lots of graduates of Tongji 
University where, unlike other institutions, German is the first foreign 
language taught. This has saved us lots of time and money. In general most of 
our staff understand either German or English while most of the German 
experts can speak English. German and English are both our communication 
languages.
(Mr Cheng Gang. Shanghai VW)
Based on the approach outlined above, it appears that no great difficulties have been 
caused due to the difference of languages in the process of knowledge transfer and 
utilisation. This is consistent with the findings of other similar research carried out 
on joint ventures in China, e.g., Harding (1999). However, our findings differ from 
those of some studies with cases based on MNCs in other parts of the world, e.g., 
Marschan (1996), who finds that the lack of language skills obstructed the effective 
inter-unit communication flows within the same MNC (ibid., p. 152). Our finding 
may be due to the fact that English was designated as the primary foreign language 
in secondary schools as early as 1978, as part of the drive of opening China to the 
outside world. As a result, there is a great supply of graduates with a good command 
of English. Joint ventures and other foreign invested firms have attracted plenty of 
such graduates since the 1980s based on better pay, more opportunities for 
international assignments, and an enviable image. Stringent recruitment 
requirements of language capabilities and continuous in-house training have enabled
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the managers and engineers in the four firms of this research to carry out 
communications in English effectively (or German in the case of Shanghai VW). In 
the case of Shanghai Bell, English is the main working language, although Flemish 
is the mother tongue of the Belgian expatriates. All the transferred materials are in 
English. All the engineers and managers can use English as a working language. 
They are easily able to read and digest English documentation directly. It is also 
possible that the supply of English-speaking Chinese is not a binding constraint 
owning to the scale of China. It may become a binding constraint as inward EDI rises 
in the future.
In contrast with the joint ventures, there is no comparable documentation or 
translation centre in Motorola (China). Instead Motorola (China) overcomes 
language problems through concerted recruitment and training programmes. Firstly, 
proficiency of English has been a primary selection criterion for all the managerial 
staff, engineers and technicians, as the working language in the firm is English 
(though in practice Chinese has been used between the Chinese staff most of the 
time). These staff must demonstrate a good command of English, i.e., must be able 
to use English fluently in the workplace, before an employment contract can be 
signed. A certain standard of command of English has also been asked of applicants 
who applied for jobs in the production workshop. Secondly, Chinese workshop 
employees undergo technical training in both English and Chinese, given by 
American and Chinese engineers and technicians, before starting their jobs, then 
further training continues to improve their production skills as well as language 
capabilities. Chinese managerial staff, engineers and other employees in non­
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production departments are required to attend in-house training courses on a frequent 
basis, in which English is the only language used. Therefore, language differences 
have not caused serious problems in this wholly-owned subsidiary of Motorola, on 
account of its integrated approach of tackling the language issues.
If we can draw any conclusions from the approaches taken by the three joint ventures 
and Motorola (China), it is that they all addressed language issues from day one.
This is a clear indication of the importance attached to language, as a means of 
facilitating knowledge transfer and organisational learning within these firms. Some 
differences between Motorola (China) and the joint ventures exist as well. Motorola 
(China) has the full authority in addressing language issues, while the other firms in 
joint venture partnerships had to go through rounds of discussion and co-ordination 
to achieve a compromised action plan. One piece of evidence is that there have been 
more frequent personnel exchanges taking place in this wholly-owned subsidiary 
where the cost was paid by both the headquarters and the subsidiary together, than in 
joint ventures where the local affiliate had to pay every penny arising from the visits 
by expatriates and Chinese employees in both directions. Frequent personnel 
exchanges enabled the Chinese employees to be exposed to the foreign language and 
cultural environment more thoroughly, promoting learning effectiveness. Moreover, 
the key role played by Motorola University in dealing with language issues within 
Motorola has demonstrated the different approaches with that of joint ventures at 
institutional level. So, the main factor that differentiates Motorola (China) from the 
other three firms has been that this company has had total authority to apply its own 
strategy in dealing with issues in this aspect.
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The difference of languages is only part of the picture concerning articulation. The 
understanding and “extemalisation”, as put it by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 64), of 
technical terminology, the difference in operation norms and practices, and the 
managerial requirements for carrying out the introduced manufacturing, all fall into 
the range of issues relating to articulation. Great attention has been paid by these 
firms to sort them out between Chinese and foreign engineering and managerial 
staff. Language differences, however, were singled out as the biggest concern among 
the management teams of these four firms, and extensive resources have been put in 
place to deal with it. The above analysis indicates that the firms concerned have 
successfully managed this issue.
7.23 Application
Application is the stage where the recipient firms can benefit from making use of the 
transferred knowledge in the business operations of the firms concerned in the 
Chinese market. According to the information collected, this stage can be divided 
into the following sections: training, copying and adaptation.
Training
Training is regarded as the first step of the application stage because it provides the 
staff of the recipient companies with capabilities to understand, exploit and adapt the 
transferred technologies, and equips them with management expertise and
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international business practices. Training has been specifically related to Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995)’s notion of internalisation, which in the contest of IJVs means 
employees take explicit knowledge from the parent and converting it into tacit 
knowledge of their own. The following accounts are descriptions of training 
programmes in the two automotive firms, which support the above argument:
Training has been regarded as a key aspect of knowledge transfer and the 
upgrading of competitiveness. Chrysler proposed in 1987, in addition to the 
training programmes already agreed, to set up a new training foundation by 
investing the tax rebate gained by the two partners of Beijing Jeep (RMB 2.5 
million yuan, about US$470,000 then at US$1 = RMB 5.3 yuan) in 
establishing a new training centre in Beijing Jeep and paying for some of the 
trainees to visit the USA. Training programmes include: (1) seminars; (2) 
professional short courses; (3) case analysis within workshops; (4) sending 
trainees to the USA (including paying some of them to attend degree courses 
in American universities).
(Mr Zhao Nailin, Beijing Jeep)
Training in Shanghai VW has been dealt with in many ways, including sending 
managers and engineers to Germany, inviting German experts to SVW to run 
training programmes, the exchanging of information, and so on. Specifically, 
we require that unless he or she attends training programmes, a worker cannot 
be allowed to work on the production lines. Some of the workers were actually 
trained in Germany and spent some time working on the production line there.
The length of training programmes in Germany varied from 3-4 months to 2 
years, and differed from department to department. Engineers from R&D, 
moulding, and so on, usually spent two years in Germany; other engineering 
and technology-related staff spent one year there. For people from finance and 
accounting, materials management, purchasing and supply, marketing and after 
sales services, and other managerial departments, the time was usually less 
than half a year. In general most of the people sent to Germany were engineers 
and technicians, a minority of them was from managerial function 
departments. Management know-how has been transferred partly through this 
way and partly through learning from German managers in SVW.
(Mr Cheng Gang, Shanghai VW)
In Motorola (China), in-house training programmes have been considered an 
important part of the task list of every employee. Motorola University, a dedicated 
internal training organisation, is in charge of the training issues of the entire
259
company. Here, training is seen as the key to transfer knowledge from its 
headquarters and established subsidiaries to those newly set up, and a principle way 
of transforming its affiliates to be world competitors. As it was put by one training 
officer:
We have employed all the ways you mentioned in knowledge transfer. But, the 
most important one is training. Training is not for special people or in a special 
period, but for all the people all the time. I have never seen or heard of a large 
firm like Motorola committing so many resources, for example time, 
investment, specialised training system, in employees’ training and continuous 
upgrading. Motorola University! What a fantastic idea! If you are not here you 
just cannot believe it.
(Mr Liu, Motorola (China))
He emphasises that training in Motorola begins when an employee is recruited. Soon 
after arrival, he/she attends intensive training sessions concerning technical and 
cultural issues (such as the Motorola’s corporate culture and communication skills 
for employees from different national cultures). Each employee will be presented 
with the potential opportunities ahead of him/her and the clear requirements 
affiliated, and a personal development ladder will be identified based on extensive 
consultation available from their head and human resources managers. This personal 
development plan will be reviewed every year according to the progress made in that 
period. This is to ensure that every employee will have the opportunity of fulfilling 
his/her aspiration along with Motorola’s development.
Apart from the job-related training in the very beginning of one’s employment in 
Motorola, each employee, including heads of the company, attends at least 40 hours’ 
training each year arranged by training officers and Motorola University. In order to 
speed up the localisation process of Motorola (China)’s management team, a
260
specially designed programme, CAMP (China Accelerated Management 
Programme) was developed in 1994. It is an intensive, 10-month training 
programme that includes a two-month rotation overseas. This is in addition to 
dozens of other comprehensive training courses covering topics such as total 
customer satisfaction, reducing project cycle time, market research methodologies 
and advanced manufacturing technologies. In CAMP’s first 3 years, 100 employees 
have participated in the programme directly relating to the transfer of management 
skills. This represents a large portion of their management team. The other main 
types of training provided by Motorola University are courses relating to total quality 
control, technology and marketing.
It is worth noting that the training provided inside Motorola is not only for its own 
employees, but also for people from its joint ventures, cooperative projects, and even 
its suppliers. This has obviously done a lot good in strengthening Motorola (China)’s 
competence.
A very similar picture of training can be found in Shanghai Bell. Notably, the 
training scheme not only covers the employees in Shanghai, but also those working 
in Shanghai Bell’s affiliates:
In our case, training is the main route of learning the management skills we 
need. We did attend many management (especially in marketing and customer 
services) training programmes organised in our headquarters Shanghai Bell. It 
is a requirement for us to attend. We also received lots of related materials 
from our parent on both management and, of course, technical issues, but 
closely linked to the products and operational arrangements of Shanghai Bell. 
Furthermore, the managers of Shanghai Bell’s affiliates are under screening 
from our leaders in headquarters from time to time. They visit us sometime in 
a year just like we need to visit them by going to Shanghai.
(Mr Zhou Feilong, NEAT)
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Training also serves as a key channel for passing on the social knowledge (including 
corporate culture) of foreign parents, most of which is embedded inside people’s 
minds, language and behaviour. In Shanghai Bell, social knowledge has been 
regarded as the “secret weapon” of their success (as noted in Section “6.31 The 
typology of the transferred knowledge”), and training is one of the ways of 
transferring this knowledge to different affiliates. Training programmes held in both 
Shanghai and Antwerp in Belgium, which have been taught by Belgian managers, 
are credited as being an effective way of injecting the belief, company-specific 
knowledge (internal jargon, management style, technical system, etc.) and corporate 
culture of Alcatel Bell to employees in its newly established affiliates. Shanghai VW 
also regards training as the process of equipping employees with VW’s tradition of 
innovation and sense of quality. Perhaps, however, the most outstanding case is that 
of Motorola (China). Training there is served not only for learning the job-related 
technical knowledge, but also to transform employees mentally into Motorola 
people. This has been a key step in promoting the integration of Motorola’s 
“Empire”. All these facts strongly support our argument that transferring and sharing 
social knowledge is critical to keep the newly established affiliates competitive in a 
foreign market.
From the above analysis, it is clear that the four firms have all carried out substantial 
training programmes since their establishment. Training centres, with dedicated 
training facilities, were set up, and special training officers appointed. Every new 
employee in these firms has to participate in a well-designed training programme
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and get qualified before being allowed to take up his/her job. Continuing training 
sessions have been followed to ensure the high level skills are maintained and 
enhanced, along with the upgrading of production facilities. Training sessions also 
have been used to equip affiliate employees with modem management skills and 
pass on social knowledge. Even when primary knowledge transfer’6 has been 
finished, as shown in the above interview data, some training programmes still go on 
in these four firms to update the technical and managerial knowledge of employees, 
and to consolidate their competitiveness in a changing market. This is in line with 
the argument of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) in achieving internalisation within 
MNCs, which is an important part of organisational learning.
In comparison, training in Motorola (China) is more systematic and intensive than in 
its joint venture counterparts. This is essentially a reflection of the different beliefs 
between them. Motorola regards training as part of its firm competitiveness, with 
Motorola University at the centre of its corporate identity, while all the joint ventures 
use training to achieve their respective firm competitiveness. This resulted in more 
investment in training, more appointment of training officers and more extensive 
personnel exchanges with its headquarters by Motorola (China). Joint ventures, on 
the other hand, have to go through a process to reach a consensus on training issues. 
Investment in this respect therefore depends on the consensus of the parties 
involved, as well as on the business operation results. In the joint ventures, training 
has always been in danger of being treated lightly, or even ignored when the affiliate 
is in difficulties.
36 The transfer of the knowledge defined in the joint venture contract, usually the technologies for 
producing a certain product.
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It also transpires that the two firms in the telecommunications equipment industry 
seem to emphasise training more as a way of strengthening the firm’s general 
competitiveness than the two in the automotive industry. This may be an industry- 
specific difference in the native of the two industries. Shanghai VW and Beijing 
Jeep contrast in that relatively fewer training programmes have been provided, and 
there is a concentration towards pre-employment training. In comparison, more 
frequent and intensive post-employment training programmes have been arranged in 
Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China). This may be a clear indication of the fast pace 
of technological innovation and fierce competition characterising in the 
telecommunications industry since the 1980s.
Copying
Copying is the second step of the application stage. It is a process of reassembling 
the business operations in the Chinese affiliate based on the blueprints of the foreign 
parent. This involves not only the direct application of all the transferred 
technologies (product design, manufacturing process, product testing and quality 
control), but also the active employment of management skills (marketing, 
accounting and finance, planning, purchasing and supply, stock control, etc.) that are 
vital to the proper functioning of the firm. The aim is to achieve the ‘cloning’ in the 
affiliate of the existing production of a product from the foreign parent. The current 
literature has failed to identify copying as an independent step within the stage of 
application. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, absorptive capacity and the creation
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of teams are thought to be of primary importance to facilitate organisational learning 
in general. This section intends to review their roles within the context of copying.
The general copying process has been very similar among the four firms concerned. 
After signing the contract, an action plan was agreed either by the joint venture 
parties or the headquarters (in the case of Motorola), and a flow of technical 
materials began from the foreign parent to the affiliate in the Chinese market, with 
blueprints for building up a workshop and for installing the production line for the 
specific product. A key finding from this research is that the success of copying 
depends on two things: one is the absorptive capacity of the recipient and the other 
one is the employment of teams. This confirms our previous discussion in Section 
“2.51 The utilisation of the transferred knowledge: An organisational learning 
perspective” of Chapter 2.
Absorptive capacity has been considered as one of the most important factors that 
determine the effectiveness of technology transfer (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
A study by Li and Shenkar (1996) reveals that existing local partner skills largely 
determine the types of skills sought from foreign partners. In other words, the 
transfer of a foreign firm’s technology, management and marketing skills will be less 
successful if the local affiliate does not possess the necessary skill base. Beijing 
Jeep’s experience strongly supports this argument. The Board of Directors of Beijing 
Jeep, on 14th October 1984, decided to achieve a localisation rate of 80 per cent by 
1987, three years after its establishment. Due to the technical gap between the joint 
venture and its local suppliers, and that of foreign parent, it transpired that this
265
objective was too ambitious. It was achieved only in 1994, ten years after its 
establishment. The data show that the technology transfer process in Beijing Jeep 
has been obstructed by two factors, and one of them is the weak absorptive capacity 
(the other one is the cost factor37). In fact, the American partner has always been 
very active in facilitating the transfer of advanced technologies according to the joint 
venture contract. The slow speed of technology transfer in this firm was largely due 
to the inability of the recipient to absorb the transferred elements on time. In order to 
raise the efficiency of utilising the transferred technologies, Beijing Jeep had to 
make slower the technology flow in order to cope with the task of digestion and 
localisation.
It would be true to say that the strategy of transferring the latest technologies and fast 
localisation was based on the exigencies of the Chinese government, and not on the 
technological and manufacturing capability of the Chinese industry. From the data 
collected in this investigation we can see that the Chinese partners perceived the 
introduction of FDI as an opportunity to inject new life into the firms concerned. 
Restricted in their knowledge about the challenges to the new products to be 
introduced in the technical and production dimensions, the Chinese partners seemed 
very confident of the availability of local suppliers and of their own technological 
capability to assimilate the new technologies. The Chinese perception was that 
market demand, competitive strategy and government policies would decide their 
future positions in the Chinese market, rather than the firms’ technical and
37 According to Zhang, P. (1995), a sample of 20 localised products indicated that their cost on 
average was 1.4 times of those imported which was composed of: manufacturer selling price + 
packaging + sea transportation + tariff + unloading at the port + surface transportation.
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production limitations. Owing to the long term segregation from the world economy, 
Chinese firms in general, and those of telecommunications and automotive 
industries in particular, were largely thirty years behind their counterparts in the 
advanced industrial countries in terms of technological capability and management 
skills. The local component producers’ perceptions were even more at variance with 
their own abilities. Due to the discriminatory Chinese industrial policies, state- 
owned, large firms were treated preferentially in terms of raw materials, capital and 
human resources allocation, while the collectively-owned, medium and small firms 
were forced to take care of themselves, under the central planning regime. For this 
reason, component producers tended to overestimate their abilities, and as a result 
were slow in meeting their targets in technology assimilation, localisation, and the 
technical upgrading of their existing line of business. Hence, while external factors 
such as market demand, competitive strategy, the intention of upgrading the existing 
range of products and government policy, drove these firms to choose the most 
advanced products and quick localisation for the joint ventures concerned, internal 
constraints such as technological capability, management skills and the availability 
of local suppliers, paralysed the production plans for the chosen products in the first 
stage of each joint venture. It is fair to say that the lack of fine judgement of the self- 
technical and management capabilities, and those of component suppliers, in the 
product selection process, has contributed to the low efficiency of technology 
transfer and utilisation in the joint ventures concerned. Beijing Jeep’s experience 
directly supports the argument that the absence of an appropriate skills base and 
absorptive capacity in an affiliate represents a severe barrier to knowledge transfer 
(Li and Shenkar, 1996; Quelin, 1998). Therefore, in a newly established firm, the
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building up of the absorptive capacity is essential to the utilisation of the transferred 
knowledge. However, slowing the transfer rate begs the question of whether training 
needed to be increased, to raise absorptive capacity in the long term.
Being aware of its importance, Shanghai Bell paid great attention to strengthening its 
absorptive capacity: inviting many mature experts to take part in the utilisation 
process, recruiting hundreds of young graduates in majors such as 
telecommunications systems, engineering, production and software development, 
holding training programmes in both Belgium and China. It also involved sending 
trainees to Belgian Bell’s production line and R&D centre to gain a thorough 
understanding and grasp of the production process, and receiving expatriates from 
Belgian Bell to head the relevant departments and groups on assimilation and 
application of the transferred knowledge. Shanghai Bell has developed a very 
experienced team in knowledge absorption and utilisation, which has been referred 
to as the most important asset of this firm by Ms Yin Linggu (of Shanghai Bell). 
Moreover, as an indication of strong absorptive capacity, Shanghai Bell now is in a 
position not only to be actively involved in the development of a new generation of 
System 1240, but also to pass on its own capability of utilising transferred 
knowledge as part of firm specific advantage to its new own affiliates in the Chinese 
market.
Shanghai Bell is not alone. The other three firms have also spared no efforts in 
improving their absorptive capabilities in ways similar to Shanghai Bell. Especially, 
we found that localisation committees were set up in all the three joint ventures of
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this research to coordinate the absorption-localisation process in these firms and 
their major suppliers. In Beijing Jeep, a localisation community comprising 
component producers, research institutions and universities was established to tackle 
the problems found in the process of knowledge transfer and utilisation. The other 
interesting phenomenon we found is that joint design was regarded as an indication 
of strong absorptive capacity, and a necessary stage to go forward after the 
successful localisation of the transferred knowledge. Shanghai Bell has a R&D 
centre in Antwerp, participating in the development of next generation System 12; 
Shanghai VW jointly developed the second generation of Santana (Santana 2000) 
along with colleagues of VW in Germany and Brazil during 1992-1993. Santana 
2000Gti was followed in 1997, and a much-advanced model is now in progress. 
Chinese engineers have played more and more important roles in this development 
process. Comparatively, Beijing Jeep has made fewer progresses in this regard, 
while Motorola is in a higher category altogether. In Motorola (China) absorptive 
capacity and R&D capability has been nourished together, but in different lines of 
products: while striving to establish its absorptive capacity in all the product 
technologies transferred, such as semiconductor products, microprocessor, cellular 
phone, pager, and so on, Motorola also established a software centre, a mobile 
telecommunications products development centre, a manufacturing technology 
research centre, and a paging research and development centre. All of these centres 
provide R&D services to all divisions of Motorola around the world. In general, our 
findings confirm that absorptive capacity was considered a key element in 
facilitating knowledge transfer. A clear understanding of the impact of the existing 
skills base on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer and organisational learning has
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pushed the parties concerned to pursue the establishment of absorptive capacity from 
the recruitment stage towards joint R&D. This has been entirely consistent with the 
finding made by Szulanski (1997).
Team is the other factor to be considered crucial in knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning in general, and in the process of copying in particular.
Team was even referred to as the single most important factor in facilitating the 
direct transfer of knowledge (Hedlund and Riddersatrale, 1994; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995). The complexity of transferring knowledge between firms is that a 
great volume of daily follow-ups are needed to maintain the momentum of the 
process, which have to be shouldered by the designated teams on each side of the 
transfer. Members of the team include not only engineers who are familiar with the 
technical aspects of the products concerned, but also managers who are empowered 
to co-ordinate the resources available for the purpose of transferring knowledge, 
communicate with higher levels in the hierarchies, and make decisions with given 
authority. Technicians and section chiefs of production line are also consulted 
regularly.
As the interview data show, first there is a team that is experienced in dealing with 
the knowledge transfer concerned in the headquarters of the parent firm, e.g., the 
Department of Knowledge Transfer in Alcatel Bell, the Department of International 
Operation in CMC and AMC, the knowledge transfer unit in the Department of Asia 
Pacific in Motorola, and the Overseas Coordination Division of VW. Each of these 
firms concerned has been engaged in international business for quite a long time, and
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has in the past two decades internationalised further via licensing and via FDI, in the 
form of joint ventures and the setting up of wholly-owned subsidiaries around the 
world. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the backup for knowledge transfer is 
strong and well organised. So, the advantage of these four firms in knowledge 
transfer lies in their expertise of supporting the transfer process, which has been 
embedded in an experienced team.
Second there is a dedicated team in the recipient firm. The transfer team in the 
Chinese affiliate usually consists of the departments such as product development, 
production, engineering and localisation, usually co-ordinated by the Knowledge 
Transfer and Localisation Office, as seen in Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and 
Shanghai Bell. But, as the deputy general manager of Beijing Jeep, Mr Zhao Nailin, 
put it:
Knowledge transfer and utilisation is not the business of several departments 
or certain people, but the business of the whole firm. Every employee has to 
assimilate the transferred knowledge concerning his own job.
The information provided by Alcatel Bell’s knowledge transfer team also reveals 
that they could deal with any department in the affiliate in order to oversee the 
progress of the knowledge transfer process.
Both partners in these firms recognise the important role of teams in facilitating 
knowledge transfer and utilisation, as demonstrated in the case of Shanghai Bell:
The most important factor in knowledge utilisation is technical assistance. A 
special team is always in place to solve the problems arising from assimilating
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and applying the knowledge transferred. Alcatel Bell also has a technology 
transfer department specifically dealing with the daily follow-ups and to 
provide further assistance to its joint venture partners or licensees.
(Mr Jos Caerts, Alcatel Bell)
Technology transfer is really not easy to carry out. I have seen many 
unsuccessful cases of transferring technology. Why have so many failed while 
ours has been so successful? First and foremost, our partner, Belgian Bell is 
very experienced in technology transfer. There is a team inside it to facilitate 
the technology transfer process from the very beginning, dealing with 
numerous daily follow-ups.
(Ms Yin Linggu. Shanghai Bell)
According to the interview data, the team of the recipient firm must be very 
competent and needs to take an active role in bridging the differences that emerge 
between parent and affiliate, and pass on the requirements and any disagreement to 
its counterpart in the parent firm. In the light of the importance of the transfer team 
in recipient firm, great efforts have been made by the recipient firms in China to 
build up high quality teams. Apart from external recruitment and internal selection, 
plus training programmes for local staff, expatriates from the parent firms have been 
kept longer in the recipient transfer teams so that the knowledge recipient can rely on 
the expertise of both Chinese and foreign staff to deal with issues in the transfer 
process more effectively. For example, Shanghai Bell still keeps 15 Belgian 
expatriates, Shanghai VW 10-15, and Beijing Jeep 9 American experts annually. It is 
also a way to promote learning by Chinese staff, in order to grasp the skills needed in 
the transfer process when working with foreign expatriates, e.g., Shanghai VW has 
employed 107 long-term (approximately 3-year stay) German specialists in all, and 
on average about 200 short-term (less than six months) foreign specialists every year 
since its establishment, passing on knowledge and enabling organisational learning.
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This practice of “grafting individuals” in the recipient was considered to be very 
effective in improving the capacity of absorption and facilitating knowledge transfer.
It is clear from this investigation that a dedicated team in place is the prerequisite for 
a successful knowledge transfer and organisational learning within multinational 
corporations. This has confirmed the argument made by Hedlund and Riddersatrale 
(1994) that teams need to be created to ensure that learning is embedded in the 
knowledge recipient firm in the transitional markets.
There has been a common approach in copying among the four firms in this 
research. This begins with sending in expatriates and technical teams to carry out the 
initial establishment of the production process and to supervise trained local 
employees to follow the headquarters’ operation practices. This was supported at the 
same time by the teams in the headquarters, such as the China project coordinators in 
Alcatel Bell, to deal with issues beyond the capability or control of the site teams. 
Although training had been offered to all newly recruited employees, copying within 
the four firms was still primarily a process of “learning by doing”(Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Lall, 1980), as numerous new bits and pieces needed to be grasped 
to achieve the desired performance. Mr Lrn, the training officer of Motorola (China), 
commented:
Learning does not stop after training. Instead, learning started from training for 
every employee in Motorola. Everyone should keep learning the skills needed 
to perfect his/her job, irrespective of workshop employee or managerial staff. 
This is the reason why we have maintained a significant training schedule 
since our establishment in 1992 (every employee of this firm, including the 
general manager, has to attend at least one-week training each year). This has 
created opportunities for encouraging employees to learn not only from foreign 
expatriates and engineers, but also from colleagues of the same unit.
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Mr Zheng Yulu of Shanghai Bell made a similar comment based on his personal 
experiences:
I was a graduate in the 1960s. Although having worked on the R&D aspect of 
telecommunications equipment continuously, I felt myself to be struggling 
when I joined this firm in the middle of the 1980s. I had no choice but to keep 
learning, learning from foreign instructors during the training sessions, 
learning from the technicians sent from Alcatel Bell’s headquarters, and 
learning from my colleagues who knew western technologies better than me, 
etc. As a matter of fact, I used most of my spare time then in these learning
activities To be honest, I was not exceptional. Every one had to learn
otherwise he or she could not cope with the job.
The distinctive difference in terms of copying between the wholly-owned subsidiary 
and the joint ventures here is that Motorola (China) started with the production of 
three products in 1992: semiconductor, pager and cellular phone, while the three 
joint ventures each started only with the assembling of one product, i.e., S12 in 
Shanghai Bell, Santana passenger car in Shanghai VW and Cherokee in Beijing 
Jeep. Hence, the volume of copying is a lot greater in the subsidiary than in the joint 
ventures. The other significant difference in copying is that joint ventures began with 
the easiest parts of the production process: assembling and testing. Complete 
components were imported from the foreign parents to these joint ventures for 
assembling. Then, copying was extended to have some simple components 
manufactured locally, which was followed gradually by more components with 
higher sophistication being produced in the Chinese market. The reason for this 
reverse-engineering to take place is two fold: one is the lack of absorptive capability 
on the recipient side, which will be dealt with in detail below; the other is the non­
existence of quality component suppliers, which became increasingly problematic
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when localisation became the priority of these joint ventures. The lack of financial 
resources also created some constraints on the copying process from time to time in 
the recipients.
This ‘from-easy-to-difficult’ approach, however, was not found in Motorola (China), 
where, from the very beginning, the final products listed above (as well as some 
components) were produced simultaneously based on its huge investment.
Moreover, some research centres (the software centre, mobile telecommunications 
products centre, manufacturing technology research centre and paging research and 
development centre) were established at roughly the same time as the production 
lines, in order to facilitate the further development and adaptation of the current 
product range. This reflects Motorola’s global division of production, with its 
Chinese subsidiary being assigned to develop and manufacture lines of products not 
only for the Chinese market but also world markets. This difference also speaks in 
support of the previous discussion on Motorola’s entry motivation in the Chinese 
market (see Section “6.21 The strategic motives of MNCs in entering the Chinese 
market” for detail).
Adaptation
The last step in the application stage of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning is adaptation. Due to social and other natural differences between countries, 
every product needs to be modified somewhat before being wholly or adequately 
compatible with the targeted markets. Adaptation therefore becomes a crucial stage
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in the knowledge utilisation and organisational learning process. From Section “2.52 
The process of organisational learning”, it is clear that, during the process of 
organisational learning, adaptation, customisation and modification are normal 
phenomena employed to make the articulated knowledge realise its most potential. 
Reuber and his colleagues (Reuber et al., 1973) further argue that technology 
adaptation by affiliates in developing countries is more common in market-seeking 
than in resources-seeking or rationalised FDI.
According to the interview data, all the technologies introduced into China in these 
firms experienced certain adaptations before the products in question were put into 
full-scale production. Adaptation covers both hardware and software relating to the 
products, production engineering, production management systems and quality 
control system. In the case of Shanghai Bell, the main problem of the S1240 in the 
Chinese market at the very beginning, was that software aspect of this product was 
not mature enough to suit the Chinese market.
There were many problems that occurred in the process of producing and 
installing the products. The original prototype technology was just developed 
and the actual product would be installed in Norway in June 1986. No other 
systems had been installed elsewhere in the world. The telephone system in 
China then was very complicated, with various systems installed at different 
times being integrated into the national grid. Some of the systems were 
actually installed 50 or 60 years ago. So the whole communication system was 
terribly complex. The Belgian side was not prepared to encounter such a 
difficult system in China. Their software was not capable of meeting the needs 
of the Chinese system. As a result, in the first phase some of our customers in 
Shanghai and Beijing met lots of problems when using our System 12. Many 
customers would not like risking to accept such an unstable product. So our 
marketing position was very weak. We had to carry out lots of modifications, 
or even develop some new functions, to meet the requirements of the specific 
customers or revising the defects of the original system that magnified 
themselves only in the new environment.
(Ms Yin Linggu, Shanghai Bell)
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In the opinion of the interviewees, as long as software problems were solved, then 
the adaptation of hardware did not pose a great challenge. The Belgian partner 
realised its promise by helping Chinese engineers to adapt the System 12 to meet 
both the Chinese criteria and the practical needs of the Chinese market. Every 
element of this product series went through a process called CDE (country 
development engineering, or customer development engineering) carried out by a 
specific CDE department. As a result, in December 1986, the first System 12 was 
transferred to the Bureau of Post & Telecommunications of Hefei, the capital of 
Anhui Province. It indicated that the System 12 technology was viable when applied 
in China. In the year after, i.e., 1987, both sides made great efforts to solve the 
remaining minor problems. During this process, the Chinese engineers fully 
‘digested’ the System 12, and established trust with the expatriates within Shanghai 
Bell and with the technical support teams in the headquarters of Alcatel Bell. This is 
exactly the ‘learning by adapting’ referred to by Lall (1980). Therefore, problems 
occurring in the adaptation process are quite normal. What needed is a specific team, 
CDE department, working on a specific process -  CDE -  to fill in the gaps between 
a technically advanced product and a potential foreign market. This enables the 
product concerned to become workable and competitive in a new environment.
Adaptation has also been found to be a crucial stage in the other three firms. The 
Santana of Shanghai VW and Cherokee of Beijing Jeep have both experienced 
substantial modifications, e.g., to the braking system, car horn and engine. This is 
due to poor road conditions in most cities and the countryside of China. The majority 
of roads are of low grade, which contributes to the higher wear and tear on cars. To
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make it worse, there is a lack of traffic management systems (traffic lights, traffic 
signs and traffic monitoring systems), coupled with frequent violations of the 
highway code by both drivers and pedestrians, which argued for the introduction of 
more sophisticated and reliable cars. It demonstrates the impact of China’s 
“underdeveloped social infrastructure”, as discussed in Chapter 3, on the automotive 
industry.
The need to modify telecommunications products made by Motorola is more 
obvious, as there are always certain technical and infrastructural differences from 
country to country, e.g., 110 volts electricity in North America but 220 volts in 
China. More importantly, there was a great need for having Chinese language text 
services on pagers and mobile phones. If Motorola wanted to maintain its market 
leadership, it would be an imperative to adapt its products in this respect. Motorola 
carried out the so much-needed adaptations, and its continuing dominance in the 
Chinese market, as discussed in Section “4.3 Profile of Motorola (China) Electronic 
Limited”, is a reflection of the success of the adaptations it made.
Increasingly, MNCs perceive their ability of modifying their products to meet 
country-specific customer needs as a competitive advantage in its own right 
(Dunning, 1993: 295), especially when the host market is relatively large, as in the 
case of the Chinese market. For example, Ms Yin Linggu of Shanghai Bell pointed 
out one of the reasons responsible for the success of this joint venture was its strong 
CDE capability:
We have an outstanding team working in CDE. What they have achieved is 
bridging up the advanced S12 with the complicated telecommunications 
network of Chinese customers. Is it easy to do? No, not a bit. I emphasise this
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is not an easy ride simply because the engineers have to deal with both 
software and hardware issues, and both foreign technologies and the Chinese 
network. There have been quite a few joint ventures established in this 
business [telecommunications exchanges] between German, Japanese 
manufacturers, such as Siemens, NEC, and Chinese telecommunications 
manufacturers, and they never posed serious threats to us. Why? One of our 
strengths [comparative advantage] is our strong CDE capability. To a certain 
extent, our success (in CDE) paved the way for the fact that our output levels 
took off and for our dominant market share.
Mr Cheng Gang of Shanghai VW also considered their capability of adaptation and
modification as an important part of firm specific advantages:
We have always regarded adaptation and modification as the only way of 
making the foreign product acceptable in the Chinese market. Indeed, we never 
• ignored R&D. However, our R&D started with adapting the transferred 
product (Santana) according to the road conditions and customer needs. We 
are successful today because we put investment into this aspect from the very 
beginning and I am pleased to see our efforts paid off.
So, adaptation is not only a matter of understanding and interpretation of the 
transferred knowledge. It also demonstrates the capability of refining the transferred 
knowledge based on an appreciation of the customer needs in the Chinese market. 
The above evidence is in line with the argument of Section “2.52 The process of 
organisational learning” that, during the process of organisational learning, 
adaptation, customisation and modification are normal phenomena for making the 
articulated knowledge realise its most potential. It also supports the suggestion made 
by Reuber et al (1973) that technology adaptation by affiliates in developing 
countries is more common in market-seeking FDI.
The ability to conduct adaptations can only be achieved by combining two fronts of 
organisational learning, i.e., the learning of the transferred knowledge from the
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foreign parent and the learning of local knowledge residing in the Chinese partner(s) 
in the case of joint ventures, or in the local employees in Motorola (China). The 
inclusion of learning local knowledge into the organisational learning process makes 
a qualitative difference to knowledge transfer because it effectively turns adaptation 
into a process of knowledge transformation and even knowledge creation (Hedlund 
and Nonaka, 1993). Learning is therefore shifted from an emphasis on simply 
understanding and copying the transferred knowledge to a new phase of integrating 
the transferred knowledge with the local knowledge, and to developing new 
knowledge in response to the competitive situation of the host market. This was 
exemplified in the modification and refining of the transferred products according to 
the needs of the Chinese market. Chinese employees were therefore not pure learners 
any more, they contributed to the newly developed competencies [of the affiliate] as 
an outcome of organisational learning and the response of the affiliate to local 
market demand. Foreign expatriates, on the other hand, had to facilitate the learning 
of local knowledge by promoting local employees, enabling them to have a bigger 
say in managing the business operations of the affiliates. The success of Shanghai 
Bell, for example, demonstrated the importance of listening to the local employees 
when operating in the Chinese market.
The Chinese directors have always maintained that we should respect the 
expertise of Belgian side very much. At the same time, the Belgian side, 
though bearing some of common characteristics of western firms, is very 
flexible in dealing with us. They are listening to us. Lots of westerners don’t 
listen to Chinese. They think they know every thing in this market. But the 
Belgians have been listening to us, they are very flexible, and can compromise 
if we are reasonable [in interpreting the customer needs and putting forward 
proposals for modifications]. So, broadly, [for foreign investors], if you want 
to succeed, you must have patience, you must be flexible, you must listen to 
Chinese when coming to this market. You cannot say I am No. 1 here.
(Ms Yin Linggu, Shanghai Bell)
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Data collected from the other three firms of this investigation also support this 
argument too. Motorola, with the belief that only Chinese employees know China 
well enough to make the correct marketing and product decisions for Motorola 
(China), and that expatriates are too expensive for long-term competitiveness, has 
utilised local knowledge significantly in its business operations, through its 
commitment to localising staffing in China as quickly as possible. To this end, it 
established the fast track management localisation programme “CAMP” (Chinese 
Accelerated Management Programme). It also held in-house training programmes 
with inputs from local officials and from tutors drawn from prominent Chinese 
universities. Moreover, Motorola (China) established several R&D centres 
immediately after the installation of the manufacturing facilities for the sake of 
seeking local knowledge, as local researchers conducted modifications on the current 
range of products as well as carried out some cutting-edge researches for the global 
market in these centres. These are just part of the picture in which local knowledge 
has been emphasised in making the products of Motorola (China) competitive in the 
Chinese market. The efforts of this company to identify and nurture capable Chinese 
citizens and provide them with the most extensive foreign-operated training 
programmes in China have already begun to pay off. Today, Chinese managers have 
taken up most of the middle level management positions in the company. Training 
continues to enlarge this proportion and increase the number of local higher-level 
managers. This is being done against a background of continued rapid growth in 
Motorola's operations in China.
281
To the same extent to the firms in the telecommunications equipment industry, 
Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep of the automobile industry also relied heavily on the 
local knowledge of their Chinese partners in their adaptation processes. They both 
benefited from the fact that their Chinese partners had been established passenger car 
producers for a long time, boasting extensive knowledge on, and links with, local 
government, component suppliers, financial institutions and marketing channels. 
These two firms were quickly alerted with information on problems arising from the 
existing models, and communications were conducted on how to refine these foreign 
cars to suit the taste of the Chinese customers. They also sorted out the complex 
relationship with local governments and banks, seeking support in adapting the 
transferred models with locally available financial resources.
The very fact that Motorola (China) has managed to utilise local knowledge without 
a Chinese partner indicates that joint venture partnership is not a prerequisite for 
tapping local knowledge. However, local knowledge has been tapped differently 
between Motorola (China) and the three joint ventures. In other words, local 
knowledge resides in different bodies within these firms. Motorola (China) obtained 
local knowledge from its employees through integrated recruitment policy, i.e., it 
tapped local knowledge residing in individual employees* irrespective their 
capability in R&D, or their knowledge on, and connections with, local business 
environment (marketing channels, access to the bankers of local financial 
institutions, access to key officials in local government bureaus, knowledge about 
local and national component manufacturers, e tc .). Joint ventures also obtained 
local knowledge residing in individual employees. But, more important, they
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inherited those local knowledge that had embedded in its Chinese partners, i.e., those 
knowledge that resided in institutions instead of individuals. Local knowledge held 
by the Chinese partners at institutional level is very important in doing business in 
this market, because, as we are going to see in Section “7.3 The key factors in the 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning process”, it can pave the way to 
government support which is crucial for achieving success in the Chinese business 
environment. Although it seems that the joint venture form can provide more up­
front local knowledge [from both newly recruited local employees and the Chinese 
partner] than the wholly-owned subsidiary does [which solely relies on newly 
recruited employees], the impact of this advantage on business operation cannot be 
overestimated. That Motorola (China) outperformed the three joint ventures in this 
investigation in the Chinese market, as shown in Section “7.5 The improvement of 
firms’ competitiveness as a result of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning”, suggests that wholly-owned subsidiary can find ways to leverage against 
the advantages joint ventures enjoy in terms of providing more local knowledge 
residing in their Chinese partners in the process of business operation. Further 
research is needed to explore the ways in which wholly-owned subsidiary achieves 
this in the Chinese market.
As a result of integrating the transferred knowledge and the local knowledge during 
adaptation processes, organisational learning within the four firms became the main 
vehicle of creating firm competitiveness in the Chinese market. This indicates the 
central role played by organisational learning in the “evolutionary process” (Chang 
and Rosenzweig, 1995: 4) of MNCs’ entry into the Chinese market.
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7.24 D issem ination: Further know ledge transfer and organisational learning
7.241 Further knowledge transfer from the four firms to their own affiliates
As discussed in Section “2.52 The process of organisational learning”, dissemination 
is the route for the recipients to further exploit the utilised knowledge in a wider 
environment. The current literature suggests that it is legitimate to assume that at this 
stage the output knowledge is further transferred from the recipient to its own 
affiliates or firms related through business process (suppliers or potential 
cooperative partners).
The data collected from this research reveal that the two firms in the 
telecommunications industry have pursued this secondary transfer vigorously: 
Shanghai Bell has transferred technologies, management skills and social knowledge 
to its own affiliate Northeast Asia Telecommunications Manufacturing Co. (NEAT) 
of Liaoning Province, Pearl River Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturing 
Co. (PRTMC) of Guangdong Province [i.e., Canton] and Beijing Bell; while 
Motorola (China) has done the same to its wholly-owned subsidiaries in Suzhou of 
Jiangsu Province and Leshan of Sichuan Province. A repetition of the knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning process has been carried out in these sites, 
similar to that between Alcatel Bell and Shanghai Bell, and between Motorola and 
the Tianjin site of Motorola (China). Royalties and other payment in relation to the 
knowledge transferred and training programmes held have been included in the joint
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venture contracts. The aim has been to make Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) 
stronger in terms of the degree to which its firm-specific advantages are established 
in the Chinese market. The following figure shows the secondary knowledge transfer 
conducted in Shanghai Bell.





What differs from the initial knowledge transfer into China is that the scale of 
secondary knowledge transfer is smaller, usually covering only part of the business 
lines of Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China), and the “expatriates” this time are 
usually Chinese instead of foreigners. In most cases only Chinese is used as the sole 
working language, thus increasing the speed of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning in the recipient firms. Through these joint ventures, both 
Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) have not only increased their production 
volume, rationalised their internal production division, and therefore achieved 
greater efficiency by way of internal trade, but also become key players in several of 
the most important local markets which are heavily regulated by the provincial
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governments. The strategy of setting up joint ventures and carrying out secondary 
knowledge transfer has contributed greatly to the success of the two firms in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry of China in the 1990s. This finding of 
secondary knowledge transfer is in line with the organisational learning theory, 
which argues that the “commitment to past success programmes” pushes firms to 
search for similar situations and environments for the setting up of collaboration and 
structures in a similar way (Lyles and Salk, 1996), in order to achieve maximum 
benefit, by repeating the learning process in different settings.
Comparatively, the two firms in the automotive industry, Shanghai VW and Beijing 
Jeep have done very little in this regard. Certainly Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep 
have further transferred some knowledge to other firms, such as first tier suppliers, 
by way of localisation, quality control, product innovation and upgrading. Shanghai 
VW disseminated to its first tier suppliers the technical specifications and quality 
requirements of the expected components. It also provided training sessions for 
managers and engineers from its main components suppliers on technological, 
manufacturing and management issues. More importantly, Shanghai VW viewed the 
main suppliers as part of its campaign to improve its environmental management.
All the components must reach the expected environmental standards before signing 
supply contracts. Hence, certain knowledge has been transferred to Shanghai VW’s 
first tier suppliers as a result of its stringent quality standards and active technical 
and management assistance. In the case of Beijing Jeep, apart from its first tier 
suppliers, as in the case of Shanghai VW, technology and management skills have 
also been further transferred to revitalise the old product series of Beijing
286
Automotive Works, i.e., the BJ212 series, which is now part of the production range 
of Beijing Jeep. This is part of the strategy of the Chinese partner in engaging in this 
joint venture. The aim has been to upgrade the old BJ212 series, enabling it to be a 
cash cow so that Beijing Jeep can subsidise the assimilation and production of the 
new Cherokee XJ series. According to the joint venture contract, the technology 
transferred from AMC to Beijing Jeep is allowed to be used in upgrading the old 
BJ212 series (Bunns, 1996), i.e., no additional payment has been needed for the 
intellectual property held by AMC in this case. BJ212L was the first product based 
on this further transfer and utilisation of the technology and management skills 
transferred from AMC (and Chrysler), ending an era of no serious innovations made 
in the BJ212 series for twenty years. It included 26 innovations and upgrading of 385 
components, concerning areas of braking system, noise reduction, emission 
reduction, and so on. In 1989, BJ212N, the other refined model, was presented to the 
Chinese market, which had 28 innovations compared with BJ212L.
Based on the above evidence, this research confirms that the knowledge firstly 
received and utilised by the four firms concerned has been further transferred to their 
own affiliates in the Chinese market, which is consistent with the relating argument 
contained in Section “2.52 The process of organisational learning”. The taking place 
of secondary knowledge transfer is an indication of the successful utilisation of the 
transferred knowledge and organisation learning by the four firms. The further 
transfer of these gained output knowledge to their affiliates owned by the four firms 
concerned is a way of consolidating firms’ competitiveness in this transitional 
market.
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The difference between the two approaches to knowledge transfer applied by 
Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) of the telecommunications manufacturing 
industry on the one hand, and Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep of the automobile 
industry on the other, is that the former is an integrated strategy based on affiliate 
growth, while the latter solely targeted quality control and cost competitiveness.
Why were different approaches used in these two industries in China? One plausible 
explanation seems to be the difference in fixed costs for setting up a manufacturing 
plant, and the resulting differences in minimum efficient scale between these two 
industries (Hill, 1999: 466). A car assembly line needs huge amount of investment to 
start up, and the production volume for reaching economies of scale is about 300, 
000 units annually. It is therefore more efficient and economical to concentrate car 
assembly lines in fewer locations, to raise the utilisation of capital equipment and 
generate the productivity gains from increased production volume. The fact that 
currently China is only a medium sized automobile market in world, compounded by 
market segmentation arising from local government protection within China, simply 
does not allow Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep to set up new assembly lines 
elsewhere in China. An increasing reliance on car component suppliers by these two 
firms, instead of in-house sourcing, is a sensible strategy to gain economies of scale. 
Therefore, knowledge transfer and utilisation can mainly take place in the 
manufacturing sites of Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, and secondary knowledge 
transfer is limited to their first tier suppliers, and to their Chinese parents at most.
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In contrast, the fixed cost of setting up a manufacturing plant in the 
telecommunications industry is comparatively low, and the production volume for 
reaching economies of scale is modest. Moreover, the high value-to-weight ratio of 
telecommunications products indicates that transport costs do not occupy a big share 
in final product price. Hence, benefiting from the rapidly increasing demand in the 
Chinese telecommunications market, several assembly plants can be established by 
Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell respectively without compromising their 
economies of scale. Between them Motorola (China) established two more 
manufacturing sites in Suzhou and Leshan after its first Tianjin production base; 
Shanghai Bell also set up two more large-scale assembly plants in Beijing and 
Guangzhou, and a few smaller sized manufacturing sites, such as NEAT. To build 
up their competitiveness, both Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell have transferred 
a great volume of knowledge to their affiliates by employing the same transfer 
mechanism that enabled themselves to learn from their foreign parents in the first 
place. A repetition of the same transfer mechanism within these two firms clearly 
indicates the effectiveness of organisational learning (Lindholm, 1998). This has 
been consistent with the finding made by Tiemessen et al (1996), who claim that 
learning can be achieved through harvesting which involves retrieving practices that 
have been created in other units or organisations and then implementing this 
knowledge in the MNC or IJVs.
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7.242 Further knowledge transfer from the three joint ventures to their Chinese 
parents
Knowledge transfer can be extended to benefit the parents of joint ventures. In 
Section “2.53 Knowledge transfer from the affiliate to the parent”, we suggest that 
the output knowledge (Westney, 1988) of an IJV can be used by the parents to 
enhance its own strategy and operation. We have found in this research that the 
transferred knowledge from foreign parents has been further transferred to not only 
affiliates of Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell, or the first tier suppliers of 
Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep, but also to the Chinese parents of the three joint 
ventures. This type of further knowledge transfer is mainly concerned with 
management skills, quality control and some social knowledge instead of 
technology, as specific technology is patented and remains the property of foreign 
parents. There is no report of technologies being leaked to Chinese parents.
However, the managers of the Belgian parent Alcatel Bell revealed during the 
interviews that they suspected that some of their technologies might have been 
secretly transferred from Shanghai Bell to other Chinese indigenous manufacturers. 
However, we recognise that this is extremely difficult to prove without launching an 
extensive investigation. Actually, the interview data reveal, what the Chinese parents 
need in earnest, in addition to transferring advanced technologies, is the opportunity 
of learning western style management, and of transforming the outdated 
management systems inherited from the central planning economy still prevalent in 
their other subsidiaries. This further signifies the importance of differentiating 
management skills from technology.
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One of the aims of establishing joint ventures with famous MNCs is to learn 
their management skills. In a sense, management knowledge is more difficult 
to obtain than pure technologies. Sometimes you can buy advanced 
technologies from foreign countries. However, they will not work if no 
compatible management systems are set up. Numerous tragic examples of this 
kind took place in China in the 1970s and 1980s. Establishing joint ventures 
with famous MNCs provides windows of learning western style management. 
This is the most effective way of learning if compared with other modes, such 
as sending limited staff overseas for three months or half a year, or inviting 
several foreign experts to your factory ... Our headquarters take this very 
seriously.
(Cheng Gang, Shanghai VW)
The data collected reveal that some management knowledge has been transferred 
from the three joint ventures to their Chinese parents by way of training, site visits, 
and personnel exchange, i.e., from Alcatel Bell to the Post and Telecommunications 
Industry Corporation of China (PTIC) through Shanghai Bell, from VW to Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) through Shanghai VW, and from Chrysler 
Motor Corporation to Beijing Automotive Works (BAW) through Beijing Jeep. This 
can be illustrated as follows by using the case of Shanghai Bell:
Figure 7-2: Knowledge transfer from foreign parents to Chinese parents via joint 
venture: The case of Shanghai Bell
Alcatel Bell
Similar picture can be found between Beijing Jeep and Shanghai VW, and their 
Chinese parents. For example, BAW used Beijing Jeep as a base of training high
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rank managers. Shanghai VW received frequent visitors from its Chinese parent, and 
its management practices have been made available to managers in the state-owned 
firms belonging to SAIC.
BAW sent managers for training in Beijing Jeep in the 1980s. It also promoted 
some managers from Beijing Jeep to its top management team. In practice, 
Beijing Jeep became one of BAW’s bases for management training.
(Ms Sun Ying, Beijing Jeep)
We have received visitors from SAIC Group on a frequent basis. SAIC is our 
Chinese parent and we are more than happy to accommodate requests from 
managers of SAIC Group to visit SVW. Our managers sometime also went to 
training sessions held in SAIC introducing SVW’s practices of business 
operation.
(Mr Cheng Gang, Shanghai VW)
But only very limited western expertise and management practices in areas such as 
marketing, including after sale service, human resources management, quality 
management and supplier management, have been applied in these Chinese parents, 
or, through them, to their non-joint venture subsidiaries. This can be attributed to 
two reasons:
One is the lack of progress in reforming the macroeconomic management system of 
China. The government still possesses extensive rights to interfere in the business 
operations of state-owned firms. Any bold reform of the current management system 
in these state-owned firms would need the approval of governments at the various 
levels, which is difficult to achieve. Two is the lack of motivation among the 
management teams in these three Chinese parents that were formerly industrial 
bureaus of local governments (in the case of the parents of two automotive joint 
ventures) or the central government ministry (in the case of Shanghai Bell’s Chinese
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parent). Those bureaucrats-tumed-managers are more concerned with opportunities 
for personal promotion to the powerful ministries than with the upgrading of the 
current management systems and the renewing of corporate cultures. As one 
manager of Beijing Jeep remarked:
Workers are not happy with the way the Chinese top management team is 
created and assessed. They are not appointed by Beijing Automotive Works 
(the Chinese parent) but by Chinese Automotive Industrial Corporation (the 
parent of Beijing Automotive Works). They are not responsible for any failures 
of business operations. When in trouble, they will, like their predecessors, be 
moved to other government posts or joint ventures, and a new team of 
managers will be appointed.
(Ms Sun_Ying, Beijing Jeep)
So, it remains an objective for China to renew old management practices and 
corporate culture that are still dominant in firms that are not affiliated to 
multinationals. Setting up joint ventures has provided windows for organisational 
learning. This confirms our argument in Chapter 2 that knowledge from a JV, called 
output knowledge by Westney (1988), can be used by the parent company to 
enhance its own strategy and operations. It is also consistent with our finding in 
Chapter 6 that the leading criteria in selecting foreign partners by local Chinese firms 
are the strategic assets held by the foreign firm, such as technological advantages, 
financial resources, and management skills (although the importance of these is 
often only fully realised later), because for the local firms, learning is a motive for 
the formation of IJVs (Inkpen, 1995a). In general, it is clear that the Chinese parents 
of these joint ventures benefited from the transferred knowledge, in particular 
management skills, residing in their joint venture affiliates.
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There is no evidence suggesting any significant difference between the three joint 
ventures, or even between the two industries in respect of secondary knowledge 
transfer to the Chinese parents (except that secondary knowledge transfer to a 
Chinese parent in Motorola (China) is not possible). Indeed, all the foreign parents, 
irrespective of American or European, kept a hands off approach in treating the 
further transfer of management knowledge from these joint ventures to their Chinese 
parents, while closely monitoring the transferred technologies. This can be attributed 
to the fact that management knowledge is unlikely to be branded as a firm’s private 
assets, and the dissemination of it can only facilitate the reform of Chinese state- 
owned firms and the establishment of good relationship between foreign and 
Chinese parents, which is crucial for doing business in China (Child and Lu, 1996; 
Davies, 1995), as discussed in Chapter 3.
7.243 Further knowledge transfer from the three joint ventures to their foreign 
parents
Knowledge transfer is not a one-way street. In Section “2.53 Knowledge transfer 
from the affiliate to the parent”, we can see that an affiliate will eventually develop 
to such a point where it has newly developed knowledge and capabilities to transfer 
to the home country parent (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995:23). We further argue in 
Section “2.54 Extending the analysis” that, in the case of market entry via JV into 
the liberalising markets of the CEECs and China, it is quite possible for there to be 
elements of ‘reverse-learning’ by the parents (or at least one of the parents) from the
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affiliate. Furthermore, the JV-derived knowledge might be used in the design and 
management of other JVs and alliances (Lyles, 1988).
In fact, some new knowledge has been sent back to the foreign parents by these four 
firms, here referred to as “reverse-learning”. This new knowledge mainly includes 
management skills and social knowledge, which is a result of the localisation of 
western management skills and social knowledge in the Chinese market. 
Technological advances made by these subsidiaries are also part of the package, 
however, although some advances were delivered on the current range of products 
by the three joint ventures, e.g., Shanghai VW’s Santana 2000, they are not regarded 
good enough to be worthy of transfer. Only the three joint ventures qualify the 
categorisation of reverse knowledge transfer discussed in this section. Motorola 
(China), as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Motorola, was designed to be one unit of 
Motorola’s globally linked innovation system (Hill, 1999), and its new product 
development serves the needs of the whole company, hence the flow of technology- 
related resources from it to other units of Motorola cannot be categorised as simple 
reverse knowledge transfer. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the 
newly acquired local knowledge has been transferred overseas. Unlike the joint 
ventures, all the expansions made in the Chinese market have been under the 
leadership of Motorola (China), instead of its parent. For this reason, our discussion 
on reverse knowledge transfer is confined to management skills and social 
knowledge developed by the three joint ventures.
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Doing business in the Chinese market is a huge challenge for any FDI. The rich 
experiences accumulated by the established affiliates provided an opportunity of 
learning for those foreign parents who aspired to establish more affiliates there. 
Having digested this new knowledge deriving from the Chinese market, the foreign 
parents can then re-use them in opening up new Chinese joint ventures. Among the 
three joint ventures, Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell transferred a great deal of 
knowledge (management skills and social knowledge) to the new joint ventures 
established by their respective foreign parents, VW and Alcatel Bell. After 
experiencing the success of Shanghai VW, VW set up a new joint venture in 1992, 
FAW-VW, with First Automotive Works (FAW), the biggest automotive 
manufacturer in China. According to Mr Sun of Shanghai VW, FAW-VW entirely 
applied the management system and practices of functional area (marketing, 
finance, human resources management, supplier management and so on) of Shanghai 
VW.
FAW-VW was established in the beginning of the 1990s, after Shanghai VW 
had been successful. It replicated our organisational structure and applied our 
management practices in major functional areas. This saved them quite a lot of 
time.
(Mr Sun, Shanghai VW)
Based on this tried and tested knowledge, FAW-VW has quickly emerged as a 
competitive producer, and further expansion of production is currently under way to 
match that of Shanghai VW. This fresh evidence strongly demonstrates the 
importance of knowledge transfer and utilisation in general, and reverse learning in 
particular.
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Figure 7-3: Reverse-learning by foreign parents: The case of VW
The other example in support of the above argument is the reverse-learning by 
Alcatel Bell in the case of Shanghai Bell. Similarly, Alcatel Bell has re-employed the 
expertise it drew from Shanghai Bell in another six new joint ventures in the Chinese 
market. Contrasting with VW ’s approach, Alcatel Bell has chosen a different line of 
business for these new firms so that their growth will not pose any threat to the well­
being of Shanghai Bell. As one manager of Alcatel Bell explained:
We have another six joint ventures in the Chinese market, but not in the same 
product markets (switching systems) as Shanghai Bell. These joint ventures are 
usually producing some “smaller” products, such as connectors, mobile 
phones, etc.
(Mr Jacobs, Alcatel Bell)
These two cases are consistent with the point made by Chang and Rosenzweig 
(1995:23) that the affiliate will eventually develop to such a point where it has newly 
developed knowledge and capabilities to transfer to the home country parent. They 
also fully support the proposition put forward by Lyles (1988) that the knowledge 
obtained through reverse-learning by the foreign parents from their affiliates, can be 
re-used in the design and management of later market entry by other affiliates of the 
same parents in the same transitional market, and plays a very important role in
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improving the firm competitiveness of the later entrants. The acquisition of the 
output knowledge (Westney, 1988) produced by an affiliate in a specific market can 
be valuable for the subsequent success of the parent firm in its market-seeking 
foreign direct investment. This finding is consistent with the discussion by Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1995) on the transfer of learning across organisational subunits, but 
not fully support the idea that affiliates as generators of scientific knowledge made 
by Papanastassiou and Pearce (1997, 1998), as no evidence has been found among 
the three IJVs of this investigation that significant development was made at the 
technological front on the current range of products. However, it is possible that, at 
least one or two of these three IJVs, will be capable of becoming the generator of 
scientific knowledge within respective MNCs when the current trend of growth can 
be maintained in a longer time. Indeed, the continuous rise in sophistication in the 
Chinese market has created a climate where innovation will become the key to firm 
competitiveness. The two cases are a further indication of the direct linkage between 
the strengthening of firm competitiveness and knowledge transfer and utilisation, 
which is also consistent with our findings in preceding sections.
Comparisons can be made among the three joint ventures of this investigation in 
respect of further knowledge transfer to foreign parents. The collected data indicate 
that the joint ventures all carried out reverse knowledge transfer but in different 
styles: VW applied its acquired knowledge (management skills and social 
knowledge) and the tested management systems from Shanghai VW to its only one 
new joint ventures, FAW-VW. However, Alcatel Bell applied its acquired 
knowledge in another six joint ventures it established after Shanghai Bell, obviously
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on a larger scale. Chrysler, the foreign parent of Beijing Jeep, did receive some 
reversely transferred knowledge (local knowledge, adapted management skills and 
so on). However, it did not re-use it in the Chinese market because it did not 
establish any more joint ventures. This different pace of applying the reversely 
transferred knowledge in the Chinese market relates to the respective firm’s 
competitive strategy. More fundamentally, it was a result of the discriminatory 
government policy towards the two industries in question: the Chinese government 
allowed easy access for FDI in its telecommunications manufacturing industry, but it 
froze any applications to set up new assembly lines in the automotive industry until 
1997. This is a telling piece of evidence demonstrating the impact of government 
regulation on FDI in China’s “socialist market economy”.
7.244 A refined stages model o f MNC evolution in transitional markets
As a result of knowledge transfer and utilisation, these four firms have become not 
only big producers, but also market leaders in servicing their customers in China and 
even other neighbouring countries. Interview data demonstrate that they did follow a 
process model of MNC evolution, as proposed by Chang and Rosenzweig (1995), to 
build up their capabilities in two respects: LOB (line of business)-specific capability 
development and country-specific capability development.
Within the international management literature it was Kogut (1983) who first 
discussed foreign direct investment as a sequential process. Later, Kogut and Zander 
(1993: 640) noted that “The sequential expansion of a firm’s activities after first
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entry is an expression of the evolutionary acquisition and recombination of 
knowledge.” Their study seeks to describe the organisational learning process within 
an international business context, in which MNCs as a whole acquire knowledge and 
develop capabilities facilitating further foreign market entry via FDI. This approach 
is similar to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995), who maintained that a process perspective, 
emphasising organisational learning, held special promise for our understanding of 
the MNC. They noted that a key feature of these organisations was their ability to 
learn from multiple products and geographic markets, and to transfer that learning 
across organisational subunits (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995).
As this research has shown, the four firms under study have invested substantially in 
facilitating knowledge transfer and organisational learning, in order to assimilate the 
knowledge obtained from their foreign parents and from the Chinese market. What is 
more, we have seen the secondary knowledge transfer carried out by these four firms 
and its importance in establishing firm competitiveness in host markets. As we 
discussed in Section “2.53 Knowledge transfer from the affiliate to the parent”, this 
reverse knowledge transfer and utilisation is a hallmark of the maturing of 
organisational learning. The changeover of these four firms from pure knowledge 
recipients to partial knowledge exporters can actually be viewed as one indication of 
the firms’ success in their first stage of development in the Chinese market. In terms 
of secondary knowledge transfer, i.e., firms previously receiving knowledge from 
their foreign parents transferring their utilised knowledge to their own affiliates, 
Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) have done particularly well. Apart from setting 
up sales representatives or sales offices, a key strategy of Shanghai Bell and
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Motorola (China) has been to expand their market by way of building up joint 
ventures with local governments, provincial bureaus of post and 
telecommunications, and manufacturers.
Up to now, Shanghai Bell’s progress is very encouraging: at least six affiliates have 
been in operation in Liaoning, Guangdong and Beijing, and several more are in 
discussion. Motorola (China), on the other hand, can be described as very successful 
in this regard: as listed in Chapter 4, eight joint ventures (including six joint research 
centres) have been established. The format for setting up these new joint ventures is 
that Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) contribute their technological expertise, 
responsible for the whole management process, while the local partners invest 
capital, provide manufacturing site and marketing channels for the new firm. What 
Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) have done here is extending their own 
capabilities in technology, production and management into these new 
establishments by way of repeating the knowledge transfer process they experienced 
before, controlling local markets, gaining a considerably more profit, by reducing 
costs. This secondary knowledge transfer from Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) 
to their own affiliates as a result of successful knowledge utilisation is a significant 
finding in our study of knowledge transfer.
The other avenue through which firms can pursue secondary knowledge transfer is 
via parents based reverse-learning. Both the Chinese and foreign parents have 
become not only the recipients but also agents for disseminating knowledge of their
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own affiliates. Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell have been successful among joint 
ventures in this regard, as illustrated above.
In the following figure (on next page), a more complete picture of the knowledge 
transfer that has taken place in Shanghai Bell is presented. It firstly includes the 
knowledge transfer from Alcatel Bell to Shanghai Bell, indicated by a thick line, 
which is the starting point of the whole knowledge transfer process. The knowledge 
transfer from Shanghai Bell to its own affiliates, indicated in the thin lines, is part of 
the secondary knowledge transfer we described above. The remaining part of 
secondary knowledge transfer includes knowledge transferred from Shanghai Bell to 
both parents, which can be re-used by the other subsidiaries of the parents of 
Shanghai Bell. This secondary knowledge transfer also indicates that certain 
knowledge has been transferred from foreign parent to the Chinese parent via 
Shanghai Bell, which again is part of the package of knowledge transfer carried out 
by MNCs in transitional markets.
These two ways of secondary knowledge transfer by the four firms, after completing 
knowledge transfer and utilisation of themselves, are generally in line with the 
proposition made by Kogut and Zander (1993: 639) that firms try to exploit their 
gained knowledge before it is imitated by their rivals.
302
Figure 7-4: Two-way knowledge transfer in Shanghai Bell
Other JVs Other Subsidiaries
Icatel Bell PTIC4 :4 ?
NEAT PRTMC Beijing Beil
It can be argued that this secondary knowledge transfer can be regarded as the 
second stage of the evolution process of joint ventures (Shanghai Bell, Shanghai VW 
and Beijing Jeep) or foreign subsidiaries (Motorola (China) in this study) in 
transitional markets, after the first stage of purely receiving and assimilating 
knowledge from their foreign parents. It follows that, theoretically, we can foresee 
that the next stage of the evolution of these firms is their being knowledge 
generators, transferring their own knowledge, instead of the assimilated knowledge, 
to their related firms (affiliates, parents or suppliers), as discussed in the above 
section. This requires not only the advancement of R&D capabilities in these firms, 
but also the upgrading of management systems and the creation of corporate entity. 
No firm in this investigation has reached this stage. It seems to be reasonable that 
this will follow. Indeed, without aiming such a stage, the knowledge transfer and
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organisational learning carried out in the first and second stages of the evolution of 
foreign affiliates in transitional markets, would only serve short term geographic 
expansion instead of the long-term building up of the firms’ competitiveness in the 
MNC concerned as a whole.
According to the above discussion, we can come up with a stage model of MNCs’ 
development in the Chinese market according to their knowledge transfer status: 
First stage: The transfer and utilisation of the knowledge from foreign parents 
Second stage: The further transfer of those utilised knowledge to the related firms 
Third stage: The transfer of self generated knowledge to the related firms.
It is worth noting here that organisational learning is an integrated part of the 
strategic development path of any multinational firm. While a simple knowledge 
transfer model may apply early on, this will necessarily develop over time into a 
more complex model incorporating organisational learning. It is important to 
appreciate that learning is likely to be an objective of the firm. The firm will invest, 
including foreign investment, in order to gain knowledge. The actions of the firm are 
to be seen as stepping-stones towards longer-term objectives. These objectives will 
most likely take it towards more highly developed forms of organisational learning. 
In the fullness of time, the role of the affiliate becomes rationalised within the 
multinational group. The affiliate will be restructured to reflect the shift in the 
balance of the knowledge transfer process as well as the growing emphasis on 
multinational-wide organisational learning, or referred to as “global learning” by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). This will go hand-in-hand with the economics of
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supplying regional or global, rather than simply domestic, markets, and the affiliate 
will become more fully integrated into the organisational structure of the MNC, 
achieving a full degree of ‘technological integration’ with its parents (Radosevic, 
1998). This represents “the maturing of organisational learning”, as we discussed in 
Section “2.53 Knowledge transfer from the affiliate to the parent”.
7.3 The key factors in the knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
process
This section is a continuation of the discussion on how the transferred knowledge 
has been utilised by the four firms in this research. Inkpen (1995b: 67) identified 
trust and relationship openness as the key to long-term, stable, relationship between 
joint venture partners, and the important elements for achieving long-term success 
by the affiliate in a new environment. The interview data suggest that the success of 
Shanghai Bell and the other three firms in the Chinese market was achieved based 
on a deliberate process of effective utilisation and exploitation of the transferred 
knowledge. Many factors were found to have contributed to this process. Among 
others, shared mindset and trust are more important.
Shared mindset
Shared mindset indicates that the partners involved in the joint ventures have a 
common perspective on aspects concerning the development of the affiliate firm. It 
incorporates long-term vision that helps to facilitate the smooth knowledge transfer
305
even when the business runs into serious troubles that may undermine the 
fundamental rationale of carrying out the transfer process. Shared mindset was 
gained not only in the negotiation course of the joint venture, but also after facing 
challenges arising from internal operational problems. Examples here are the 
“Beijing Jeep Incident”, and external (environmental) changes, such as the “4th June 
Incident” in 1989. The lack of a shared mindset can derail the undertaking of the 
agreed knowledge transfer programme, pushing the whole business into crisis, as 
vividly illustrated in the case of Beijing Jeep’s foreign exchange problem. This 
incident arose when the American partner decided to stop cooperation owing to the 
shortage of foreign exchange in the Chinese affiliate to pay for imported 
components, leaving the whole firm in a state of disarray. Although essential 
assistance, in the form of emergency foreign exchange provision and a policy to 
allow Beijing Jeep to charge local customers in foreign currency, was provided from 
the Chinese government, the wound could not be healed easily, and still affects the 
present operation of Beijing Jeep in respect of mutual trust. On the other hand, in the 
case of Shanghai Bell, Belgian managers showed great flexibility and understanding 
when the marketing situation of this firm was in a poor state in the middle of the 
1980s, and did everything they could to push the business back on track, based on 
their own expertise in technology and management. At the same time, they sought 
the sympathy and support from the host government. This experience, which 
resulted in greater cooperation to solve the problem, enabled the two sides to work 
together even more harmoniously since then.
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However, it is obvious that the shared mindset discussed above does not seem to be 
important in wholly-owned subsidiaries in that these are under the sole control of the 
parent and the whole purpose is to implement the strategy of the headquarters. This 
strategy must be drafted based on a clear understanding of the host market. In the 
case of Motorola (China), the business strategy reflects the mindset of the 
management team in its headquarters. This was drawn first by its headquarters in the 
USA, and then added to by its China headquarters in Beijing (after it was established 
in 1992), based on the strategic objective of Motorola’s business operations in 
China.
Trust
Trust between partners is the foundation of co-operation. It includes two elements: 
technical and personal (Chang and Rosenzweig, 1995: 29). In the case of Shanghai 
Bell, it took several years for the Belgian partner to build up confidence in their 
Chinese counterpart in terms of technical capability. As commented by the parent’s 
Belgian managers and technical experts during the interview:
The Chinese engineers in Shanghai Bell are first class. They are not inferior to 
any engineers in the west.
Due to the technical capabilities of the Chinese engineers, a R&D centre owned by 
Shanghai Bell was set up in Belgium, just neighbouring Alcatel Bell, working on the 
projects subcontracted by Alcatel Bell. It also served as a product design department 
for Shanghai Bell. Similar examples are available in the other three firms, e.g., the 
contribution of Chinese engineers to the assimilation and adaptation process in
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Beijing Jeep. It transpires in this research that the four firms of this research highly 
regard the technical capability of Chinese engineers they employ. This reflects the 
great improvement in Chinese higher education since the end of the 1970s, when 
China chose to embark on extensive economic reform.
Personal trust was also engineered at different levels in the affiliate firm, especially 
among managers and engineers, as a result of numerous meetings and consultations 
in the process of knowledge transfer. It is worth noting that this is not easily attained. 
Sometimes it is very fragile. However, due to the need for cooperation in order to 
share the risks of ‘the joint venture’, trust between managers is a precondition of 
success. Apart from deriving from long time contact, mutual understanding and 
respect, personal trust can also be established from a situation where equal power 
sharing has made personal trust essential to keep the company going, i.e., in 
Shanghai VW, where the equity is shared equally by the Chinese and the German 
partners, each of the four members of SVW’s executive committee has the power to 
handicap the operation of the whole company by vetoing any motions proposed. 
Therefore, compromises based on mutual trust and understanding are the natural 
results of playing to achieve the overall goals of the firm. This confirms the point of 
Casson (1991: 29) that the ambiguity of control created by a certain type of 
ownership structure can be used to engineer trust.
It seems that even if foreign partner’s equity holding is less than 50 per cent of the 
firm concerned, as in Shanghai Bell and Beijing Jeep, a mere even balance in 
bargaining power in negotiation nevertheless exists due to the advantageous position
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of the foreign partners as a result of their proprietary assets. They can, as shown in 
the case of Beijing Jeep, exercise their influence by withholding knowledge transfer 
(in the case of the Beijing Jeep’s foreign exchange crisis), changing technical 
criteria, and withdrawing expatriates, among others. The Chinese partner with 
majority control, in each case, has to make compromises in exchange for the 
continuous support of the foreign counterpart in providing proprietary assets. The 
non-equity bargaining power enjoyed by the foreign partners in joint ventures has 
made trust a more important factor in affecting the efficiency of knowledge transfer 
and utilisation. Only when both the technical and personal trust between the Chinese 
and foreign partners has been established or engineered, can knowledge transfer be 
carried out much faster and more smoothly. This confirms our discussion in Chapter 
2 that trust needs to be engineered between the partners in joint ventures located in 
transitional markets, to ensure the smooth transfer, localisation and application of 
the proprietary assets from headquarters.
7.4 The impact of the Chinese business environment on knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning
A typical characteristic of transitional markets is environmental uncertainties, 
including various host government interference in company operations. In Section 
“2.6 Technology and knowledge transfer to transitional economies”, we argue that in 
the transition economies, research must grapple with knowledge transfer within a 
setting where institutional and cultural factors play an important role in deciding 
corporate performance. This different characteristic of transitional economies will
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surely affect MNCs’ knowledge transfer and organisational learning. In our research, 
we found market size and access to the Chinese market, government industrial 
policy, the existence and influence of the Communist Party and its subordinate 
organisations in the affiliates of those MNCs involved, Chinese culture, the quality 
of Chinese employees, the rivalry among local governments, and so on, all have had 
certain impacts on the strategy and behaviour of MNCs in transferring knowledge to 
the Chinese market and their handling of organisational learning. In the following 
accounts, we want to specifically examine the impact of cultural awareness, 
government support and long-term vision on the MNCs’ knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning issues in the Chinese market.
Cultural awareness
Culture, defined by Dutch organisational researcher Hofstede (1991) as the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from another. With the rise of internationalisation in the 1980s, researchers 
consider culture as a tool to understand the trend and changes in international 
business and as a base for building up corporate competitive advantages. Ghoshal 
and Westney (1993) argue that organisations are socially constructed systems of 
meaning: they do not have cultures, they are cultures.
Culture is an issue that foreign investors need to take seriously when entering the 
Chinese market. When asked to judge the merits of the traditional Chinese culture in 
general, it seems that the interviewees agree that it is good in the sense that it
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promotes (1) hardworking which is needed in every firm; (2) collectivism which is 
in line with teamwork, one of the key principles in modem business operation, and is 
also good for carrying out disciplines of the firm. But, Chinese culture is not good in 
that it doesn’t encourage individualism, which is an important character for carrying 
out innovations, and to some extent, organisational learning. These firms thereby 
have had to train their employees in China to develop their individual creativeness 
that is badly needed in the long-term development in any new market.
No surprisingly, it is found in this research that an important factor facilitating 
knowledge transfer in China is cultural awareness of the host market. At first glance 
it seems very difficult to connect these two together; however, the data collected 
reveal that they do have a significant linkage. As is commonly agreed, the Chinese 
market is far different from not only western markets, but also from those of its 
neighbouring economies -  economically, geographically and culturally. Cultural 
awareness here indicates the understanding of both the traditional Chinese culture 
and the behaviour of Chinese people, and more importantly, China’s political set-up. 
This is of prime importance in doing business in China. For example, the decision of 
Alcatel Bell to invest in this market and carry out knowledge transfer, in light of 
China’s poor industrial base, the communist regime and its notoriously changing 
policy, was not an easy one. However, it demonstrates the importance of cultural 
awareness with strategic vision which enabled Alcatel Bell to take the risks of 
transferring knowledge, that other firms tried to avoid doing, handle the difficulties 
in the transfer process with patience that others did not want to endure, make the 
compromises in business operation that others would not think about, and reap the
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extensive benefits of its involvement in Shanghai Bell, based on the knowledge 
transfer, that others could not compare with. Moreover, the key factors in 
transferring and utilising knowledge, such as shared mindset, mutual trust and 
respect, and team, are fundamentally underpinned by the cultural awareness held by 
the Belgian partner.
Different from other westerners, the Belgians have been listening to us and are 
very flexible, and can compromise if we are reasonable. I think this is partly 
because their country is very small. Furthermore, they have a very important 
quality that is badly needed in joint ventures: patience. They have patience and 
now they have got their reward for it. So I advise other foreigners that they 
must have patience if they want to invest here and collect a good reward. So, 
generally, you must have patience, you must be flexible, you must listen to the 
Chinese when coming to this market. You cannot say I am No. 1 here.
(Ms Yin Linggu. Shanghai Bell)
As demonstrated in the above comments, it is fair to say that cultural awareness is 
the first step towards success in operating in the Chinese market.
The other three firms also manifested a similar quality of being culturally aware in 
the Chinese market. Motorola sent in an American Chinese as the general manager 
of its China operation, it also adopted a fast track management localisation plan, put 
housing allocation at the core of its employee benefit system (which does not exist in 
any other subsidiary of the firm), and donated scholarships and financial resources to 
various educational establishment. Chrysler showed its cultural awareness by 
agreeing to put the then most advanced model into the joint venture, and instructed 
its affiliate to restrain from sending any profits back to the USA in the first phase of 
Beijing Jeep, in order to demonstrate its concern for the serious financial problems 
experienced by this joint venture in the 1980s. As an experienced international
312
player, VW did not show any less cultural awareness in its dealing with the Chinese 
environment and market. It enlisted the support of the German government to 
persuade the Chinese government to agree to the establishment of a joint venture 
with a 50:50 equity structure. This was bolstered by a large German government 
grant towards training local Chinese employees and the sponsoring of bilateral 
visiting programmes. This is an excellent example of the promotion of “guan xi” 
between the two countries. The firm has been an active sponsor of major sports 
events, of educational institutions, and of various projects for helping the poor in 
inland areas of China, for the purpose of establishing itself as a responsible corporate 
citizen. This string of facts indicates that cultural awareness should be a key 
component of any business strategy of MNCs wanting to enter the Chinese market. 
Firms must take a different approach in doing business in China, underpinned by an 
understanding, and even an appreciation, of the Chinese culture.
Moreover, the effective development and use of “guan xi”, which is regarded to be at 
the core of the Chinese culture (Davies, 1995; Bjorkman, 1996; Child and Lu, 1996), 
is seen as a requirement for the successful establishment of new business ventures 
and for the effective day-to-day management of Chinese enterprises. Unlike other 
MNCs of the telecommunications industry, Alcatel Bell knew this from the start. It 
agreed to establish Shanghai Bell with the then Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, though the official Chinese parent of this joint venture is the 
Post and Telecommunications Industry Corporation of China (PTIC) which is under 
the Ministry. This is a wise move for Alcatel Bell as it can guarantee the proper 
implementation of the joint venture contract and elicit substantial government
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support, as will be discussed next section. Alcatel Bell’s expatriates were also quick 
to realise the importance of maintaining “guan xi” with their Chinese partners. One 
piece of evidence, among numerous of them, is their understanding and cooperation 
in sending hundreds of visitors annually from Shanghai Bell, its suppliers, customers 
(local bureau of post and telecommunications) and Ministry and governmental 
officials, to Belgium in the name of inspecting new product or for attending short 
“training courses”. The truth of the matter is that there is hardly any need for them to 
go to Belgium from a technical point of view, and these sightseeing-natured visits 
have been used as a way of rewarding employees by the Chinese. However, it is of 
great benefit to Alcatel Bell when judging it from a business point of view, as this 
will greatly enhance Alcatel Bell’s relationship or “guan xi” with all the parties it 
relates.
The other firms in this study have taken a similar stance on building up “guan xi” 
with government officials, customers and suppliers. Examples of this are Shanghai 
VW’s technical assistance to its suppliers, Beijing Jeep’s donation of its products to 
the Beijing Municipal Government and the Military, and Motorola (China)’s free 
training and seminars for governmental officials of the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications. As a result of these efforts, these firms have been successful in 
creating a favourable external atmosphere for doing business, a strengthened 
capability for localisation and a growing customer base in their respective markets. 
This is a confirmation of the argument made by Roehrig (1994: 77) that an important 
strategy for foreign invested firms to elicit favourable implementation of laws, rules, 
regulations, and policies from local authorities is to establish good, personal
314
relationships with strategically-located individuals in business, government, and 
bureaucracy who may be able to influence the outcomes of possible future questions 
and disputes in favour of the enterprise.
Government support
Government support plays an important role in deciding the success of foreign 
invested firms in this transitional market. An interesting fact is that most of the firms 
we visited in the first field trip, and three out of the four firms we visited in the 
second round, are all joint ventures. That is because, first, MNCs tended to choose 
joint venture as the entry mode to prevent them from exposure to the uncertainties 
endemic in this market. Second, Chinese government policy has required that joint 
venture is the only avenue to be allowed for foreign investors entering into the 
Chinese automotive industry (assembly sector). The aim is to enable the key 
technology and management skills be introduced to Chinese partners.
Joint venture is also a way of leveraging direct government support, an important 
factor in securing success in transitional markets. In the case of Shanghai Bell, the 
interview data indicate that without the continuous support from both the Chinese 
and Belgian governments, Shanghai Bell simply could not have survived, let alone 
achieve the success it has to date.
Government support is very very important. It’s for sure that without 
government support from both countries, we can do nothing. That’s partly the 
reason why Alcatel Bell preferred to hold minority equity in Shanghai Bell — 
in this way the Belgian side could get concrete local government support. 
Regarding the support from the Belgian government, it was Alcatel Bell’s 
initiative to ask the Belgian government to take an equity stake in this joint
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venture (in order to facilitate growth by way of inter-governmental co­
ordination), however playing an unofficial role in the managing of this joint 
venture. The Belgian government did exactly in this way.
(Mr Jos Caerts, Alcatel Bell)
The government support received by Shanghai Bell mainly comprises: 1. From 
Belgian government: interest free loans, free training programmes (technical and 
management) for Chinese engineers and managers, and more importantly, inter­
governmental co-ordinations for issues like technology transfer licenses, which the 
firms concerned could do nothing about; 2. From the Chinese government: as the 
main shareholder of this firm, the Chinese government (at both central and local 
levels) has done everything it can to nurture the formation and growth of Shanghai 
Bell, from capital injection, manpower provision (facilitating supply of qualified 
workers), to government procurement, direct subsidy where the Chinese government 
paid the local customers the difference between the higher price of Shanghai Bell’s 
products and those of its competitors during 1986-1989, localisation encouragement, 
and so on.
As I mentioned before, this project, listed as one of the key national projects, 
has always enjoyed the endorsement of the Chinese government. The Ministry 
of Post & Telecommunications even set up a special department, called 
System 1240 Bureau, for the development of this project.
(Ms Yin Linggu. Shanghai Bell)
Government support proved to be the lifeblood of Shanghai Bell in her early years 
when struggling for survival and on-going knowledge transfer, and still has a big 
stake in the success of Shanghai Bell’s development, based on the fact that the 
(Chinese) government organisations are the primary purchaser of Shanghai Bell’s 
products.
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Government support has also been cited as the chief external factor affecting 
knowledge transfer and utilisation in the other three firms. But, unlike in the case of 
Shanghai Bell, where both central and local governments are direct stakeholders, 
local governments have played a nurturing part in the establishment of these firms. 
Due to the size and leading importance of these firms, the local governments 
concerned (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin) have regarded the development of 
Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and Motorola (China), respectively, as the locomotive of 
local economic development. The projects to upgrade and expand these firms have 
been made priorities (sometimes named as “No. 1 project” in various year) of the 
cities concerned. Government supports of this nature has ensured the allocation of 
badly needed resources to these firms, the opening of local markets to their products 
and, most importantly, the provision of a high status. This contrasts markedly with 
the normal reputation of state-owned firms, which are well known for being 
bureaucratic and often corrupt.
The case of Beijing Jeep is illustrative in understanding the influence of government 
support (including interference) on the firm’s performance. As the first joint venture 
in China’s automotive industry, Beijing Jeep enjoyed far higher attention and 
benefits from the government than later ones, especially in the early period of its 
operation. Government support not only means favourable tax treatment, preferential 
bank loans, government purchasing, and so on, but also, in the case of China where 
governmental intervention into firms’ business is extensive, a favourable operating 
environment. At the same time, Beijing Jeep also experienced various difficulties 
from the old command-based economic system, e.g., shortage of foreign exchange
(which was resolved finally by the involvement of the Premier of the Chinese 
government), various barriers to import components, government bureaucracies, and 
so on. Beijing Jeep, even as a joint venture, has to subject itself to the government’s 
control and intervention, in a very similar way to that incurred by state-owned firms. 
One example is that the China Automotive Industrial Corporation, the main Chinese 
equity holder of Beijing Jeep, chose all the major managing directors reserved for 
the Chinese based on very vague criteria largely unrelated to merit, but more related 
to personal connections, which did harm to this firm. Another example is that, when 
Beijing Jeep applied for a license to produce a new passenger car developed by 
Chrysler in the beginning of the 1990s, the chief decision maker (a government vice 
premier) in this sector vetoed it. This has been seen as a classic case of the political 
influence on firms’ operations. So, both positively and negatively, the case of 
Beijing Jeep vividly exemplifies the importance of government support in running a 
joint venture in a highly regulated economic system.
Chinese government’s enthusiasm for supporting FDI into key industries at 
considerable expense was in general due to the Chinese government policy of 
promoting knowledge transfer from western investors, and also a result of local 
rivalry among municipalities and provinces. To some extent, local rivalry is a 
driving factor. As a matter of fact, competition among local governments has always 
been a characteristic of Chinese politics. Officials of local governments have used 
the record of economic development as a way of gaining promotion. The progresses 
made in terms of FDI in key industries in respect of knowledge transfer and 
utilisation are seen as especially impressive, since the economic reform and opening
318
policy carried out from the end of 1970s. Both the telecommunications and 
automotive industries are the so-called pillar industries, designated to be so by the 
central government a decade ago, and their importance in leading economic 
development is clearly tangible. This is the main reason why Shanghai (where 
Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW locate), Beijing (where Beijing Jeep locates) and 
Tianjin (where Motorola (China)’s production base locates) are the top three 
municipalities inside China. They have pursued the growth of the firms in this study 
relentlessly, by using all the possible resources to hand in the past one and a half 
decades. These firms have enjoyed treatment and resources that other multinationals 
might not be able to access. Therefore, these firms’ experience and success in 
knowledge transfer and business operation cannot be expected to apply to every FDI 
in China due to this discriminatory treatment. To date, Chinese government support 
has been selective but nevertheless powerful when FDI falls into the designated 
priority categories of the host local governments. As a result, investing in China is 
highly distinctive. This is in support of our argument in Section “2.6 Technology and 
knowledge transfer to transitional economies”, that institutional and cultural factors 
play an important role in deciding corporate performance in the transition 
economies. It is also a confirmation of our description regarding the uniqueness of 
the Chinese socialist market economy in Section “3.2 Features of the Chinese 
business environment”. The importance of government support indicates that foreign 
investors must pay particular attention to macro-environmental factors when doing 
business in China (Yip, 1995).
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Long-term vision
All the firms of this research have shown a common character -  long-term vision -  
in dealing with the challenges and problems of the process of knowledge transfer 
and organisational learning. This long-term quality may be manifested by a long­
term commitment to China, deriving from the future potential and absolute size of 
the Chinese market. This includes making compromises to smooth cooperation, e.g., 
the gradual increase of the American shareholding in Beijing Jeep from 31.5 per cent 
to 42 per cent; various training programmes, which is an investment in employees; 
sticking to the market even when the immediate prospect of business was in 
difficulty, e.g., the troubled initial operation of Shanghai Bell (continuous deficit for 
the first four years) and the overcoming of the shortage of foreign exchange (which 
forced Beijing Jeep to stop production for several months); and the reinvestment of 
all the profits into production and training in the initial period. In respect of the last 
point all the four firms, Shanghai VW, Shanghai Bell, Beijing Jeep and Motorola 
(China), had ploughed in funds and reinvested earnings over several years into 
production expansion, demonstrating its long-term interest in the Chinese market. 
For example, Motorola (China) had not only invested US$1.2 billion of new capital 
in China and reinvested all its profits from its Chinese operations back the country, 
but also committed to invest an additional US$1.3 billion by the end of 2000 (China 
Daily, 14th January 1998).
Long-term vision has proven to be a key point in relieving the friction caused either 
by the differences between partners, or by the unpredictability of the Chinese
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business environment. Long-term vision may not be a characteristic enjoyed by 
every foreign investor, but it is a prerequisite for successes in dealing with the 
Chinese market. As commented by a senior manager of the parent Alcatel Bell:
Long-term vision and flexibility of the Belgian partner in Shanghai Bell has 
nothing to do with Alcatel Bell. They are part of the qualities of the Belgians. 
The reality is that Belgium is a small country (with a small internal market) 
and we have to export 65-75 percent of our products in order to survive. 
Alcatel has got seven joint ventures in China and all of them (except Shanghai 
Bell) are in loss. So the difference is between the Belgians and the French. The 
reason you have to keep patient and long-term vision is simple: if you have 
been there you have to stick there for the potential of that market to become a 
reality.”
(Mr Chris Morel, Alcatel Bell)
In general, long-term vision, plus strong financial resources, along with a shared 
mindset, trust and dedicated teams, seems to be more important than any other 
strategies in facilitating knowledge transfer and organisational learning, and realising 
business expectations in the Chinese market. Long-term commitment, willingness to 
transfer technology, and an ability to partner either with local firms through joint 
venture or close relationships with overseas Chinese firms are considered crucial for 
success. Czinkota and Ronkainen (1997) argue that the lack of predictability of 
Chinese demand and the missing legal infrastructure will eventually be worked out 
through market forces and future development of corporate law. The firms that have 
entered the Chinese market earliest clearly have had to demonstrate more ability to 
overcome problems than those that will come later.
Actually, long-term vision is closely related to how to judge the performance of 
affiliates in foreign markets, especially in the case of international joint ventures. 
Only when they are happy with the performance of the affiliates, or they believe
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there is the prospect of a long-term reward, would foreign parents lend their total 
supports to, and invest additional resources in, these joint ventures. Therefore, long­
term vision is dependent on the calculation of long-term returns from foreign 
affiliates. The fact that they stick to the market even when the immediate prospect 
for business is difficult, e.g., the initial operation of Shanghai Bell (continuous 
deficit for the first four years) and the foreign exchange problem faced by Beijing 
Jeep, demonstrates that the calculation of long-term returns from foreign affiliates 
carried out by foreign parents is not objective, in terms of short-term financial 
results. Rather, it is quite subjective, i.e., based on the understanding of the targeted 
market, e.g., business practices, culture, political and economic environment, 
industrial and human resources by the foreign parents. This demonstrates that the 
performance of an international joint venture in transitional markets has been 
preferentially assessed subjectively (in the opinions of the parents), rather than 
objectively (in terms of financial results). Indeed, the long-term vision shown by the 
foreign parents, which was based on the subjective estimation of the long-term 
business prospect of the affiliates concerned, has ensured the foreign partners their 
chance of reaping great returns five or ten years later. The following is a description 
of the returns for the parent Alcatel Bell’s continuous involvement in Shanghai Bell 
based on its long-term vision demonstrated when this affiliate was in deep trouble in 
the middle of the 1980s:
Here is a very simple graph that shows the return on the investment of the 
partners of this firm. It is clear that if investing $1 in 1984, then $25 is the 
return now [in 1997] including bonus, profit, dividends and net assets. This is 
a very high return. This is only the first part of return actually. The second part 
of the return is that the Belgian side can increase their export of parts greatly as 
our scale of production is so huge. The third part is that they can increase their 
business scope in China based on the success of Shanghai Bell. Apart from 
Shanghai Bell, Alcatel Bell has set up another six or seven JVs with the
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Ministry of Post and Telecommunications in the Chinese market, such as the 
Wafer Plant and so on. Why have they been so successful? Because there is 
such a sound example of Shanghai Bell here.”
(Ms Yin Linggu. Shanghai Bell)
A conclusion from our above discussion is that long-term vision is conditional, 
depending on the subjective assessment of the long-term returns from the foreign 
affiliates. The causes of these returns are multifactoral, but an important part is 
played by market size and growth, as argued in the theory of international business -  
for example, the optimum market servicing strategy model of Buckley and Casson 
(1985). However, to this we must add not just the importance of good relations with 
the government, but the understanding that good relations are key to successful 
operation in China.
7.5 The improvement of firms’ competitiveness as a result of knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning
The aim of knowledge transfer and organisational learning is to improve the 
competitiveness of the recipient firm. There is a whole package of indicators, 
developed by Buckley et al (1992), to measure the changes of firm’s competitiveness 
in terms of competitive performance, competitive potential and management 
process. There is no question that the firms visited are now much more competitive 
than when they were established, based on the advanced production and 
management systems transferred from the west — lots of evidence have proved that. 
For example, one senior manager listed the improvements of competitiveness in 
Shanghai Bell as follows:
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Based on the excellent cooperation between the partners, we have now 
enlarged our line of business to include mobile telecommunications, standard 
rack of GSM, series products for Wide Band Information Highway, software 
products and intelligent net, and also the technology of chip production. 
Actually some engineers of Shanghai Bell are participating in the research and 
development of next generation telecommunications products, such as the 
wide band information highway and CLSI chips. This firm now has become a 
whole-service provider in its area, i.e., some R&D, production, installing, 
testing and maintenance. It is very advanced from a manufacturer’s point of 
view.
(Mr Zheng Yulu. Shanghai Bell)
Clearly the case of Shanghai Bell is a typical stage model development of line of 
business referred to by Chang and Rosenzweig (1995). Its participation in the 
research and development of next generation telecommunications products 
coordinated by Alcatel Bell is in line with the organisational learning theory 
(especially learning by designing) discussed by Lall (1980). The horizontal 
(expansion of line of business) and vertical (from no R&D to participating in joint 
R&D) development in this firm is powerful evidence of the impact of knowledge 
transfer and utilisation in transitional markets. Because a similar route of expansion 
has been found in all the other three firms as well, we can conclude that the 
competitiveness of the foreign affiliates in their first stage in transitional markets can 
be judged as the result of knowledge transfer and utilisation.
What interests us is not only the improvements of competitiveness in general terms, 
but also the present situation of the four firms in all the three categories of firm’s 
competitiveness, i.e., competitive performance, competitive potential and 
management process. Having reassessed the measures proposed by Buckley et al 
(1992:18-19), which are mainly used to compare the competitiveness of firms
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servicing international markets, we have chosen only the most relevant measure in 
each category to enable an objective, but simplified, comparison among these four 
firms which are primarily targeting the Chinese market . The measures include: 
market share in competitive performance, R&D in competitive potential, and 
management relations (motivating and organising the employees inside the firm and 
maintaining good relations with outside stakeholders in the Chinese market) in 
management processes.
According to the information collected in relation to the present situation of these 
firms in the above categories in the Chinese market, a general description of their 
competitiveness can be given in the following table:
Table 7-1: The present competitiveness for the four firms in the Chinese market
Competitiveness
Firm Name Performance Potential Management process
Beijing Jeep A W A
Motorola S S S
Shanghai Bell S A A
Shanghai VW S A A
Note: S - Strong; A - Average; W - Weak39.
We found that two of the three joint ventures, Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW, are 
very strong in “competitive performance” in terms of market share, where Shanghai
38 The Chinese market is an international market for the foreign investors. Also, international joint 
ventures and wholly-owned subsidiary are forms of international business. Therefore, the measures 
proposed by Buckley et al (1992) can be applied here.
39 This is in line with the scaling system used by Inkpen (1995b: 135) and Swaan (1995, in Radosevic, 
1998: 25) in categorising the performances and other case characteristics of different firms. “Strong, 
average and weak” are qualitative measures. They are used to differentiate issues which are either not 
quantifiable in nature, for example, competitiveness, management process, organisational change, 
leadership, organisational learning outcome, etc., or too complex to be quantified, for example, 
competitive performance and competitive potential are underpinned by a group of indicators and it is 
very difficult to decide the right formula for gauging them exactly.
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VW has seized just more than 50 per cent of the Chinese car market since the end of 
the 1980s (according to Mr Cheng Gang of Shanghai VW and Shanghai VW’s 
annual reports), and Shanghai Bell occupied about one third of the total telephone 
exchange equipment market in the last several years, increasing from about 25 per 
cent at the beginning of this decade (Alcatel Bell’s internal document, 1998: P.n/10). 
However, they are not so outstanding in “competitive potential” and “management 
process” — an indication of the improvement of their rivals, both other foreign 
invested firms and China’s indigenous industry, a lack of solid self R&D capability, 
and the decreasing of government support owing to the increase of FDI in these two 
industries and the change of Chinese industrial policies.
If Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW want to remain key players in the Chinese 
market, it seems much more needs to be done to promote management effectiveness 
and strengthening its R&D capabilities, which is the main indicator of competitive 
potential. Beijing Jeep, once a big cash cow at the end of the 1980s, on the other 
hand, is now scored lower in all the three categories than the two fellow joint 
ventures, leaving itself very little space to manoeuvre. This reflects the relatively 
poor performance of this firm in the current difficult Chinese automotive market: 
only occupying about 6 per cent of the total Chinese car market in 1996, according 
to “Automotive industry of China” (1997: 38); and since then, market demand for its 
main products declined, which made Beijing Jeep in a very uncomfortable situation. 
Beijing Jeep’s handicapped R&D capability is also an underlying source of 
weakness. Motorola (China), a full member of Motorola family, is the highest 
ranked among the four. Inheriting its strength directly from its parent, Motorola 
(China) is now at the same level as Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell in terms of 
“competitive performance”, based on the track record that it is one of the main 
providers of mobile phones. Its market share in mobile phones is estimated at 25 per 
cent of the total market in 1997 by Mr Liu of Motorola (China). Even more 
outstanding is the firm’s “management process” and “competitive potential”, if
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compared with any of the three joint ventures. The secret of its success was clearly 
stated by one senior manager of this firm, Mr Lee Liu:
In general, if we have been successful, that’s because, apart from others [some 
of them have been mentioned above], we have a sound business strategy first, 
and then concentrate on the organisational building up. Our competence comes 
from not only every bit of the firm (such as advanced technology), but also the 
whole firm — integrated organisation. Motorola is very competitive in all the 
aspects of a firm: technology, management, and more important, corporate 
culture. If you want to understand Motorola, you have to understand its culture 
first.
The reason why the three joint ventures scored lower than Motorola (China) in 
“management process” and “competitive potential” lies in the fact that the Chinese 
employees of these firms are still strongly influenced by the mindset of Chinese state 
owned firms, e.g., relying on governmental preferential treatment, providing 
employees with a whole range of welfare benefits, paying less attention to R&D, 
concentrating on production volume instead of efficiency, and the strong influence 
of the Communist Party organisations on the business operation process. However, 
differences can still be found among them in these three categories. It seems, the 
general tendency is that the higher the foreign ownership, the higher the score of the 
firm’s competitiveness. Shanghai VW, with its equity 50 per cent owned by VW, 
gained the best results among the three firms, presenting a stark contrast with Beijing 
Jeep in all the comparable areas, although the latter was earlier in setting up the joint 
venture.
The improvement of our competitiveness after knowledge transfer and 
utilisation lies in the following aspects: 1. Financial improvement. This has 
been the result of our rising rate of localisation that therefore reduces the tariff 
on the imported parts, which is now less than 10 per cent of the total. These 
are mainly those not worth localising. The key technologies relevant to 
Santana have all been transferred and localised. 2. Multiple brand products. 
This has ensured that Shanghai VW keeps its momentum in competition. 
Shanghai VW is now holding a bit more than 50 per cent of the total Chinese 
car market, and one of the biggest firms in China. 3. Excellent after sales
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services. But, if compared with FAW (First Automotive Works), Shanghai 
VW lags behind in R&D.
(Mr Cheng Gang. Shanghai VW)
The key variable in the category of “competitive potential” is the strength of R&D. 
Knowledge transfer is thought to be an effective way of improving the R&D strength 
of MNCs’ affiliates in transitional markets. But, a surprising finding from the data is 
that the cloning process (a copying process of parent knowledge assets through 
knowledge transfer and utilisation) in these joint venture affiliates has not greatly 
improved their self R&D capability, as in the case of Shanghai Bell. Indeed, to some 
extent, the transfer of knowledge assets seems even to have paralysed their capability 
of self-R&D, especially so in the case of Beijing Jeep.
Before proceeding to examine the reasons responsible for the slow development of 
self R&D in the three joint ventures, we want to establish why these joint ventures 
wished to have their own R&D capabilities in the first place. Reflecting the strategic 
motive of the Chinese government in utilising FDI as a chief avenue of transferring 
to China the latest technology and management skills, as discussed in Chapter 6, the 
Chinese partner has always regarded the development of self R&D, linked to the 
current advanced products introduced by the western partners, as tangible evidence 
of knowledge transfer and utilisation. Foreign investors were required to commit 
themselves to contribute towards this goal if they wanted to get access to the Chinese 
market through joint ventures.
A capability in self-R&D can also help the Chinese partners to revitalise the relevant 
state-owned firms and increase their competitiveness internationally. Moreover, such
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a capability can also halt the heavy technological reliance of the Chinese side on the 
foreign partner, and, as a result of that, create opportunities for great savings by 
switching key component supply from the foreign partner to local manufacturers 
(provided the latter can provide the same quality products at a much cheaper price 
than the former). Foreign investors, on the other hand, have to deliver some 
substantive outcome in this regard in order to establish trust between the joint 
venture partners and seize more future opportunities in an increasingly important 
market. Emerging from such a scenario, both sides of the joint ventures concerned 
accept that self-R&D capabilities need to improve, sooner or later, to achieve their 
individual goals.
There is certainly a need to discuss the barriers to self R&D, or why the self R&D 
capabilities of these joint ventures have not been properly developed as expected, 
following the knowledge transfer and utilisation. It seems no common reasons can 
be given. We can divide these four firms into several categories:
Before knowledge transfer and utilisation:
Firms with some self R&D capabilities include: Beijing Jeep, Shanghai VW 
Firms without self-R&D capabilities include: Motorola, Shanghai Bell (both started 
from scratch)
After knowledge transfer and utilisation:
Firms with R&D capabilities developed: Motorola, Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW 
Firms with R&D capabilities paralysed: Beijing Jeep
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These are shown in the following table:
Table 7-2: The impact of knowledge transfer on affiliates’ R&D capabilities
R&D Before Knowledge Transfer R&D After Knowledge Transfer





In the case of Motorola (China), though a new establishment, as part of the Motorola 
empire, a networked R&D strategy has been applied since its birth, i.e., the 
headquarters co-ordinate the whole firm’s R&D strategy, while Motorola (China) 
develops its capabilities in a handful of chosen areas, e.g., semiconductors, mobile 
phones. In practice, Motorola (China) has not only set up its own R&D facilities 
inside its production site in Tianjin, but also carried out a comprehensive strategy of 
cooperating with China’s renowned universities, research institutes and companies 
(see the profile of Motorola) to utilise these resources for the purpose of maximising 
of its research output in China. All the research projects carried out serve as part of 
its overall R&D strategy and are for Motorola’s global market, and do not, as many 
would assume, serve the Chinese market alone.
This has not happened in Shanghai Bell, where the imperative of undertaking 
adaptations to meet the specific needs of the Chinese market, and the shortcomings 
of S12 itself, have allowed the space for the affiliate to develop its own R&D. 
However, the truth of the matter is that this firm has done little in terms of R&D to 
compete any wider than the Chinese market, due to its protected market status in
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China, and of the culture inherited from the central planning system. As commented 
by one senior manager of the parent Alcatel Bell on this:
When the production volume is six million lines a year and the joint venture’s 
major shareholder and the biggest customer is MPT (Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications), why should they worry about the next generation 
products?! In a one billion people market, it is not difficult to find customers. 
What they try to do is to extend the life cycle of the present products, which is 
wrong.
(Mr Chris Morel, Alcatel Bell)
The protected market condition created by government support and a lack of 
motivation among the management team has therefore blocked the full release of the 
R&D potential of Shanghai Bell even after the extensive knowledge transfer and 
utilisation.
In the case of Beijing Jeep, it is the low efficiency of localisation that has seriously 
handicapped the development of its R&D capability. While striving to establish self- 
R&D capability through joint venture operations, Beijing Jeep has never managed to 
address this since its establishment in 1983. The huge technology gap between this 
joint venture and its American parent, and the increasingly hasty upgrading of its 
existing products in Chrysler, mean that Beijing Jeep has no time to “breathe”, but 
was obliged to immerse itself in a continuous process of digesting and adapting 
product innovations from abroad. The deterioration of the market situation in the 
1990s contributed to the financial difficulties of this joint venture in undertaking any 
new research and design. The result is that Beijing Jeep did transfer some 
technologies to its old models and carried out extensive modifications on its main 
product range, Cherokee XJ, but has never been able to develop new generation
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product of this series either jointly or independently. This leaves Beijing Jeep in a 
situation of dependent development, i.e., as a passive producer of American products 
according to American design, as extensively discussed by Zhang (1995: 33). So, as 
far as R&D capacity is concerned, it seems that Beijing Jeep has made very little 
progress.
The huge differences among these four firms in terms of their improvements in 
competitiveness, as discussed above, were identified by employing the 
benchmarking indicators developed by Buckley et al (1992). Combined with this is 
the assessment reached by the individual parents of the respective firms. It appears 
that the verdicts of the parents on the performance of each international joint venture 
differ wildly. The Chinese parents of the two joint ventures, Shanghai Bell and 
Shanghai VW, seem genuinely happy with the performance of these firms, which 
can be demonstrated by continuous government supports, various honours based on 
their performances, and frequent visits by key government figures. Beijing Jeep, 
however, has been under criticism from its Chinese parent on its failure to upgrade 
its own R&D capabilities after a decade-long knowledge transfer and utilisation 
(e.g., Zhang, 1995) and its poor performance incurred since the middle of the 1990s. 
This can be demonstrated by the frequent removal of the Chinese management team 
in this firm and the refusal of Beijing Jeep’s application by the Chinese government 
for extending its current product range (off road car) to include the latest sedan 
developed by Chrysler.
Government support is crucial in doing business in the Chinese market. But 
government only supports you when you are doing well. Beijing Jeep has not 
done very well in the past several years and would like to make a big change in 
its product range. However, when Beijing Jeep applied for a license to produce
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a new car developed by Chrysler, it was vetoed by Vice Premier Li Lanqing. 
This is evidence that the central government is not happy with the performance 
of Beijing Jeep.
(Ms Sun Ying, Beijing Jeep)
On the other hand, foreign parents view the performance of these affiliates from a 
different angle. In addition to the financial aspect of the firms concerned, it appears 
that the foreign parents highly regard the progress made in building up their long­
term positions in the host market. Factors contributing to long-term success are 
judged as more important than the recent financial figures. This different perspective 
in assessing the performance of affiliates in the Chinese market by foreign parents is 
illustrated in the following comments, made by a senior manager in Alcatel Bell, the 
foreign parent of Shanghai Bell:
Financially, the return from Shanghai Bell is exceptional. But, in terms of 
technology and engineering capability building up, we have lost heavily 
because we lost the opportunity of building it in time. The reason for that is 
that the market situation has been so wonderful that the Chinese side just don’t 
listen to you. We have no choice. We should build up much faster the local 
engineering capability of Shanghai Bell.
(Mr Chris Morel, Alcatel Bell)
It indicates that Alcatel Bell is not happy with the performance of Shanghai Bell in 
respect of its R&D capabilities, even though the current financial return is excellent.
The Alcatel Bell view of performance appraisal is discernible in the other two joint 
ventures as well40. For example, even though Shanghai VW has occupied more than
40 Due to financial and time constraints, we were unable to visit the foreign parents of the other two 
joint ventures, i.e. Shanghai VW’s foreign parent, VW in Germany, and that of Beijing Jeep, Chrysler 
in the United States. However, their judgement of the respective joint venture performance can be 
gauged through interviews with the foreign expatriates in these joint ventures and commitment to the 
affiliates. This is in consistency with the grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) on which this 
research is based.
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50 per cent of this emerging car market and is the most profitable firm in China’s 
automotive industry, VW is worrying about the future competitiveness of Shanghai 
VW, due to its high unit costs and limited product range in the Chinese market, if 
and when China is admitted into the World Trade Organisation:
This firm is not going to repeat its current success once China is admitted to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and barriers for importing foreign cars 
have to be greatly knocked down. Seriously, we are very worried. Why? Look 
at the cost per unit here and the similar product made in Europe. And look at
the unit cost of components supplied by local manufacturers We can do
something on our own, but, we cannot close all the gaps arising from the 
difference in respect of the productivity of component suppliers. Shanghai VW 
is doing well with the support and protection from the Chinese government. 
Then what if all the doors are open [when China is admitted into WTO]?
(Mr Wolfgang Rohroff, Shanghai VW)
Chrysler, however, has sought every chance to increase its equity stake in Beijing 
Jeep from 31.35 per cent in 1983 to 42.4 per cent in 1994, a statement of its strong 
confidence in the future of Beijing Jeep (and an attempt to improve management 
control), although this affiliate has been embraced with continued stagnant market 
demand in the 1990s, leaving itself the least profitable among the big car 
manufacturers in China.
The reason behind this variation in the assessment of affiliate performance by the 
Chinese and foreign parents is that the different parties have different objectives 
within the joint ventures. The Chinese parents put knowledge transfer, import 
substitution and the setting up of competitive firms in “pillar industries”, as the key 
criteria for assessing the performance of their joint venture affiliates, and any 
progresses made on those fronts would please them. Conversely, the foreign partners 
are more concerned with market share and the long-term benefits of staying in this
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market. Long-term profitability would be regarded as more important than short­
term high returns. This is what long-term vision is all about, as we discussed in the 
preceding sections. Hence, it is right to say that, due to the different objectives, the 
performance of international joint ventures in transitional markets has to be 
preferentially assessed subjectively (in the opinions of the parents), rather than 
objectively (in terms of financial results).
In general, the data collected indicate that after carrying out knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning, the four firms in this research have all improved their 
competitiveness in the Chinese market. It is fair to say that without knowledge 
transfer and utilisation, the four firms would be unable to compete successfully with 
other foreign invested firms and indigenous rivals. Buckley et al (1992)’s 
terminology proved to be useful in measuring the improvement of the 
competitiveness of these firms in that it can gauge the differences between them in 
the three categories of comparison. However, this research finds that the 
performance of the affiliates in the Chinese market was also measured subjectively 
by the Chinese and foreign parents in relation to their respective objectives in 
engaging in the joint ventures. This is a further indication of the complications of 
doing business in the Chinese market.
7.6 Summary
The remaining two research questions, i.e., how has the transferred knowledge been 
utilised and what is the impact of the Chinese business environment on the process
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of knowledge transfer and organisational learning by FDI, have been dealt with in 
this chapter. This has been conducted by closely following the relating discussions in 
Chapter 2, as demonstrated in the following table (on the next page).
First, this chapter further examined the process of organisational learning carried out 
in four multinational affiliate firms in China and its impact on these firms’ 
competitiveness in the Chinese telecommunications equipment and automotive 
markets. It has been confirmed that utilising the transferred knowledge is a learning 
process carried out in the knowledge recipient firms in China. In addition to the 
earlier stage of knowledge transfer, as already discussed in the previous chapter, this 
learning process comprises knowledge articulation, knowledge application, and 
knowledge dissemination. Knowledge application is further divided into training, 
copying and adapting. And knowledge dissemination consists of secondary 
knowledge transfer from these four firms (which previously received transferred 
knowledge from their foreign parents) to their own affiliates, and further knowledge 
transfer from these four firms to their Chinese and foreign parents -  a practice in this 
research referred to as ‘reverse-learning’. Key elements that are significant in this 
process include training, team, and absorptive capacity. Training ensures the 
provision of qualified staff and the dissemination of parental corporate culture. 
Teams need to be created, maintained and enhanced, as they are the “joints” to 
underpin, or operationalise, knowledge transfer and organisational learning. We have 
also seen that teams are central to the absorptive capacity of the recipient. In 
addition, one way of improving the absorptive capacity of the knowledge recipient 
firm in transitional markets is through the grafting of individuals.
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2.53 Knowledge transfer from the 
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business environment on knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning
7.5 The improvement of firms’ 
competitiveness as a result of 
knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning
Question No. 4: 







2.7 Summary 7.6 Summary
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An objective indication of the successful utilisation of the transferred knowledge is 
the further transfer of the gained output knowledge from the firms concerned in this 
study to their own affiliates in the Chinese market, and to their Chinese and foreign 
parents by reverse-learning. This is a way of consolidating firms’ competitiveness in 
the transitional markets. Knowledge obtained through reverse-learning by the 
foreign parents from their affiliates can be re-used in later market entry by other 
affiliates of the same parents in the Chinese market. Based on the evidences of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the recipient firms, we proposed a 
three-stage model of MNC evolution in transitional markets, which leads to an 
improved understanding of the process of the capability development of the foreign 
invested firms in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry and 
automotive industry.
Two factors were identified to be the cornerstone of managing the process of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the three joint venture recipients: 
shared mindset and trust. In the face of the complexity of economic and cultural 
differences between foreign and local investors, this study concludes that a shared 
mindset needs to be cultivated, and trust needs to be engineered between the 
partners, in joint ventures located in the Chinese market, to ensure the smooth 
transfer, assimilation and application of the proprietary assets from headquarters.
Second, this research agrees with the contention that the Chinese business 
environment has impacts on the management behaviour of MNCs that engage in
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knowledge transfer and organisational learning. Cultural awareness, government 
support and long-term vision were found to be linked to carrying out knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning in the Chinese business environment. The 
evidence from this research is that they influence the strategy and behaviour of the 
four MNCs in transferring knowledge to the Chinese market. This is in line with the 
findings of a recent survey conducted by KPMG (1999), which concludes that 
“Culture and mentality have been a constant source of trouble to the German 
enterprises” due to poor understanding of Chinese partners and the Chinese business 
environment. Although the KPMG study did not research knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning, it is possible that (as they are dimensions of success factors) 
these were impaired as a result of these inter-partner problems. As our four affiliates 
in China are very large, it is reasonable to infer that the substantial commitment and 
resources of the parents were effective in addressing the barriers of cultural 
difference and mentality. This would contrast with the experience of the firms in the 
KPMG survey, which were of considerably lower average size.
Third, this chapter also examined the impact of carrying out knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning on the competitiveness of the MNCs’ affiliates in the 
Chinese market. The competitiveness of the foreign affiliates in their first stage in 
this transitional market can be judged as the result of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning. It has confirmed that this can be measured by various 
indicators of the firm’s competitive performance, competitive potential and the 
management process (Buckley et al, 1992). It seems likely that there is a positive 
relationship between the performance of knowledge transfer and organisational
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learning, and that of firm competitiveness. However, a note should be struck here. 
Due to the differing objectives, the performance of an international joint venture in 
the Chinese market has been preferentially assessed subjectively (in the opinions of 
the parents), rather than objectively (in terms of financial results).
Finally, having compared the practices of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning of these four firms in China’s telecommunications manufacturing industry 
and automotive industry, we can see the common themes among the four firms in 
this investigation. These are how to carry out organisational learning effectively to 
achieve an improved and sustainable firm performance in the Chinese market, how 
to deal with the environmental uncertainties presented by the host market in the 
organisational learning process, and how to adapt appropriately to the local culture.
There are, however, some differences emerging between these four firms. In most 
instances the contrasts arise between the wholly-owned subsidiary of Motorola 
(China) and the joint ventures, i.e., Shanghai VW, Shanghai Bell and Beijing Jeep. 
Unlike the joint ventures, there is no documentation or translation centre in Motorola 
(China). The way of overcoming language problems in this firm is through very 
selective recruitment and training programmes. However, training in Motorola 
(China) is more systematic and intensive than in its joint venture counterparts. This 
is essentially a reflection of the different beliefs between them. Motorola regards 
training as part of its firm competitiveness, with Motorola University at the centre of 
its corporate identity, while all the joint ventures use training as a means to achieve
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their respective firm competitiveness. Regarding copying from foreign parents, 
Motorola (China) started with the production of three products, while the three joint 
ventures each only started with the assembling of one product. The three joint 
ventures began the localisation of manufacturing by adapting the easier elements 
first. This ‘from-easy-to-difficult approach’, however, was not found in Motorola 
(China), where, from the very beginning, the final products as well as some 
components were produced simultaneously. Moreover, some research centres (the 
software centre, mobile telecommunications products centre, manufacturing 
technology research centre and paging research and development centre) were 
established roughly at the same time as the production lines, in order to facilitate the 
further development and adaptation of the current product range. This demonstrates 
that a difference in cultivating R&D in the process of organisational learning exists 
between the four firms. Motorola (China) has integrated R&D development with its 
organisational learning, while the three joint ventures took a different approach by 
nurturing their adaptation capability first and placing independent R&D second.
Differences were also evident in respect of further knowledge transfer to the foreign 
parents. Only the three joint ventures qualify for the categorisation of reverse 
knowledge transfer discussed in this section, while Motorola (China) does not 
because it has carried out all the subsequent expansions in China. This is not to deny 
the fact that Motorola as a whole benefited hugely from the acquisition of local 
knowledge and newly created knowledge by Motorola (China) in the Chinese 
market. The point is that as Motorola (China) implements the strategies devised by 
the headquarters of Motorola for the Chinese market, there is no need to carry out a
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separate process of reverse knowledge transfer, as no expansions are envisaged that 
are not conducted through its own wholly-owned subsidiary. On the contrary, the 
joint ventures all carried out reverse knowledge transfer, but in different styles. VW 
applied its acquired knowledge (management skills and social knowledge) and the 
tested management systems from Shanghai VW to its only one new joint ventures, 
FAW-VW. For its part, Alcatel Bell applied its acquired knowledge in another six 
joint ventures that it established after Shanghai Bell, clearly on a larger scale. 
Chrysler, the foreign parent of Beijing Jeep did not re-use the reversely transferred 
knowledge in the Chinese market because it did not establish any more joint venture 
at all. Government support has been cited as the chief external factor affecting 
knowledge transfer and utilisation in the four firms. But, unlike in the case of 
Shanghai Bell, where both central and local governments are direct stakeholders, 
local governments have played a nurturing part in the establishment of the firm 
competitiveness of Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and Motorola (China).
Differences can still be found among the firms in the three categories of 
competitiveness. It seems, the general tendency is that the higher the foreign 
ownership, the higher the score of the firm’s competitiveness. Motorola (China), a 
full member of Motorola family, is the highest ranked among the four. Inheriting its 
strength directly from its parent. Motorola (China) is now, after a shorter period of 
establishment, at the same level as Shanghai VW and Shanghai Bell in terms of 
“competitive performance”. Even more outstanding are the firm’s “management 
process” and “competitive potential”, if compared with any of the three joint 
ventures. If Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW want to remain key players in the
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Chinese market, it seems much more needs to be done to promote management 
effectiveness and the strengthening of R&D capabilities, which is the main indicator 
of competitive potential. Beijing Jeep, is now scored lower in all the three categories 
than the two fellow joint ventures. This reflects the relatively poor performance of 
this firm in the currently troubled Chinese automotive market.
Fewer differences can be established in a comparison of the two industries. One of 
them, however, is the difference in the positioning of training within the business 
strategy of the Chinese affiliates. It is a clear indication of the fast pace of 
technological innovation and fierce competition characterising in the 
telecommunications industry since the 1980s that the two firms in the 
telecommunications equipment industry seemed to emphasise training more as a way 
of strengthening their general competitiveness as compared with the two in the 
automotive industry. As a result, more frequent and intensive post-employment 
training programmes have been arranged in Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China). 
Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep contrast in that relatively fewer training programmes 
have been provided, while there is a tendency towards pre-employment training.
This may be an industry-specific difference in the nature of the two industries.
The other difference identified between the industries relates to further knowledge 
transfer -  where extensive knowledge transfer carried out by Shanghai Bell and 
Motorola (China) to their own subsidiaries and suppliers is witnessed, but only 
modest knowledge transfer was reported to have taken place between Shanghai VW 
and Beijing Jeep and their major suppliers. Shanghai Bell and Motorola regarded
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further knowledge transfer as part of an integrated strategy based on affiliate growth, 
while Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep perceived it as a vehicle for tightening quality 
control and achieving cost competitiveness. This is also a result of the industry- 
specific difference between the two industries, for example in respect of setup cost 
and different levels of production for achieving economies of scale, as well as 
government restrictions on the automotive industry, as discussed in Section “7.241 
Further knowledge transfer from the four firms to their own affiliates”.
On the other hand, no systematic differences have been found between the two 
European firms and their counterparts from the USA. This suggests that country of 
origin has not played an important role in creating differences between these MNCs, 
headquartered in the western industrialised countries, in their knowledge utilisation 
in the Chinese market. However, it seems possible that the organisational form does 
play a role, i.e., the use of whole ownership (where permitted) as opposed to JV -  as 
in the case of Motorola. To the extent that the American firms may have a preference 
for whole ownership, it may result in some difference in performance in general by 
nationality -  although this cannot be investigated in this study.
Although it would have been desirable, no comprehensive comparison could be 
carried out on MNCs’ knowledge transfer and organisational learning as between 
China and other transitional economies owning to the lack of similar research on the 
latter41. While acknowledging that more differences must exist, we can draw no firm
41 Exploratory research by Clegg, Kamall and Tan (2000) suggests that where government policy is 
very liberal towards FDI, and radical change in domestic industry is required, wholesale foreign 
acquisition of the leading firm is seen as the fast route to knowledge transfer and competitiveness. 
Clearly, owning to the scale and political differences, China cannot entertain such policies.
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conclusions in this respect except recognising the different practices arising from 
cultural differences between the two sides. This has been complicated by the 
persistence of the legacy of the old communist regimes, and the erratic development 
of market-based systems, in the Central and Eastern European countries in which 
FDI takes place.
Having examined the whole process of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning in these four firms, a related issue worth exploring is the dynamics in the 
evolution of the knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the Chinese 
market. According to Hyder and Ghauri (1989), the reason to form a JV is to gain 
complementary resources from each other and an important characteristic of 
resource exchange is its dynamic nature. In the four firms studied it is clear that the 
driving forces behind the knowledge transfer are two fold:
First is the Chinese government’s intention of transferring advanced western 
technologies and management skills to upgrade the Chinese indigenous industry and 
strengthen China’s international competitiveness in knowledge intensive industries. 
This has been reflected in the favourable environment created for knowledge transfer 
in the two industries of this research, such as the green light for foreign involvement 
in the industries, tax breaks, priority of allocating foreign exchanges, flexible 
employment regulations, and the extensive government supports enjoyed by the 
firms concerned. The aim for providing these incentives was to engage in FDI in the 
first place and to expand it, making it a success in the Chinese market. Apart from 
the Chinese government’s promotional efforts, the Chinese partners of joint ventures
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also hoped to benefit from the “venture” in which they were involved. Their aim was 
to become high fliers in the industries concerned. At a personal level, the experience 
of running joint ventures in strategic industries can guarantee a bright career future 
for Chinese managers in running other big firms, or in gaining promotion to central 
ministries and local government.
Second is the desire of foreign investors to avail themselves of the potential of the 
Chinese market in respect of local sales (and to a lesser extent, local manpower). As 
market seeking is the primary motive in entering the Chinese market in the chosen 
industries, foreign firms needed to establish their presence in this market by 
transferring their existing knowledge to the new affiliates. Without the successful 
transfer and landing of their existing knowledge in the new affiliates, the foreign 
investors of the four firms in this research would be disadvantaged to compete with 
other manufacturers in this expanding market (which usually services this market by 
way of exporting, and in few cases, manufacturing licensing). It is this vision that 
kept the foreign parents of the four firms engaged in the lengthy, sometimes 
problematic, process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning.
The relationships between two parents are the other crucial dimension to look at 
when examining the dynamics of knowledge transfer and organisational learning in 
the firms concerned. On the face of it, it is clear from our interviews that the two 
parents have not got directly in touch with each other often after the signing of the 
respective joint venture contracts. Their interests have been represented, and their 
views aired, by their directors in the Board, and their managers and expatriates in the
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management team. As would be expected, all the relevant business has been 
conducted within the joint venture concerned. This is in line with international 
practice. Hence, the direct relationship between the two parents is very limited. 
There is no record indicating that the parents of the three joint ventures in this study 
have engaged in more co-operations.
However, the managing of knowledge transfer and organisational learning in joint 
ventures is really a crusade of handling relationships between two parents of these 
firms. Although the Chinese parents own the majority of equity in their joint 
ventures, such as Shanghai Bell and Beijing Jeep, or at least share with the foreign 
parent sometimes, such as in the case of Shanghai VW, their influences have been 
seriously offset by the foreign parents due to their possessing of knowledge-based 
firm specific advantages for which the joint ventures sought. In order to proceed in 
conducting knowledge transfer and achieving firm competitiveness, all the parties 
involved had to work together, making compromises and accommodating each 
other. This research has found, as indicated in Sections “7.3 The key factors in the 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning process” and “7.4 The impact of the 
Chinese business environment on knowledge transfer and organisational learning”, 
that shared mindset and trust between parents of joint ventures are essential to 
enabling knowledge transfer and organisational learning, and foreign parents need to 
take special attention of the cultural differences in the Chinese market (“cultural 
awareness”), pursuing long-term vision rather than short-term gain. The success of 
these firms has therefore largely been built on shared mindset and trust between the 
Chinese and foreign parents. This is consistent with the previous findings on joint
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venture partner relationship in general, such as the development of a trustworthy 
interpartner relationship is critical to the venture’s operation (Faulkner, 1994), and 
the interpartner co-operation and mutual adjustments represent an inevitable solution 
to address unexpected challenges over time (Yan and Gray, 1996). It is extremely 
similar to the findings on joint venture partner relationship in the context of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning by Inkpen (1995b: 67), who argues 
that trust between JV partners and relationship openness are important elements of 
long-term JV relationships. This further demonstrates the validness of the relevant 
findings of this research.
Along with the progress made in knowledge transfer and organisational learning, the 
relationships between parents and their affiliates also evolve. On the one hand, the 
affiliates have become increasingly autonomous. This is evidenced in the fact that 
fewer expatriates are employed now in these affiliates than in the past (after carrying 
out management localisation programmes), and the transfer of the majority of 
component suppliers from foreign parents to local manufacturers following lengthy 
localisation programmes. The explanation for the increasing autonomy in these 
affiliates may lie in the improvement of their competitiveness in the Chinese market. 
This is consistent with the finding of Glaister, Husan and Buckley (1999: 20) that 
foreign parents allow IJV autonomy as long as performance is acceptable to them.
On the other hand, both foreign and Chinese parents have become increasingly 
dependent on these affiliates in the Chinese market. For the foreign parents, these 
affiliates represent their hope of realising their ambitions in the fast growing Chinese 
market. They also rely on these affiliates as customers, to which they export
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intermediate goods. Although in decline recently, the jobs of thousands of people in 
their home countries rely on these export. Chinese parents also rely on these 
affiliates for the acquisition of management skills and social knowledge. These new 
developments indicate that the importance of the affiliates is rising for the MNCs in 
this study, which is consistent with research of Prahalad and Doz (1981), Taggart 
(1996) and Young, Hood and Dunlop (1988). The foreign parents of these affiliates 
have employed strategic control, exercised both directly and indirectly (Hill, 1999) 
in order to perpetuate success in the Chinese market (notwithstanding that Beijing 
Jeep has recently performed poorly). Direct control is achieved in the affiliates of 
this research through sending expatriates to fill in those positions designed to be held 
by managers from foreign parent, and indirect control is achieved by the 
dissemination of corporate culture, which was referred to as a “secret weapon” of 
MNCs by a Belgian manager (See Section “6.31 The typology of the transferred 
knowledge”). This again confirms the findings of Hill (1999) and Gupta and 
Govindarajan (1991).
The above findings do have significant theoretical implications. First, they take us 
beyond the mainstream theory, which regards knowledge transfer as primarily one­
way process, whereby the knowledge asset advantage of the parent compensate for 
the ‘cost of foreignness’ in the host economy (Hymer, 1960,1976; Dunning, 1977, 
1993). It is now clear that organisational learning is the key to the establishment of 
affiliate competitiveness by MNCs in the transitional markets. Although some 
research has established that organisational learning is the cornerstone of building up 
firm competitiveness in the developed markets (Edmondson and Moingeon, 1998;
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Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Levinthal, 
1991; Lyles and Baird, 1994; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992; Porter, 1991), this research 
clearly demonstrates that organisational learning plays the same role in China, one of 
the largest transitional markets. This indicates that organisational learning is of 
universal importance to firms wherever they operate. In this way, it may be taken as 
an example of the impact of globalisation on international business. In order to 
extend their global competitiveness into transitional markets, MNCs need to put 
organisational learning at the heart of their business strategy, and create a favourable 
environment where internal organisational learning of both transferred knowledge 
and local knowledge can flourish and be sustained.
Second, organisational learning is a complicated process, which needs to be 
cultivated by all the parties involved in the affiliates. There are plenty of academics 
and practitioners who perceive organisational learning as critical in nurturing and 
maintaining firms’ comparative advantage (De Geus, 1988; Nevis, Di Bella, and 
Gould, 1995). However, how organisational learning is actually worked out in a 
MNC remains arcane in many respects. Some recent research, e.g., Inkpen (1995b), 
Hedlund and Nonaka (1993), explored the process of organisational learning and 
originated ideas about the main stages that it comprises (as in the scheme proposed 
by Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 126) and used in this chapter). Yet, they are entirely 
based on cases in the developed markets, such as Inkpen’s (1995b) research on 
Japanese investments in the North American market, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) 
investigation into Japanese firms. This research has furthered current research on 
organisational learning by presenting a detailed analysis on the specific sub-stages of
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the whole process based on multiple case studies. It also identified the key factors 
affecting the organisational learning process in the distinctive Chinese market. Our 
study concludes that foreign investors must obtain trust and cooperation from the 
Chinese stakeholders to enable knowledge transfer and organisational learning to 
proceed smoothly. This has provided a stepping stone in understanding the 
complexities of managing knowledge transfer and organisational learning process 
within MNCs in the global marketplace. The key point is that the process has 
dimensions that are external as well as internal to the firm. Indeed, the external 
dimension could be argued to be more important when entering transitional markets 
such as China, than when entering the developed economies.
Third, cultural issues matter hugely in the process of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning carried out by MNCs. It is a recognised weakness of the JV 
literature that it has least to say about the process of JVs (Parkhe, 1993). A striking 
example is the subject of national cultural differences (and the effects of these on 
IJV performance). This topic has been the focal point for controversy in the 
mainstream JV literature (Geringer, 1998; Glaister and Buckley 1998a and 1998b). 
Cultural issues, however, were not ignored in this research. It is certain that, given 
the fact that there are a great deal of culture-related differences found between China 
and the western countries, foreign investors have to be very cautious when 
progressing their operations inside China. There are many factors that need to be 
carefully evaluated before, and after, FDI has taken place. They are not only 
quantities such as market size and expected market growth, but also the sources of 
country risk (political risk, economic risk, etc.), plus the classical locational and
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production factors such as inflation, wage costs, skills (human capital), 
infrastructure, technical capital, government policy towards FDI, trade barriers, 
exchange rate, as well as monetary and other macroeconomic factors. On top of all 
these factors, cultural issues influence the processes that are crucial to the progress 
of the affiliate and the perception of them.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions
8.1 Main findings and managerial implications
The objective of this research was to expand and deepen the conventional academic 
approach of technology transfer to that of knowledge transfer. The basis for this is 
that FDI, in the modem theory of international business, is a complex transfer and 
interaction of resources beyond that of mere technology transfer. Indeed, technology 
transfer relies on the transfer of other resources in order to succeed. Accordingly, 
this research sought to analyse the process of MNC’s knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning by which foreign affiliates develop from “fresh” entrants to 
becoming competitive players in China’s telecommunications equipment market and 
automotive market. In particular, it intended to address the following questions: 
What knowledge has been transferred by the MNCs into the Chinese market? How 
has the knowledge been transferred? And how has the transferred knowledge been 
utilised? It also sought to review the impact of the distinctive characteristics of the 
Chinese market on MNCs’ knowledge transfer and organisational learning practices.
This chapter intends to evaluate the whole research against the objectives set 
beforehand, i.e., to:
• analyse the process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning by
addressing the following questions: What knowledge has been transferred by the
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MNCs into the Chinese market? How has the knowledge been transferred? And 
how has the transferred knowledge been utilised?
• review the impact of the Chinese business environment on MNC’s knowledge 
transfer and organisational learning practices
First, prior to tackling the above questions themselves, we examined some strategic 
issues of these four firms with regard to their entry into the Chinese market. This 
research reveals that the strategic motive for FDI in entering the Chinese market 
within these two industries is primarily local market servicing. The rents that accrue 
from the transfer of knowledge to the affiliates of these MNCs in China and the 
benefits arising from component supply are therefore important elements for the 
firms’ consideration. In order to make FDI successful, this research also suggests 
that foreign firms must find an optimal entry mode to cope with the regulated 
Chinese market. The fact that three out of the four firms chose joint venture as their 
entry mode, reflects the restrictions imposed by the Chinese government in the 
1980s on the one hand, and the risky nature of this market on the other. Joint venture 
was regarded as a way of securing local cooperation to mitigate country risk, itself 
strongly associated with the ‘cost of foreignness’ specific to foreign firms (Hymer, 
1960, 1976; Dunning, 1977, 1993).
The Chinese firms engaged in the joint ventures had different intentions from those 
of their foreign partners. They wanted to seek access to the strategic assets held by 
the foreign firms, such as technological advantages, financial resources, and 
management skills (although the importance of the last is often only fully realised
354
later). This was evident in the fact that only the most advanced products of foreign 
partners were expected to be introduced by the Chinese partners. Given the bad 
record of intellectual property protection in China, it begged the question of how the 
foreign partners could limit the “bleedthrough” of their input knowledge in the 
process of running joint ventures. This research indicates that one way employed by 
the firms of this investigation is through designing the structure of corporate 
governance to achieve a division of management control within the firms concerned 
that preserves the value of their ownership advantages.
Second, we addressed the three questions about the process of knowledge transfer 
and organisational learning by the four MNCs in China. Regarding the knowledge 
that has been transferred by the MNCs into the Chinese market, the findings from 
this research clearly demonstrate that the transferred knowledge to the Chinese 
affiliates is composed of technology, management skills and social knowledge. 
Social knowledge plays an important role in shaping the vision and atmosphere of 
newly established affiliates. In order to better exploit the opportunities arising from 
the expanding Chinese market, foreign parents transferred a broader range of 
knowledge than just production related technologies. Among the three joint 
ventures, the knowledge transferred to the Chinese market has been found to have a 
stages characteristic. From our investigation, the firms were found to transfer the 
different types of knowledge at different stages, even though some of them had 
intended to carry out the transfer of different knowledge types simultaneously.
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Regarding the second question, i.e., how has the knowledge been transferred by the 
MNCs into the Chinese market, some illuminating findings have been gained. The 
way in which MNCs transferred knowledge was examined by looking at the 
following issues: transfer mode, transfer route, transfer volume and transfer cost. It 
is evident that the more tacit is the knowledge concerned, in terms of codifiability 
and teachability, the stronger the incentive to transfer across national boundaries to a 
wholly-owned subsidiary (where permissible) than through a joint venture. To 
facilitate knowledge transfer and localisation of production, foreign parents always 
sent expatriates to their affiliates in the Chinese market, in addition to the normal 
routes such as the transfer of documentation and training programmes. Foreign 
expatriates can provide important on-site support to ensure that the recipient 
company can acquire and utilise the transferred knowledge much more effectively 
and efficiently.
In terms of the volume of knowledge transfer, this research reveals that both the 
knowledge gap between foreign parents and their joint venture affiliates, and the 
competitive strategy of the parent firms in the host market, played important roles in 
deciding how much knowledge (including management skills and social knowledge) 
was transferred to the Chinese affiliates among the four firms concerned. Notably, 
knowledge flows from the parent to the affiliate might be increased to include the 
latest technological and managerial expertise if the affiliate faces declining market 
power (i.e., increasing market competition). And finally, this research confirms the 
findings of relevant studies conducted in western countries in respect of the cost of 
knowledge transfer to the Chinese market. These are that, the complexity and
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tacitness of the transferred knowledge, the financial and human resources committed 
by the parents, and the absorptive capacity of affiliates in the host market, were key 
elements that affected the cost of knowledge transfer within the relevant MNCs 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Teece, 1977; Lan and 
Young, 1996). However, further research is still needed to examine these elements 
individually for a better understanding of their role in influencing the volume of 
knowledge transfer by MNCs in transitional markets.
How has the transferred knowledge been utilised? This research has established that 
the transferred knowledge has been utilised by the four recipients through a lengthy 
process of organisational learning, which is composed of knowledge articulation, 
knowledge application and knowledge dissemination. The stage of knowledge 
application is further divided into training, copying and adapting. Knowledge 
dissemination further comprises secondary knowledge transfer to the affiliates of the 
four primary recipient firms. Finally, there occurs further transfer back to the 
Chinese and foreign parents of new output knowledge created in the affiliates, a 
practice referred to in this research as ‘reverse-learning’. This research has also 
identified the key elements in the process of knowledge transfer and organisational 
learning: training, team, and absorptive capacity. Training ensures the provision of 
qualified staff and the dissemination of parent corporate culture. Teams can underpin 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning, and are central to promoting the 
absorptive capacity of the recipient. Absorptive capacity decides the efficiency and 
effectiveness of knowledge transfer and organisational learning.
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The aim of knowledge transfer and organisational learning carried out by the four 
MNCs is to consolidate the competitiveness of their Chinese affiliates. This research 
argues that an objective indication of the successful utilisation of the transferred 
knowledge is the further transfer of the gained output knowledge from these primary 
recipient firms to their own affiliates in the Chinese market, and from the primary 
recipient firms to their Chinese and foreign parents through reverse-learning. It has 
been found that knowledge obtained through reverse-learning by the foreign parents 
from their affiliates was re-used in later market entry by other affiliates of the same 
parents in the Chinese market, such as in the case of Alcatel Bell and Shanghai VW. 
This insight into the dynamics of knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
provides substantiation of the stages view of the FDI process, which posits 
incremental increasing commitment by the investing firm (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977).
Hence, the process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning by the four 
firms in the Chinese market can be illustrated in the following figure.
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Figure 8-1: The process of knowledge transfer and organisational learning by the 
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Third, the last question regarding the impact of the Chinese business environment on 
MNCs’ knowledge transfer and organisational learning was also evaluated. A typical 
characteristic of transitional markets is environmental uncertainties, including host 
government interference in the case of China. This research has established that 
market size and access to the Chinese market, government industrial policy, the 
existence of the Communist Party and its subordinate organisations in the joint 
venture affiliates of those MNCs involved, Chinese culture, the quality of the 
Chinese employees, and the rivalry among local governments, were found to have 
had a clear impact on the strategy and behaviour of MNCs in the Chinese market. In 
the face of the complexity of economic and cultural differences between foreign and 
Chinese partners, this study concludes that a shared mindset needs to be cultivated,
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and trust needs to be engineered between the partners in joint ventures located in the 
Chinese market, to ensure the smooth transfer, assimilation and adaptation of the 
proprietary assets from headquarters. Moreover, cultural awareness, government 
support and long-term vision were deemed to be specifically linked to carrying out 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning in the Chinese business environment. 
We conclude that failing to address these issues before and during a proposed 
knowledge transfer will bring great difficulties to the process of grounding the 
transferred knowledge in the recipient, potentially causing substantial loss of the 
resources invested and resulting in low morale among the employees concerned. The 
above finding has been supported by a recent survey conducted by KPMG (1999) in 
its investigation of German investment in China.
Last, this research also examined the impact of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning on the competitiveness of the MNCs’ affiliates in the 
Chinese market. It is apparent that there is a positive relationship between 
performance in knowledge transfer and organisational learning and affiliate 
competitiveness. This research has confirmed that the improvement of firm 
competitiveness can be measured by various indicators of the firm’s competitive 
performance, competitive potential and the management process (Buckley et al, 
1992). If we compare the four firms, Motorola (China) was the champion in each of 
the competitiveness categories, while Beijing Jeep performed poorly owning to 
various internal and external reasons, while Shanghai Bell and Shanghai VW were in 
between. It is evident that the efficiency and effectiveness of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning contributed greatly to the differences observed between
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them. In this research, we also notice that the performance of these international 
joint ventures in the Chinese market has been preferentially assessed subjectively (in 
the opinions of the parents), rather than objectively (in terms of financial results).
Comparisons have been made to examine the practices of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning of these four firms in China’s telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and automotive industry. This research has established that, 
though different in terms of technological sophistication, the common themes for the 
four firms with respect to knowledge transfer and organisational learning are: how to 
secure the most favourable environment in the host market by making a well-judged 
strategic decision on entry mode; how to carry out knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning effectively to achieve improved and sustainable performance 
on the part of the firm in the Chinese market; how to deal with the environmental 
uncertainties presented by the host market that affect the organisational learning 
process; and how to adapt appropriately to the local culture.
In addition to the commonalties, some significant differences were found between 
the Chinese affiliates of the four MNCs. These include “choosing” different entry 
modes (joint venture vs wholly-owned subsidiary), selecting products of different 
levels, and the fact that the Chinese Communist Party operates its command 
structure in joint ventures, so influencing decision making processes -  but not in the 
wholly-owned subsidiary. A notable contrast was that knowledge in more than one 
line of business was transferred to the wholly-owned subsidiary, but knowledge of 
only one line of business was transferred to the joint ventures. This research has
361
revealed that there is a stages characteristic to be found in the primary knowledge 
transferred to the three joint ventures, but not to the wholly-owned subsidiary. This 
indicates the gradual realisation among the joint venture partners of the importance 
of management skills and social knowledge for the success of doing business in the 
Chinese market. These three joint ventures all subsequently transferred more types 
of knowledge than were originally negotiated to address the imbalance between 
technology and the soft natured knowledge which was in deficit.
Differences also exist regarding the way the knowledge transfer was handled 
between these firms. Apart from employing different knowledge transfer modes, the 
role of the expatriates was also different between the joint ventures and the wholly- 
owned subsidiary. Those deployed to joint ventures were not only there to facilitate 
knowledge transfer, but also to guard against any possibility of the leakage of 
intellectual property owned by the foreign parents. This demonstrates the 
complication of managing partner relationships for foreign investors in the Chinese 
market. In addition, the means of overcoming language problems differed as well 
between the joint ventures and Motorola (China) -  the only wholly-owned 
subsidiary. The joint ventures set up documentation or translation centres to address 
language differences, while Motorola (China) dealt with it solely through selective 
recruitment and training programmes, over which it had sole discretion through its 
100 percent ownership. In comparison, training in Motorola (China) is more 
systematic and intensive than in its joint venture counterparts. A contrasting 
localisation approach was adopted by affiliates in the two ownership categories: the 
three joint ventures started manufacturing localisation by adapting the easier
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elements first (called the ‘from-easy-to-difficult approach’ in this research), while 
Motorola (China) has integrated R&D development with its organisational learning. 
And finally, the four firms accomplished divergent performances in the three 
categories of competitiveness, partly as a result of differences in respect of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning. It seems that there are reasons to 
believe that higher foreign ownership facilitated the achievement of a higher score in 
terms of competitiveness.
There are also some differences with respect to knowledge transfer between the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and the automotive industry of China. 
First, different vintages of technologies were transferred to these two industries. 
Motorola (China) and Shanghai Bell transferred the latest technologies in response 
to the fast pace of technological innovation and fierce competition of the Chinese 
market. However, only modest (very mature) technologies were transferred to their 
Chinese affiliates by VW and Chrysler42 against the background of a highly 
regulated and protected automotive market. Second, the volume of the transferred 
knowledge in the telecommunications manufacturing industry was much greater than 
in the automotive industry. Third, labour cost did have some significance in the 
investment decision of the automotive industry, where China provided a locational 
attraction in respect of its internationally low real wage costs, but not in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry. In the telecommunications
42 The main technology transferred to Beijing Jeep was developed by American Jeep, which was 
acquired by Chrysler in 1987. Chrysler has continued to meet the obligations defined in the original 
joint venture contract signed in 1984. The technology in question was very advanced when Beijing 
Jeep was established. However, due to its weak absorptive capacity, Beijing Jeep has only managed to 
localise the original technology which became outdated since the end of the 1980s.
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manufacturing industry the proportion of labour costs in total cost was too low for 
this to materially affect the investment decision.
In addition, some differences have been found between the two industries regarding 
the process of organisational learning. The two firms in the telecommunications 
manufacturing industry seemed to regard training as a way of strengthening their 
general competitiveness, and as a result, more frequent and intensive post­
employment training programmes were arranged. Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep of 
the automotive industry contrast in that relatively fewer training programmes were 
provided, while there was a tendency towards pre-employment training. The other 
difference identified between the industries relates to secondary knowledge transfer. 
Although extensive knowledge transfer carried out by Shanghai Bell and Motorola 
(China) to their own affiliates and suppliers was witnessed, only modest knowledge 
transfer was reported to have taken place between Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep 
and their major suppliers. Shanghai Bell and Motorola (China) regarded secondary 
knowledge transfer as part of an integrated strategy based on affiliate growth, while 
Shanghai VW and Beijing Jeep perceived it as a vehicle for tightening quality 
control and achieving cost competitiveness. This is also a result of the industry- 
specific difference between the two industries, for example in respect of setup cost 
and different levels of production for achieving economies of scale (as discussed in 
Section “7.241 Further knowledge transfer from the four firms to their own 
affiliates”), as well as government restrictions on the automotive industry.
364
This research has found no systematic differences between the two European firms 
and their counterparts from the USA. No evidence is found to support that country of 
origin played an important role in creating differences between these MNCs in their 
knowledge transfer and utilisation in the Chinese market. Of course, all four firms 
are headquartered in the western industrialised countries, which does give them 
something in common. However, it seems possible that the organisational form does 
play a role, i.e., the use of whole ownership (where permitted) as opposed to JV -  as 
in the case of Motorola. To the extent that the American firms may have a preference 
for whole ownership, this may result in some difference in performance in general by 
nationality (Dunning, 1958). This needs to be investigated further in future studies 
on this topic.
What are the differences between China and other transitional economies with 
respect to knowledge transfer and organisational learning? Based on the very limited 
research carried out on transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe, it is 
difficult to conduct any comprehensive comparisons. However, it seems that one 
thing is clear. While Chinese firms have always sought to start with transferring the 
hard elements (technological) of knowledge, firms in other transitional economies in 
Europe have been more ready to prioritise the soft elements of knowledge on their 
transfer lists. This is due to the different existing technological capability between 
China and these countries. It may also owe something to the strength of the 
government view that technology is a priority, as the government still wields more 
power in China (as a one-party state) than in most countries. More different practices 
in knowledge transfer could be identified in a future study. For instance, it is
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possible that the cultural differences between China and the transitional economies 
in Eastern Europe are important, as the latter have been affected by the transition 
from the old communist regimes to market-based capitalist systems.
It needs to be acknowledged, however, that by no means all of the above findings are 
generally applicable outside the cases under study. First, and having said that, even 
though all the findings from this research were drawn from cases in the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry and the automotive industry, no 
findings are regarded as exclusively industry-specific. To some extent other 
industries of some sophistication are likely to share common features. However, it 
would be inappropriate to apply them in industries of less-knowledge intensity, such 
as toys, food and the mining industries. Second, some of the above findings are more 
pertinent to transitional markets. This includes how to secure the most favourable 
environment in the host market by making a well-judged strategic decision on entry 
mode, where the environment is determined more under the discretion of the 
government. It also includes the finding that foreign investors seek to limit the 
“bleedthrough” of their input knowledge in joint ventures to the government sector 
enterprises by way of designing the structure of corporate governance. The stages 
characteristic that appeared in the process of knowledge transfer is more likely to be 
found in transitional economies than in developed markets. This is because the 
degree of uncertainty and lack of local market familiarity is greater, meaning 
commitment is likely to change more with local experiences as local learning takes 
place. Third, cultural awareness, government support and long-term vision were 
deemed to be specifically linked to carrying out knowledge transfer and
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organisational learning in the Chinese business environment. While foreign investors 
need to deal with these issues in other transitional economies (or even in some 
developed economies, such as Japan), the combination of these three factors are 
considered to be most peculiar to China.
In the process of exploring MNC’s knowledge transfer and organisational learning in 
the Chinese market based on the existing theoretical paradigm, we found that this 
paradigm, in most cases, is applicable in China. Wherein its weakness lies in this 
transitional market is that: (1) it did not give enough weight to some of the factors 
identified to be crucial for the success of knowledge transfer within MNCs, such as 
shared mindset, training, and adaptation; (2) it gave too little attention to addressing 
the enhanced role of social knowledge in contributing to the transferring and 
grounding of technology and management skills. This reflects the parallel processes 
of knowledge transfer and organisational change, and, understandably, some of the 
issues related to the host environment, such as the impact of government support, 
cultural awareness, the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the operation of joint 
ventures; (3) it failed to identify the specific steps within each stage of the 
organisational learning process. This research has striven towards addressing these 
weaknesses, or filling the gaps in the current paradigm, as described below, to 
improve our understanding of MNCs’ internationalisation in transitional markets.
Certain aspects of the research have emerged as being original:
• To our knowledge, this research is the first to put forward, and to test, that 
transferred knowledge includes not only technology and management skills, but
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also social knowledge. Compared with technology and management skills which 
are commonly referred to as the main elements transferred within MNCs, social 
knowledge actually plays a much wider role in equipping the employees of the 
recipient firms with the kind of mindset, corporate culture, internal language and 
other tacit knowledge that are required to undertake the identification and 
establishment of firm-specific advantages in a challenging environment. These 
have been considered by the firms concerned to be a “secret weapon” in realising 
a firm’s competitiveness in the host market. Firm competitiveness in transitional 
markets depends on the totality of the transferred knowledge.
• When examining the factors that decide the volume of the transferred knowledge 
by MNCs into the Chinese market, we identified the size of the host market 
concerned as a prime factor in expediting the knowledge transfer, even though 
there are quite a number of uncertainties pending in this market. This is likely to 
be an indication of the extent of competition in world markets that market share 
and growth has become vital for MNCs’ existence and development.
• We have inferred that knowledge utilisation is a natural continuation, but also an 
integral part, of knowledge transfer, and group them together in the focus of this 
research. This has helped to ensure that a full picture of the issues concerned with 
MNCs’ knowledge transfer was presented, and provides a thorough 
understanding relating to the building up of firm competitiveness in the Chinese 
market. This systematic approach is a contribution to the research on knowledge
v
transfer within MNCs.
• We identified the specific steps within each stage of the organisational learning 
process (comprising knowledge articulation, knowledge application and
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knowledge dissemination) put forward by Hedlund and Nonaka (1993). We found 
in this research that knowledge application is further divided into training, 
copying and adapting. And knowledge dissemination comprises secondary 
knowledge transfer from the four affiliates under study to their own affiliates, 
plus further knowledge transfer from the four primary affiliates to their Chinese 
and foreign parents, a practice referred to as reverse- learning in this research 
(which will be discussed in the next point). Key elements significant in this 
process such as training, team, and absorptive capacity, were individually 
examined; host business environmental factors affecting the performance of 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning by MNCs, such as cultural 
awareness, government support and long-term vision, were highlighted. The 
further breakdown of the stages in the organisational learning process provides a 
stepping stone in understanding the complexities of managing knowledge transfer 
and organisational learning processes within MNCs in the global marketplace and 
specifically in China where MNCs’ uncertainty about the local environment is a 
distinctive factor.
• In this research we examined secondary knowledge transfer from MNCs’
affiliates, i.e., Shanghai Bell, Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and Motorola (China), 
to their own affiliates in the Chinese market, e.g., in the case of the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry, NEAT (of Shanghai Bell) and 
Sichuan Leshan Semiconductor Company (of Motorola), or in the case of the 
automotive industry, to their first tier suppliers, following the successful 
knowledge utilisation and development in the four firms. Secondary knowledge 
transfer was also found in all four firms to their parents by way of reverse
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learning. The extension of MNCs’ firm-specific advantages into China, based on 
this three-tier (foreign parents - the four foreign invested firms - their own 
affiliates and component suppliers in the Chinese market) knowledge transfer and 
utilisation process, represents a new contribution to understanding within the 
international business literature on operating in transitional markets.
These findings have important implications for the internationalisation of 
multinational firms in transitional markets in general, and on knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning in China in particular. It is evident from this research that 
knowledge transfer and organisational learning serves as the cornerstone of firms’ 
internationalisation processes. The deployment of firm-specific advantages across 
borders through a deliberate transfer and learning process, is used to ensure that 
multinational firms keep their niche advantages over local rivals in a diversified 
global market. In fact knowledge transfer has been regarded as a lifeline in the 
growth of multinational firms (Kogut and Zander, 1993) -  a view that has been 
strongly supported by the cases in this research. But it also transpires from this 
research that MNCs do plan - and indeed should plan - to extend their primary 
affiliates’ competitiveness to their own affiliates through secondary knowledge 
transfer, and to their parents through reverse-learning. The impacts of secondary 
knowledge transfer fall within the topic of spillover effects, which to date has not 
been researched in China either qualitatively or quantitatively. It is worth pointing 
out that the effectiveness of knowledge transfer and utilisation among multinational 
firms, as shown in this research, is not the same. The contrast in this respect 
contributed to the perceived difference in affiliate competitiveness in the Chinese
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market, reflected in the different market shares, financial positions and R&D 
adaptations and development capabilities.
Our findings shed some light on the importance of knowledge of a soft nature for the 
general competitiveness of multinational firms. It is very clear from the cases 
investigated that each of the three categories of knowledge contributes to the 
successful production and delivery of the transferred product and to general firm 
competitiveness in the Chinese market. In fact, management skills and social 
knowledge weigh no less than technology in contributing to the firm’s 
competitiveness in a new market. To some extent, it is the soft knowledge that has 
really transformed the management behaviour of the firms concerned, and created 
the corporate culture that is to a greater extent compatible with that in the western 
parent firms. We can conclude that in order to achieve improved performance the 
traditional technology-centred view should be rebalanced to reflect the unique value 
and inseparable contribution made by management skills. In particular this applies to 
social knowledge, which underpins the business operation of the newly established 
affiliate in transitional markets.
The finding that the volume of knowledge transfer is strongly influenced by both the 
knowledge gaps between foreign parents and their joint venture affiliates43, and the
43 The knowledge gap does not affect Motorola’s knowledge transfer volume in the same way as with 
the joint ventures. Motorola’s Chinese affiliate has been established as 100 per cent owned and as a 
greenfield venture. Motorola’s desire has been to maximise the appropriation of returns on the firm’s 
ownership advantages, and the transfer of knowledge to its wholly-owned subsidiary is the mechanism 
through which this objective is achieved. The volume of Motorola’s knowledge transfer has therefore 
been decided by the competitive strategy of the parent firm for the Chinese market, from which 
ensures the need to transfer management skills and corporate culture to facilitate the newly established 
subsidiary becoming full member of the “Motorola Empire”.
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competitive strategies of the parent firms in the host market, demonstrates the 
dynamic nature of knowledge transfer. In fact, knowledge transfer is an on-going 
process of great complexity, instead of a static, pre-set, carefully-planned, journey. 
MNCs need to be prepared to adapt to the changing market situations in China, and 
perhaps other transitional economies, by committing more of their resources when 
involved in a knowledge transfer project. There is a natural tendency to under-in vest 
in these on account of market uncertainty and possibly because of the fact that 
ownership is shared in JVs. In practice, it is likely that more investment will actually 
mitigate the risk and uncertainty particularly if the resources include a balanced level 
of investment in social knowledge and organisational capital. The key to success in a 
potentially huge market such as China’s is in strategic judgement instead of 
accounting judgement, i.e., seeking long-term strategic presence and the overall 
financial return from it instead of short-term net gain.
This study also contributes to our understanding of the influence of the host business 
environment on the performance and competitiveness of MNCs in transitional 
markets. Various government support, as well as interference, has made the Chinese 
business environment very unpredictable, leaving foreign invested firms vulnerable 
to the changing situations in this market. In addition, given the fact that there is a 
great deal of cultural difference found between China and the western countries, 
foreign investors have to be very cautious to move forward in their operations inside 
China. We conclude that a wise selection of partners, cultural awareness, long-term 
vision and trust between Chinese and foreign investors, along with active knowledge
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transfer and localisation, are the key factors in seeking a positive relationship with 
the host government at both the central and local levels.
8.2 Limitations and recommendations for future research
This research does, however, have some limitations that suggest future research. 
First, the data were collected mainly from four firms in two industries. While this is 
understandable in case study research (Yin, 1994: 50), the limited coverage of the 
data certainly will restrict the application of the research findings to a wider context. 
To overcome this weakness, methodologically, a natural continuation of this 
research is to carry out more case studies in other industries in China, and in other 
transitional markets, to test the findings of this research and investigate the reasons 
responsible for any differences that emerge. Beyond the present exploratory study, a 
quantitative study, based on a large questionnaire survey, would be needed to tackle 
the issues of knowledge transfer and knowledge utilisation within MNCs. 
Ultimately, to gain a more complete understanding of the knowledge transfer 
processes in transitional markets will necessitate the examination of processes over 
time. Thus, future research should combine the use of longitudinal study with the 
questionnaire survey method.
Second, the collected data were biased toward Chinese employees. Although great 
efforts were made to seek a balanced picture of the perspective of the interviewees, 
this was not achieved in the firms concerned, except Shanghai Bell. This was due to 
the very limited access and availability of foreign expatriates in these firms. It would
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be ideal to visit the headquarters of the remaining three firms to record their 
perspective on the issues concerned. This was, however, not possible within the 
parameters of this research due to time limitations and especially the financial 
constraints attaching to Ph.D field research. The maximum external competitive 
funding for field research was obtained, which was just sufficient for the two field 
trips made. Future research should be able to address this point by adhering to an 
equalised composition of interviewees from foreign expatriates and local Chinese 
employees. This is likely to require several researchers and the raising of project 
finance to include extensive interviews in parents’ headquarters.
Third, the firms visited have all been the beneficiaries of substantial government 
support given to strategic industries. This may be far different from other industries 
in the Chinese market, where direct government support may be much less in 
evidence. This limits the generalisability of our findings and their ability to reflect 
the full range of issues concerning MNCs’ knowledge transfer in the Chinese 
market. More research should be undertaken in those industries that may be in a less 
favourable situation in terms of government support in order to assess the influence 
of the host government in the internationalisation and knowledge transfer process.
Apart from those mentioned above, one more avenue for future research is to further 
clarify the role of cultural issues in affecting the knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning process. It is also necessary to shed more light on the reverse 
knowledge transfer and utilisation carried out by parent firms. The aim here should
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be to provide a more detailed conceptual grounding for, and testing of, the analytical 
framework presented in this study.
8.3 Summary
This thesis examines the practices of knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
carried out in four foreign invested firms and the impact of these processes on the 
firms’ competitiveness in the Chinese telecommunications manufacturing industry 
and the automotive industry. This research is based on investigations achieved 
through a research process appropriate for exploratory research on new topics. It 
reveals that the transferred knowledge includes not only technology and management 
skills (as commonly known), but also social knowledge, which helps to shape the 
vision and atmosphere of the affiliate. A sound strategy dealing with knowledge 
transfer, in parallel with that of business operations, is essential to build up the 
capabilities of the recipient firm in the host market. In successful cases, this has been 
supported by a deliberate process of utilising the transferred knowledge efficiently 
based on organisational learning. Key factors in this process are discussed, from 
which we are able to derive understanding of the success factors in the development 
of the capabilities of these firms. The research shows that the competitiveness 
acquired by established foreign affiliates can be extended through secondary 
knowledge transfer to their own affiliates in the Chinese market, and back to their 
parents by way of reverse learning. The implication is that knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning serves as the key to multinational corporations’ development 
in transitional markets, particularly in knowledge-intensive industries where
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indigenous firms often lag far behind the developed countries in terms of technology 
and management.
This study is only the very beginning of tackling the role of knowledge transfer and 
organisational learning in MNCs’ expansion into transitional markets. The findings 
discussed above are based on one multiple-case study, which is clearly limited. More 
research is needed to examine the characteristics of the knowledge transfer processes 
in other industries, and to explore the general framework of MNCs development in 
transitional markets. Specifically, great effort should be made to further clarify the 
role of cultural issues in affecting the knowledge transfer and organisational learning 
process, and to shed more light on the reverse knowledge transfer and utilisation 
carried out by parent firms.
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Appendix I: The interviews conducted in the first field trip to China (May-July 
1997)
1. The profile of interviews conducted 










Siemens Automotive Electronics 1
Shanghai Siemens Auto Motor_______ 1
In total: 10
Total interviews conducted: 24
2. Interviewees’ Profile:
• Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry
Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd
Madam Yin Linggu, director of the chairman’s office (interviewed twice)
Mr Zheng Yulu, general manager of production department 
Mr Wang Lixin, deputy manager of Beijing branch 
Mr Fan Feng, general manager of Xinjiang branch
North Eastern Asia Telecommunications Manufacturing Co. Ltd 
Mr Zhou Feilong, general manager (twice)
Motorola (China) Electronics Co. Ltd
Mr Bill Bowers, vice president and China country controller
Mr Liu Hui, general manager of human resources department, semi-conductor
plant in Tianjin
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Mr Boris Wang, Tianjin site controller 
Mr Liu Hong. Tianjin site training officer
Ericsson (China) Co, Ltd
Mr P. Bjork, executive vice president
Mr Chris Chan, general manager of information department
Mr Liu Guolai, engineer, production department
• Automotive Manufacturing Industry
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company, Ltd
Mr Cheng Gang, assistant to the deputy managing director & commercial
executive (twice)
Mr Wu Baochang, chief engineer, production planning and coordination office 
Beijing Jeep Co, Ltd
Mr Tong Zhiyuan, director of product development and quality control department 
Ms Sun Ying, chief engineer, production engineering department (twice)
First Automotive Works-Volkswagen
Mr Wang Bing, director of human resources department
Mr Luan Changqing, chief engineer, forging plant
Siemens Northern Automotive Electronics Co.
Mr Paolo Petronio, general manger
Siemens Automotive Electric Motor Co. Ltd
Mr Gregory Wong, strategic planning manager, sales department
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A ppendix II: The interview s conducted in  A ntw erp, B elgium  (February 1998)






19 February 1998 
Company conference room
Two and a half hours (followed by one-hour informal discussion 
Hui Tan and Dr Jeremy Clegg
Note: This interview was kindly arranged by Mr R. Theys, a former General 
Manager of Shanghai Bell, after we contacted him. Four experts on knowledge 
transfer from Alcatel Bell to Shanghai Bell were present and Mr Morel joined the 
interview for a short while.
Interviewees' Profile:
Mr Chris Morel, Vice President, Switching Systems Division, Alcatel Bell
Mr Jos Caerts, head know-how and technology transfer; Bell Telephonelaan 3, 
Switching Systems Division, Alcatel Bell
Mr ir. Marc De Koker, project manager, factory projects and technology transfer; 
Bell Telephonelaan 3, Switching Systems Division, Alcatel Bell
Mr Hubert Van Potelberghe, senior sales manager China, Switching Systems 
Division, Alcatel Bell
Mr Jef Jacobs, programme manager China, Switching Systems Division, Alcatel 
Bell
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A ppendix III: T he interview s conducted in  the second field  trip  to C hina (June-
July  1998)
1. The profile of interviews conducted 






Total interviews conducted: 13
2. Interviewees’ Profile:
• Telecommunications Manufacturing Industry:
Motorola (China) Electronics Co. Ltd
Mr Liu Hui. general manager of human resources department, semi-conductor 
plant in Tianjin
Mr Boris Wang. Tianjin site controller
• Automotive Manufacturing Industry
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company, Ltd
Mr Wolfgang Rohroff, senior adviser, director of supply department
Mr Cheng Gang, director of public relationship
Mr Sun Changsheng, assistant to the deputy managing director & commercial 
executive
Mr He Xiaode, supervisor, gearbox & clutch section, product engineering 
department
Mrs Gu Huiqin, public relationship officer
Mr Zhang Mingshen, division manager, environmental protection section 
Miss Zhang Yimin, engineer, environmental protection section
Beijing Jeep Co, Ltd
Mr Tong Zhivuan. director of product development and quality control department 
Ms Sun Ying, chief engineer, production engineering department (twice)
Mr Jiang Kuiduo, division manager, No. 2 section of production engineering 
Mr Sun Jiashan, manager, localisation office
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B. Pre-FDI Knowledge Transfer
1. What is your position and what does your job involve? [when no internal or public 
documentation are available, ask the next question: ] What are the main business 
areas of your firm? Who are your main business competitors? (identifying the true 
universe o f the firms in Chinese telecommunications manufacturing market)
2. [Asking Chinese: ] What is your perception of the needs of setting up joint 
ventures with substantial foreign participation in China's telecommunications 
manufacturing industry?
[Asking Foreigner: ] What is the motive for your firm to be involved in the 
Chinese market? (Strategic motives for FDI, such as market-seeking, cost-reduction 
seeking, etc.)
3. Why was FDI chosen (in preference to the other modes — and was FDI preceded 
by other forms of involvement)?
Why was a joint venture chosen? (legal requirement, business reasons, e tc .)
4. What contribution to meeting these needs can be met by the strategic partners? 
(Partner selection)
5. What is the structure of corporate governance of your company? (Management 
control)
— equity percentage
— administration division between partners
6. What changes have been introduced to your company since the setting-up of the 
joint venture?
7. What has been the main influence of the foreign investors?
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C. Post-FD I know ledge transfer:
Open-ended questions:
To employees of technology-related departments
1. In the past five years, what key technologies have been transferred from your 
parent firm to your company? When?
2. Could you please give me a general introduction on the transfer process of these 
technologies?
3. Could you say something on utilising these transferred technologies? What's the 
implication to your performance of today and future?
4. In the process of transferring and utilising these technologies, what’s the influence 
of Chinese business environment (such as government policy, proprietary rights 
protection, corporation of local staff, business custom, etc.)?
To employees of non-technology-related departments
1. In the past five years, what key management expertise has been transferred from 
your parent firm to your company? When?
2. Could you please give me a general introduction on the transfer process of these 
management skills?
3. Could you say something on utilising these transferred management skills? What's 
the implication to your performance of today and future?
4. In the process of transferring and utilising these management expertise, what’s the 
influences of Chinese business environment (such as government policy, proprietary 
rights protection, corporation of local staff, business custom, etc.)?
Semi-structured questions (It is worth noting here that I will not ask every 
interviewee to answer all the questions in this part. Depending on the interviewees' 
positions, I will only ask those that they are able to provide reliable data.):
1. [To employees of technology-related departments:] Along with your 
transferred technologies, did you transfer management skill and some tacit 
knowledge as well, such as corporate culture of parent firm? Any more? If you did 
transfer these stuff, why? Is there a stage model of transferring them? Why?
[To employees of non-technology-related departments:] Along with your 
transferred management skills, did you transfer some tacit knowledge as well, such 
as corporate culture of parent firm? Any more? If you did transfer these stuff, why? 
Is there a stage model of transferring management skills and social knowledge? 
Why?
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2. (1) Among the three knowledge transfer modes, i.e., licensing, joint venture and 
100% internal transfer, which mode did you choose? Why?
(2) Which knowledge transfer route did you employ (such as staff exchange, 
management training, books, computer software, e tc .)? Why?
(3) Have you got an idea of the volume of transferred knowledge in the past five 
years? What's the relationship between the knowledge transfer volume and (i) the 
knowledge gap and (ii) competition situation in the host market?
(4) What are the main factors that affect the knowledge transfer cost? Apart from 
others, what difficulties have language differences brought in the knowledge transfer 
process?
3. (1) What are the important factors in the knowledge utilisation process of your 
firm? Was there any organisational changes taken place? Why? [ May further ask: 
Who are the winners and losers of the organisational changes in your firm?]
(2) What kind of resources have you committed to ensure the knowledge transfer?
4. What's the result of utilising these transferred knowledge? What capabilities have 
you gained beyond the transferred knowledge? How to measure the improvement of 
the competitive advantage of your firm? Why? (Performance outcomes)
5. What's your impression of Chinese business environment after executing these 
aforementioned knowledge transfers?
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